In this issue:

- Annual NAPTS Meeting: Schedule and Banquet Information
- Report of the Tillich Collected Works Project Committee
- "Paul Tillich and Capital Punishment: The Meaning of Power" by Anne Marie Reijnen
- On the Calendar

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**Annual Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society**

The following schedule includes three parts: (1) sessions of the NAPTS on Friday, November 18, 2005; (2) information about the annual banquet on Friday night; (3) the schedule of the American Academy of Religion Group, “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion and Culture.”

Bring your Bulletin to the meeting with you for handy reference. Locations are subject to change.

**NAPTS Sessions and Banquet**

**Friday, November 18, 2005**

9:00 – 10:45 AM (A18–8)
Loews Philadelphia Hotel
Commonwealth A2
Theme: Tillich on Symbolism
Christopher Rodkey, Drew University
Presiding
Donald Dreisbach, Northern Michigan University
Tillich’s Symbols and Christology: A Failure of

Nerve?

Robison James, University of Richmond
Symbol Early and Late: Continuity and Discontinuity between the German and American Tillich

Stephen Murray, Skidmore College
Paul Tillich and the Wrath of God

11:00 AM – 1:15 PM (A18–9)
Loews Philadelphia Hotel
Commonwealth C
Theme: The Early Tillich
Terry O’Keeffe, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland
Presiding
Jean Richard, University of Laval
Philosophy of History in Tillich’s Early Writings
Doris Lax, University of Heidelberg
The Tillich of the Years 1911-1913
Christian Danz, Institute of Systematic Theology, University of Vienna
The Influence of Schelling's Philosophy of History on Paul Tillich's Early Theology of History

Matthew Lon Weaver, University of Pittsburgh

Religion and Nationalism: Tillich’s First World War Chaplaincy Sermons

2:00 – 3:45 PM (A18–52)
Loews Philadelphia Hotel
Commonwealth A2
Theme: Tillich and Religious Knowledge
John Thatamanil, Vanderbilt University
Presiding
Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville
Experience’s Role in Religious Knowledge
David H. Nikkel, University of North Carolina at Pembroke
The Mystical Formation of Paul Tillich
Tabea Rösler, Princeton Theological Seminary
“You Never See with the Eyes Only”: Reconfiguring Paul Tillich’s Concept of Personhood

4:00 – 6:30 PM (A18–108)
Loews Philadelphia Hotel
Commonwealth A2
Theme: Paul Tillich and Public Theology
Matthew Lon Weaver, University of Pittsburgh, Presiding
Laura Thelander, Princeton Theological Seminary
Tillich’s Ecclesiology as a Source for Public Theology
Jeffrey Keuss, Seattle Pacific School of Theology
Unmoving Movement: Evangelical Worship after the “Emerging Church” and Neo-Correlational Theology
Todd Mei, University of Kent at Canterbury
Paul Tillich and the Ontological Foundation of Freedom and Destiny
Thomas Bandy, Guelph, Ontario
“Is That a Prayer?” The Possibility of Worship in Tillich’s Theology of Culture and the Reality of Worship in Postmodern Mission

Annual Banquet (A18–109)
7:00 – 10:00 pm
Sotto Varalli, Booth Room
231 South Broad Street

Our distinguished guest speaker:
Ronald H. Stone of the University of Pittsburgh
Address: “Reinie and Paulus: Allied Public Theologians.”
The cost of the banquet is $50 and may be paid in advance or at the banquet. If you pay at the banquet, please bring a check with the exact cost of the banquet with you.
Please make reservations by contacting:
Prof. Frederick Parrella
Religious Studies Department
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
408-554-4714
<fparrella@scu.edu>

Saturday, November 19, 2005

7:00 – 8:30 AM (A19–31)
Philadelphia Marriott Downtown
Room 304
North American Paul Tillich Society Board of Directors Meeting

