



North American
Paul Tillich
Society

Ilona Nord
President

Benjamin Chicka
President Elect

Greylyn Hydinger
Vice President

Bin Song
Past President

Lawrence A. Whitney,
LC+
Treasurer

Verna Marina Ehret
Secretary and Bulletin
Editor

Board Members:
Russel Re Manning
Johanne S. T. Kristensen
Rachel Baard
Charles Fox
Kirk MacGregor
Kathleen Burton
Samuel Needham
Eric Trozzo

Bulletin

Volume XLIX, Number 1-2 Spring Summer 2023
Editor: Verna Marina Ehret (vehret@mercyhurst.edu)

In This Issue:

Editor's Note

Verna Marina Ehret

2023 Meeting Information

Meeting Agenda
Benjamin Chicka, President Elect

Articles

Review of Ronald Stone's The Ethics of Paul Tillich
Greylyn Hydinger

*Christology between Idealism and the Gospel of John:
Paul Tillich's Early Reception of the Fourth Gospel in the Light of Wilhelm
Lütgert's Johannine Christology*
Emil Lusser

*Religious Socialism as "Normative Aesthetics" of Society: Reframing the
Concept of Theonomy in Paul Tillich's Early Work*
Gerrit Mauritz

*On "Myths of Origin" and the "True Origin":
Tillich's Socialist Decision and Decolonial Concerns*
Victoria Basug Slavinski

Member Spotlight

Dr. Sharon Burch
Dr. Mary Ann Stenger
Verna Marina Ehret

Member News

Editor's Notes

Verna Marina Ehret

Well once again the demands of the academic life delay publishing of the *Bulletin*. Hopefully, however, it will be worth the wait. First a bit of business. In November we will gather again for our annual meeting. It will be Friday, November 17, the day before the start of the AAR in San Antonio. This is an all-day meeting and we hope many of you will be able to join us to see new developments in Tillich scholarship. Additional information about the meeting follows these notes. Your membership dues will help cover costs for the annual meeting and the stipends for the Tillich Fellows, the next generation of Tillich scholars. Your dues will also help fund the development and maintenance of a more robust website. The Executive Committee has been working for months to be able to set up the website to be a more interactive experience that will allow proper access to Society news, publications, and online dues payment. Once the revised website is available, an announcement will be sent out through the Google group. Second, in this issue you will find several papers given last year at the annual meeting covering an array of intriguing topics. This issue's spotlight is of two long-time members and treasured mentors, Drs. Sharon Burch and Mary Ann Stenger. You will also find additional member news and new publications. If you have any news to share or if you have presented either for the NAPTS or the Tillich Group of the AAR and have not already sent your essay, please send those papers to me for publication in the next issue of the *Bulletin*. Because we are a Society Newsletter, publishing with us does not prohibit you from publishing your essay elsewhere. Finally, at the end of this issue you will find a form for membership dues. If you have not yet paid dues for 2023, please fill out the form and send it along with a check to the address listed on the form. The Society has not collected dues for a few years, so if you are able, please consider an additional gift to the society.

Thank you all for your continued support of the NAPTS and Tillich scholarship globally.

2023 Meeting Agenda

Benjamin Chicka, President Elect

2023 Annual Meeting

November 17, 2023

San Antonio, Texas

8:30 – 11:00 AM Tillich and Artificial Intelligence

- "Self-Love as a Positive Concept on Social Media" Alberte Zerman Steffen, University of Copenhagen
- "Justification by Digital Grace: Can AI Mediate the 'Power of Acceptance' from a Tillichian Perspective?" Daniel J. Peterson, Queen Anne Lutheran Church
- "Ambiguity and Transcendence of Life: Paul Tillich's Views on Human Spiritual Predicament in the Age of AI" Li Wenzhu (Zoe), Huazhong University of Science and Technology
- "Participation in AI: Towards a Tillichian Reading of AI Art" Eric Trozzo, Australian Lutheran College of the University of Divinity
- "Paul Tillich's Theology in the Mirror of Contemporary Reflections on Artificial Intelligence" Ilona Nord, Universität Würzburg

11:15 – 12:30 Tillich and Embodiment

- "The (Queer) New Being: Synthesizing Paul Tillich and Judith Butler's Approaches to Ontology" J.J. Warren, Universität Wien
- "Intersectionality and Estrangement: The Situation of Women in Afghanistan and the Thought of Paul Tillich" Lon Weaver, Marshall School
- "On the Idea of a Theology of Neurodiversity" Emil Lusser, Universität Wien

12:30 – 1:45 Lunch and Board Meeting

1:45 – 2:15 Special Session

"Reflections on the Complete Works of Paul Tillich in English" Russell Re Manning, Bath Spa University

2:15 – 3:45 Tillich, Personalism, and Ethics

- "From Ontology to Ethics: Anxiety and Precarity in Paul Tillich's *The Courage to Be*" Taeha An, Yale University
- "An Intersubjective Account of Tillichian Grace" Taylor Thomas, Boston University (NAPTS Fellow)
- "Natural Law in a Modern Key: Paul Tillich's Personalist–Existentialist Theory of Natural Law" Sarah Thomas, The Catholic University of America (NAPTS Fellow)

4:00 – 5:30 Special Book Event in Place of Keynote Speaker

Panel on Playing as Others: Theology and Ethical Responsibility in Video Games by Benjamin J. Chicka (Baylor University Press, 2021)

- Ilona Nord, Universität Würzburg (Moderator)
- Greylyn Hydinger, Gannon University
- Donna Bowman, University of Central Arkansas
- John Thatamanil, Union Theological Seminary
- Benjamin Chicka, Curry College (Responding)
- 5:30 – 6:00 Business Meeting

6:00 Banquet

While there will not be a formal banquet at a restaurant hosted by the North American Paul Tillich Society, we encourage everyone to gather together in groups (we especially encourage you to invite younger scholars and those who are new to the Society), go to dinner together, and continue conversations from the day into the evening.

Articles**"Review of Ronald Stone's *The Ethics of Paul Tillich*"**

Greylyn Hydinger

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to both Ronald Stone and Bin Song for inviting me to comment on Ronald Stone's monumental treatment of Paul Tillich's ethics in *The Ethics of Paul Tillich*. Stone has provided the first solo-authored, systematic account of Tillich's ethics; the book beautifully illustrates both the depths and complexities of Tillich's theory of morals in relation to personal, societal, and global life. In addition to this thorough discussion of Tillich's ethics at different levels of organization, the book also tracks the historical development of Tillich's work from his time in the Weimer Republic to his lectures at the University of Chicago Law School & the posthumously published work in *My Search for Absolutes*. Stone interprets Tillich's final position as a "principled-situationalist ethic" that is grounded in ontology, indebted to socialist thought and practice, and approached dialectically.¹ Throughout this historical account, Stone takes into account both the continuities and discontinuities in Tillich's theory while also articulating points of success and failure in Tillich's personal application of that theory. Because of this careful historical treatment and discussion of several of Tillich's friendships, the book also provides a solid intellectual biography of Tillich, though that certainly is not the primary genre of writing. Stone's book provides a nearly comprehensive analysis of Tillich's ethics, and I would like to move through this excellent work thematically, lumping some chapters together by topic and commenting on the broader themes.

Chapter 1 situates ethics as the "theory of morals" and describes the overall trajectory of Tillich's ethical development. It begins with Tillich's childhood and illustrates how he realized the inadequacy of his inherited views. As Stone beautifully words it, "The helmet he wore proclaiming 'For Fatherland with

¹ Ronald H. Stone, *The Ethics of Paul Tillich* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2021), 1.

God and King' neither protected his brain from the blasts of artillery nor represented his thought by the end of the war."² The chapter then articulates his subsequent development as a theologian of culture rather than a theologian of the church.³ Stone interprets Tillich's mature ethics as: a threefold pattern of free moral choice: (1) The interpretation of *agape* including justice as the absolute moral imperative; (2) The recognition of moral principles as relative moral wisdom to be applied in moral judgments; (3) The need for "loving listening" to the situation including its analysis through the relevant human sciences.⁴ Especially here and in the conclusion (Ch. 12), Stone emphasizes the importance of "risking mistakes" and ambiguity at each level of ethical life from the personal to the global. A strong connection exists between ambiguity and the principle of *agapē*, a connection enhanced by following the Johannine account of *agape*, rather than the Synoptic, but that is an obscure debate.⁵

Chapters 2 and 4 track Tillich's attempts to unify socialist & Marxist utopian ideals, on the one hand, and a Protestant Christian Faithful Realism, on the other. These chapters highlight both the importance

of various religious socialist communities for the development of Tillich's ethics and his dialectical method of saying "Yes" and "No" to different aspects of socialism *and* religion. The important connection between *kairos* and religious socialism does not simply manifest in a religious sanctioning of socialist political struggles.⁶ Marxist materialism failed and turned into another form of totalitarianism, according to Tillich, because of the rejection of God and loss of principles of internal critique.⁷ Rather, the connection is in the theonomous endeavor to restore "an eros relationship between person and thing" when capitalist society demonically creates a war among everyone in competition, reduces people to a mass level, and stifles individual autonomy.⁸ At the same time, socialism itself can become self-righteous and idolatrous by substituting its own ideology for and losing reference to the ultimate.⁹ This sort of dual-direction critique of religion and socialism, the "Yes" and "No" answer to both, distinguishes Tillich's thought on these matters from several of his fellow religious socialist colleagues, though Tillich shares with some of them (esp. the Frankfurt School) the use of utopian visions not as a future blueprint, but rather as principles of critique for the present.¹⁰ Stone resumes this discussion of

² Stone, 3.

³ Stone, 3, 5, and 6.

⁴ Stone, 10.

⁵ The connection between Tillich and "John" is strong on the topic of *agape*, but this connection strays from the main topic of Stone's work. In the Fourth Gospel, the "Father's" *agape* is a divine act of love that creates all lovely things *ex nihilo*, holding nothing back; in the act of creating the world, God creates God's own Logos nature and holds nothing back. We can thus think of God as the fecund, but empty, ground that lovingly and wildly gives rise to all things, including structured axiological possibilities, that are ambiguously instantiated in all contexts (even Jesus's own ministry). For a similar analysis of *agape* in terms of the Fourth Gospel and Tillich's ground of being, see Robert Cummings Neville, *Symbols of Jesus: A Christology of Symbolic Engagement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 205.

⁶ Stone, 17.

⁷ Stone, 72-3.

⁸ Stone, 17-18 and 31.

⁹ Stone, 73.

