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- “Critique and Formation. Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Protestantism” by Christian Danz

NAPTS 2018 Meeting
Denver, Colorado
Friday, November 16
Saturday, November 17, 2018

Friday, November 16

8:30 – 10:30 AM

Paul Tillich Visioning—Roundtable discussion
Aspen Room, Salon B, Embassy Suites

Moderator: Verna Marina Ehret, Mercyhurst University

Panelists
—Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville
—Sharon Burch, San Francisco Theological Seminary

——Christian Danz, University of Vienna
——Duane Olson, McKendree University

11:00 AM-1:00 PM

Complete Works of Paul Tillich in English
Board meeting (brown bag lunch)
Aspen Room, Salon A, Embassy Suites

1:15 – 3:15 PM

Book Panel Paul Tillich and Asian Religions
Aspen Room, Salon B, Embassy Suites

**Moderator:** Robert Neville, Boston University

**Panelists:**
—John Thatamanil, Union Theological Seminary
—Bin Song, Washington College
—Russell Re Manning, Bath Spa University

Respondent:
Kevin Ka-Fu Chan, Hong Kong Baptist University

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3:30 – 5:30 PM

**Tillich Fellow Workshop**

Aspen Room, Salon B, Embassy Suites

**Moderator:** Lawrence Whitney, Boston University

—Deborah Casewell, Liverpool Hope University  
  “Being Saved from Yourself: Tillich, Love, and the Existentialist Self”

—O’Neil Van Horn, Drew University  
  “‘Fertile Grund:’ Rematerializing Tillich’s Ground as Soil”

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6:30 – 9:30 PM

**Annual Banquet of the North American Paul Tillich Society**

Maggiano’s Italian Restaurant  
500 16th St.  
Denver, Colorado 80202  
https://locations.maggianos.com/colorado/denver/500-16th-st/

**Distinguished Guest Speaker:**

Mary Ann Stenger  
Professor Emeritus, The University of Louisville

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**NAPTS Board Breakfast**

The Officers of the Society and Members of the Board of Directors are expected to attend. The specific location will be announced at the banquet.

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9:00 – 11:30 AM

**Thinking with Tillich about Contemporary Society Panel**

**Annual Business Meeting of the NAPTS**

Aspen Room, Salon B, Embassy Suites

**Moderator:** Devan Stahl, Michigan State University

—Jari Ristiniemi, University of Gävle  
  “Being/Value Potentiality: A Relational and Interactional View”

—Kirk R. MacGregor, McPherson College,  
  “The New Being in the Historical Jesus as the Antidote to the Quasi-Religion of White Nationalism”

—Ilona Nord, Universität Würzburg  
  “Robot Technology in the field of Religion and Tillich’s Writings on ‘Logos and Mythos of Technology’”

—Daniel Boscaljon, University of Iowa  
  “The Addict God: Tillich as a Model for Modern Theological Thought”

**Annual Business Meeting of the NAPTS**

The location will be announced at the banquet.

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**SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17**

7:30-8:30 AM
For Those Attending the Annual Meeting in Denver: A New Way of Paying Dues and the Banquet Fee.

An Apple IPad will accept Your Credit Card.
Please, no cash accepted, but checks are accepted.
Thank you!

The Annual NAPTS Banquet

The fee for this year’s banquet will be 55 USD with a cash bar available. Graduate students are asked to pay what they can—at least $25. Retired faculty are also asked to pay according to their means, but all are welcome! Please contact Fred Parrella in advance if you plan to attend and make payment to the NAPTS. As always, all are welcome, but advanced notice will help us best prepare the venue for the evening.

The banquet will be held this year at:

Maggiano’s Italian Restaurant
500 16th St.
Denver, Colorado 80202
303.260.7707

Distinguished Guest Speaker:
Mary Ann Stenger
Professor Emerita
University of Louisville

An important reminder:
Credit Cards will now be accepted at the banquet and will be the preferred way of payment.