11:45 AM – 12:45 PM (A19–35)
Philadelphia Marriott Downtown
Room 306
North American Paul Tillich Society Annual Business Meeting
Matthew Lon Weaver, President
Presiding

Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture

AAR Group

Saturday, November 19, 2005

1:00 PM – 3:30 PM (A19–74)
Convention Center 104
Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group and Theology and Continental Philosophy Group
Theme: Interrogating Ontotheology: Tillich, Heidegger, Marion, and Caputo
Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville
Presiding
Russell Manning, University of Cambridge
*Beyond Being: Tillich, Marion, and Caputo on Why God Does Not Exist*

Martin Gallagher, University of Kansas
*Tillich and Heidegger on Being*

Mario Costa, Drew University
*God-Less Thinking: The Question of Onto-Theology in Heidegger and Tillich*

Anthony J. Godzieba, Villanova University
*Responding*

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Saturday, Saturday, November 19, 2005
4:00 PM – 6:30 PM (A19-124)
Convention Center 104B
Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group

Theme: Public Theology and Democracy
Darlene Fozard Weaver, Villanova University
*Presiding*
Marc Krell, University of Arizona
*Constructing a Public Theology: Tillich and Buber's Movement beyond Protestant and Jewish Boundaries in Weimar Germany*

Jonathan Rothchild, Loyola Marymount University
*Confronting the Powers: Tillich, Stout, and West on Democratic Principles and Procedures*

Loye Ashton, Millsaps College
*Christofascism in America: A Tillichian Analysis of Christian Reconstructionism*

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**REPORT OF THE TILLICH COLLECTED WORKS PROJECT COMMITTEE**

Dear Colleagues,

At its annual meeting in November, 2004, the Society appointed Mary Ann Stenger Chair of the Tillich Collected Works Project (TCWP). Mary Ann asked Fred Parrella, Ron Stone, John Thatamanil, and me, Sharon Burch, to constitute a work group.

In June of 2005, Mary Ann convened a meeting of the work group in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Although John Thatamanil and Ron Stone were not able to come, Fred Parrella and I joined her for four days of productive work with material from the Til-

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SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 20 2005
4:00 PM – 6:30 PM (A20-124)
Convention Center 106B
Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group

Theme: God, Being, and God beyond Being
Robison B. James, University of Richmond, Baptist Theological Seminary at Richmond
*Presiding*
John J. Thatamanil, Vanderbilt University
*Why Tillich Is Not (Just) an Ontotheologian: Tillich’s Indebtedness to Apophatic Theology*

Lois Malcolm, Luther Seminary
*Mystical and Prophetic: Tillich's Theology of the God beyond God Reconsidered*

John C. M. Starkey, Oklahoma City University
*God, Being, Tillich, and Neville*

John D. Caputo, Syracuse University
*Responding*

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AAR Group Business Meeting

Presiding:
Robison B. James, University of Richmond, Baptist Theological Seminary at Richmond
Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville

The Tillich Archive, housed in the Andover-Harvard Library at Harvard Divinity School. We are grateful to Bill Crout who kindly arranged for us to stay in Lowell House, just outside Harvard Yard, and with whom we enjoyed sharing several meals with during our stay. Our work went well, as we shared different areas of in-depth knowledge of Tillich’s works, and we were able to lay out ten 600-750-page volumes, based on a chronological organization and a preliminary effort to be inclusive of most writings. We did the initial planning for at least two more volumes.

We created an outline of the materials that we know will be included in the volumes. We also have a group of selected manuscripts to translate or check. For example, there were handwritten drafts in the Archive boxes that may be the initial text of articles later assigned a title and published. In addition,
there were typescripts that could be the text for an article that appeared in this collection or that one. We have taken on the task of determining if these drafts are identical to the published text or were edited before publication. A number of drafts, both handwritten and typed, are undated. Archivists have organized them by assigning dates arrived at through educated guess work. We have decided to do all that we can to confirm their chronological place by assessing the thrust of the scholarship, language of composition, and our general knowledge of the Tillich corpus.