¹⁰ Stone, 28. There are two other relevant lines of thought on this topic. While chapters 2 and 4 share a thematic link, Chapter 2 provides a more nuanced historical discussion. As a study of ethical concepts, Ch. 2 does a fantastic job

of tracking the development of Tillich's concept of *kairos*, "right time," vs *chronos*, "formal time," from the early days in Berlin, where Tillich emphasized the absolute demand of *kairos*, through the writing of *Systematic Theology* vol. 3, where he emphasized the fragmentary nature of the horizontal dimension of *kairos* relative to its fulfillment in the vertical dimension.¹⁰ As an historical discussion, Ch. 2 is especially impressive in the way Stone tracks the movement of major intellectual figures and influences in and out of the different circles: e.g., while Adolf Löwe, Carl Mennicke, and Eduard Heimann all interacted with Tillich in Berlin, Löwe and Mennicke continued their discussions in Frankfurt, but Heimann and Löwe reunited with Tillich in New York while Mennicke was in a concentration camp (Stone, 13, 21, and 33). As Stone notes, the intellectuals in these different circles "did not have the same ideas, but they shared some of the same problems on which they reflected" and no single thinker dominated the others in these various discussions (36). Stone also argues that O'Keefe is mistaken in deemphasizing the influence of the other members of the *Institut* on Tillich (29). Specifically Stone points to Benjamin, Horkheimer, and Adorno as members of the *Institut* who were influential on Tillich (28). Tillich shared with these members of the Frankfurt School not only a "deep note of pessimism in their work," but also an

kairos in Chapter 9, which looks at eight different contemporary movements that employ Tillich's concept of *kairos*. Like Tillich, Stone recognizes both the fragmentary realization of *kairos* in these movements and the need to be rescued from cynicism by the same Spirit that initiates the transformative movement in the first place.¹¹ A closely connected discussion to the religious socialism–Christian realism chapters also reappears in Chapter 8. Here, Stone adeptly compares Tillich's

approach to utopian worldviews (28). I suspect that the affinity between Tillich's thought and Adorno's thought runs even deeper. Robyn Marasco's recent work on Adorno and despair rejects the criticisms of Adorno that portray him as a sort of "uninhibited skeptic" and pessimist who "'holds out scarcely any prospect for an escape . . .'" [Robyn Marasco, *The Highway of Despair: Critical Theory After Hegel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 7]. These critiques by second, third, and fourth waves of critical theorists indebted to the Frankfurt School (e.g., Habermas and Benhabib) have missed something more profound in Adorno's work (Marasco, 47). Adorno's thought is radically aporetic, and this absence of a specific path or goal opens up the possibility for radical freedom of the human spirit (Marasco, Marasco, 6, 112, and 113). Marasco analyzes Adorno's position as follows:

"Thinking that follows trails is narrative thinking, like the apocryphal model of the adventure story about the journey to a utopian goal," Adorno remarks in connection with the thought patterns of Ernst Bloch. By contrast with narrative thinking, aporetics derives its sense of adventure from the fugitive traces of freedom that do not follow charted trails or pathways . . . aporetic thinking "abandons the royal road to origins, which leads only to what is most derivative," as well as plotted futures and ordained objectives . . . Paradoxically, though, it does point to new directions . . . (Marasco, 113).

As Stone points out, Tillich and Adorno do agree about the negation of negation and that "'it is the spirit of utopia that conquers utopia'" (Stone, 28). If Marasco is correct in her analysis of Adorno's aporetics, then the connection that Stone notes runs even deeper in terms of the distinction in Tillich's thought between utopia and the Kingdom of God. Stone insightfully argues that Tillich's distinction

. . . most forcefully means that the freedom of the human spirit is such that no form of human organization will fulfill it. The human spirit is truly led to strive beyond its present boundaries, but while the Kingdom of God may be realized momentarily in human history as the vertical dimension intersects the horizontal dimension, fulfillment is never complete. Life continues as a tragic-ironic existence . . . (Stone, 28).

While Adorno would certainly not use Tillich's theological language of "the Kingdom of God," they share the idea

religious socialism with liberation theology (especially Gutiérrez's version of it, though with strong commentary from Garcia). As Stone notes, Tillich's thought preceded liberation theology, but the two traditions "have engaged only meagerly in conversation."¹² Tillich's late works indicate (especially, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*) that an important next step in Tillichian theology is moving outside of his early and narrow context, the Weimar Republic, to other

that the utopian goal is inadequate, for no form of human organization can fulfill the freedom of the human spirit. There is a sort of fugitive freedom that remains outside of even the best utopian forms of life that is more radical and resides only in the vertical or depth dimension of existence. As Stone notes, in the early days of Tillich's career (c. 1919), he thought that religious socialism expressed the absolute (Stone, 72). Similarly, in the early days of the Nazi's rise to power, Tillich was optimistic about the "rediscovery of eschatology" in the prophetic tradition could reveal imminent possibilities that could transform the situation (Stone, 50). By 1932, Tillich viewed socialism not as an expression of the absolute, but rather as an appropriate mode of human engagement (Stone, 72). By 1933, as Stone says, it "was too late; socialism was exhausted, capitalism was disgraced and fragmented, conservatism was irrelevant, and chaos and war resulted" (Stone, 50). This transition in Tillich's perspective largely overlaps with his time in Frankfurt and his involvement with the *Institut* (1929–1933) and discussion with Adorno (Stone, 20). If I have articulated this connection correctly, I think it both adds further supports Stone's position (in contrast to O'Keefe's) about the profound sense of community and mutual development of these thinkers and further reenforces Stone's claim that these thinkers used utopian visions as principles of critique for the present, a prophetic way of confronting "the 'is' with an 'ought,'" not as plans for the future (Stone, 28).

¹¹ Stone, 162.

¹² Stone, 127. Ada María Isasi-Díaz's *Mujerista Theology* is one of the few other works that seriously connects liberation theology with Tillichian thought. Her discussion of *lo cotidiano*, the quotidian or everyday life, functions much like Tillich's use of the "situation," and her discussions of the human predicament (specified by "*la vida es la lucha*," the life is the struggle and vice versa) and *fiestas* as ecstatic fulfillments that allow people to stand out of the quotidian existence extend a Tillichian analysis to a new situation. See Ada María Isasi-Díaz, *Mujerista Theology: A Theology for the Twenty-First Century* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996), 21–2, 70–71, and 130–1. Isasi-Díaz's discussion of "Exile as a Way of Life" also parallels some of Tillich's experiences as analyzed by Stone (Isasi-Díaz, 35 ff.; Stone, 21, 46, 51, et passim).

situations around the globe. Stone's comparison of Tillich and Gutiérrez reveals several genuine similarities. The discussion of liberation is especially strong. Prior to reading this book, I had never heard an account of WWII articulated in terms of liberating not only the Jews and others being targeted by the Nazis, but also Germany as a whole from Nazi ideology. Tillich raised this point repeatedly, as Stone shows, and it is an incredibly insightful analysis.¹³ The idea of liberation is, of course central to Gutiérrez's work, and the comparison highlights the liberative themes in both thinkers' writings.¹⁴ Equally illuminating is the contrast between, on the one hand, Gutiérrez writing more about getting rid of "institutionalized injustice" rather than institutionalizing justice and, on the other, Tillich's description of principles of justice that needed to be institutionalized at different levels.¹⁵ A more tragic aspect of this comparison is the shared sense of failure to realize these ideals for both Tillich and Gutiérrez as the utopian themes become muted: "their religious socialism has been brutalized and defeated."¹⁶ In their late writings, the sense of ambiguity (Tillich) and sadness (Gutiérrez) is profound.

Stone admits that "Gutiérrez really is more of the people than Tillich ever was of the proletariat."¹⁷ However, this comment reveals a deeper disagreement between Gutiérrez and Tillich. As Stone notes, "Gutiérrez regards theology of liberation as a style of reflection in solidarity with the poor."¹⁸ Does this not make Gutiérrez a "church theologian" in the sense that he "explicates the ethics of a particular religious community" such that the desideratum of truth is the community to whom the theologian is accountable?¹⁹ While Tillich fought to improve the conditions of the poor (or the masses or the proletariat), his theology remains accountable

to anyone who might correct it, including members of other communities (such as Tillich's Jewish and Buddhist dialogue partners), the sciences, the arts, and "religion's cultured despisers."²⁰ Perhaps this analysis pushes Gutiérrez too close to Hans Frei or George Lindbeck, but the distance is not far. Setting aside differences in the community of accountability, is there not also a deep theological disagreement? If Gutiérrez's God has a preferential option for the poor, then that God is either extremely limited in power (given the stark reality of poverty) and hence the opposite of Tillich's "the power of being itself" or it is the "God of confidence," not the God above the God of theism."²¹ As such, the God of confidence would leave us "in the darkness of doubt and meaninglessness."²² Wesley Wildman has argued rightly, I think, that the Ground of Being is "practically useless," not in the sense of "almost useless," but rather "useless in practice," because it is the fecund ground of all axiological possibilities.²³

This theological disagreement between liberation theologies and Tillichian theologies runs deep. Jumping back to other topics, Chapter 3 explores Tillich's responses to Jews and situates his position in careful comparison with Reinhold Niebuhr's. The chapter covers Tillich's personal relationships with Jewish students and friends, his leadership in refugee assistance for Jews coming to the U.S. from central Europe, his church administrative work to remove antisemitism from church publications, and his surprising support of the Zionist movement. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 10 provide a nuanced and sophisticated articulation of Tillich's ethics for international policies, especially around the themes of (just) war, (durable?) peace, international leadership & organization, the role of power in relation to empire(s), and the use & development of atomic weapons. These chapters advance a robust

¹³ Stone, 75, 80, esp. 85–6, 98, 129, *et passim*.

¹⁴ Stone, 130.

¹⁵ Stone, 133 (for institutionalized injustice) and 138–9 for principles of justice.

¹⁶ Stone, 144–5.

¹⁷ Stone, 142–3.

¹⁸ Stone, 141.

¹⁹ Stone, 5.

²⁰ The phrase, "religion's cultured despisers" comes from Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its*

Cultured Despisers, trans. & ed. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

²¹ Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale, 2014), 172.

²² Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, 172.

²³ Wesley J. Wildman, "Response to Religion in Multidisciplinary Perspective," in *Religion in Multidisciplinary Perspective: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Approaches to Wesley J. Wildman*, ed. F. LeRon Shultz and Robert Cummings Neville (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2022), 317.

"Christian realism that seeks peace as far as it is possible, and then participates in war with few illusions about limiting the violence."²⁴ I not only agree with the war aims that Tillich specified for his situation, but also think his concept of war aims provides a much needed check on war practices in any situation, even if the aims in other wars are different from the ones Tillich himself articulated.²⁵ Moreover, they provided Tillich with a viable basis for opposing atomic warfare. As Stone notes, "For Tillich defense was a moral necessity, but to defend something in actions which meant its destruction violated the reason for defense."²⁶ The concept of retreat as a legitimate strategy in some situations also acts as a helpful check on war-ready policies.²⁷ I found myself in more or less complete agreement with most of the ethical positions expressed in these chapters; coming from Boston University's School of Theology, where several prominent ethicists are Hauerwasian pacifists at the moment, I found Stone's Tillichian position to be incredibly refreshing with both greater historical accuracy and more viable responses to the situations into which we find ourselves thrown. At the same time, I also wonder about contemporary applications of his vision. For example, as Stone points out, Tillich thought that an important aspect of conquering Nazism involved integrating Germany's economy with the rest of Europe's in order to reduce Germany's economic hegemony.²⁸ To a large degree, the European Union fulfills Tillich's vision. Like Tillich, I see these organizations as vitally important, probably even more so today. Yet Postmodernism, in the hands of conservatives, has led to a rise in nationalistic movements (for such leaders, see Johnson, Modi, and Trump) that retract from international coalition work. What would Tillich's response to Brexit, for example, be?²⁹

Continuing on this global trajectory, Chapter 11 focuses on Tillich's late work in *Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions* and his dialogues with Buddhists, especially Hisamatsu Shin'ichi.³⁰ This chapter was personally delightful to me, in part because of Stone's warm comments about Thomas Tangaraj, who was my first theology professor at Boston University; in part because I understand my work in comparative theology and philosophy to be a direct extension of Tillich's late work. I greatly appreciate the ways in which Stone describes his own extensions of Tillich's work in this area, through Jewish-Christian dialogues at Columbia, Hindu-Christian dialogues at the Meenakshi-Śiva temple, and Buddhist-Christian dialogues at Bhutan and with family members.³¹ Stone's chapter accurately accounts for Tillich's approach to the World Religions and the significance of interreligious work in the quest for peace. However, Tillich himself made a grave error in his articulation of criteria for interreligious work. Stone accurately articulates Tillich's criteria for dialogue as follows:

(1) both partners acknowledge the worth of both traditions; (2) Conviction of one's own tradition, so that the confrontation is serious; (3) The presupposition of a common ground; (4) The recognition of the impact of the quasi-religions upon the times and the discussion.³²

Criterion 3 is obviously an empirical question, and it should be assessed at the end of a comparative inquiry or dialogue, not at the beginning. More challenging is the second criterion, which Tillich doubled down on by saying that "Christ was the only principle of judgment of Christianity and other religions."³³ I wholeheartedly agree with Stone that "this assertion does not seem very productive for interreligious dialogue."³⁴ To be sure, for the time, the seriousness of Tillich's dialogues with other religions was good, so far as it went, but it needs to

²⁴ Stone, 93.

