In this issue:

- A Special Edition
  Die Judenfrage—ein christliches und ein deutsches Problem by Paul Tillich.
  Translated by Marion Pauck and Wilhelm Pauck, with an Introduction by Marion Pauck

- “The Primacy of Ethics: Relationality in Buber, Tillich, and Levinas” by Guy B. Hammond

- “Self, Otherness, Theology, and Ontology: A Critical Engagement between Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille” by Jonathan Rothchild

- New Publications

- Index of the Newsletter/Bulletin up to and including volume 29. Compiled by Matthew Lonweaver

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**The Jewish Question: A Christian and a German Problem**

**Paul Tillich**

Translated by Marion Pauck and Wilhelm Pauck

Introduction by Marion Pauck

Editor's Note:

We are very grateful to Mutie Tillich Farris for permission to publish Die Judenfrage in English for the Bulletin. We are also grateful to Marion Hausner Pauck for translating Die Judenfrage into English and writing an Introduction.

Die Judenfrage—ein christliches und ein deutsches Problem consists of four lectures that Paul Tillich delivered in Berlin at the German Institute of Politics in the summer of 1953. The German text was published as a monograph in Berlin by Weiss in 1953, and can be found in Gesamte Werke, Band III, 128-170.

**Introduction**

Marion Pauck
Fifty years ago, Paul Tillich handed me a monograph that had been published in Germany. It was titled “Die Judenfrage: Ein Christliches und ein Deutsches Problem,” and it consisted of four lectures he had delivered in Berlin in 1953. The editors of a newly established Jewish journal had invited Tillich to write a short article on the subject of Israel for them. Tillich, for whom I had done translation work for several years, asked me to translate pertinent sections he selected from his lectures. He had a secondary reason for giving me this assignment. We had become close friends by then and he knew that I had found it difficult to come to terms with my German heritage during the Second World War.

As a native of New York and the offspring of German-born parents, I first became aware in 1936 of the evil treatment of Jewish persons in Western Europe, particularly in Germany by Hitler and his henchmen. My parents had emigrated to America in 1920 and had become citizens and successful business people. They wanted no part of Hitler’s Germany. My mother, in fact, was extraordinarily liberal and progressive. She hired Irish Catholics, German and American Protestants, New York Jews, and even one African American to work for her in the cosmetic shop she owned. In the last case, her high-society clientele shied away from being treated by a black person, no matter how gifted, and my mother reluctantly was forced to let her go.

My father, on the other hand, inherited his anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish prejudices from his father and tried in vain to pass them on to me. My resistance was enormous and put my father and me on a warpath early in life. The influence of my Lutheran pastor, Paul Scherer, and my experiences in school where Jews and Christians studied and played together daily, had already created a positive influence upon me. The paradox with which I lived was puzzling and painful: on the one hand, my father had helped Austrian and German Jews relocate in America, feeding them and helping them find jobs. He was very popular in these circles because he was witty and well read. He liked, even loved, individual Jews. But his prejudice against Jews in general remained and even hardened with old age. Yet, my father and I loved one another very much and found mutual joy and understanding in the world of music. Tillich’s request was both practical and pastoral. He felt that I would understand my father and people like him better after I read the lectures and thus be both enlightened and consoled. And he was right.

My friendships with many Jewish men and women throughout my life and everywhere in the world have been amongst the most rewarding, intellectually and emotionally, that I have had. In the schools that I attended and in academic and publishing circles in which I moved, there was a mixture of all nationalities and religions. Common interests in literature, music, and painting, both classical and avant garde drew us to one another. For me at least there was never a problem regarding my identification with Christianity and my friendship with Jews. And so, it was difficult for me to understand what was happening in Germany and elsewhere.

After Wilhelm Pauck and I were married in 1964, we turned to our work on the biography of Paul Tillich. It was Pauck also who urged me to complete my translation of “Die Judenfrage” in the hope of publishing it. He helped me with the translation by correcting my manuscript and occasionally rewriting small portions of the text; accordingly, I have listed him as co-translator. But because the work was too short to publish separately, the translation lay for years in a chest in my study. When my colleague and friend, Professor Frederick Parrella learned of its existence, he urged me to publish it in the *North American Paul Tillich Society Bulletin*. I have once again reviewed it, rendering certain passages more graceful and clear—at least I hope this is the case—aware as I did so that much that Tillich wrote in 1953 is still, fortunately—and unfortunately—relevant today.

When Tillich delivered these lectures in Berlin, there were still ruins in that great city which had been bombed and invaded by the Allies, and split between east and west. In 1953, his audience was composed of overwhelmingly anti-Nazi intellectuals, secular and ecclesiastical, former students and colleagues, family and friends. Perhaps because the war had ended only eight years earlier, the listeners wanted to disassociate themselves from the Holocaust and so the lectures were not met with the usual enthusiasm. Passages concerned with “collective guilt”—albeit redefined by Tillich—were a major irritant. Yet, some members of the audience were freed by Tillich’s words. His brilliant, elegant analysis, his historical knowledge and grasp of the religious background, his understanding of the relationship between Jews and Christians, and Jews and Germans, are reflected in this tightly compressed monograph.
Tillich’s analysis of both German and Jewish history and character converge to help us understand the background of this seemingly eternal problem in a new light. In the meantime, Germany has done a great deal in the public and secular realm to prevent another Holocaust but the Christian churches there have done less. Tillich urges them in these lectures to imitate the Protestant churches in America who began to remove anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish material from Sunday School books. Although our own history of absorbing numerous groups of foreigners into our country came earlier and is far more extensive than the German experience and although Jews in our country have been unusually successful and secure, even here now and then anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism remain alive.

As I write these words, I think of one of Tillich’s listeners in the audience in Berlin, a wonderful man whom I interviewed during my tour of Germany in 1963, collecting material for our biography. His name is Harald Poelchau. He was an extraordinarily handsome man, tall, blonde, and blue eyed. I remember our first meeting and the laughter we shared at the fact that we were representatives of Hitler’s ideal—only physically, I hasten to say. Poelchau was pastor at the prison in Spandau where he comforted the inmates because they had been brave enough to speak and act against Hitler. Indeed, Poelchau risked his life many times to help Jews and non-Jews escape from Germany. When I exclaimed how it was that he was never caught, he said, “I look like an Aryan, Hitler’s ideal.”

In that same audience, there were a handful of persons who studied with Tillich but who supported Hitler and criticized Tillich’s lectures in private conference. In his travel diary, Tillich remarked that it was a supreme irony that students of his should have become Nazis but he remained friends with them nevertheless, trying but failing to change their minds.