We worked pretty much non-stop for the four days, but our spirits were high because we could see definite progress. We are keenly aware that even with the time that we dedicated to the endeavor, we barely scratched the surface of what needs to be done. We did set basic principles for deciding what to include or not, tentative criteria for volume editors, and beginning editorial decisions, with more details on those to be presented at the annual meeting in November, 2005.

A major issue is the question of support for this project. Augsburg-Fortress, the press we expect to publish the collected works, suggested that we think of expenses for the entire project in the range of $300,000 to $400,000. Their estimate is based on the costs of the Bonhoeffer project, a collected works project that has some similarity to our endeavor. For example, it was necessary to hire translators for the Bonhoeffer German texts, both to check the fidelity of the extant translations and to make sure English equivalents to German phrases were consistent throughout the translated materials. The scholars working on the Bonhoeffer project found that the work required a general editor in addition to volume editors. These scholars received a stipend for their work. The press has told us that they are prepared to pay for one-time publishing rights for those parts of the Tillich corpus currently under contract with other publishers. Other than that, we are on our own to raise funds.

We have already begun our review of possible funding sources. Your wholehearted support of the project could be made evident by way of a contribution. Checks should be made out to NAPTS and sent to Fred Parrella at Santa Clara University.
Sincerely,
Sharon P. Burch

Additional note from Sharon Burch on her work in investigating a specific text

Our work in Cambridge this summer consisted of digging through several extensive bibliographies. We found ourselves sometimes at a loss to identify the provenance of a document. There were a number of articles listed that were short, sometimes less than a page. Often we had no context to help us determine how important this comment might be, what it pertained to and how it related to the body of Tillich’s work.

Each of us took home a number of citations to investigate. One that ended up in my pile was entitled “Was Soll Mit Deutschland Geschehen?” It was included in Volume 13 of the Gesammelte Werke, and there I found its subtitle to be “a) Gegen Emil Ludwigs Neueste Rede.”

Two things piqued my interest in this short piece. One was that a quick read revealed that Tillich’s language was straightforward and uncompromising. Tillich did not soften his critique with the qualifications that often characterize his interchanges. The second was that I couldn’t make sense of the English title of Ludwig’s article, “Ludwig Asks Fight on German People.” It was one of two English phrases in the piece, and it sounded like one of my more awkward translations from the German!

Upon further research, Wikipedia revealed that Emil Ludwig was born Emil Cohn in 1881, in Breslau. He moved to Switzerland in 1906, and during World War I worked as a foreign correspondent for the Berliner Tageblatt in Vienna and Istanbul. He studied law, but chose a career in writing, and became famous during the 1920s when he produced biographies that combined historical fact, fiction, and psychological analysis. His biography of Goethe was the first to appear, and was widely translated, as was his biography of Bismarck. He became a Swiss citizen in 1932, and emigrated to the US in 1940. After the end of World War II and his return to Switzerland, he went to Germany as a journalist, and is credited with retrieval of Goethe’s and Schiller’s coffins, which had disappeared from Weimar 1943/44. He died in 1948 in Switzerland.

On July 6, 1942, the comments to which Tillich replied appeared in the New York Times. I found a copy of the article, which was indeed entitled “Ludwig Asks Fight on ‘German People’,,” but as you can see, the phrase “German people” is in secondary quotes. Ludwig quoted a Gallup poll that
showed that 70% of Americans felt that they were fighting against Hitler and not against the German people. He wanted to disabuse people of that idea. He declared that the German people had a “war passion” that had led them into two world wars. To protect the world against them, he recommended that arms, education and government be taken out of their hands by an “army of soldiers and an army of teachers,” none of whom would be German. “Religion, history, philosophy all teach principles foreign to the German character and can only be infused gradually....” After victory was clear, Ludwig recommended that Germany be indicted for “political immaturity,” and this flotilla of teachers and soldiers launched to bring about its shift in views. Tillich’s reply to this article appeared on July 17, 1942 in Aufbau, a German-Jewish emigrant newspaper published in New York. The newspaper was designed to provide a forum for an exchange of views about culture, economics, social commentary, and intellectual trends. It was independent until January of 2005, when it became a part of Jüdische Medien AG.