New Publications


Critique and Formation. Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Protestantism

Christian Danz

In the 1929 published article, “Protestantism as a Critical and Formative Principle,” Paul Tillich’s theory of Protestantism assumed its final form. The article contains the inclusion as well as the critique of the Protestantism that had emerged from Luther’s Reformation. According to Tillich’s critique, the soteriological interpretation of religion, provided by the Wittenberg Theologian in his doctrine of justification, needs to be replaced by a universal, cosmological framework. The critical negativity of Protestantism needs to be joined with its realization. Protestantism is not only critique. It is also formation. This conviction is the result of Tillich’s theological development in the first half of the 20th century, which proceeds from the theological principle (by means of which he was able to unite his interpretation of Protestantism in the texts before and shortly after the First World War) to the Protestant principle.

Three stages can be discerned in the development of Tillich’s understanding of Protestantism: first, the construction of a theological principle of the Systematic Theology from 1913; second, the interpretation of Protestantism after the First World War; and third, the formulation of Protestantism as critique and formation at the end of the 1920s. These stages of development supply the structure that informs the following considerations.

1. The Theological Principle and Protestantism

Tillich had already criticized the traditional framework of the doctrine of justification in the speculative construction of the Systematic Theology from 1913. Here the fundamental determination of religion is justification, which, as the author emphasizes, is nevertheless “broader than the usual formulation, which contents itself with the
equation justification = forgiveness of sins” (EW IX, 320). According to Tillich, against the soteriological interpretation of Albrecht Ritschl and Pietism, it is necessary to refer justification to the “whole state of the world” (Ibid.). This notion should be understood to mean that God is not only to be found in his revelation in Christ, but also in the world.

In the concept from the 1913 System, which cannot be discussed in detail here, Tillich defines religion by means of the concept of paradox, the return of the relative to the absolute. This paradox is the standpoint of theology, or the theological principle. It mediates the absolute with the relative point of view. Tillich’s interpretation of Protestantism is condensed, without, of course, using the term itself, in the theological principle. The theological principle—the synthesis of the relative and the absolute—is structured in three moments: an absolute, a relative, and a third moment. The third moment addresses the realization of the theological principle in history. Decisive for the concept from the System of 1913 is the assignment of the absolute moment of the theological principle to justification and the relative moment to Christology. Justification, designated as the material principle, constitutes the superordinate aspect as opposed to Christology, which is interpreted as the formal principle.

Statements about the Reformation from 1913 text are sparse. Nevertheless, essential features of Tillich’s image of the Reformation can be extrapolated, and they remain relatively constant in his subsequent work. In the 26th paragraph of the apologetic—which bears the heading The Historical Establishment of the Christological Judgment (EW IX, 323)—the author refers to the history of Christianity. In this context, a few observations are made concerning the Reformation. The statement is made: “Yet the forces of the theological principle, preserved in Scripture, reacted in the Reformation against the bondage to certain cultural moments” (EW IX, 325). The Reformation is interpreted here as the ascertainment of the absolute moment of the theological principle, which indeed entered into history with the Christ, but was concealed by Catholicism. In Luther’s reformation, the theological principle breaks through, with reference to its absolute moment. However, it is constrained soterologically by the Theologian from Wittenberg. In the subsequent history of Protestantism, the one-sided formulation of the theological principle was condensed in the working out of the scriptural principle as a new “concrete-absolute system” (EW IX, 325), which then shattered under the force of the historical critique. Tillich expressly describes the interpretation of the Reformation and of Protestantism indicated here—which amounts to the demand to frame justification not as a soteriological, but as a universal, cosmological principle—as the “dogmatic-historical justification of the present undertaking” (Ibid.), that is, his own System’s concept.

According to the intention of the Systematic Theology of 1913, Protestantism has to be understood as a universal principle, and it has to be connected to history. This is what the theological principle signifies in its three moments.