²⁵ Stone, 85-6, 89-94, 109, *et passim*.

²⁶ Stone, 171.

²⁷ Stone, 171.

²⁸ Stone, 88.

²⁹ To a degree, this question is reversing Stone's question at the end of chapter 5 when he asks, "Can we continue to contain Germany in a larger NATO and a European Union?" (95). Today, Germany seems like one of the more

stable forces in these types of organizations. But, the question seems better put in terms of making do with smaller international organizations when nations like Britain leave.

³⁰ Stone, 176-189.

³¹ Stone, 177-8.

³² Stone, 186-7.

³³ Stone, 188.

³⁴ Stone, 188.

go much farther. In the long run, serious interreligious dialogue might show us that we should be less convicted of our own tradition; in fact, the concept of a tradition may even come into question.³⁵ Again, my opposition here is against two of Tillich's criteria, not towards Stone's chapter. In fact, I think Stone and I may be in close agreement on this topic.

Stone's final chapter returns to some of the claims of chapter 1 regarding Tillich's late ethics, discusses aspects of Tillich's personal ethics (especially his marriage with Hannah), and ties together overarching themes of the book. This chapter not only unifies the individual themes of the book, but also provides a sophisticated discussion of the ambiguity in Tillich's ethics, both theoretical and lived. I take it that one of Tillich's greatest contributions to theology (and that's really saying something) is his thematization of the ambiguity of existence.³⁶ Stone connects Tillich's concept of ambiguity in existence to ethics near the conclusion of the volume:

The choices of human life for norms and of moving forward involve courage and risk taking and the sacrifice of choices not taken. "Life is neither essential nor existential, but ambiguous." Within his philosophy of the ambiguities of life, morality is the action of self-centered interpretation of one's spirit into community. This process continues throughout life. This enables the free activity of choosing norms to influence reality and to risk the application of the normative to the world.³⁷

I agree wholeheartedly with Stone's comments here, and I think he does an excellent job of discussing the ambiguity in Tillich's personal relationships, especially in terms of failure with Hannah, but this discussion needs to be extended to other dimensions of Tillich's ethical thought throughout the book. Most socialist regimes have been seriously ambiguous and have often failed to actualize the ideals they profess, and Stone advocates a "Christian-democratic, mixed-economy" for a fairer America (though I am skeptical of linking democracy too closely to any particular religion).³⁸ Perhaps this suggestion would be a viable revision of Tillich's religious socialism in our U.S. context today, but a mixed economy includes both the benefits and the drawbacks of each side of the mixture as compromises are negotiated at the national level. Again, economic policy remains deeply ambiguous. Obviously, my Hauerwasian friends at BU would point out many ways in which Tillich's, Stone's, and my just war theories are ambiguous or outright failures, although Tillich, Stone, and I would quickly point out that an extreme pacifism would have been far more ambiguous or outright wrong when 6 million Jews and 5 million others were being murdered at the hands of a genocidal regime during the Holocaust when the Allies had the power to do something about it.

A perhaps less obvious example of ambiguous ethics in Tillich's time, has to do with his support of the Zionist movement in the form of the formation of Israel as a nation in the middle of Palestine. To be clear, I agree with Tillich's claim that the Jewish people had a need for a homeland and with his

³⁵ David Eckel and Wilfred Cantwell Smith have both recounted the story of Leo Tolstoy's choice to become a wandering ascetic and leave behind his home and family. Tolstoy modeled this choice on the life of Josaphat, who "gave up his life as a prince, became a wandering mendicant, and achieved recognition as a saint." But the Latinized "Josaphat" came from the Greek "Iosaph," which came from the Georgian "Iodasaph," which came from the Arabic "Yudasaf," which came from the Manichean "Bodisaf," which came from the Sanskrit "Boddhisattva." Mohandas Gandhi then named his own ascetical community "Tolstoy Farm" and drew heavily on Tolstoy's writings for his ascetic principles.³⁵ Martin Luther King, Jr. then picked up Gandhi's ascetic principles. Can this model of and for life be clearly identified as Buddhist,

Christian, or Hindu? In a global context, the boundaries between traditions become arbitrary. For accounts of this interreligious borrowing, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1989), 7-11. See also Malcolm David Eckel, "'Show Me Your Resurrection': Preaching on the Boundary of Buddhism and Christianity," in *Interreligious Hermeneutics*, ed. Catherine Cornille and Christopher Conway (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2010) 149-151..

³⁶ See also Robert Cummings Neville, *Existence*, vol. II of *Philosophical Theology* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2014), 196.

³⁷ Stone, 191.

³⁸ Stone, (esp.) 11, 146, and (esp.) 212.

analysis of different types of guilt in Germany;³⁹ reparations are an important factor in conflict transformation. As Stone points out in the discussion of Palestinian *Kairos*, “the sins of Europe should not have been repented of at the expense of the [Muslims] . . . The issue is the land . . . To the Palestinian farmers, shepherds, and olive grove workers . . . that is the issue here.”⁴⁰ This discussion in Ch. 9 should be tied directly to Ch. 3 to illustrate the ambiguity in the situation. Stone notes that Tillich and Niebuhr were “not absolutist about the need for a homeland for the Jewish people *to be in Israel* [emph. added].”⁴¹ Pursuing other options would have been wiser and more in keeping with Tillich’s own definition of power. If, as Stone analyzes Tillich’s concept, “Power is not exactly force or compulsion. It uses force and compulsion to move other beings, but force without limits would destroy the other beings and not be power but destruction,”⁴² then the United Nations’ partitioning of Palestine to create the State of Israel in 1948 was an act of destruction. I agree that the Holocaust required reparations (though this term is inadequate) for the Jewish people, but the formation of the State of Israel has been ambiguous, with some very positive and some very negative results. Perhaps my only major complaint about *The Ethics of Paul Tillich* as a whole is that the concept of ambiguity could be pronounced throughout discussions of Tillich’s non-personal ethics.⁴³

Near the beginning of *The Ethics of Paul Tillich*, Stone notes that, while a voluminous body of scholarship exists on Tillich’s philosophy of religion and theology, Tillich’s ethics have rarely been the focus of scholarship on Tillich (with the exception of John Carey’s edited volume *Being and Doing*).⁴⁴ I have learned a great deal from reading Stone’s systematic account of Tillich’s ethics, and I confess that I largely fall into the category of scholars who focus on his philosophical theology and neglect his ethics. I am excited that two members of the North American Paul Tillich Society, Benjamin Chicka and Ronald Stone, published books in 2021 that have helped correct this failure. These two books take remarkably different strategies.⁴⁵ Stone’s strategy is to track carefully the development of Tillich’s theory of morals throughout his career and to indicate the overarching themes and principles in his theory so that they can be applied today. Because Stone unifies so many different works by Tillich (33 by my count), Stone has provided a more coherent account of Tillich’s ethics than Tillich himself did. Tillich would surely respond with sincere agapeistic gratitude for Stone’s endeavor.

³⁹ Stone, 52–3,

⁴⁰ Stone, 158.

⁴¹ Stone, 52.

⁴² Stone, 121.

⁴³ There is another level at which I think ambiguity needs to be teased out and this circles back to the connection between Tillich and the Fourth Gospel. While I generally agree with Stone’s assessment that *agapē* is the absolute moral imperative, I think it is a highly ambiguous moral imperative. Stone largely follows the Synoptic Gospel’s account of the Greatest Commandment(s): “³⁷And he said to him, ‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’”³⁸ This is the great and first commandment. “³⁹And a second is like it, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’” (Mt. 22:37–38, RSV). There is a fundamental problem with this imperative to love the neighbor. It assumes that all people have the same needs that you have. The Johannine commandment provides greater nuance: “⁹As the Father has loved me, so have I loved you; abide in my love.”¹⁰ If

you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in his love. . . . ¹²“This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. ¹³Greater love has no [one] than this, that a [person] lay down [their] life for [their] friends.” (Jn. 15:9–13, RSV). So, we are instructed to love as God loves. In the prologue to the Fourth Gospel, we learn that God loves by creating all things *ex nihilo* in an ontological Logos act of creation that gives rise to things with both their own unique logos identities and their interrelations with other things. So, loving also involves figuring out the unique needs of the many logoi in accord with their own-being, not merely our own-being. This is challenging and any act of love will likely miss part of what is unique to each beautiful logos expression.

⁴⁴ Stone, 3.

⁴⁵ Chicka’s strategy is to elicit the theonomous in gaming culture and develop Tillich’s ethics of the other in this contemporary situation through a comparison of Tillich and Levinas.

"Christology between Idealism and the Gospel of John: Paul Tillich's Early Reception of the Fourth Gospel In the Light of Wilhelm Lütgert's Johannine Christology"

Emil Lusser

In previous research, greater attention was paid to Paul Tillich's (1886–1965) early reception of Fichte in his 1906 student paper *Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium* (*Fichte's Philosophy of Religion in its Relation to the Gospel of John*). In that research, it is more frequently pointed out that Tillich's reading of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) comes from Fritz Medicus (1876–1956) and his 1905 *J. G. Fichte. Dreizehn Vorlesungen* (*J. G. Fichte. Thirteen Lectures*)⁴⁶. In the eleventh lecture Medicus treats Fichte's Johannine period. In it, a particular reference is made to *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben* (*The Way Towards the Blessed Life*) by Fichte. It is instructive for this study that Medicus is very critical of Fichte in this section and repeatedly corrects Fichte with the 1899 *Johanneische Christologie* (*Johannine Christology*)⁴⁷ from Wilhelm Lütgert (1867–1938).⁴⁸ Finally, Medicus concludes that Fichte's discussion of John "could not have been much more than a misguided exegesis along the lines of Origen and other philosophizing heretics and mystics"⁴⁹. However, the discussion of Tillich's reception of Medicus-Fichte is only part of his student paper. The other part, Tillich's reception of

the Gospel of John, has not yet been examined in previous research. This paper aims to close this desideratum. Therefore, in Part I, Lütgert's early Christology is unfolded against the background of his methodological considerations. Subsequently, Part II treats Tillich's theory of religious consciousness and his understanding of Christ. The concluding part elucidates how Tillich tries to exceed his teachers Medicus and Lütgert. The thesis of this paper is that Tillich in his student work prepares a philosophical re-foundation of Lütgert's Christology with the help of Medicus-Fichte. This is then carried out only in his later writings, yet clear parallels are evident between Lütgert's Christology and that of Tillich, which are later reformulated in the idealistic linguistic style. But first, a brief historical overview is necessary to situate the thesis of this paper.