I have been able to locate the article written by Frederick Wilhelm Foerster, Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogy at the University of Munich that appeared in Aufbau on July 31, 1942 in which he engages the Tillich-Ludwig interchange, a further critique by Alfred Kantorowicz of New York City that appeared on August 7, 1942 with comments by Tillich on the same page (Part B of what appears in the GS) and, on August 14, 1942, Emil Ludwig’s response to the exchange. As fascinating as all this is, I have had to stop. My task was to identify the venue of the piece and determine if it is central to Tillich’s endeavor, and my research has shown conclusively that to be true.

What Should Happen to Germany? Against Emil Ludwig’s Newest Speech
by Paul Tillich

In the July 6th New York Times, under the heading “Ludwig Asks Fight on German People,” a speech by Emil Ludwig is quoted that should cause all decent German Jews in America to resolutely and visibly distance themselves from Ludwig. A statement like “Hitler is Germany” and talk about the Germans as “warrior people” is taken from the arsenal of the most foolish anti-Semitic propaganda, only this time it is directed not against the Jews, but against the Germans. An evil that appears at a particular time and in a particular group of a people is attributed to the entire people. Against this method, against which we the non-Jewish friends of Jews inside and outside of Germany have fought a hard battle for the sake of which many of us are emigrants, this method is now directed against us by a Jewish writer. If he is right, then we were wrong; then the possibility is taken from us to go on fighting. It is the obligation of our Jewish friends to decide this issue. Not much need be said about the first conclusion drawn by Ludwig. Questions about the occupation, the transition period, and German disarmament are serious political issues which have nothing to do with Ludwig’s psychology of the Germans and which must be settled by serious political leaders. I am not sure these leaders are going to make the thieves and robbers in Germany happy by appointing only American and English police. Silly, however, is the proposal to send over an army of American teachers to instruct the Germans in “morality.” To support it Ludwig writes, “Religion, history, philosophy all teach principles foreign to the German character.”

This sentence—replacing only the word “German” with “Jewish”—can be found in every anti-Semitic mudslinging pamphlet. It descends to the same level. It is not worth discussing factually in view of German mysticism, the Reformation, Leibniz, Kant, Goethe, etc.

But in conclusion I want to say one thing. Every word cited from Ludwig signifies a dishonoring of many unknown persons who, unlike Ludwig in safety reviling the German people rather than living in daily peril among them, struggled for the soul and the future of that people. Americans who for years assisted those who thus struggled will be grateful for the assignment to go to them as morality instructors. They will ask to hear from them what they have experienced in the depth of their suffering and will keep quiet. Gesammelte Werke, volume 13, 278-288; Aufbau July 17, 1942.

(I am deeply grateful to Durwood Foster for this translation. His help was invaluable.)

Paul Tillich and Capital Punishment: The Meaning of Power

Anne Marie Reijnen

“Whoever condemns anyone to eternal death condemns himself, because his essence and that of the other cannot be absolutely separated.”

Paul Tillich did not write directly about the death penalty, as far as I know. However, he did attempt to shed some light on a cognate problem: the
meaning of power. It is therefore feasible, I believe, to construe a Tillichian criteriology of “just punishment.” In contrast with a widely held Christian interpretation of power which identifies it with hubris, if not outright evil, Tillich’s perspective, in the text from the German period that I will analyze, is more complex. Also, a sermon in the 1955 collection, The New Being, shows—as so often with Tillich—the fundamental continuity within his thought. But first, we must establish the legitimacy of our question (capital punishment) within a theological discourse. This short paper is part of a larger project tentatively called The Cross and the Sword: A Theological Investigation of Capital Punishment. I start with a few questions. Is it a paradox that one of the world’s most overtly “Christian” nations is at the same time so sanguine about inflicting irreversible punishment, alone among all the other nations of the West? Or is there, on the contrary, an unspoken link between the two characteristics of the contemporary United States of America? If such is the case, we must search for the symbolic meanings of (ultimate) punishment. In other words, I ask how the many faces of the Crucified have shaped popular conceptions of redemptive suffering. Some theologians, like Mark Taylor, believe that the way of the Cross is the antidote to “gulag America.” He refers to the work of René Girard, among others, who contend that the passion was the sacrifice to end all sacrifices.