In 1953, Berlin was the center of a world divided between east and west, between communism and democracy. Today, after the cessation of the cold war, and at a time when the United States of America is the sole superpower, the world is divided again. The Muslim and the Judeo-Christian worlds are pitted against one another. For the first time in our history, America has become the object of terrorist attacks. The problems that Tillich foresaw regarding Israel’s theocracy are now full blown. The Palestinian–Israeli struggles seem to worsen despite attempts to find peace. These multiple struggles threaten the peace not only of that region but also of the entire world.

Tillich’s hope that Christians include space for the Jews and other religious groups—allowing each to live next to the other, thus establishing a new community in order to preserve the old—has not been entirely fulfilled. Were he alive today he would doubtless call for a similar attitude between Muslims and Christians. Such hope is fulfilled, broken, and reborn. Nearly half a century later, we are forced to deal with the same problems we faced in our youth. Yet, we can learn from Tillich’s words, which are as relevant today as they were when he delivered them.

I am pleased and grateful that Erdmuthe Tillich Farris, to whom I dedicate this translation, has given us permission to publish it at long last. I thank her and I thank Frederick Parrella for the suggestion and for his editorial assistance. Finally, I thank my friend and teacher Paul Tillich, as well as my late husband Wilhelm Pauck, in memoriam.

The Jewish Question: A Christian and a German Problem

Paul Tillich

Lecture One

I find it difficult to speak about this subject because I am used to working with comparatively clear concepts. The three decisive concepts of these lectures are vague. The concept “Jewish Question” is an indefinite one. What is “the Jewish question”? Does it refer to the sociological function of the Jews as a minority, a function that Judaism has fulfilled for thousands of years—which other groups, however, have also fulfilled—or does the “Jewish question” refer to the religious function of the Jews as a sacramental community? If this is the case, what is the relationship between the sociological and the sacramental elements involved?

The ambiguity of the concept “Jew” produces further difficulties. What is the meaning of the concept? Does the concept refer to Jews who live as guests, as oppressed people, or as exiles in foreign countries? Does it refer to the members of the state of Israel? What is the relationship between these two groups? Is the Jew one who actively participates in
the Jewish sacramental community? Is he the one whose ancestors once belonged to Judaism and then divorced themselves from the Jewish community? Or is the Jew one who was baptized and acknowledges a humanism beyond confessional religion? Are we talking about Jewish identity as a religious reality, or are we talking about it as a race? I do not believe that there is a Jewish race, as I do not believe there is an Aryan race. But if there were, my question would be: is our subject the race problem, or does the Jewish question involve something special, a race that is, nevertheless, something different from a race? Is the Jewish person a representative of one of the eleven great religions that have universal character, or do we speak—if we speak as Christians—about a Jewish person as the forerunner of Christianity? These are some of the problems that the word “Jew” brings to mind.

The other words in the title of these lectures are also ambiguous. The word “Christian” can mean the Christian principle that transcends historical Christianity, be it in the form of a Catholic or in the form of a Protestant expression of this principle. Or “Christian” can mean the Christian churches in the past and present, the reality of church history, and the relation of the churches to Christian principles. “Christian” can mean the countries in which a so-called Christian culture thrives. I say “so-called” because it is a very derivative and completely imperfect form of Christian development. The word “Christian” can mean all these things.

The word “German” has a many sided meaning. It can mean two things. It can mean that there is something in the nature of the German character, which makes Judaism positively, or negatively, a German problem. It is immaterial, in that case, whether one relates the German character to some sort of biological factor, or whether one looks upon it as a product of German history. In any case, it is the German character then which poses the problem. Or is it something completely different? Is it a unique situation, is it a catastrophe in German history, which created the problem “Judaism and German Politics”? The word “German” itself as we use it in this lecture is ambiguous.

In what sense, therefore, should the concepts, “Jewish question,” “German,” and “Christian” be used? I believe that we cannot exclude any of the meanings I have mentioned. They belong together and depend on one another. The semantic difficulties are not decisive, for to a certain extent they can be overcome by means of a clear definition of the problem before us. What is decisive are the human and personal difficulties which one encounters as one deals with this subject. One is not equally involved in everything about which one lectures. The distance of the speaker from his subject can be smaller or greater. In my case, the distance between my subject and me is as small as possible.

It has been my fate to participate in the questions that arise in my lecture. They are existential questions for me. As a Christian theologian, I have taken part in Jewish-Christian discussions for decades. I have experienced the entire burden of these problems that today, as at the beginning of the Christian era, excite theological thought. I am not talking about the nonsense that is often uttered in these debates, but rather about the questions that ultimately concern man as man and about which I have struggled with my Jewish friends when I have discussed these problems with them. Another reason for my existential involvement in the problems of my subject is that I am German-born. As an emigrant in the catastrophic year of 1933, I sided with those who opposed everything that happened that year in Germany, especially everything that Germany inflicted on the European Jews. A third reason for my existential involvement is that for many years Jews have been among my most intimate friends. Under such circumstances, discussion of such a subject is difficult. However, it is even more difficult because my listeners are also existentially involved. There are Jews and Germans in this room. At the very outset, therefore, one who undertakes to speak to Germans about Germany and Judaism will be brought face to face with the German problem in all its radicalness. For it leads up to the question which I shall not try to avoid, although the temptation to do so is very great, namely, to the question of collective guilt. I owe you an honest word about this problem. Without such a word, something unexpressed would remain in the background of my lecture, and this would disquiet you. Hence, I shall speak frankly about it.

What is the meaning of collective and individual guilt? Guilt can mean that one is the direct and immediate cause of an act that renders one guilty. I know that only specific groups of the German nation are guilty in this sense. Resistance to the concept of collective guilt is understandable if guilt, in this sense, is used as the immediate cause for what happened. I should say therefore that guilt in the sense of immediate cause cannot be laid upon the German
nation as a whole. It is the guilt of limited groups and individuals.

There exists a second concept of guilt, namely guilt in the sense of the failure to live up to responsibility. Every German is guilty in this sense, including those who became victims as well as those who emigrated. I have never failed to make clear to my friends in America that I considered myself guilty in the sense of being responsible for what happened. Why? Because during the years when those who committed these crimes prepared for the assumption of political power, we were not strong enough to hinder them. Nor were we sufficiently self-sacrificing, even when we uttered protests and thereby became emigrants or victims. Since the middle of the 1920’s, we had sensed what was about to happen. Often I told my friends how, as in a vision, I saw German cities in ruins, exactly as I see Berlin in ruins today twenty-five years later. The feeling of what was about to happen became stronger to the degree by which the powers that would bring about destruction appeared irresistible. But what does the word “irresistible” in history mean? It means that we were not strong enough to resist what was to come, although we sensed that it would come. That is guilt in the second sense of the word, and that is the guilt of all Germans before 1933, no matter what became of them.