**From the Theological Principle to the Protestant Principle, or Tillich’s Interpretation of the Reformation after the First World War**

The theological principle continues to constitute the systematic foundation of Tillich’s writings after the First World War. However, as indicated by the 1919 essay, “Justification and Doubt,” it underwent decisive modifications with regard to its pre-war formulation. These modifications essentially consist in the fact that the 1913 System concept’s superordinate frame of the absolute point of view is, so to speak, inserted into the act-structure of the religious performance. In this way, the concrete and particular, which was already a necessary moment of truth in the System of 1913, no longer comes into view as a mere moment of passage. The concreteness of history now becomes, at the same time, the necessary expression of the truth and the transgression thereof. This is represented in the new guiding concepts of “meaning” [Sinn], the unconditioned, kairos, and theonomy. These concepts describe the reflexive structure of the self-relation in its historical embeddedness and aim at the reflexive transparency of the present situation. The determination of religion in terms of the absolute, as paradox, is replaced by a newly constructed
framework that aligns with Husserl’s intentional consciousness. Religion is directedness toward the unconditioned. This also leads to a reformulation of the theological principle and its three moments. Taken together in its three moments, it now describes the structure of justification, which is therefore no longer (as was still the case in 1913) merely identified with the absolute moment. The new systematic groundwork of his theology after the First World War is also associated with a critique of concepts of religion formulated in terms of capability. Religion is not predicated on a special function of culture, but on the self-relation of consciousness. Thus, here also, there is an associated critique of the soteriological interpretation of Protestantism. And, once again, it is Ritschl and Pietism who represent this inadequate and false interpretation of the Reformation. Tillich’s universal, cosmological formulation of justification interprets it as an act of reflection in the self-relation of consciousness. Religion is, in an abbreviated formulation, the being-disclosed of the unconditioned as the substratum of consciousness in all cultural functions, or, in Tillich’s words: intending the unconditioned [Meinen des Unbedingten]. In and through its concrete contents, consciousness orients itself toward the unconditioned, the latter functioning as a description of consciousness, while the concrete contents function as media or symbols. The unconditioned underlies consciousness as such. In religion, the concrete cultural forms that are posited by consciousness are negated, becoming, through the positing and fracturing of forms, symbols through which the unconditioned is intended. Thus, the universal religion, defined in terms of the theology of justification, consists in the passage from cultural consciousness to the intending of the unconditioned. How does Tillich interpret the Reformation according to this (with regard to the system conception from 1913) changed systematic groundwork?

Here as well, the foundational structure of Protestantism as the true religion results from the theological principle and its three moments. In the lecture course, “Christendom and the Societal Problems of the Present,” Luther’s Reformation is understood to be the critical dissolution of the unified religious culture of the Middle Ages. In Luther’s Reformation, “critique” (EW XII, 80) breaks through in the history of Christendom. “Luther’s basic position is the displacement of institutional and sacramental grace, with its merit-consequence-scheme and its asceticism, by a personal, spiritual grace experienced in the interior of the person as fellowship with God” (EW XII, 98). In the Reformation, the absolute categories are grasped, the absolute moment of the theological principle, by which the unified culture of the middle ages was dissolved. What is missing in the Lutheran Reformation are the relative categories, the connections with history.

In his writings from the beginning of the 1920s Tillich repeatedly took up this interpretation of the Reformation, assigning it to the absolute philosophies of history in his constructions of the philosophy of history. However, owing to their critical negativity, the revolutionary, absolute forms of the interpretation of history lead to a devaluation of history. Thus, Protestantism needs to be connected to history, without abandoning the absolute moment of the theological principle.” The religious socialism of the writings from the beginning of the 1920s represent this linking of absolute and relative moments.

To be sure, religious socialism was realized as critique and formation, but the systematic problem with this conception consists in that Tillich cannot make clear in what way religion differs from the general structure of consciousness that underlies both religion and culture. This is precisely what Karl Barth had criticized in his argument with Tillich in the year 1923.