I believe it to be more fruitful and interesting to explore the ambiguity of the Cross. For the crucifixion fuels the ‘blood theology’ of much popular religion, yet it also inspires a vision of the sanctity of human life, even in the presence of the enigma of radical evil. But first, a few words about the context might be in order: the contemporary debates about the role of religion in the agora of public life.

1. What is the proper public use of Christianity?

The copula between the judiciary system of a nation and Christian “justice,” between political theory and theology, between the conscience of the believer and the public square is highly problematic. Tertullian famously (or infamously) asked: “what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” We might wonder: what has Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School for political studies to do with the Center of Theological Inquiry? In the past, as Duncan Forrester points out in his book Christian Justice and Public Policy, “a theological approach, or at least an explicitly theological dimension to the discussion, was almost universal in western political thought.” Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Calvin sought “to relate the gospel to the public realm.” A double nexus of an almost organic nature existed, unquestioned, between the two. “Policy and authority, it was almost universally assumed, were to be legitimated, authorised and shaped by Christian belief, and political theory was often seen as little more than a satellite of theology. That faith had to do with the shaping and guidance of society was assumed almost as universally as is it today in Islamic societies.”

That alliance, it seems, has been broken. It has been said that, “the entire western legal tradition has been transformed by separating it from its ancient religious foundations.” Seeds of this new approach were sown long ago. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the Dutch jurist and diplomat of Calvinist origin, has been used to mark a turning point, with his assertion that the postulates of political theory derive from the principles of reason rather than faith and divine order: they are etsi Deus non daretur. “ Political commitments are now to be bracketed off from one’s religious convictions; they belong in the private sphere; and public life must now be shaped by something other than the varying and often conflicting particularities of religious belief.” But as Forrester is himself quick to point out, “We tend to read back too easy an account of the cumulative triumph of the secular.” In 1984, Richard John Neuhaus, a Lutheran who was then on the verge of converting to Roman Catholicism, wrote a controversial book called The Naked Public Square. Twenty years later, Mary Ann Glendon, professor of law at Harvard University, summarizes what was at stake for Neuhaus: the United States, while calling itself a democratic society, was systematically excluding the values of the majority of its citizens from policy decisions. He contended that to rule out of bounds in public life religiously grounded moral beliefs not only does injustice to America’s “incorrigibly religious” citizenry but also saps the very foundations of our democratic experiment. Reflecting on the work of Neuhaus, Professor Glendon writes: “State-sponsored secularism, legally tightening its control, is ever more openly intolerant of rival belief systems.”

Speaking broadly, the triumph of the secular order over theocracy characterizes the post-French revolution, modern state of affairs that now prevails in most western countries. But there is no status quo, for this separation is constantly under pressure in a great number of western democracies, as shown in the few samples of dissenting thought I adduce. In-
deed, different parties attack the constitutional provisions for various, sometimes opposing reasons: religion should have even less of a public role, some say, while others believe that the separation has now gone too far and that the balance of power should be corrected, in order to allow citizens who also happen to be Muslims or Christians to shape the laws that rule the state. Regarding the interpretation of the topic of capital punishment, I believe it is wrong to exclude considerations related to the realm of ultimate concern.