In the third sense, guilt means guilt of suppression of knowledge. This is a deep psychological problem because it does not involve conscious acts, nor completely unconscious acts; rather this guilt involves acts that are suspended between conscious-ness and unconsciousness. We knew what was happening, and yet we did not know. I believe everyone who tells me he did not know, and yet I do not believe anyone. For I am convinced that if anyone did not want to know, one nevertheless knew enough so that one was compelled to suppress what one knew. This kind of guilt produces serious psychological and ethical problems. If someone says, “I do not want to know. I wash my hands of it,” then that is an example of completely simple guilt; certainly many did just this but they are not significant. The many who wanted to know and yet were unable to accept the knowledge that pressed in upon them are significant. This is the third kind of guilt. Such guilt appeared only after 1933, and those who were not in Germany have no part in it. We do not condemn them, for we all suppress things that we cannot bear to know. What man of even the slightest sensitivity can bear to look at himself in a mirror? Everyone looks away from his own reflection. That is the psychological mechanism either in the self or in others.

I now come to a fourth concept of guilt, which is similar to the third, namely, guilt in the sense of forgetting. That is the same psychological mechanism turned toward the future. One does not want to know, i.e., one does not want to remember; one wants to forget. This kind of guilt has become so powerful since 1945 that it can lead to disaster. Forgetting does not mean that one actually forgets, or that one does not think about what happened in one’s daily life. Who thinks of guilt in daily life? Forgetting does mean not allowing what has happened to influence the future. It means erasing what has happened as a factor for the future. This is decisive for the guilt of forgetting. Max Scheler has written an essay on contrition; it is one of his best. In it, he clearly shows that contrition is not a sentimental feeling of pain about the past, but rather the expulsion of something false from the inner life. To what extent can this expulsion take place; to what extent does it ever take place? Everything depends on this: that those elements which have induced the anti-Semitic madness be driven from the soul, that they not be forgotten, not be suppressed, not be hidden, but that they be acknowledged and banished, accompanied by the pain of repentance. The last two forms of guilt have partially unconscious causes. Therefore, they are tragic, and yet they are “guilt,” for one can know about them.

Finally, I should like to mention a fifth kind of guilt of which one is completely conscious, namely the calculating consideration on the basis of which one says, “We have done evil but we have also suffered accordingly. Others have suffered through us, and now we have suffered through them: we are even.” I should like to make a theological remark about this. There are two forms of justice. One is the justice of proportion. It calculates as follows: “I have done such and such. Therefore, I deserve such and such. Therefore, for what I have done I have received what I deserve.” There is a level on which such proportional thinking is unavoidable both in daily life and in the administration of the law. We all calculate what we and others deserve. A lawyer does so systematically when he seeks to find the right proportion between guilt and punishment. Justice is not possible without the element of proportion that Aristotle defined as the “nature of justice.”
But there is another definition of the concept of justice. It does not deny the proportional element but transcends it: I am thinking of the Old and New Testament concepts of justice. It recognizes the violation of justice and the consequences of the injustice that follow. But this is not the final word. The goal of justice is the reunion of that which has been separated through injustice, God and human beings, one human being and another human being, one group and another group. The point of this idea of justice is the justification of the unjust man. But such justice and the reunion effected by it are possible only if the violation of justice has been acknowledged, and neither forgotten nor regarded as settled in the balance of guilt and punishment. Reuniting justice presupposes the acknowledgment and expulsion of its causes. The judgment, “We have suffered equally: now everything is in order,” contradicts the basic law of life as it is expressed in the Biblical idea of justice. The question is this: is reunion possible and what is necessary to make reunion a reality?

The distinction between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism is of the greatest significance for the understanding of our problem. Therefore, I wish to present a brief historical survey of the relationship between them. Anti-Judaism is a word I first encountered when in connection with a study of anti-Semitism I was asked to express the attitude of the Catholic and Protestant churches toward the Jewish problem. Anyone—a theologian, a church historian, or a secular historian—who studies this problem will be surprised and will be forced to recognize the distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism. The word “anti-Semitism” originated in the 1880’s, during the period of philosophical naturalism. It is a transformation of the more basic concept of anti-Judaism. It did not exist earlier because theories of race arose only at this time in England and France, but not to begin with in Germany.

It is possible to distinguish between two concepts of race: the vertical and the horizontal. The German word rassig has several meanings. When applied to human beings, it means “blue blood” or noble when we want to point to characteristics that have developed for generations in certain families. The word rassig, which is always used in a positive sense, can be applied to animals as well as to people, for example, a “blue-blooded” or “spirited” horse. The word can be used in reference to individuals as well as to groups. In the latter case, it can be equated with the aristocratic principle and it includes biologically developed as well as culturally acquired qualities. One can hardly object to such a concept of race from either a humanistic or a religious standpoint. It must remain clear, however, that such a concept involves neither ethical nor religious values. A morally mature or a religiously charismatic person is not identical with one we call noble.

Another concept of race is the descriptive, biological concept of races of humankind, who are distinguished by specific physical marks. It is not possible to object on a humanistic or Christian basis against this concept either, so long as it is not identified with the vertical concept of race, or so long as it is not connected with ethical or religious values. This, however, is exactly what was done by the proponents of naturalistic race theories in the second half of the 19th century; it led to the anti-Semitic horrors of the 20th century. Christian anti-Judaism is completely different from the horizontal concept of race and from the anti-Semitism that resulted there from. Anti-Judaism exists throughout church history and exhibits a tragic guilt of the church.

When we look at the earliest parts of the Gospels, we find that Jesus felt he was sent to the Jews. He was pushed beyond this limit only by special events. The calling of the twelve apostles and the restoration of the twelve after Judas’s withdrawal is not an incidental but an intentionally symbolic action. It means that according to the judgment of the primitive church, Jesus intended to continue the Jewish tradition. The church is symbolized by the twelve tribes of Israel. It is not the suspension but the completion of the Old Testament congregation, naturally not on a national but on a universal basis. This train of thought contains no anti-Judaism.

There is also no anti-Judaism in Paul despite his radical break with Judaism and his struggle with “Judaizers” in the Christian congregations. Judaism was and remained the problem of his life, the problem of his own existence as a Jewish Christian. The theory he advances in the ninth and eleventh chapters of Romans is a profound contribution to the interpretation of history. Judaism has a continuing function even in the new age. The Jews will not cease to exist so long as there are pagans on the earth. It is my conviction that this is the Christian answer to the Jewish question as such. In any case, this answer does not contain anything anti-Jewish. It is the “no” and the “yes” of Christianity to that which is Jewish in the Christian world. Paul himself would have been (as he himself writes) ready to sac-
rifice the salvation of his soul for the salvation of the Jewish people. For these and other reasons, many anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic Christians consider him to be too Jewish, while no one has been or is still as fiercely opposed as he is on the part of the Jews.