From the Protestant Principle to Protestantism as Critique and Formation

Tillich reacted to Karl Barth’s critique in his lecture, “Justification and Doubt,” published in 1924, introducing the distinction between foundational revelation and salvation revelation. It is only from here that the final interpretation of Protestantism as critique and formation results. Tillich now also submits a soteriological interpretation of Protestantism to critique and calls for a universal, cosmological formulation. As was already the case in the outline of the same name from 1919, the two keywords, justification and doubt, stand for
this systematic intention. However, the interpretation of Luther and the Reformation offered in the lecture from 1924 now has as its focus the classification of Karl Barth’s soteriological interpretation of Protestantism within the history of theology. “With Luther the protest was issued against the unconditional, self-positing Catholic realization, which, by virtue of its hierarchical form, increasingly made any effective correction impossible. As a result of this there is in Protestantism a thought-out relationship to realization in general, to religion and to the Catholic principle.” Soteriology, as elevated by Luther to the foundational point of view of his Reformational new interpretation of religion, anticipates the critical philosophy of Kant, which was presently being renewed by Barth and dialectical theology. Here as well, Tillich understands the Reformation, as he had already done in 1913, as the breakthrough of the absolute categories and of the critique. Yet, this interpretation is now used for the purpose of classifying dialectical theology in the history of theology. As was the case with Luther’s soteriological interpretation of Protestantism, so with his modern, dialectical successors, the breakthrough, or corrective, which justification represents (that is, the earlier, absolute moment of the theological principle) is taken to be the whole of religion, thereby negating religion’s realization.

Tillich’s own interpretation of Protestantism, which, as an answer to Barth, is also aimed at a universal understanding of Protestantism, follows the old formulation according to which, in terms of sense and the philosophy of spirit, the unconditioned is the foundation of all consciousness, and religion is directedness toward the unconditioned. Yet this is now carried out on the basis of the new distinction between foundational revelation and salvific revelation, which have broken asunder in modernity. Foundation revelation represents the reflexive disclosedness of consciousness, which is divine as well as demonic, or, as the later technical term of the Systematic Theology puts it, ambivalent or ambiguous. The knowledge of God is thus not exclusively bound to the revelation in Christ, as it is in Barth. By contrast, Tillich now defines the salvific revelation as the overcoming of the divine-demonic ambiguity of consciousness and no longer as intending the unconditioned. It is only in this way that religion, the reflective formulation of which he maintains and the contents of which are also not determined here, receives a more precise definition than in the earlier writings.

The study published five years later, “Protestantism as a Critical and Formative Principle,” takes up the here outlined universal, cosmological understanding of Protestantism and encapsulates it in the protestant principle, which is also maintained in the later works. The former theological principle, with its three moments, is transferred over to the concept of Protestantism, in that prophetic critique and formation are merged with critique and formation. Over against the Reformation and its modern dialectical successors, who (as early as 1924) are interpreted as a rediscovery of the prophetic tradition—a classification of the Reformation that is also maintained in the later works—Tillich merges critique with formation. It is only from this that an understanding of Protestantism as reflexive and universal religion results, in which critical negativity and reflexive positing of form are joined together. It is as a form of grace that Protestantism realizes itself as the permanent self-critique of religion and culture. Yet, it is precisely the associated sublation (or the contradiction of the holy and the profane as objective spheres) which itself requires a religious symbolization, if the “form of grace” is meant somehow to be visible as “actual form.” For this reason, there have to be religions within culture as special symbolic forms and social groups. These have the function to point, on the one hand, to the sublation of the contradiction of religion and culture in the eternal, and on the other hand, to the fact that this contradiction cannot be overcome in history. At the end of the 1920s, Protestantism as critique and formation is construed by Tillich as a self-reflective religion. It is alone by virtue of its perpetually imposed self-critique, of all of its cultural and religious settlements, that Protestantism is not only absolute religion, but in it the Reformation is also completed. To be sure, Protestantism had rediscovered the prophetic tradition, but had given it a one-sided, critical formulation. Only in the understanding of Protestantism as elaborated by Tillich is an adequate consciousness of Protestantism reached, appropriate to modernity, being
simultaneously critique and formation.