Politics in the United States of America show more examples of the resistance of political theory to secularization than Western Europe. On behalf of the majority of the US Supreme Court, Justice William O. Douglas wrote, in 1951, “We are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”

Half a century later, many citizens on this side of the Atlantic would still think that axiom to be an adequate description of their state of mind. Yet the axiom would be strongly contested by most European citizens, as the battle over the preamble of their new constitution shows. Very recently, it is true that Alabama chief Justice Roy Moore lost his job for refusing the federal court order to remove the monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments from the courthouse in Montgomery. Thus, technically, his voice is a dissenting one. But it has kept, or regained, a strong popular backing and appeal. Many believe, as Roy Moore said in an interview with Newsweek, that, “The battle is not over—the battle to acknowledge God is about to rage across the country.”

As for international relations, the explicitly religious self-understanding of the mission of the current president is probably the element that most alienates even former European allies of the United States.

One of my quandaries in discussing the death penalty as a theologian is that, on the one hand, I favour a stricter separation of the State and its judicial system and God, theology, the Scriptures, and the churches on the other. Tolerance and pluralism on the ground require the strict neutrality of the State in matters of religion. Yet religious interpretations, especially relating to guilt and retribution, seem to resist those forces that would separate the realms of profane, pluralist society and the confessional sphere. Both abolitionists and partisans of the retention of the death penalty, but also criminals and the relatives of their victims and many of those involved in the prison system, not only prison chaplains, frequently use religious categories to interpret crime and punishment, evil and redemption. Therefore, in spite of my sympathy for secularity, I take it to be a serious challenge for today’s theologians to participate in the ongoing conversation. In spite of the multitude of sometimes strident voices that speak of conflicting holy causes and of God’s own armies, we should resist the temptation to withdraw from the agora. We should not let only old forces of secularism pitch the battle with the new forces of conservative and reactionary folk-religion: there must be a third way. I still believe public theology of the more progressive kind to be legitimate and effective. Lessons have been learnt in the meantime. Theology no longer views herself as the Queen of the sciences. As Jeffrey Stout argues, “It must take its place among the other voices, as often to be corrected as to correct.”

2. Paul Tillich on Power and State, Applied by Us to Capital Punishment

The apostle Paul could, prima facie, be taken to defend “law and order,” since he wrote: “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God…if you do wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer.”

From his early adulthood, Paul Tillich had also grappled with the problem of a more or less strong State and the role of Christianity within, or above, such a State. In a lecture from 1929 called “Constraint and Freedom in Social Life. The Philosophy of Power,” given for two local Kant societies, he offers insights that in my judgment are relevant to our discussion of the death penalty, albeit indirectly. Tillich here applies a highly speculative, ontological grid to the discussion, similar to the method used in his much later work, Love, Power and Justice. Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications. The continuity in Tillich’s thinking about power is manifest. In 1955, in his sermon about Romans 8, “Principalities and Powers,” Tillich uses the language of myth to analyse the power of power.

Another principality, angelic and demonic at the same time, is power. It has the severe manly beauty that we see in some pictures of the great archangels. It is itself a great angel, good and evil, just as love is a mighty principality, and it
is the builder and protector of cities and nations, a creative force in every human enterprise, in every human community, in every human achievement. It is responsible for the conquest of nature, the organization of states, the execution of justice.... World history is the realm in which the reign of the angel of power is most manifest in all its glory and in all its tragedy.\textsuperscript{15}

Part of the difficulty for any translator of the 1929 lecture resides in the profusion of German nouns, related but subtly different. The basic polarity, in my opinion, is force as power and authority (\textit{Macht}) and force as violence and authority (\textit{Gewalt}). The English word “power” encompasses those two dimensions of authority and of violence, as appears from a conference given in 1956, “Shadow and Substance: The Price and Opportunity of Power.”\textsuperscript{16} Power (Macht) is the place where constraints find their origin, and it enters into tension with freedom. But since this is an ontological essay, Tillich has to probe deeper and ask whether it is not a characteristic of being to possess power. Power is not something that has been added on to our experience like newspapers or broadcasting, Tillich declares: we must take into account the possibility that to think of being is to think at the same time of power.\textsuperscript{17} To be in fact the power to be, which he calls powerfulness (\textit{Mächtigkeit}), that is the capacity of being-with and the power to differentiate oneself from other forms of being. To be, then, is to actively differentiate oneself (\textit{sich aktiv abheben}), by dint of a specific powerfulness, from being sucked into mere being-togetherness.\textsuperscript{18} This dynamic is relative, always depending on the other: a tree differentiates itself differently amidst the forest or in the middle of a field. Being realizes itself relatively to Being-With.... World history is the realm in which the reign of the angel of power is most manifest in all its glory and in all its tragedy.\textsuperscript{15}