Anti-Judaism is born at the moment when Christianity comes into the pagan world and must interpret itself to paganism. This occurs in the fourth Gospel that, as is well known, put words into Jesus’ mouth in which early Christianity attempts to answer the questions and problems that were presented to it by the pagan world. The author of John attempts to show that the leaders of Judaism, and not Pilate, the Roman procurator, were responsible for the sentencing of Jesus. No Jewish authority had power over life and death. In John, Pilate appears as a skeptic who is as little convinced of Jesus’ message as he is of the accusation of the Jews, and therefore tries everything to save Jesus. Pilate is pictured as a weak character, as incapable of withstanding the pressure of the Jews, but not as one actually guilty himself. The Jews and the Jews alone are guilty. The meaning of this conception is made clear in a later development of the Pilate legend. We are told of the conversion of Pilate to Christianity, and of his repentance that ultimately causes him to become a saint. In the Egyptian Pilate legend, he does appear as a real saint. Although this legend has no historical value, it does reveal the attitude of mind which increasingly asserted itself and for which we can have no other name than anti-Judaism.

I will pass over the next centuries to the year 1215 in which the Fourth Lateran Council took place under Innocent III, the most powerful of the popes. This year represents the high point of the development of the Middle Ages. At this council, the pope proclaimed laws regarding the Jews that had two sides. On the one hand, the new laws stressed that the popes were protectors of the Jews and felt obliged to shield them from the brutal exploitation of the aristocracy. This corresponded to an old tradition. On the other hand, Innocent III began the struggle against the emerging heresies of the Albigensians and Waldensians and against older Manichaean undercurrents as they were represented by the Cathari. The Roman church felt itself threatened. It feared that the unity of tradition would be lost, and traditions other than its own would enter into the consciousness of occidental humankind.

All authoritarian systems are filled with this fear. They feel secure so long as those who acknowledge their authority are cut off from every other tradition. As soon as other possibilities appear, however, the unity of consciousness, and therefore the security of authority, is threatened. The Jews represent another tradition, and not only Christianity but also Islam depended on it. This is the background of the laws of segregation that were proclaimed by Innocent III and his successors. It was not anti-Semitism but anti-Judaism that dictated these laws, or to put the matter still more precisely: it was the church’s fear of Jewish influence on its members that produced these laws. When one compares these laws with Hitler’s so-called Nuremberg laws against the Jewish people, one finds that the decrees of the Nazis are at many points an imitation of the papal decrees. Jews were forced to wear sashes that marked them as Jews. A Jewish person was not permitted to have Christian household help. The Ghetto was more tightly closed. These and other similar laws are found in the papal Bull of the 13th century. The basis of these laws was always the curse which, according to Biblical concepts, the Jews brought upon themselves and their descendants through the crucifixion of Jesus. This is anti-Judaism plain and simple, but it is not anti-Semitism.

I shall again pass over several centuries and come to Luther and the Reformation. At the beginning of the Reformation, Luther was convinced that the purification of Christianity from heathen elements, which he proposed, would enable the Jews to join the Christian church. In the eyes of the Jews, the Catholic sacramental system, including its christological presuppositions, was idolatrous and a demonic abomination. Especially the Mass was judged in this way. Nothing could contradict the Jewish prophetic consciousness as much as the objectification of God through the priestly transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of the incarnate God. Luther’s criticism of the Mass and its theological suppositions was similar to this and had the same prophetic background. Therefore, Luther believed that the Jews would be ready to join Christianity after the removal of this fundamental offense. In one of his early writings, he expressed himself very positively about the Jews of his time. But his hope was disappointed. There were elements in Christianity, common to Catholics and Protestants, which made it impossible for the Jews to become Christians. It was, however, more than a disappointment that later moved Luther to speak out against the Jews. He believed, with Paul, that once
the Jews were converted, the end of history would be reached. He hoped for the Last Day. He did not want history to continue, since he understood clearly the destructive consequences of the power politics of his time and he continually suffered from them himself. He spoke of the “dear Judgment day” and waited for signs of its appearance. But one decisive sign, namely the conversion of the Jews, did not come to pass. This led him to his angry attack on the stubbornness of the Jewish people. As a result, Christian anti-Judaism took hold in the churches of the Reformation. In all Christian churches, the Jews of every generation are burdened with the guilt of the condemnation of Jesus.

It is worth looking at this reproach in the light of our analysis of the concept of guilt. Then one immediately sees the absurdity of this accusation. None of the concepts of guilt I have mentioned can be applied to this phenomenon. One can hardly say that all the Jewish people who lived at the time of Jesus were responsible for the crucifixion. The accounts do not show at all that the same people who greeted him with “Hallelujahs” as he entered Jerusalem were those who cried, “Crucify Him!” Those who called for his crucifixion were probably groups stirred up by the leaders of the people, the mob that at all times allows itself to be used for such actions. Whatever the historical fact may be, the most we can say is that the people as a whole did not support Jesus and were therefore indirectly responsible for what happened. But one must ask what this very indirect responsibility has to do with those who were children at that time or not yet born, and what it has to do with all the Jews who were born since then? Yet, this absurd thought is raised again and again in the catechisms and in the teachings of both church traditions. In America, there existed at one time a commission that was appointed to examine Sunday School textbooks for negative comments about Judaism. Everywhere, anti-Jewish and in some cases even anti-Semitic statements were found. This is the constant tragic guilt of the Christian church. It would be desirable for the German churches to also make such an investigation. If, as I hear, it is already being done in certain places, it should be done very thoroughly. From my own youth, I remember vividly the impression that anti-Jewish teaching makes on Christian young people. We sensed the ways of the Jews as ominous and were inclined to see in every Jew someone who helped to crucify Jesus. In the last hundred years, conscious anti-Semitism has drawn nourishment from this often unconscious anti-Judaism of the Christian churches.

In America, the situation seems to be much more favorable. Liberal Protestantism and liberal Judaism work together on many levels. It is possible without much hesitation to invite a Rabbi to speak in a Christian church. I myself have spoken in synagogues, and occasionally even in a liturgical setting. This is astonishingly mature from the point of view of human partnership and mutual understanding. But it is no solution to the Christian-Jewish problem. It must be presupposed that both religions must leave aside as much of their concrete teachings and forms of worship so that what will remain is merely a relatively unsubstantial and unsatisfactory moralism. The problem of these religions and their relationship to one another cannot be solved in any way by subtraction.