After his first winter semester (1904/05) in Berlin, Tillich moved to Tübingen (1905) where, among others, he heard lectures of Schlatter. In his following winter semester (1905/06) Tillich transferred to Halle. His doctoral file shows that forty percent of the courses Tillich attended in Halle were chaired by Lütgert.⁵⁰ It can be assumed that Tillich's 1906 seminar paper was written in the context of (1905/06) Medicus' Philosophical Exercises (Fichte). However, it must not be disregarded here that Tillich attended Lütgert's lectures on Dogmatik II (*Christologie*) in the same semester. The notebooks in the archive indicate that Tillich took notes very attentively in Lütgert's Christology lecture.⁵¹ The

⁴⁶ Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Alf Christophersen, "Neukantianismus, Fichte- und Schellingrenaissance: Paul Tillich und sein philosophischer Lehrer Fritz Medicus," *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 11, no. 1 (Juli 2004): 52–78. Marc Boss, "Paul Tillich and the Twentieth Century Fichte Renaissance: Neo-Idealistic Features in his Early Accounts of Freedom and Existence," *Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society* 36, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 8–21. Christian Danz, "Theologischer Neuidealismus: Zur Rezeption der Geschichtsphilosophie Fichtes bei Friedrich Gogarten, Paul Tillich und Emanuel Hirsch," *Fichte-Studien* 36, no. 1 (December 2012): 199–215. Georg Neugebauer, *Tillichs frühe Christologie: Eine Untersuchung zu Offenbarung und Geschichte bei Tillich vor dem Hintergrund seiner Schellingsrezeption* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007). Christian Danz, "Freiheit als Autonomie: Anmerkungen zur Fichte-Rezeption Paul Tillichs im Anschluss an Fritz Medicus," in *Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie und ihre Folgen*, ed.

Michael Hackl and Christian Danz, 217–230. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2017.

⁴⁷ Cf. Wilhelm Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie* 3, no. 1 (1899).

⁴⁸ Cf. Fritz Medicus, *J. G. Fichte: Dreizehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität Halle* (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1905), 204–226.

⁴⁹ Medicus, *J. G. Fichte*, 225. Tillich agrees with Medicus' verdict when he writes: "It should not be a matter here of reexamining Fichte's exegesis, which is to a large extent misguided" (Paul Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," in *EGW IX: Frühe Werke*, ed. Gert Hummel and Doris Lax, 1–19. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998, 9).

⁵⁰ Cf. Neugebauer, *Tillichs frühe Christologie*, 406–408.

⁵¹ Cf. Paul Tillich Archive, Harvard University Archives, bMS 649, 15(4).

correspondence between Tillich and his fellow students also shows that the contents of the lectures prompted lively discussions within Wingolf, the student fraternity to which both Tillich and Lütgert belonged.⁵² In addition, Lütgert was friends with Tillich's father, Johannes Tillich. Additionally, Lütgert spent the holidays with Tillich's family in Misdroy.⁵³ Because of the special relationship between Tillich and his Halle professor Lütgert, it is now worth examining Lütgert's early Christology to unfold Tillich's reception of the Gospel of John.

Lütgert studied Protestant theology in Berlin and Greifswald. In Berlin he attended courses with Adolf v. Harnack (1851–1930), among others, whose teaching fascinated but did not convince him. In Greifswald, the biblical theologians Hermann Cremer (1834–1903) and Adolf Schlatter (1852–1938) were of particular importance. The latter is considered by Lütgert not only as the most valuable theological teacher but also as a friend. Schlatter and Lütgert shared the goal of constructing theology as a science of revelation.⁵⁴ Both theologians start from a twofold concept of revelation, which distinguishes between a revelation in Christ and a revelation in creation. Furthermore, it should be noted that Lütgert was quite familiar with the philosophical and theological discussions of his time and positioned himself in them in an independent way.⁵⁵ On the one hand, this can be traced in his 1892 theological dissertation *Die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises in ihrer*

*Entwicklung unter dem Einfluß Schleiermachers (The Method of Dogmatic Proof in its Development under the Influence of Schleiermacher)*⁵⁶, in which Lütgert refers to Hermann Lotze (1817–1881) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) right at the beginning and then describes the theological methods since Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834) against the background of his understanding of science. On the other hand, Lütgert's familiarity with the history of 19th-century philosophy can be observed in his 1923–1930 four-volume *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende (The Religion of German Idealism and its End)*⁵⁷.

1. Lütgert's early Christology

Like his contemporaries, Lütgert is concerned with pursuing theology as science (*Wissenschaft*). To maintain the scientificity of theology, it must be able, like any other science, to obtain cognitions that are consistent with an area of reality. In Lütgert's view, these cognitions "claim to be generally recognized [*anerkannt*] as objectively true. Every thought recognized as true, regardless of the subjectivity of cognition [*Subjektivität des Erkennens*], claims objective validity [*Geltung*]."⁵⁸ Validity refers to effective laws, which necessarily and always have the same effect on objects and events. The task of a proof is to validate subjective cognition as objective truth, i.e., to demonstrate the laws that have led to the formation of this

⁵² For example, see Paul Tillich Archiv, Universitätsbibliothek Marburg (008 G), Hermann Schafft to Paul Tillich on 29th March, 1906: "Indeed, I am amazed at your diligence. The collegiate booklet on Smul [Lütgert] must swell infinitely with all the additions! – please console me and write that there are not so many §§ that you have already dealt with."

⁵³ Cf. Samuel Shearn, *Pastor Tillich: Justification of the Doubter* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 31.

⁵⁴ Cf. Eckhard Lessing, *Geschichte der deutschsprachigen evangelischen Theologie von Albrecht Ritschl bis zur Gegenwart, Band 1: 1870–1918* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 118–123, 126–129.

⁵⁵ Cf. Peter Müller, *Alle Gotteserkenntnis entsteht aus Vernunft und Offenbarung: Wilhelm Lütgerts Beitrag zur theologischen Erkenntnistheorie* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012). Werner Neuer, "Einführung," in *Wilhelm Lütgert: Schöpfung und Offenbarung: Eine Theologie des ersten Artikels, Reprint*, ed. Werner Neuer, n. pag. (Gießen/Basel: Brunnen-Verlag, 1984).

⁵⁶ Cf. Wilhelm Lütgert, *Die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises in ihrer Entwicklung unter dem Einfluß Schleiermachers* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1892).

⁵⁷ Cf. Wilhelm Lütgert, *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende. Erster Teil: Die religiöse Krisis des deutschen Idealismus* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1923). Wilhelm Lütgert, *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende. Zweiter Teil: Idealismus und Erweckungsbewegung im Kampf und im Bund* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1923). Wilhelm Lütgert, *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende. Dritter Teil: Höhe und Niedergang des Idealismus* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1925). Wilhelm Lütgert, *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus und ihr Ende. Viertes Teil: Das Ende des Idealismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1930).

⁵⁸ Lütgert, *Die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises in ihrer Entwicklung unter dem Einfluß Schleiermachers*, 1

cognition.⁵⁹ This means that to give proof, one must be able to assign the subjective cognition performed in consciousness to an objective realm of intersubjectively accessible reality. Lütgert does this by assigning the act of faith to revelation. Since there is already a unity of cognizing subject and cognizing object, it is impossible to determine the content of revelation. Instead, only the relationship between subject and object, i.e., the reflexivity of consciousness to itself, can be described. For Lütgert, revelation as the self-referentiality of consciousness is the "source and material of Christian cognition"⁶⁰. Therefore, the method of Christian dogmatics must be historical because in history the reflexivity of the consciousness manifests itself. This means to operate from the standpoint of a reflexive historical consciousness, i.e., to be aware that one is part of history. Lütgert's historical method does not explain whether, why, and how religious knowledge can be proven, but to what extent the theology-historical foundational models are valid. This principle, that theology must prove the validity of its development, is constitutive for Lütgert's 1899 *Johanneische Christologie (Johannine Christology)*, which he calls not a philological but a historical investigation.⁶¹ In his Christological writing, Lütgert aims to reconstruct the Johannine formation of ideas (*Gedankenbildung*) in its "peculiar interplay of induction and speculation."⁶² To harmonize his methodological approach with the subject matter of his investigation, Lütgert places Jesus Christ at the beginning of his investigation and follows it up with the doctrine of the Logos.⁶³ Lütgert understands the Logos doctrine as the ultimate idea of Johannine Christology, which is the congregational faith that the evangelist could presuppose when writing his gospel.⁶⁴ Therefore, in the first step, Lütgert

discusses God's revelation in Christ and, in the second step, he deals with God's revelation in creation. Revelation, however, only becomes understandable through faith. Thus, Lütgert is not concerned with statements of faith deduced from John's Gospel, but with the question of how John substantiates Jesus as Christ. According to Lütgert, God becomes visible in Jesus "because God resides in him and grounds all his deeds and words, [...] Jesus is the revelation of God"⁶⁵.

In the Gospel of John, the testimony of Jesus is based on his ability to perceive God's activity by hearing and seeing.⁶⁶ What enables Jesus to see and hear God's activity is that he is "standing in absolutely free fellowship with God"⁶⁷. On the one hand, Jesus is absolutely free from God; on the other hand, Jesus is absolutely dependent on God. The freedom of Jesus consists in hearing and seeing God, at the same time his deeds are founded in God and determined by God.⁶⁸ The foundation of Jesus in God, however, should not be thought of in terms of nature, in the sense of a causal natural process, "but it is realized through action, speech, and command."⁶⁹ Through the deeds and words of Jesus, which carry out the will of God, the cognition of Jesus and God as being one is supposed to awaken.⁷⁰ Lütgert repeatedly emphasizes that the dependence of Jesus on God is not passivity but receptivity. Jesus is obeying, receiving, and executing.⁷¹ Jesus "places his work next to God's work as its completion. His work continues the divine work and brings it to its goal."⁷² The activity of Jesus is thus grounded in his receptivity, which allows the activity of God, and through this Jesus becomes the bearer of the divine spirit.⁷³

⁵⁹ Cf. Lütgert, *Die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises in ihrer Entwicklung unter dem Einfluß Schleiermachers*, 1: "The proof can only consist in the demonstration of the formation of the cognition which is to be proved out of the area of reality to which it is supposed to correspond."

⁶⁰ Lütgert, *Die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises in ihrer Entwicklung unter dem Einfluß Schleiermachers*, 2.

⁶¹ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 3.

⁶² Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 3.

⁶³ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 1.

⁶⁴ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 1.

⁶⁵ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 28.

⁶⁶ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 18-21.

⁶⁷ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 22.

⁶⁸ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 23: "Dependence on God is the form of Jesus' sonship to God. Jesus' sonship to God and his obedience to God are interdependent."

⁶⁹ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 22.

⁷⁰ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 28.

⁷¹ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 34.

⁷² Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 36.

⁷³ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 37f.

Jesus is not only the bearer of the Spirit, but also "by his exaltation, Jesus is the Spirit, the way God is the Spirit."⁷⁴ Just as Jesus was able to see and hear God during his time on earth through the work of the Spirit, Christ as the Spirit within the disciples enables them to recognize the "unity of Jesus with God, his presence in them, and their being in Jesus."⁷⁵ Jesus gives himself to his disciples as the spirit, enabling them to see God through his Word.⁷⁶ The Word refers to the doctrine of the Logos, i.e., the act of faith. That is why Jesus, in return for the ability to perceive God, demands faith as a form of recognition of his person.⁷⁷ In faith, the unity of receptivity and activity, or dependence and freedom, occurs.⁷⁸ The kingdom of God as the goal of the divine activity is now being realized through the faithful congregation, for "just as God steps back behind Jesus and leaves to Jesus the completion of God's work, so too Jesus can hand over to his disciples the 'greater works.'"⁷⁹ Lütgert describes the receptivity of the act of faith as an "event of self-disclosure of the human being for an otherworldly influence."⁸⁰ For Lütgert, faith is an underivable act in which the believing subject becomes aware of its dependence on God. The reflexive realization of consciousness, however, is not to be understood intellectually, but voluntarily.⁸¹ Faith is not only about knowledge but about will and deed.