To be part of society is to possess power and to recognize it. Nor is it possible to conceive of ourselves first as individuals who hold no power for to the extent that we are, we have power.\textsuperscript{20} The most fundamental recognition in our social being is geared towards the Law (Rechtsmächtigkeit): it is the recognition that is identical with our being accepted into the sphere of freedom. Such acceptance occurs in two manners: the first sets limits on our own “powerfulness.” Here, we acknowledge others as parts of the social order, in a formal way, beings who are endowed with reason, and in a “pathetic” way, all those who have the countenance of human beings; or in legal terms, personhood.\textsuperscript{21} The second manner excludes a large number of these from the capacity of determining one’s own being, classically, women and slaves. Persons such as these are not just “disenfranchised” members of society: in fact, they do not belong to society. Rather, they are objects at the disposal of society or its members. This goes to establish once more, according to Tillich, the definition of power: it is the combination of recognition and being within society.\textsuperscript{22} Now the form of power that pertains to a social group is the “state-like” (\textit{das Staatliche}). Groups always possess a structure that is “statelike,” but the State proper is a separate structure that has acquired autonomous meaning, and which could also cease to exist.\textsuperscript{23}

To summarize what Tillich has done thus far: power is the realization of freedom, as being-in-society. The condition for such positive appraisal is that the notion of powerfulness (\textit{Mächtigkeit}) be diffused with meaning and that it be coupled with the acknowledgment of limits. Now we may wonder what defines the antithetical figure (“bad power,” as it were). That is the topic of the following paragraph about power-as-violence (\textit{Gewalt}).

Violence is power imposed, in the face of its refusal, resulting in the depletion of powerfulness (i.e., capacity) of the other. Violence can come forth from an individual who resists his or her obligation to partially renounce power, that is, to recognize constraints and acknowledge limits, thus betraying the original meaning of licit powerfulness.\textsuperscript{24} In such a case, it is the collective body of society that will counteract by imposing the power that supersedes the individual. One may extrapolate from this point and venture that this represents the justification of the repression of violent crime by the judiciary, ostensibly acting on behalf of the common good. But Tillich goes on to describe another kind of violence, perpetrated by the group that is invested with power.
When, betraying the original meaning of this power, they exploit their position and pervert it to a senseless powerfulness, such actions also cause counteraction, namely resistance of various kinds. Resistance includes the inner refusal to submit to tyranny (“inner exile”) and external revolutionary reaction.

In the life of nations, the measuring stick is being endowed with power and meaning (selbstmächtig and sinntragend); violence is that which opposes those two elements. In nature, specifically the animal kingdom, this intention (meaningfulness) is lacking and cannot be betrayed. Although all living beings live off others, non-human animals are incapable of violence as defined above, since they can neither acknowledge power and meaning nor refuse to do so.