One criterion for the attitude of Christians toward anti-Judaism is their position toward the missions to the Jews. A group of leading American theologians who meet twice a year for several days, once discussed at one of these meetings, in an interesting and, for me, a very important way, the question of the mission to the Jews. We were very doubtful that such a mission was possible, and if so, under what circumstances. There was a tendency to confine the mission to the Jews to those who had broken inwardly with Judaism and should therefore find a way to Christianity. In any case, there was no clear answer to the question of the meaning of the mission to the Jews. I myself agreed with these theologians who said that an active missionary drive from the Christian side directed to believing Jews is in most cases psychologically and sociologically impossible. What is possible, however, is a readiness on the part of Christians to receive Jews in such cases where the Jewish person has recognized his existential boundaries and then has raised the question about what lies beyond. In such cases, the Christian can try to show that Christian symbols can provide an answer to the inner conflict of Judaism. This is not active but passive mission to the Jews. I would not be willing to go beyond this. The experience of the Bible and church history shows that only in the rarest possible cases is it meaningful to do so.

I should like to end this survey of the relationship between the Christian churches and the Jewish question with a reference to the experience that the churches had under Hitler. In National Socialism, religious anti-Judaism was turned into racial anti-
Semitism. The Christians who were at first confused and could not pluck up enough courage to take a clear stand against the early anti-Semitic acts of Hitler, soon discovered that the attack upon Judaism as Judaism was also an attack upon Christianity. One realized that, not only in Germany but also everywhere in the Christian church, a fundamental attack on Christianity must begin with a fundamental attack on Judaism. Historically, this was a renewal of an ancient experience of the churches. The most dangerous threat to early Christianity was not the persecution of Christians but rather the Gnostic-syncretistic religion of later antiquity. It tried to unite elements of many religions within itself and absorb Christ as a central figure. But it excluded the Old Testament and thereby cut off Christianity from its historical roots. The church was forced to fight a battle of life and death in those days. The church, therefore, decided that the New Testament cannot exist without the Old Testament. It realized that the Christ who is separated from the spirit of the Old Testament prophecy becomes one among many pagan mystery gods. This was at stake in the Gnostic movement and this was at stake in National Socialism, as well in every type of religious nationalism, which is in no case limited to Germany alone. In order to transform Jesus into a cultic God next to others, or into a national leader or prophet, one must lift him out of the context of Old Testament prophecy. For this prophecy was engaged in continual struggle with the religious nationalism of its time. The New Testament stands in the continuity of this fight or struggle. If the continuity is interrupted, the New Testament becomes invalid. This is what the Christian church knew when it decided that the Old Testament is the foundation of the New Testament. In its stand against National Socialism, the church experienced once again what it had experienced in its stand against Gnosticism in the third century: the spirit of prophetic Judaism is the only spirit which can protect the church from sinking back into a national religion, i.e. heathenism.

Lecture Two

Now I want to talk about the Jewish question as a German problem. I recall an episode that occurred in 1933, shortly before Hitler came to power. The rector of the University of Frankfurt, where I was professor of philosophy, asked me to deliver the university Founders Day Lecture. In this lecture, I dealt with the development of intellectual history from the time of Spinoza, a Jew, through classical German poetry and philosophy, to Marx, also a Jew. I showed how the rational Jewish mystic Spinoza influenced the greatest period of German poetry and philosophy, and how at the end of this period the rational Jewish ethicist, Marx, functioned as its critic. In 1933, people did not hear such facts gladly. As I left the assembly hall, I heard some colleagues say to one another, “Now they even want to make us into Jews.” This foolish comment implies a serious problem, namely the question, “Are there structural analogies between the Jewish and the German character?” I am convinced that such analogies exist, and I have been confirmed in this conviction by my experiences as an emigrant. It was astonishing to see how many of my Jewish friends, how many Jews in general, identified themselves with German culture even after the catastrophe. In all of them, one could feel a yearning for the Germany where they had grown up, and which had molded them. This yearning was kept alive even underneath the hatred of wounded love. By contrast, many non-Jewish émigrés, including myself, felt emigration to be an objective political fact with which they had to come to terms.

One would have expected the opposite. And yet, the fact of which I speak is understandable. Since the period of the emancipation, a close connection had been achieved between German culture and Judaism. Mendelsohn was the philosopher of the Enlightenment, Spinoza was the saint of Romanticism, Rahel Varnhagen was the source of its inspiration, and German youth found its poetic voice in Heinrich Heine. Nineteenth century philosophy in its neo-Kantian form felt the impact of the philosopher Cohen; the social revolution became historically articulate in Marx. Many other examples could be mentioned. It is amazing to note how quickly the Jews supplied creative forces to German culture after their emancipation, and how, because of a deep affinity, a fruitful interpenetration took place. It is difficult to find an explanation for this without pointing to similarities in the spiritual structure of both cultures.

The first fact that I would like to mention is that once in their history, both groups, the Germans as well as the Jews, experienced a prophetic movement of reform: the Jews in Prophecy, the Germans in the Reformation. Both movements represent a break in the immediate national self-realization of those con-
cerned. In both cases, in Prophethood as well as in the Reformation, something unconditional broke into the relativities and ambiguities of the national process of self-realization: the unconditional represented both judgment and demand. In both cases, national self-realization was never again achieved; and the break was never healed. It determined the history of both peoples. The Jews ceased to be a people of space after the break. They became a people of time. The break that the Reformation brought about in Germany produced a territorial insecurity and world-historical late onset of this special self-realization of the German nation. Therefore, we find in both peoples a surprisingly unique emphasis on space as a metaphysical problem. We are not concerned with the fact that space as the basis of national self-realization is an actual problem of politics everywhere; rather, we are concerned with the fact that in both cases the space problem was experienced as a metaphysical problem, namely as a problem of the final meaning of national existence.

A second structural analogy closely related to the first is the spiritual inner strife one finds in both peoples. It is frequently expressed in a mixture of self-hatred and self-over-estimation. I believe that when I make this statement it will be understood by both Germans and Jews. Naturally, we try as hard as possible to hide this fact from ourselves. Yet, every German who has spent much time with Jews, especially liberal Jews, and every foreigner who is in a position to regard the Germans objectively, will find this strange and contradictory mixture. In both cases, it represents destiny as well as character. “A man’s character is his fate,” says Heraclitus, and we can add, “His fate gives man his character.” It is a well-known fact that with few exceptions all great Germans have devastatingly criticized the German people. This criticism is something different from the natural self-criticism that we find in all peoples, and which is a necessary and healthy corrective of their self-acceptance. The great Germans who make this criticism do not do so in the hope that they can change the German character; rather their criticism is an act of despair. On the other hand, one finds in contemporary Judaism a certain anti-Semitism that is exhibited again and again even by the most intelligent and critical Jews. This is particularly sharply expressed in Marx’s writings about the Jews. This background lends the Jewish wit its distinctive character.