If, from here, we look back once again at the course of the reflections submitted here, then it is apparent that there is a high degree of continuity in the understanding of the Reformation in Tillich’s texts. In terms of content, in the writings consulted, going back to 1913, the descriptions remain to a large degree the same. However, this should not belie the fact that the formulations Tillich employs in the three historical contexts of his works are fitted into different systematic contexts, and yet also receive thereby an altered systematic function."

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Christian Danz

In the spring semester of 1929, Paul Tillich began to teach as a professor of philosophy and sociology at the University of Frankfurt. It was, as we now know, not easy for Tillich to get this professorship. Nevertheless, his time in Frankfurt is very important not only for the development of his theological and philosophical thinking, but also for Tillich’s intellectual biography. Tillich’s Frankfurt lectures, published within the last few years, shows a significant transformation of his thinking. His theology and philosophy of religion became within this time an anthropological foundation. One of the keywords in the Frankfurt lectures is encounter. It is in the Frankfurt lectures where Tillich works out a philosophy of encountering, an aspect that we also find in his latest writings. While in Frankfurt, Tillich became a close friend to Max Horkheimer and to Theodor W. Adorno, the leading thinkers of Critical Theory. Together they gave courses at the University, and they had
meetings to discuss the problems of their time. Without Tillich, Horkheimer would have never obtained a professorship in Frankfurt, and Adorno would have never gotten the chance for a second habilitation. Likewise, since this time, Tillich had close personal and intellectual relationships with other members of the Institute for Social Research, such as Leo Löwenthal or Friedrich Pollack. After Tillich’s immigration to the USA, the discussions that began in Frankfurt went further. There are numerous letters, texts, and discussions between Tillich, Horkheimer and Adorno on the one side, and Löwenthal, Löwe, Marcuse, and Fromm on the other, that show the close personal relations of the former Frankfurt colleagues. In the literature about the so-called Frankfurt School, Paul Tillich does not really play a prominent role. Tillich is mentioned in these studies, as also his relationship to Horkheimer, Adorno and Löwenthal, but within this intellectual network Tillich is marginalized.1

Against this background, Bryan Wagoner’s book Prophetic Interruptions is the first extensive study of Paul Tillich within the context of the Frankfurt School. Herein lies the importance of Wagoner’s study. Methodologically, Bryan Wagoner does not ask which place does Tillich have in the formation of the Frankfurt School, or if there is a mutual influence between these thinkers. Wagoner is interested in the intellectual network (11-44). “Instead, the argument is that the similarities and differences among these three thinkers [sc. Horkheimer, Adorno, and Tillich] are best approached contextually and through thematic ‘dialogue.’” (3) His thesis is that “the projects of critical theory and religious socialism are complementary emancipatory solutions to a common view of instrumental rationality and threats to subjectivity like alienation, domination, and reification” (3). Wagoner analyzes the personal and intellectual network between Tillich, Horkheimer, and Adorno against the background of their interpretation of modernity. They all see modern society as characterized by Max Weber through rationalization and the iron cage. This also means that the genesis of modern society has religious roots. But now, since the beginning of the 20th century, religion has come to an end. The “tragedy of the modern culture” (Georg Simmel) has led to a loosening of the unity of the culture. The society is differentiated in diverse subsystems, which only follows its own logic and autonomous laws of development. Many intellectuals in this time, like Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch, are looking for an exodus from the iron cage of modernity. All of this Bryan Wagoner discusses very well in his book, placing Tillich’s theology within the intellectual network of the Frankfurt colleagues, both personal and intellectual.