3. Is There a Case against Capital Punishment?

We now arrive at a crucial part of Tillich’s analysis, from which an application to today’s problem of capital punishment may not be altogether far-fetched. Violence is the use of power to the extent that the powerfulness of the other is depleted, leading to a depletion of being itself, for the original meaning is corrupted. Therefore, violence in fact manifests the limits of power in the very power that resists to violence. Tillich gives the following example, which was very pertinent in the interbellum: the extermination of a conquered people yields less power, even for the victors, than their integration into a greater power structure. The reason for this, according to Tillich, is that you cannot exterminate the powerfulness (Mächtigkeit) of a living entity. The meaning that pertained to it and transformed its powerfulness into power can never be annihilated. It will continue to manifest itself by purely negative resistance. Sabotage by the oppressed persists even after their physical obliteration, Tillich believes, for, in mythical terms, their “spirit” (Geist) will haunt the victors, ultimately undermining the power of the latter. If we accept this premise, we shall say that the violence committed against death row inmates (the detention preparatory to execution and the death penalty itself) is destructive of them, even for the victors, than their integration into a greater power structure. The reason for this, according to Tillich, is that you cannot exterminate the powerfulness (Mächtigkeit) of a living entity.

Every act of violence breeds violence through resistance. That could only be avoided if the meaningfulness of power were manifest in every moment of actualisation of power. Such is not the case, tragically. Yet, we continue to seek meaning amidst the struggle for power. It cannot be counted on and it is constantly being corrupted. Because of the dynamic nature of reality, this tragic cannot be avoided, because reality has to unfold itself in the act.

What is the public use of Christianity? Surely it is not the one described by justice Roy Moore, to form a coalition of all those who see God as the source of law, liberty and government. But Christians cannot excuse themselves from the debate in the public square concerning crime and punishment. They might join the forces that advocate the abolition of capital punishment. Next, such coalitions of people of good will must examine the alternatives, some of which are not desirable. Sentences for life-long imprisonment without parole may spell out a fate akin to death, beyond hope of redemption in the here and now, forever cutting off human beings from the possibility of becoming part of society again. We are reminded of Tillich’s warning: “whoever condemns anyone to eternal death condemns himself, because his essence and that of the other cannot be absolutely separated”.

4 Ibid. 12
5 Ibid., 13
6 Ibid., 15
7 Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984)
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 The New York Times, Tuesday October 4, 2005
12 Romans 13: 1-4 (NRSV)
In addition to the discussion of the subject named above, there will also be a discussion of Tillich’s understanding of religion. Spontaneous discussion on this subject is invited.

We recommend the following text as preparation for this discussion: Paul Tillich, Philosophy of Religion, GW, ed. R. Albrecht, Vol. 1, Early Works (Stuttgart 1959), 297-364.

Since the number of participants must be limited we urge those interested to apply as soon as possible. Write to:

Prof. Dr. Christian Danz
Institute for Systematic Theology
Protestant Theology
University of Vienna
Rooseveltplace 10
Austria 1090 Vienna
e-mail: christian.danz@univie.ac.at

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**Deutsche Paul-Tillich-Gesellschaft**

**International Ph.D. Colloquium on Paul Tillich**

The German Paul Tillich Society will meet from 27 to 29 January 2006 in an international Colloquium of Ph.D.’s at the Protestant Theological Faculty of the University of Vienna. All those who have concentrated upon the thought of Paul Tillich in their doctoral dissertations, past or present, are welcome. In this way all aspects of Paul Tillich’s thought will be discussed.

The Colloquium will be chaired by the substitute chairman of DPTG, Professor Christian together with the Chairman of DPTG Prof Werner Schussler (Professor of Philosophy at the Theological Faculty Trier) and Prof Erdmann Sturm (Protestant Theological Faculty University of Munster).
A Reminder: Dues for the 2005 Year were due with the Summer Issue. Please send your dues to the Secretary Treasurer at your earliest convenience, or, if you are attending the annual meeting in Philadelphia, you may give it to him in person.

Thank you very much.

Coming in the Winter Bulletin:

• The Report from the annual meeting in Philadelphia and the new officers of the NAPTS
• The Banquet Address by Professor Ron Stone
• The Papers from the Meeting of the Society

Please note: if you are presenting a paper in Philadelphia, please send it via email or disk to the secretary treasurer for publication in Volume 32 (2006) of the NAPTS Bulletin.

Thank you.
The Officers of the North American Paul Tillich Society

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