According to Lütgert, Jesus functions as the foundation of the knowledge of God. In faith, however, Jesus himself becomes part of this knowledge by understanding his unity with God.⁸² In faith, the world is understood as God's creation, i.e., that it is God's property and God acts in it. The statement that God is Creator is a judgment of faith that is in tension with the judgments of experience derived from reality. In the act of faith, this tension is

overcome, and the judgment of faith becomes a judgment of experience. That means both faith- and experience-judgment function formally in the same way, but they change in the valuation of their content.⁸³ The prerequisite for this is Jesus, who as the mediator of creation enlightened the world and thus enabled it to understand the world as distinct from God.⁸⁴ However, the divine light, which enlightens every human being, does not necessarily lead to faith. This universal revelation of God in creation merely makes faith possible because faith is not purely receptive, but also active. The light of God must be apprehended. This means that the divine will is done and through this, the faithful subject understands the relationship between God and Jesus.⁸⁵ Faith is the result of God's love which is a twofold movement of the will: it consists of longing and receptivity on the one hand and activity and deed on the other hand.⁸⁶ The human being opens itself to God and carries out God's will instead of their own will. But since humanity cannot negate its own will out of itself, faith takes place underivably.

2. Tillich's reception of the Gospel of John

Before Tillich's "positive inquiry" into *Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium* (*Fichte's Philosophy of Religion in its Relation to the Gospel of John*),⁸⁷ he prefaces it with his reflections on the philosophy of religion, which are used as a framework for his study. According to Tillich, "the human spiritual life [*Geistesleben*] presents itself as a duality, as thinking and willing".⁸⁸ However, there is no balance between thought and volition. One always rules over the other. This becomes clearest, according to Tillich, "in the diversity of religious consciousness, this most central, all-dominating expression of the spirit".⁸⁹

⁷⁴ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 78.

⁷⁵ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 77.

⁷⁶ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 120f.: Jesus' "final goal is to found community with himself, to give himself. But he can only give himself in the Word. Spirit can be grasped only in the Word."

⁷⁷ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 101.

⁷⁸ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 69.

⁷⁹ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 77.

⁸⁰ Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 62.

⁸¹ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 61.

⁸² Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 103f.

⁸³ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 9.

⁸⁴ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 103f.

⁸⁵ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 136.

⁸⁶ Cf. Lütgert, "Die Johanneische Christologie," 104.

⁸⁷ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 5.

⁸⁸ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 1.

⁸⁹ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 1.

Depending on whether the tendency is more toward intellectualism or voluntarism, the image of God, the understanding of history and ethics vary. Tillich understands history as the manifestation of spiritual life and sees in it "the Jews and Greeks classical representatives" of one-sided voluntarism or intellectualism.⁹⁰ In Christianity, with the self-revelation of God in Christ, "something absolutely new enters the world", namely grace and truth.⁹¹ Grace and truth do not abolish will and thought but give the two attitudes of consciousness "a new meaning and higher unity".⁹² Against this background, Tillich's reception of Fichte as the "apostle of autonomy" and John as "the poor fisherman" must be understood.⁹³ Despite his turn to John, according to Tillich, Fichte represents intellectualism. On the other hand, John manages to speak adequately of God as grace and truth.⁹⁴ In the following, Tillich's understanding of John's Christology is presented in terms of three points. First, the divine life is treated as a gift of God. Following this, Christ is thematized on the one hand as the bearer and on the other hand as the bringer of the Spirit.

To John, God is the epitome of life, which expresses itself intellectually as light and voluntarily as love. According to Tillich, the fourth gospel does not define life. Instead, the divine life, which John sees "in all its abundance in Jesus Christ", is illustrated through "religious experiences."⁹⁵ Next, what Tillich means by light and love must be clarified. Light is mainly, but not exclusively, intellectually determined and describes God's activity in the world as God's property. In the world, God was and is already always effective as Logos and enlightens people so that they

could recognize God.⁹⁶ With the illumination of the world through the Logos, Tillich describes a general revelation of God that is accessible to all people. By being a creation of God, every individual is receptive to God's self-revelation. The knowledge of God, however, does not necessarily lead to faith, i.e., to the appropriation of the divine life. This is because of sin. Tillich understands sin not as negativity but rather as a "strong position, which dominates the world."⁹⁷ Sin describes the possibility of man directing one's will toward oneself instead of toward God. However, the world is created to reveal God's love as God's innermost being. Sin makes the communion of love intended by God impossible, which is why "the wrath of God rests on the world."⁹⁸ At that moment, when the Logos as a part of the divine being became flesh in Jesus, "the fullness of the Godhead appeared once and for all [...] as truth, [...] love and grace."⁹⁹ Grace here is the sin-forgiving love that enables humanity to appropriate the divine life. The Logos respectively Christ is then no longer only the medium, but also "as volition of oneself [*Wollen seiner selbst*], the object of God's revelation of love."¹⁰⁰ With Christ, divine love entered the world as the will to commune with God.¹⁰¹ Only through this is a complete revelation of God as the unity of truth and love possible. While the light makes every human being receptive to the activity of God in the world, the love of God gives humanity the will to accept this: "This affirmation of Christ is faith. The essence of faith is life communion with Christ, participation in His truth, and His love. He is the object of will and thought."¹⁰² In faith humanity is both receptive to God's will and active insofar as one acts according to God's will. Tillich understands faith as the appropriation of the divine life, i.e., the unity

⁹⁰ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 1. Unfortunately, Tillich reiterates the supersessionist view prevalent in his time that Christianity succeeds and replaces Judaism.

⁹¹ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 2.

⁹² Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 2.

⁹³ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 18.

⁹⁴ Cf. Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 16.

⁹⁵ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 11.

⁹⁶ Cf. Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 11, 15.

⁹⁷ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 13.

⁹⁸ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 13.

⁹⁹ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 15.

¹⁰⁰ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 15.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 17.

¹⁰² Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 16.

of love and truth in which Jesus gives himself to the believer. Since in faith there is the unity of volition and thought, it cannot be grasped by the human mind. Therefore, John cannot explain the origin of faith. Instead, he starts from the fact of religious experience as a higher truth.¹⁰³ The divine life that the individual appropriates in faith is also defined by Tillich as "absolute transparency of oneself, absolute grasp of one's content, the good."¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, faith describes a form of reflexivity in which consciousness becomes aware that it is both receptive and productive.

3. Comparison and conclusion

Both Lütgert and Tillich assume that John starts from a religious experience and presupposes this for his Christological reflections so that he concludes that Jesus Christ is the visible self-revelation of God. Jesus appears as the bearer and bringer of the Spirit and with that reveals the inner unity of human consciousness, which is both receptive and active. Lütgert and Tillich describe this with the terms divine light and divine love. According to both theologians, divine enlightenment functions as a universal revelation of God that is primarily intellectual. With the incarnation of the logos, divine love enters the world and leads to a complete revelation of God's being as the unity of receptivity and activity. Therefore, both theologians share a two-fold concept of revelation. In faith, life is understood as a reflexive process in which one becomes aware of oneself as dependent and free at the same time. This paper has shown that there are structural parallels between Lütgert's Johannine Christology and Tillich's reception of the fourth Gospel. Notwithstanding that Tillich and Lütgert understand Johannine Christology similarly, Tillich's conclusion

at the end of his seminar paper should be noted. Although Tillich gives preference to the Johannine description of divine revelation, he notes at the end of his paper that Fichte's philosophy shows that the mind is capable of "reasoning and understanding truths as necessary."¹⁰⁵ Philosophy can, in this way, "become a valuable support of religion."¹⁰⁶ While John captures the essence of religion better than Fichte, it would still be difficult to prove the validity of religion in culture with John. This would require the cooperation of religion and philosophy, which Tillich strives for the rest of his life.

"Religious Socialism as "Normative Aesthetics" of Society. Reframing the Concept of Theonomy in Paul Tillich's Early Work."¹⁰⁷

Gerrit Mauritz

For Paul Tillich and his theology of culture, art and aesthetics are crucial. During his time in the United States, Tillich gave several lectures on the meaning of – and the relationship between – art and religion or theology.¹⁰⁸ However, in his lectures and essays on art and aesthetics, Tillich turned out to be a very idiosyncratic art theorist whose own limited horizon quickly became clear.¹⁰⁹ His stubborn art criticism is evident, for example, in a short article in the "People" section of Time Magazine. There, Tillich referred to Salvador Dalí's artwork *The Sacrament of the Last Supper* as "simply junk". Tillich's opinion on the painting was devastating: "The technique is a beautifying naturalism of the worst kind. I am horrified by it."¹¹⁰ Overall, Tillich had no sympathy for impressionistic and naturalistic paintings. Tillich's preferred style of art was Expressionism¹¹¹ because

¹⁰³ Cf. Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 18.

¹⁰⁴ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 11.

¹⁰⁵ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 19.

¹⁰⁶ Tillich, "Fichtes Religionsphilosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum Johannesevangelium," 19.

¹⁰⁷ This paper was presented at the NAPTS annual meeting in Denver 2022 under a slightly different title: "The Beauty of Religious Socialism. Theonomy as an Aesthetic Principle in Paul Tillich's Early Work". All

translations from German texts have been done by the author. Italic phrases in brackets are from the original texts.

¹⁰⁸ See Paul Tillich, *On Art and Architecture*, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1987).

¹⁰⁹ See Russel Re Manning, "Tillich's Theology of Art," in *The Cambridge Companion to Paul Tillich*, ed. Russel Re Manning (Cambridge: University Press, 2009), 165f.

¹¹⁰ Time Magazine, November 19, 1956, No. 21, 46.

¹¹¹ See Paul Tillich, "Die Religiöse Lage Der Gegenwart (1926)," in *Paul Tillich, Writings on Religion / Religiöse Schriften*, ed. Robert P. Scharlemann, Main Works /

his approach to art was strongly influenced by his theology of culture. Tillich had no appreciation for art that did not correspond to his own understanding of art. In the introduction to his *Systematic Theology*, Tillich describes the role of art in his theological approach as follows:

Pictures, poems, and music can become objects of theology, not from the point of view of their aesthetic form, but from the point of view of their power of expressing some aspects of that which concerns us ultimately, in and through their aesthetic form.¹¹²

This quotation outlines Tillich's approach to art precisely: For Tillich, it is not the work of art that is the focus of his interest – and certainly not what is pictured – but rather, its function for a theology of culture. Therefore, there is no such thing as theological aesthetics, because for Tillich every engagement with art is already theology of culture per se.