The systematic thesis of Wagoner’s investigation is the interpretation of the relation between Tillich on the one side and Horkheimer and Adorno on the other, all under the concept of prophetic interruption. In this concept, religious socialism and critical theory come together. “The collective “prophetic interruptions” among the three thinkers have a common goal of naming and remediating injustice, and of interrupting forms that inhibit individual and collective agency” (3f.). The book discusses this within five chapters. But the core of Wagoner’s interpretation lies in Chapter 3: “Anthropological Differences between Tillich, Adorno and Horkheimer” (99-178). Indeed, anthropology plays a central role in the discussion between the three thinkers. In what follows, I will discuss these topics more closely. I would like to start with Wagoner’s reconstruction of the anthropologies from Horkheimer, Adorno, and Tillich. After this, I give my own interpretation of the systematic function of Tillich’s doctrine of man, which he develops from 1925. Finally, we must look at the concept of religion and the interpretation of the ontological implications.

In 1936, Tillich makes his first visit to Europe after his emigration. In Manchester, he met Theodor W. Adorno. Tillich wrote about this meeting in his travel diary, and Adorno also wrote letters to Horkheimer about his encounter with the theologian. In a letter to Horkheimer on June 25, 1936, Adorno wrote: “Tillich belongs to the ‘Heideggers.’” This remark stands in the context of Tillich’s Review from Kurt Goldstein’s book Der Aufbau des Organismus in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung from 1936. Adorno was not very amused about Tillich’s review. He totally rejects Tillich’s view on the importance of anthropology for philosophy. This indicates a difference between Tillich and Adorno. But is there also a dif-
Within Wagoner’s book, the central focus of Chapter 3, “Anthropological Differences between Tillich, Adorno and Horkheimer,” is the controversy between Adorno and Tillich in 1944. In his draft, Contra Paulum, Adorno gives an annihilating critique of Tillich’s conception of anthropology and his understanding of human being as finite freedom. “Every sentence which takes the form of ‘the human is …’ implies that content is already written through just this form: the human person is filth” (288). Before analyzing the controversy between Adorno and Tillich, Wagoner reconstructs the implicit anthropology in the writings of Horkheimer. Horkheimer “consistently argues against any stable ‘nature of humanity’” (108). Wagoner asserts that this is similar to Tillich’s anthropology during this time. The theologian also rejects, like the philosopher, any timeless and essential aspects of human nature. Similar to Horkheimer, for “Tillich, humanity is characterized in terms of dynamic encounter, not eternal nature.” The difference for Horkheimer lies in the fact, that for Tillich, “although he does refer to human being (menschliches Sein), suggesting an ontological element which Horkheimer denies” (128). But from this point of view, it has become a riddle as to why Adorno criticized Tillich’s anthropology in his lecture, “Man and Society in Religious Socialism,” of 1943 so harshly, and not also Horkheimer’s implicit anthropology.

According to Wagoner, Tillich’s “primary anthropological concern in the 1930s and early 1940s is rooted in his understanding of religious socialism” (142). Consequently, Tillich’s Socialist Decision of 1933 is the primary source for Wagoner’s reconstruction of Tillich’s anthropology. But this is in my opinion not at all right. In his book, Wagoner does not ask about the systematic function of anthropology in general, and by Tillich in particular. To give an answer to this question, one must look at the development of Tillich’s thinking in the 1920s. Since 1925, we find that he transforms his theory of meaning and spirit as the foundation of the theology and philosophy of religion into an anthropological conception. Tillich calls this the doctrine of man. The main source of the new conception is the Dogmatics lecture from Marburg and Dresden in 1925 until 1927, and from other texts at the end of the 1920s, like the Frankfurt lectures. Here we also find the famous determination of religion as an ultimate concern. This formula is closely connected to the new concept of a doctrine of man. The task of anthropology is not to give an objective description of the human being or an eternal determination of human essence. The doctrine of man is, according to Tillich, an expression of the realization of the concrete human being in a concrete situation. “The whole doctrine of man is,” as Tillich describes his project in his lecture Man and Society in Religious Socialism, “a description of such an astonishing and unique structure as that of finite freedom.” (MW III, 492) Anthropology in this sense is the foundation of theology and philosophy of religion and culture, and also of social ethics. Tillich develops such a doctrine of man in the context of the rising existentialism on the one side and the debates about philosophical anthropology in the 1920s on the other side.