A counterweight to this negative feeling has developed in both peoples. In certain respects, all nations are conscious of being chosen, but this is more strongly developed in the Jews and in the Germans than anywhere else, and has assumed among them special forms. Allow me, in order to show you what I mean, to point to the consciousness of election among the most important western nations. In Aristotle’s Politics, we find an explanation of the fact that the Greeks are the only people who possess culture, while all other nations are barbaric. Aristotle seeks to explain this in spatial-climatic terms. The Greeks live neither in the east nor in the west, neither in the north nor in the south; they are the people of the middle. When we talk of the people of the middle, we are reminded of the Chinese consciousness of being called. The Roman consciousness of calling is well known. They did not say, “We have conquered a country.” They said, “We have brought this land back under the jurisdiction of the Roman people.” The Romans felt that they represented the Law and this consciousness made them certain that their imperialism was justified by destiny. In the Italians of the Renaissance, we find the feeling that an entire generation is born again, and as it were, on the ground of the old Roman Empire. Renascimento does not mean rebirth of a few individuals or rebirth of the arts and sciences, but it means the rebirth of the humanity of a certain age.

The French concept of election is something different. They felt themselves to be the bearers of modern civilization and thus they justified the imperialism of their Revolution and of the Napoleonic age. The English consciousness of being called can be described as the consciousness of a nation that it was their destiny to bring a purified Christianity, namely Protestantism, and Christian humanism to the backward peoples of the earth. The American sense of calling involves a new beginning, made in America, after the demons and conflicts of ancient Europe had been forgotten. In the Middle Ages, the Germans too, had a sense of calling in the consciousness of being the national center of unified Christianity. And for the medieval German emperors, this was not an ideology but reality. But when we come to modern times, we find no genuine sense of calling in the German people. As a result, it was possible for Hitler to proclaim the absurdities of a racial sense of vocation and, in as much as he was filling a vacuum, he was successful. The other possibility, realized in the so-called Realpolitik of the
19th century, was the powerful political nationalism of the Wilhelminian period. The ugliness and brutality of this period can only be understood when one is aware that it was not united with a consciousness of election. It is not my purpose to maintain that other peoples are better than the Germans. I am much more concerned with historical destiny. When power and consciousness of being elected are united, power ceases to be brutal power. For a unity is then produced which derives itself from the deepest roots of being, from the unity of being and value to the ground of being itself. Where this unity is lost, self-contempt is produced on the one side, and brutal, un-ideological will-to-power on the other.

With the Jews, things are somewhat different. We have mentioned the religiously-based consciousness of election as it is expressed in the Old Testament, where it applied first to the nation as a whole, and then “to the Remnant that was to be saved.” Prophetic criticism understood the consciousness of election in this way. The Jewish consciousness of being called becomes dangerous only when it loses its religious corrective. As a result, it is transformed into nationalism without self-criticism. Among the Germans as well as the Jews, a false consciousness of being elected produces inner schism and despair. Despair is the expression of an insurmountable schism. The wish to flee the self follows from despair. One of the least harmful and important forms of this wish to flee the self is the yearning for the unknown. This yearning is to be found to a greater degree in Germany than in any other nation I know. We all know about the yearning of the Germans for Greece during a classical period, the ever fresh and new yearning for Italy, the wish to imitate the French or the English, the hope for Russia and Asia. As soon as this yearning is fulfilled, and the German settles in one of these nations, he disappears among them as a German more rapidly than do the members of any other nation. This can only be understood as the secret wish of the Germans to deny themselves as Germans.

An analogy to this is the Jewish ability to adjust to every given situation. It is false to explain this ability as purely pragmatic. Other minorities, who were in much greater need have refrained from doing so. Behind the adaptability lies the deepest root of a lack of self-affirmation. An interesting proof of this is the emergence of a conservative Jew, of a man like Stahl, who became the great theoretician of the German conservative party. The conservatives found their intellectual defender in a Jew who had given up the naturally liberal, critical attitude of the Jews. In his political theory, he fought for the very order of society that had always suppressed him as a Jew and by which he could expect to be attacked at any moment in his own emancipated status. In this connection, Christian theologians of Jewish heritage are also interesting. After their conversion to Christianity, they are more radical in their criticism of Judaism than any other Christian theologian. They deny that from which they come. They are often of the greatest value to Christian theology because they see things that the native Christian theologian does not see. They themselves, however, are divided: they must suppress something in themselves and therefore they become fanatic. Here also, we find analogies between the Jewish and German existence. In both cases, the denial of self seeks ways in which to express itself.

The prophetic break, which both people experienced in their efforts to achieve national self-realization, has not only psychological but also sociological consequences. I mean that there is a gulf between the few who rise far above the average, not only of their own people but also of others, and the masses that are often inferior to the average of other peoples. In a nation that has experienced no such break, the representative personality emerges from the substance of the nation. It certainly does not merely reflect this substance. It transcends it in the direction of the new that makes history, but only in so far as this transcendence remains understandable to the average person. One can still observe this today in England. The great leaders are not separated in their substance from the masses. In Germany, the great leaders were always isolated. The masses never understood these leaders as an expression of their own consciousness. This is how the despair of so many great Germans becomes understandable. This is why the greatest bearers of culture in Germany tended to shut themselves off and to oppose the masses. I have in mind for instance the German classicists, above all Goethe, or the revolutionary groups of the mid-19th century, for example, Nietzsche. If, however, the leaders are not symbolic of what happens in the masses, if they do not represent the unconscious goal of average people, then the nations themselves remain unformed. If we look at other western nations, we observe in England the effect of the gentleman ideal on every individual Englishman, of the citizen ideal on every individual Frenchman,
of the ideal of the rights of man on every individual 
American. These ideals were created by a small 
group of leading individuals, but since they were 
expressions of that towards which the nation as a 
whole struggled, they possessed an extraordinary 
formative power.