Tillich's interest in art can be traced back to the time before his emigration to the U.S.A. Already after the First World War in Germany Tillich began to develop this enthusiasm. As a decisive moment for his enthusiasm for art, Tillich cites an experience he had in Berlin shortly after the First World War when he stood in front of a painting of the *Madonna with Child* by Botticelli:

And in a moment for which I know no other name than inspiration, the meaning of what a painting can reveal opened up to me. It can open up a new dimension of being.¹¹³

In this moment, Tillich apparently experienced what he described in his theology of culture as a

'breakthrough of the Unconditioned' [*Durchbruch des Unbedingten*]. For Tillich, successful art is characterized by the fact that it enables moments of breakthrough in which the Unconditioned is revealed *in the conditioned through the conditioned*. Tillich's criteria for art are thus obviously very different from criteria of common theories of art, such as pictorial composition, color harmony or technical execution. Even if, as already mentioned, Tillich's theory of art is idiosyncratic and does not really receive any attention in art studies, I remain convinced that it would be useful to approach Tillich's early understanding of art as a means for uncovering the potential within his thought for formulating an "art hermeneutics", which otherwise remains unnoticed. Tillich made the first systematic remarks on aesthetics as a science in his *System of the Sciences according to Objects and Methods*, published in 1923.¹¹⁴ The text was initially intended as an introductory booklet. Today, however, his *System of Science* is regarded as a "writing that is difficult to understand."¹¹⁵ This is mainly because Tillich based his *System of Sciences* on his theory of meaning. The task of humanities [*Geisteswissenschaften*] within his philosophy of science is to investigate the possibility of a meaningful 'being' in reality, which results from the creative-formative spirit of the human being [*schöpferisch-gestaltender Geist des Menschen*]: Humanities are both sciences of cultural achievement of the spirit and simultaneously the analysis of it.

Tillich divides the humanities into four different fields of meaning: Science theory and art theory as the theoretical field of acts of fulfilling meaning [*Sinnvollzüge*]; jurisprudence and social sciences as the practical field of acts of fulfilling meaning. These sciences investigate the creative potential of the spirit in their respective dimension – which is to say,

Hauptwerke, vol. 5/ Band 5 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1988), 47.

¹¹² Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology, Volume 1* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 13.

¹¹³ Paul Tillich, "Zur Theologie der bildenden Kunst und der Architektur (1961)," in *Paul Tillich, Ausgewählte Texte*, ed. Christian Danz, Werner Schüßler, and Erdmann Sturm (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2007), 99.

¹¹⁴ Paul Tillich, "Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1923)," in *Paul Tillich, Philosophical Writings / Philosophische Schriften*, ed.

Gunther Wenz, *Main Works / Hauptwerke*, vol. 1 / Band 1 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1989), 113-263. For an English translation: See Paul Tillich, *The System of the Sciences According to Objects and Methods*, translated and with an introduction by Paul Wiebe (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1981).

¹¹⁵ Christian Danz, *Religion als Freiheitsbewußtsein: Eine Studie Zur Theologie Als Theorie Der Konstitutionsbedingungen Individueller Subjektivität Bei Paul Tillich* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), 306, fn. 12.

art theory in the field of aesthetics, jurisprudence in the field of law or politics, etc. This analysis of the potential of the spirit in culture leads to a reflexive "self-contemplating" [*Sich-selbst-Zuschauen*] and "self-determination" [*Sich-selbst-Bestimmen*] of the spirit in its acts of fulfilling meaning. The humanities thus behave reflexively towards themselves.¹¹⁶ They productively engage with the spiritual act [*geistiger Akt*] that makes culture meaningful in the form of individual experience through orientation towards universal forms. In this way, the humanities (and thus also art theory) determine their own object in a creative-formative act and simultaneously create their object of analysis: The humanities investigate the act of fulfilling meaning, but at the same time they are also acts of fulfilment of meaning in their respective fields. According to Tillich, this productive character of the humanities comes with a normative character. In the act of self-contemplating and self-determination the spirit differentiates itself into the fields of meaning and has a normative or systematizing effect on these fields. The humanities thus have a "productive-normative character,"¹¹⁷ which is expressed in their respective systematics.¹¹⁸ This definition of the humanities is based on Tillich's model of the interplay of form and import [*Form und Gehalt*],¹¹⁹ which strives for the fulfilment of meaning in culture. According to Tillich, the productive-normative character of humanities is always accompanied by a creative impulse directed at improving the spiritual situation [*Geisteslage*]. Thus, all humanities need a normative system with which the respective field of meaning can be examined for its potential to fulfil meaning in the tension between the form of meaning and the import of meaning [*Spannungsverhältnis von Sinnform und Sinngehalt*].

For Tillich, aesthetics, which deals with the potential for the fulfilment of meaning in the field of art, is one of these normative systematics within the humanities. According to Tillich, aesthetics attempts "to grasp the import of things [*Gehalt der Dinge*] through its form."¹²⁰ Its task is thus to examine the tension between form and import in the field of meaning for successful fulfillment and undesirable developments. According to Tillich an ideal image of art is when the import of the Unconditioned is revealed in the conditional form through and the conditional form – as shown in the example of Botticelli's Madonna mentioned above. Tillich sees the different styles of art as being distinguished from one another in the determination of the relationship between the different tensions and the extent to which the import is expressed in the aesthetic form. For example, Impressionism is – in Tillich's opinion – a form-orientated style of art. Expressionism on the other hand is an import-dominated style.¹²¹ The "style is the general determination of aesthetic forms through the manner of perception of import [*Art der Gehaltserfassung*] in general."¹²²

According to Tillich, art history [*Geistesgeschichte der Kunst*] that assesses and analyses the aesthetic expression of import in art is thus a spiritual history of style [*Geistesgeschichte des Stils*].¹²³ Its task is "to point out the various tensions between form and import in the artistic conception and to lead them to the ideal synthesis, towards the balance of tensions, of which normative aesthetics is concerned."¹²⁴ A normative demand is thus always already resonating in aesthetics, towards which successful art should be directed. In the balancing of the tension between aesthetic form and import, aesthetic expression comes to its "fulfilment of meaning". Aesthetics is thus a cultural hermeneutics that examines the field

¹¹⁶ Tillich, "Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1923)," 201.

¹¹⁷ See *ibid.*, 201-204.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹¹⁹ Since the German word *Gehalt* is difficult to translate without losing its meaning as the depth dimension and precondition of culture, I would like to point out that I have chosen the translation *import* to distinguish it from the German word *Inhalt*, which is translated as *content*. In the English translations of Tillich's early works, *Gehalt* is mostly translated as *import*. For examples for this translation see Tillich, *The System of the Sciences*

According to Objects and Methods and Paul Tillich, "Basic Principles of Religious Socialism," in *Political Expectation*, ed. and transl. James Luther Adams (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 58-88. After his ontological turn in his *Systematic Theology*, Tillich uses the pair of terms "form and substance".

¹²⁰ Tillich, "Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1923)," 226.

¹²¹ See Manning, "Tillich's Theology of Art," 160.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 228.

¹²³ See *ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

of meaning in art and, through its normative-productive character, is directed towards the demand for a synthesis of form and import. The goal of a normative aesthetics is thus fulfilment of meaning or, in other words: synthesis of form and import.

I would like to pay particular attention to the synthesis of form and import. Tillich's theology of culture is often treated merely as the interplay of form and import. However, the concept of synthesis is inseparable from form and import.¹²⁵ Tillich made this clear in a letter to his friend Arnold Wolfers, who criticized Tillich's normative systematics. Tillich describes that:

[f]orm of meaning [*Sinnform*] and import of meaning [*Sinngehalt*] stand in a relationship of tension in all fields of reality and that the richness of both objects and processes is based on this tension. Of course, there are no isolated elements. Reality is always integration [note by the author: in this context integration means directedness towards perfection]. But there is also no perfect integration, no absolute synthesis. [...] If you want to understand the dynamics of becoming, you must pick out these elements in abstracto and observe their relations of tension.

¹²⁶

For Tillich, synthesis or absolute synthesis is a "regulative principle"¹²⁷ that fulfils a demand for the absolute Unconditioned in culture, but always in the knowledge that it can never be achieved or held as a status quo. The synthesis is only realized in the moment of the breakthrough of the Unconditioned, which cannot be captured. Only there is fulfilment of meaning [*Sinnerfüllung*]. For Tillich, in history there are always spiritual situations in which the tension

between form and import sometimes pushes more in the direction of the conditional forms (which he refers to as autonomy) and sometimes in the direction of the Unconditioned (which he refers to as theonomy). But this tension is never resolved in one of the two directions. Synthesis therefore only exists symbolically, as a demand for the Unconditioned, which becomes formative in the spiritual act of realization. At the same time the tension between form and import, which is directed toward a balanced synthesis, ensures that reality remains interpretable as a dynamic and not simply accidental happening. In this way reality also becomes recognizable in the fulfilment of meaning. So, when Tillich speaks of theonomy, he means realization of forms in culture, through which the import of the Unconditioned becomes more recognizable than in other historical situations. In the field of aesthetics, for example, "theonomous art" is characterized as a style of art that results from the tension between form and import, in which the Unconditioned is more recognizable in the conditional form than in other styles.¹²⁸ At the same time, any theonomous, import-orientated aesthetic expression can only be experienced at all *through* the form and *in* the form of paintings. The unconditional form, which would be the goal of synthesis, thus remains unattainable but always demanded.¹²⁹ Without Botticelli ever having painted the Madonna, Tillich would never have been able to perceive the Unconditioned through this painting. Theonomy is thus an aesthetic principle insofar as it describes the demand for a balanced tension between form and import in the field of art. Tillich's explanations of the relationship between form, import and synthesis, however, did not arise in the wake of an early essay on aesthetics and cultural theology – as one might assume from my previous explanations – but in his essay *Basic Principles of Religious Socialism* from 1923. In this essay, in which

¹²⁵ See Danz, *Religion als Freiheitsbewußtsein*, 309; See also Fabio Abreu, "Directedness Towards the Unconditioned". On the Theoretical Foundations of Paul Tillich's Theology of Culture," in *Paul Tillich in der Diskussion: Werkgeschichte – Kontexte – Anknüpfungspunkte*, ed. Christian Danz, and Werner Schübler, (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2022), 42.

¹²⁶ Paul Tillich, "Zu Tillichs Systematik," *Blätter Für Religiösen Sozialismus* 5 (1924): 19.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ See Paul Tillich, "Grundlinien des Religiös[en] Sozialismus. Ein Systematischer Entwurf (1923)," in *Paul Tillich, Writings in the Social Philosophy and Ethics / Sozialphilosophische und ethische Schriften*, ed. Carl Heinz Ratschow, Main Works / Hauptwerke, vol. 3 / Band 3 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1998), 117. For an English translation: See Tillich, "Basic Principles of Religious Socialism," in *Political Expectation*, translated by James Luther Adams (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 58-88.

¹²⁹ See Tillich, "Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1923)," 252.

Tillich for the first time explained his basic systematic thoughts on religious socialism in detail, the concept of synthesis is crucial. Tillich writes: "Theonomy is the goal of religious socialism."¹³⁰ He further writes: In reality we find a series of creative syntheses of form and import, in which the eternal idea, the absolute synthesis, is revealed. One such concrete synthesis we call theonomy. [...] Theonomy is a condition in which the spiritual and social forms are filled with the import of the Unconditioned [Gehalt des Unbedingten] as the foundation, meaning, and reality of all forms. Theonomy is unity of sacred form and sacred import in a concrete historical situation.

¹³¹

Here, too, the concept of theonomy performs as the synthesis of form and import. But in the case of religious socialism, theonomy refers to the field of the social relations and not to the field of aesthetics. However, religious socialism in Tillich's work stands for a theory of society in a broader sense. In the social field of meaning theonomy creates a just reality in which the Unconditioned can be noticed through the form of the society. The structuring of Tillich's systematics in the field of aesthetics and religious socialism is congruent, which is not surprising. After all, their task is basically the same: To enable breakthrough moments of the Unconditioned in their respective realizations of meaning. Only the areas of meaning differ. In the case of art, this is the field of aesthetic perception or aesthetic expression, and in the case of religious socialism, the field of social relations and society at large.