Horkheimer criticizes such a philosophical anthropology in his writings in the beginning of the 1930s, for example in his inaugural lecture, “Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialforschung und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung” of 1931, and also in his article “Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie,” published in 1936. Anthropology is, in Horkheimer’s view, the modern successor of metaphysics. All anthropologies are the attempt to give human life a meaning. But this is not possible, because all foundations and justifications are circular. Every understanding of human being is determined by society and historically changeable. Therefore, anthropology is only possible as a negative anthropology. Horkheimer, along with his conception of a negative anthropology, criticizes Tillich vehemently in his draft Der Mensch im Christentum und im Marxismus from 1935, and also in his lecture, “Man and Society in Religious Socialism” and other writings from this time like the Socialist Decision. Tillich’s own doctrine of man, which he developed beginning in 1925, and which we find also in his lecture “Man and Society in Religious Socialism,” is a counterpart to Horkheimer’s negative anthropology. The argument against Horkheimer’s and Marx’s negative anthropology is the thesis that
such an anthropology without a knowledge of human being is not possible. "They all have a doctrine of man. They do not want to confess it for reasons of political or religious strategy" (MW III, 491). But this conception and the determination of human being as finite Adorno rejects in his own draft that was never sent to Tillich. "But the only positive thing you 'have' is the given in its depravity beyond that our knowledge/realization cannot go other than by identifying the depravity through its imminent contradiction to the given. The positive is the negative and only the negative, the defined negation, is actually positive. What humanity is can only be said by what they are not" (292).

Against this background and the systematic function of the anthropology, I would make a stronger distinction between the conceptions of Tillich on the one side and of Horkheimer and Adorno on the other. The latter both come together in the conviction of a negative anthropology. The controversy about anthropology is a dispute about the systematic function of the anthropology and not only a dispute about an implicit anthropology. Tillich's conviction is that a doctrine of man must be the foundation of theology and philosophy of religion. Horkheimer and Adorno deny exactly this.

But Wagoner also points to a difference. Tillich refers to an ontological framework and this is an aspect that both Horkheimer and Adorno reject. But what is meant by the ontological framework, and which function has this conception for the understanding of religion? Wagoner discusses the understanding of religion by Horkheimer, Adorno, and Tillich in the last chapter of his book entitled "Religion and Critical Theory" (217-268). Here he works out the theological implications of Horkheimer's and Adorno's Critical Theory. The difference between Tillich's religious socialism and the Critical Theory of his former Frankfurt colleagues lies in Tillich's ontology, which is an implication of the ultimate concern (cf. 265). Such an ontological reformulation of his theory of religion we find in the writings of Tillich since 1925. But how is this ontology, that of the formula of ultimate concern, to be understood? Wagoner gives, in my opinion, no answer to this question. Is Tillich's ontology to be understood as a metaphysic in a classical pre-Kantian sense? Is Tillich's description of religion as directedness to the unconditioned meant as a substance that stands beyond the human consciousness? And is being-itself to be understood as an identity? But more important is another aspect. The prophetic critic has indeed a central function for Tillich's concept of religion, but since his early writings and especially in the 1920s, the prophetic dimension is like the Reformation, the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the dialectical theology only a moment in the understanding of religion. Like dialectical theology, the critical theory is one-sided, because both are only negative. Against such a negative understanding, which we find in the prophetic tradition and the critical theory, Tillich claims religion is both critical and forming. In such a manner it is therefore right to discuss Tillich's religious socialism as prophetic interruption, but this is only one aspect of his conception.

The questions mentioned may arise from a different understanding of Tillich's thinking in the time between 1929 until 1944. Nonetheless, Wagoner's book about Tillich and the Frankfurt School is a benchmark in the discussion about this topic.

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10 Cf. Horkheimer, Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie, 255: „Nur negativ spricht eine illusionslose Theorie von menschlicher Bestimmung und zeigt den Widerspruch zwischen den vorhandenen Bedingungen des Daseins und allem, was die große Philosophie als jene Bestimmung verkündet hat.“