As a young man, when I encountered French 
workers in the streets of Paris for the first time, I 
was astonished at the degree to which these people 
appeared to be civilized. In Germany, there 
prevailed the ideal of the civil servant, and above it, as 
the highest, the ideal of the officer, which only few 
could attain. But the ideal of the civil servant is not 
able to form human bonds except those that concern 
the official intercourse between civil servants and 
citizens. The civil servant ideal creates objective 
relations but no direct human contacts, or person-to-
person encounters. In this respect, therefore, a vac-
uum was formed. Human contacts remained unde-
veloped, and they are still undeveloped today, if one 
compares them with what has been attained in other 
countries. National Socialism broke into this signifi-
cant gap, for it found no resistance in a fully devel-
oped reality of human relations. This fact is not 
changed by the observation that individual relation-
ships in Germany achieve a depth, which in other 
nations is often made impossible by the general 
standardization of these relations.

In the Jewish situation, the analogy is as fol-
lows: there are, on the one hand, individuals who are 
the bearers of the prophetic spirit and of the highest 
cultural development. On the other hand, there is the 
average man who never adjusts himself completely 
to the standards created by the rest of the world in 
which the greater number of Jews must live. The 
entire history of the Jewish nation shows that it is 
impossible to make a whole nation subservient to the 
absolute ideal of the prophetic message. Hence, 
there develops a cleavage, similar to the schism to be 
found among the Germans, between the bearers of the 
unconditional demand and the masses who are in no 
way equal to this demand. The structural similiar-
ties between the German and the Jewish character, to 
which I have pointed, imply both a very strong at-
traction and extreme repulsion between them. It will 
be difficult for some of you to make value judg-
ments about yourself based on this analysis, and yet 
such an analysis must be attempted. I know that 
what I have said is not complete, but I believe none-
theless that it clarifies the relationship between the 
two peoples better than the factors to which I would 
now like to turn—factors that were certainly opera-
tive but perhaps not finally decisive.

There is an extensive literature on the political 
and social origins of recent events in Germany. As 
far as economics is concerned, I am dependent on 
the analyses of experts. It seems to me correct to say, 
however, that in capitalistic society the Jews re-
ceived protection from the ruling class because they 
were indispensable as brokers of capital. The more 
this free brokerage of capital declined in importance 
as a result of the development of monopolistic and 
state capitalism, the more the rule of the Jews de-
creased and the more they lost the protection of the 
ruling classes. But the question is, why do the Jews 
need such protection? And why do the attacks and 
persecutions set in when the protecting groups are no 
longer interested in exercising their function? I have 
already described the origin and development of re-
ligious anti-Judaism. With respect to the present 
situation, it is important to understand why religious 
anti-Judaism developed into political anti-Judaism 
and why political anti-Judaism developed into po-
litical anti-Semitism. It is well known that Germany 
did not initiate this development. In the realm of 
theory, the French and the English were in the lead. 
The social (but never the political) segregation of the 
Jews was much more effective in America than in 
pre-Hitler Germany. On the other hand, in America 
Jews segregate themselves voluntarily to a much 
larger extent than anywhere in western Europe since 
the time of the emancipation. The city of New York 
contains the largest and most influential Jewish 
population in the world. It is the largest Jewish city 
anywhere. But the Jews are concentrated in special 
sections of the city, and this segregation is volun-
tary, not enforced. A problem arises only when indi-
viduals break away from these segregated groups 
and seek to find a place in the rest of society. They 
have greater difficulty finding such a place than they 
would have had in Germany around the year 1900. 
Naturally, all of this cannot, in any way, be com-
pared to what happened in Germany under Hitler.

Since the 13th century, religious anti-Semitism in 
all European countries was used to divert criticism 
from the ruling classes to a minority. The despair of 
the masses in economic crises was successfully al-
lowed to vent itself in this way. At the same time, 
the ruling classes were enabled to enrich themselves 
at the cost of the Jews. This diversionary anti-
Judaism has produced horrible but always only oc-
casional persecution of the Jews. Systematic anti-
Semitism is an invention of the naturalistic anthropology of the late 19th century. The biological theory of race that was based on certain definite observations was misused in a dilettantish and distorted way for political purposes. This development played into the hands of totalitarian dictatorship, which requires an absolute enemy, and would have to create one if he did not exist.

There is nothing more absurd, nothing more irrational, than political anti-Semitism. The reasons advanced in order to rationalize anti-Semitism cancel each other out. When one engages in criticism, one normally intends to change that which one criticizes. But nothing would be more disagreeable to an anti-Semitic person than the idea that the “Jew” would undergo a change under the impact of his criticism. Normally, individuals are held responsible for misconduct or for a criminal act. The anti-Semite holds no individual responsible. He establishes the picture of a group of people who are guilty by being who they are. Personal responsibility, and therefore the demand to treat a person as a person, disappears. In the case of a criminal act, the criminal is declared guilty as a criminal, if a non-Jew is involved. But when a Jew is involved, he is declared guilty because he is a Jew. When one brings these absurdities to mind, one is tempted to doubt the Stoic teaching that every man naturally partakes of universal reason. Or one must assume that mass psychoses can put apparently reasonable people into a state of mind in which they cease to take part in universal reason. In the Middle Ages, one accused a real collective, the Ghetto, in most cases unjustly, but yet with some appearance of reason. Today, one accuses a type, not a collective and not an individual. This is related to the naturalistic dehumanization of man, with the progressive “objectification” of the personal dimension in an industrial society. The absurdity of all this becomes clear when the instinctive anti-Semite encounters a real Jew. The real Jew is then always looked upon as an exception to the rule. In the encounter with the real Jew, the fiction of the type becomes invalid. It cannot be verified. But the anti-Semite wants the picture to be true, and therefore the individual Jew is looked upon as an exception. Typological thinking is unhistorical. It is unable to acknowledge that personalities and groups are subject to historical change. It cannot believe that the type that it attacks can change, and therefore it must be exterminated.

Biological thinking stresses hereditary factors in the formation of the type, without scientific justification to be sure. Acquired characteristics are not inherited, and most characteristics that constitute the picture of the typical Jew are acquired characteristics. They are the result of special sociological conditions, and they change with these conditions. Modern depth psychology makes it very clear that childhood influences, influences that depend on the general and specific environment in which the child grows up, determine character. But such arguments have no effect upon the anti-Semite. The dogma is fixed and the dogma says the Jew is a type. Type is opposed to history, nature is opposed to personality, and inherited characteristics are opposed to acquired characteristics. But when the type is placed above history, a human being is no longer perceived as a human being.