In the case of art, I have already worked out the normative character of aesthetics. For Religious socialism, the normative character is much more obvious. Its goal is a balanced, just, and communal society that overcomes the bourgeois society. Bourgeois society stands in the tension between form and import, or between autonomy and theonomy, for the expression of a society strongly directed towards conditional forms. In the same way that normative aesthetics examines artistic styles for

their potential to fulfil meaning and "has to point out the various tensions between form and import in artistic conception and lead them towards the ideal synthesis, towards the balance of tensions"¹³², Religious socialism has the task of leading 'styles' of social life towards the ideal synthesis in society. Religious socialism is thus, in a sense, a "normative aesthetics" of society. Its task is to bring form and import into a balance of tension, which is directed towards theonomy. A society with aesthetic expression and perception, in which the potential for the fulfilment of meaning is realized, is the goal of religious socialism. The aesthetic expression of society is expressed, for example, in its way of being a just society in which humans can perceive themselves as a meaningful being grounded in community.

Now what can be concluded from these observations? In his theory of meaning, Tillich intentionally distinguished between different areas of the meaning of the spirit. Through the reframing of religious socialism as a "normative aesthetics" of society, Tillich's structure of these different fields of meaning is excluded. But at the same time, I have also shown that aesthetics and religious socialism have the same goals. So, what is the advantage of the reframing I have proposed?

Firstly, the term "religious socialism" can easily be misunderstood. Tillich's understanding of religion, as a depth dimension or background of culture, differs enormously from what we call religion in a common sense. The term socialism also differs from our common understanding, i.e., as a political system. With the term religious socialism Tillich is referring more to a certain attitude of engaging with reality – an attitude that is directed towards the Unconditioned. Reframing Religious socialism as a 'normative aesthetic of society' could counteract these misunderstandings. I believe that Tillich himself had an interest in his theology of culture being perceived as a theory in which an aesthetic demand resonates. Tillich did not choose the conceptual pair of form and import as the basic elements of his simple but also ingenious theology of

¹³⁰ Tillich, "Grundlinien des Religiös[en] Sozialismus. Ein Systematischer Entwurf (1923)," 112.

¹³¹ Ibid., 109.

¹³² Tillich, "Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden (1923)," 228.

culture by accident. He himself writes at various points that he adopted these terms from the fine arts and that they better meet his concern than the conceptual pairs "being and thinking" or "having and ought"¹³³, which would have made more sense in the socialist, Marxist environment in which the discussions about Religious socialism took place in the 1920s. Reframing is thus an attempt to support Tillich's concern to consciously understand form and import as aesthetic concepts. Even though my suggested reframing contradicts Tillich's separation of the different fields of meaning, as he proposes in the *System of the Sciences*, an aesthetic approach to religious socialism does not detach this idea from his theory of meaning. Religious socialism and normative aesthetics are structured in the same way and have the same aim. And even Tillich himself is not always faithful to this separation when it comes to religious socialism. He stated that religious socialism must have impact on the theoretical fields of meaning.

As a champion of social justice, religious socialism must seek justice for the things in the theoretical sphere, that is, the justice implicit in the affirmation of their proper forms [*Bejahung ihrer Eigenform*], in their rational, logical, or aesthetic contexts.¹³⁴ Within Religious socialism the practical fields and the theoretical fields of meaning are intertwined. So Religious socialism and theonomy thus have an aesthetic dimension – justice must also be expressed on the field of aesthetics. This claim opens Tillich's concept of religious socialism for an aesthetic interpretation of society.

Secondly, this reframing conceals the hope that it will make Tillich's idea of religious socialism more

accessible to an interdisciplinary environment. Interpreting Tillich's Religious socialism as a theory of society with aesthetic pretensions opens his theory to the broad field of "society and aesthetics"¹³⁵ within sociology. This field began to emerge especially from the beginning of the 20th century. Georg Simmel's *Sociological Aesthetics*,¹³⁶ originally from 1896, for example, should be mentioned here. Tillich was demonstrably familiar with Simmel's works on philosophy of art.¹³⁷ But there are also many other researchers to be mentioned who have worked and are still working in this field: Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Pierre Bordieu, Michel Foucault¹³⁸ – to mention only the most famous names. But there is also no lack of contemporary approaches.¹³⁹ I would just like to briefly mention an approach by Hartmut Rosa, who is probably today's best-known sociologist in Germany. He has become famous above all for his sociological concept of 'resonance' first published in 2016.¹⁴⁰ Resonance describes the striving for a 'resonant' relationship between human beings and the world in which they live. Rosa's concept of resonance has – just like Tillich's theory of meaning – aesthetic implications.¹⁴¹ A resonant relationship to the world is perceived as a good and meaningful life. This is a concern that Tillich also pursues with his theology of culture. The concept of resonance by Rosa is strongly reminiscent of Tillich's first description of a theonomous society in his first Kairos essay of 1922:

Rather, an epoch directed towards the Unconditioned is one in which all functions of life have their foundation in the consciousness of the Unconditioned [...]. This finds its expression first of all in the all-dominant, unshakable power of the religious sphere; [...] it is the lifeblood, the inner

¹³³ Tillich, "Zu Tillichs Systematik," 20.

¹³⁴ Tillich, "Grundlinien des Religiös[en] Sozialismus. Ein Systematischer Entwurf (1923)," 115.

¹³⁵ For an overview on this topic see Andreas Reckwitz, Sophia Prinz, and Hilmar Schäfer, *Ästhetik Und Gesellschaft: Grundlagentexte Aus Soziologie Und Kulturwissenschaften*, 2015.

¹³⁶ See Georg Simmel, *Soziologische Ästhetik*, ed. Klaus Lichtbau (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2009).

¹³⁷ See Werner Schüßler, "Die Bedeutung der Kunst, der Kunstgeschichte und der Kunstphilosophie für die Genese des religionsphilosophischen und kulturtheologischen Denkens Paul Tillichs," in *Paul Tillich*,

Kunst und Gesellschaft: Drei Vorlesungen (1952), ed. Werner Schüßler, (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), 76-86.

¹³⁸ See Reckwitz, Prinz, and Schäfer, *Ästhetik Und Gesellschaft: Grundlagentexte Aus Soziologie Und Kulturwissenschaften*, 5f.

¹³⁹ See Jacques Rancière, *Das Unbehagen in Der Ästhetik* (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2016).; See Erika Fischer-Lichte, *Ästhetik Des Performativen* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004).

¹⁴⁰ See Hartmut Rosa, *Resonanz: Eine Soziologie Der Weltbeziehung*, 6th ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2022).

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 472f.

vibration [*innere Schwingung*], the ultimate meaning of all life.¹⁴²

The figure of the *inner vibration*, the resonance with one's environment, the breakthrough of the Unconditioned – or expressed differently: theonomy (whether in aesthetic perception or in being integrated in a just society) – is perhaps a pivotal point at which Tillich's theory of meaning could become a valuable starting point for a modern sociology of aesthetics.

"On 'Myths of Origin' and the 'True Origin': Tillich's *Socialist Decision* and Decolonial Concerns"

Victoria Basug Slabinski

In this paper, I discuss Paul Tillich's terminology of "myths of origins" and "origins-related groups" in *The Socialist Decision*, raising some questions from decolonial thought that urge a complexification of such terminology.

In *The Socialist Decision*, published in Germany in the early 1930s, Christian theologian Paul Tillich speaks to the conditions of post-World War I devastation and capitalist exploitation by intervening against the rise of National Socialism. Tillich responds by proposing a new form of socialism to challenge unjust and dehumanizing economic systems. His political analysis of Western capitalism, political romanticism, and socialist momentum is framed by his account of the "origin" and "demand" of humankind—the origin being the continually creative and frequently mythologized source of human existence; the demand being the demand of justice and equality that compels human beings to realize something new in historical existence. Tillich views

the demand of justice towards which socialism strives as the fulfillment of the intentions of the "true origin" of humanity, but he warns that certain attachments to mythologized versions of the "origin" may serve to entrench existing unjust economic structures and block this fulfillment from occurring. That is, "myths of origin" must be broken, but the "true origin" cannot be lost.¹⁴³

When Tillich discusses the potential dangers of myths of origins and the manipulation of origins-oriented groups, he has in mind the Nazi party's tendency to valorize essentialized Germanness and to promote xenophobic ideologies of blood, soil, and nation. He does not, however, envision the ways that communities with different positionalities might mobilize origins-orientation toward vastly different ends. In the present, for instance, origins-orientedness seems to inform the tendency of white Christian nationalists to coalesce around imagined American values. However, one might also perceive a connectedness with some sense of "origins" in Indigenous resurgence and decolonization movements, or in efforts by U.S.-based people of color to connect transnationally and diasporically with cultural resources in resistance to white supremacy.

To expand on one example of these latter efforts: Filipino and Filipino American scholars such as Leny Mendoza Strobel, E. J. R. David, and Joyce del Rosario have addressed patterns of colonial mentality and cultural amnesia among Philippine peoples and diasporic Filipinos. They write that racism and colonialism have led to the development of self-destructive views such as a belief in Filipino inferiority, the feeling that one should be grateful for Spanish and American colonialism as beneficial or divinely directed, and the acceptance of historical and ongoing injustices as an inevitable part of progress.¹⁴⁴ In response to colonialist narratives and

¹⁴² Paul Tillich, "Kairos (1922)," in *Paul Tillich, Philosophy of Religion / Religionsphilosophische Schriften*, ed. John P. Clayton, Main Works / Hauptwerke, vol. 4 / Band 4 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1987), 63f.

¹⁴³ Paul Tillich, *The Socialist Decision*, trans. Franklin Sherman (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1977), 3-6. Originally published by Alfred Protte, Potsdam, 1933.

¹⁴⁴ See Leny Mendoza Strobel, *Coming Full Circle: The Process of Decolonization among Post-1965 Filipino Americans* (Quezon City, Philippines: Giraffe Books, 2001); E. J. R. David, *Brown Skin, White Minds: Filipino-/American Postcolonial Psychology (with commentaries)* (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing Inc., 2013); and Joyce del Rosario, "Can There Be a Postcolonial

situations of internalized oppression, Strobel writes that a turn towards origins—that is, the purposeful recovery of and engagement with pre-Spanish-colonial knowledge, symbols, and values—can be an act of decolonial healing, reclamation, and resistance. Such an origins-oriented gesture may open up possibilities for community-formation, activism, and the expression of counter-memory in opposition to ongoing legacies of racialization and colonization.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, journalist and author Deborah Jian Lee has discussed efforts of Black, Indigenous, Asian American, and Indo-Latine Christians to reclaim their cultural traditions, practices, and ancestral wisdom as resources for inspiring and sustaining resistance to racism, colonialism, heteropatriarchy, and Christian supremacy.¹⁴⁶

In these cases, some sense of origins-orientedness provides a way to recover what has been suppressed, to challenge cultural imperialism, and to gather strength and inspiration for resisting oppressive systems. These examples reveal a form of origins-orientation that Tillich did not anticipate or theorize explicitly in *The Socialist Decision*. To further reflection about this point, the remainder of this paper offers an interpretative account of Tillich's origins-related terminology before introducing critical questions from decolonial thought. I argue that an awareness of groups differently impacted by legacies of colonialism necessitates a complexification of "origins"-related language beyond what Tillich explored in his text, even as Tillich's attention to what he names the "true origin" remains a valuable corrective to overly mechanistic or rationalistic accounts of human existence.

The Socialist Decision suggests that movements aiming to advance justice in a world dominated by Western capitalism must contend with the "origin" and its powers. Tillich does not attempt to describe the "origin" through traditional theological language

or directly define it in this text, but he emphasizes that the "true origin" is continually creative, giving and sustaining the existence of every living thing before gathering all back to itself.¹⁴⁷ "Myths of origin" can never fully apprehend this true origin, but in their attempt to prioritize the "whence" questions of human existence, they hinder the development of possibilities beyond what is already given in existence. Therefore, the "bonds of origin" maintained by such myths must be broken in order for human beings to transcend the cyclical movement of birth and death and realize something new in existence—that is, realize the demand of justice and equality that is the intention of the true origin.¹⁴⁸

Beginning his political analysis from an unspecified pre-modern era in which myths of origin dominated human life, Tillich writes that a double break from bonds of origin resulted in the elevating of historical development over cyclical time, reason over myth and mystery, and rational human agency over the forces of nature. In his analysis, the prophetic tradition flowing through Judaism and Christianity initiated one side of this "break"; the autonomous consciousness that developed through the Enlightenment initiated the other.¹⁴⁹ "Prophetism" and autonomy together made possible a new ordering of the world, with the prophetic break from origins occurring most radically through the Protestant Reformation and the autonomous or humanistic break occurring through the Enlightenment.¹⁵⁰

This double break with origins resulted in the production of Western capitalistic society, a society that he describes as "an attack on the myth of origin and the bond of origin everywhere on earth."¹⁵¹ Tillich describes Western capitalistic society as fully oriented to the "demand" at the expense of the origin: that is, it emphasizes purposeful human action, historical progress, and technological

Theology While Living in the Colonizer's House?" *ChristianityNext* (Winter 2018): 41-57.

¹⁴⁵ Strobel, *Coming Full Circle*.

¹⁴⁶ See Deborah Jian Lee, "Christians of Color are Rejecting 'Colonial Christianity' and Reclaiming Ancestral Spiritualities," *Religion Dispatches*, January 10, 2018, [https://religiondispatches.org/christians-of-color-are-](https://religiondispatches.org/christians-of-color-are-rejecting-colonial-christianity-and-reclaiming-ancestral-spiritualities/)

[rejecting-colonial-christianity-and-reclaiming-ancestral-spiritualities/](https://religiondispatches.org/christians-of-color-are-rejecting-colonial-christianity-and-reclaiming-ancestral-spiritualities/).

¹⁴⁷ Tillich, *Socialist Decision*, 3-4.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 20-25.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

advancement, but it generally does not approach that which is given in existence with the sense of reverence promoted by myths of origin. This society, through its “active, world-transforming will,” has ultimately “established a world dominion which no one on earth can completely elude.”¹⁵² Not all groups of people welcomed the changes brought about by this society’s emergence and rise to global dominance, however, and in reaction, origins-oriented groups emerged.

It is not clear that Tillich’s phrase “origins-oriented groups” is limited to any one specific referent. Throughout the book, Tillich offers various examples such as the “ancient powers” of the landowners, peasants, artisans, clergy, and nobility in Europe—groups historically possessing strong attachments and commitments to the land, to the preservation and honoring of traditions, and to the pursuit of creative work.¹⁵³ He also mentions the German masses experiencing longing and exhaustion under the supposed freedom of the new rational, capitalistic society, and those seeking to return to an imagined pre-Enlightenment way of life.¹⁵⁴ In his analysis of the post-World War I German context, Tillich identifies such groups as those who are neither in the dominant capitalist class nor in the proletariat class, yet who are economically disadvantaged by the post-war downturn and drawn toward the nostalgic desires of political romanticism.¹⁵⁵ The essential feature of “origins-related” groups, however, appears to be an orientedness toward the frequently mythologized origins of human existence.¹⁵⁶

Tillich warns that human attachments to “myths of origin” are frequently in danger of being manipulated towards oppressive ends by politically romantic movements such as Nazism and by those who benefit the most from capitalism.¹⁵⁷ As such, the socialist movement must intentionally intervene against such manipulation and must take caution when approaching appeals to the origin. At the same

time, he argues that origins-oriented groups should be sought out as potential allies—not only for pragmatic reasons, but also because some connection to “the true origin” and its powers is essential to human nature and is therefore crucial for resisting dehumanization within a culture of objectification and mechanization.

With this argument, Tillich intervenes against the ways that capitalist forces *and* the socialist parties of his context minimized the importance of the inherent connection to the origin that human beings and natural phenomena possess. Here, he is concerned with countering objectifying views of humanity which would reduce human beings to “psychological mechanisms possessing calculable pleasure-pain reactions.”¹⁵⁸ Such accounts of humanity, whether employed in service of capitalist goals or socialist ones, are rooted in a Western capitalist desire for rational mastery of the world.¹⁵⁹ Tillich argues that, if framed through an account of the origin and demand of humankind, the proletarian struggle and the desires of origins-oriented groups can be reinterpreted as both representing the “protest of human beings against the dehumanizing consequences of an exclusively rational system.”¹⁶⁰ It is the power of the origin, “flow[ing] from the fullness and depth of being,”¹⁶¹ which resists and exceeds the limits of the mechanized capitalist account of existence and provides both groups with the impulse to react against objectification.¹⁶²

A cautiously effected alliance with origins-oriented groups, then, is one means of honoring and drawing upon this common source of resistance. The “decision” required of socialism is a decision to honor the intentions and powers of the true origin while rejecting myths of origin: to attend to the longings of discontented, “origins-oriented” German peoples and affirm their core desire for connectedness with the origin, while simultaneously asserting that the demand of justice requires the transcendence of a mythologized bondedness to the origin.¹⁶³

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 25.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 27-32.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 44 and 56.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 3-4.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 43-44 and 129.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 133.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 48.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 44.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 137.

¹⁶² Ibid., 98.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 100-101 and 106.

Tillich's account of the emergence of Western modernity is important to his discussion of origins-related groups, but when viewed from a critical decolonial perspective, the limitations of his framework become evident. The political analysis provided by *Socialist Decision* implies but does not explore the global impact of multiple "breaks with origins." It focuses on the Enlightenment and Protestant Reformation and expands beyond Germany to discuss the fate of "Western civilization,"¹⁶⁴ but it fails to consider the histories of Western exploration and colonization as critical to the production of modern Western/European capitalistic society and the ways that this society's presumption of global dominance¹⁶⁵ may have given rise to different types of "origins-oriented" groups in response.

In contrast, decolonial thought by scholars such as Aníbal Quijano, Walter Dignolo, and Nelson Maldonado-Torres has emphasized that modernity cannot be thought apart from coloniality—"the darker side of Western modernity" and the "underlying logic of all Western ... modern/colonial imperialisms."¹⁶⁶ Aimé Césaire, in his 1950 "Discourse on Colonialism," makes a similar point. He writes that the existence of "Western civilization" gave rise to both "the problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem"¹⁶⁷ and that European colonizers were the accomplices of Nazism before they were its victims,¹⁶⁸ since the practices and justifications of colonization and enslavement inevitably change those who undertake them and result in a society that progressively normalizes dehumanization.¹⁶⁹

The intervention offered by these decolonial accounts is an awareness of the colonial divide, and of the ways that colonialism—not just the Enlightenment or the Reformation—initiated an unavoidable and transformational "break" against

which origins-related groups have arisen. This intervention necessitates a complexification of Tillich's terminology and offers a means of explaining the differences among contrasting origins-oriented groups—for instance, the abovementioned white Christian nationalists, Indigenous decolonization movements, and efforts to challenge cultural imperialism. It also opens questions about how one might refigure Tillich's call for the transcendence of myths and bonds of origin.

Can Tillich's socialist decision also support a decolonial decision? This paper has raised this question by pointing to the absences within his political analysis. While Tillich's argument that connection with the "true origin" must be maintained remains a valuable intervention against objectification and mechanization, his origins-oriented terminology must be differentiated in light of the colonial "break with origins" that is left unspoken by his text.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 160-161

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 47.

¹⁶⁶ Walter D. Mignolo, "Part 2: Key Concepts," interview by Alvina Hoffmann, *E-International Relations*, January 21, 2017, <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/21/interview-walter-mignolopart-2-key-concepts/>.

¹⁶⁷ Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York, NY: NYU Press, Monthly Review Press, 2000), 31, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt9qfkrm.4>. Originally published by Éditions Réclame, Paris, 1950.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 36.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 39 and 41.

Member Spotlight

The Adventures of Sharon Burch and Mary Ann Stenger

Verna Marina Ehret

In this second member spotlight I would like to highlight the work of two extraordinary members of and mentors for the Society, Dr. Sharon Burch and Dr. Mary Ann Stenger.

Dr. Sharon Burch has been influencing Tillich scholarship since 1984 when she first joined the NAPTS. Dr. Burch has served as a Board member and as President of the society as well as co-chair of the Tillich Group of the AAR. She has held a variety of roles in the field, including faculty at Boston University and San Francisco Theological Seminary, pastor, and pastoral counselor. This blend of academics and pastoral care has made Dr. Burch an irreplaceable mentor and guide for her colleagues in the NAPT, and in particular for junior colleagues. Her more recent publications include "Paul Tillich and the Method of Correlation" in *Why Tillich? Why Now?*, Thomas G. Bandy, ed. Macon, GA: Mercer, 2021, and an editorial for the journal *Theology and Science* entitled "Is Death Reversible?" October, 2020. Sharon first started to influence my own work in the early 2010s when I started to become an active member of the society. With every presentation I have given at the NAPT Sharon has been there to compliment, support, and be a discussion partner for possible next steps. She builds people up while also encouraging further thinking. She continues to be an invaluable conversation partner for myself and others in the Society. Former students of hers continue to ask me about her and her work because of the lasting impact she has had on their lives.

Dr. Mary Ann Stenger has been a member of the NAPT leadership since 1981. She has served on the Board and as President of the Society. Dr. Stenger has also served in leadership of the Tillich Group of the American Academy of Religion. While she has been retired from the faculty of the University of Louisville for about 10 years, this time has provided her opportunities to explore new avenues in Tillich scholarship. Her publications of the last few years

include "Rethinking *The Courage to Be* for American Culture Today," *International Yearbook for Tillich Research: The Courage to Be*, Vol.13, ed. Christian Danz, Marc Dumas, Werner Schüssler, and Bryan Wagoner (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2018), pp. 197-216. Reprinted (with small revisions) in *Why Tillich? Why Now?* Ed. Thomas G. Bandy (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2021.) and "Exploring the Universal and the Particular in Tillich for Feminist Theology," *Paul Tillich in der Diskussion*, ed. Christian Danz et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2022). She has also been a dedicated mentor and friend to other members of the Society. Dr. Stenger wrote the introduction for Adam Pryor and Devan Stahl's 2018 *The Body and Ultimate Concern*, and on a more personal note, has been mentoring me since the early 2000. Mary Ann, did her Ph.D. at the University of Iowa alongside my dissertation advisor, Dr. David Klemm. Early in the writing process, David connected me with Mary Ann. She did not hesitate to provide me with valuable resources. She helped me clarify my trajectory, contributing substantially to me completing my dissertation. She has provided guidance and support for junior members of the Society for years and continues to be a sounding board for me and many others in the Society.

Member News

New Publications by Members

Ronald H. Stone, *The Political Crisis and Christian Ethics*, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2023.

Volume 21: Rezensionen / Reviews 1911–1955

Edited by: Christian Danz and Erdmann Sturm

Part of the multi-volume work [Gesammelte Werke. Ergänzungs- und Nachlaßbände](#)

If you have news to share about your own work or about members of the society, please email me at vehret@mercyhrst.edu. If you have sent a paper that has not yet been published, it will be in the Spring-Summer issue, but please reach out to me at the above email address to make sure I have it.