Anti-Semites claim that, from the point of view of other nations, Jewish nature is sensed as something strange. Without a doubt, we are dealing here with something strange or alien. But when I heard the word “strange,” especially in a negative sense, I think of the answer Hamlet gives to the soldier who says, “O day and night, but this is wondrous strange...” namely, “And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.” Strange things are welcome and unwelcome. The foreign element is unwelcome when it is a part of an individual character that cannot be incorporated in the whole. It is like a foreign body that enters a biological organism, and which the organism must either incorporate or reject; if neither of these steps is successful, the organism perishes. Every social minority breaks up the integral nature of the social group. This is the difference between the stranger within and the stranger outside the group. We have seen that Germans love that which is foreign, partly because they want to be rid of themselves by losing themselves in what is strange. But they cannot tolerate the foreign element alive among them, because it wrenches them from their unquestioning self-affirmation, and because their self-realization is so weak that it cannot admit anything foreign. Thus, there arises a feeling of anxiety. Anything alien among the Germans produces anxiety concerning their own self-realization. Perhaps one can put the matter this way: for the German subconscious, the Jew is too near to be welcomed as a stranger, and not near enough to be experienced as an integral part of the nation.
This, therefore, has a reverse effect: the Jew is put into a situation in which what is described in terms of type is accentuated in reality. Completely disregarding the grim caricature of a perverted typology, such as appeared in *Der Stürmer*, there still remain special characteristic traits that are accentuated because their owners are treated as strangers.

Therefore, one can say: ideally as well as really, anti-Semitism creates that against which it fights. And it must create it, since it cannot be found in reality. The anti-Semite is frightened by the mirror that the Jew holds up to him. There are moments in which we dislike, even detest ourselves, when we see ourselves in a mirror. The mirror tells us what we are for the others who look at us. In many utterances of cultured Jews, there is something that the Germans regard as a “mirror.” The German knows that the mirror tells the truth, but he cannot bear the reflection, and therefore he reacts against the person who holds it up to him. This does not mean that the person who creates the mirror does not need a mirror himself and would probably react to one in a similar way. I speak neither philo-Semitically nor anti-Semitically but analytically.

**Lecture Three**

The central subject of today’s lecture is the Jewish question as a religious problem. The remarks of the second lecture concerning the break in Israel’s and Germany’s history through a prophetic movement, already give a hint of the fact that in the last resort the Jewish problem can only be understood as a religious problem. It is not sufficient to make sociological and socio-psychological analyses as we have done in the second lecture. The reason for this is that the history of the Jewish people is marked by something unique and particular that can only be understood in the light of a religious analysis. The sociological question leads directly to the religious question. For although it is possible to apply all well-known sociological categories to the history of the Jewish people, once this history is described, there is need for a yet more profound discussion of the question: why did such a history occur?

Surely, a group like the Jews that has existed for 3000 years can become the object of diversionary tactics. Such a group can be caricatured as a type, and psychological conflicts can be found within the group itself. But the decisive question is: how is it that such a group exists? We have spoken of Christian anti-Judaism, which appears throughout church history beginning at the time of the New Testament. But this too is not a sufficient explanation for the basic fact. Christianity also opposed other minorities but no case even closely resembles Christian anti-Judaism. And here we come to the basic problem of these lectures, that is, the theological problem. Today, therefore, I want to offer a theological analysis, and then in the last lecture apply the insights, which this theological analysis will provide for us, to the Jewish and German situation.

Perhaps some of you think that the philosophical and theological trains of thought that we wish to follow today are beside the point. But I hope to be able to show you that these peripheral trains of thought lead to the heart of our subject.

Wherever the holy is encountered, it is the experience of that which concerns us unconditionally, that which we cannot push aside. We cannot limit it, either in time or in space. It comes upon us with an absolute demand. Wherever that which concerns us unconditionally manifests itself, it possesses two sides. On the one hand, it manifests itself as that which is present, which grasps us, which antecedes all action and thought. The holy cannot be derived from something else, neither from moral perfection nor from truth. The holy includes goodness and truth, but it is not created by them; it is their ultimate root. The other side of the holy is that it is never completely finished, that it is always challenging, demanding perfection and promising fulfillment. The holy contains the tension between that which is and that which ought to be, a tension that reaches down into the deepest roots of all being. The tension between the two elements of the holy has a polar character. One pole limits the other. As soon as this alternating dependence is questioned, conflicts occur. What belongs together is torn apart and the parts move against one another. Being and what-ought-to-be struggle against one another. To be sure, this struggle can never issue in a complete separation, since the sphere of the holy itself would come to an end if one of the two poles disappeared completely.

The holy, insofar as it is present, has sacramental character and is preserved and actualized by the priest. The holy, insofar as it is a demand, has prophetic character and this demand is the norm of the holy. Both poles are to be found throughout the history of religion. Everywhere, there is a more priestly-sacramental or a more social-prophetic type. If there is only the priestly pole, the sacrament turns...
the representative of God on earth, the emphasis of Catholic Church. In the dogma of the infallibility of the higher degrees is greater than that of the lower ones, regardless of the personal qualities of the bearers. The complete picture of such a sacramental system is the Roman Catholic Church. In the dogma of the infallibility of the representative of God on earth, the emphasis of the holy presence has found an unsurpassable expression. And yet, an element of challenging demand is not entirely missing in such a system. This element comes alive as the doctrinal and moral law that is mediated through the hierarchy. But in the sacramental system, the demand is an internal part of the system; it can never be opposed to the system as such.

Things are entirely different at the opposite pole: the demand does not remain bound to the sacramental; rather it breaks away from and turns against the system itself. In this case, the system is also criticized by reference to elements that are themselves part of the system. The bearer of this criticism is the prophet. He does not criticize from the outside as the enlightener does, but from within, speaking as the representative of the will of God against the priestly-sacramental system. For example, the prophet proclaims the social consequences of the commandment of love over against the mechanical and socially indifferent practice of ritual piety. The prophet is not a prophesier; that is to say, he is not characterized by the fact that he can predict the future. To speak as a prophet means to speak the will of God, to express threats and promises, but not romantically by means of signs to predict future destinies. The prophet is the one who proclaims the will of God and attacks sharply that which is done in the name of the holy against the unconditional demand. This does not mean that the prophet opposes the sacramental as such. It is not his function to deny priestly piety. But the prophet denies the sacramental as soon as it claims to accomplish sanctification by itself regardless of the sanctity of the commandment. He opposers the magical misuse of the holy. He is concerned with the social situation and the injustices in it that the priestly type either ignores or even practices himself.

The prophetic type is the Father-type and its stands in contrast to the sacramental Mother-type. In the prophet, the tradition turns against itself and breaks its own immediacy and certainty. The individual is directly confronted by God and his unconditional demand. The priesthood loses its mediating position. The authority of the hierarchy breaks up. The degrees of holiness lose their meaning inasmuch as everyone is equally unable to live up to the absolute demand. The taboo that protected the church and her representative from criticism disappears. The prophet criticizes everyone who tries to hide behind the sacramental taboo. And yet, here the
power of the holy is not undone. The prophet makes his demand not on the basis of an abstract moral law, but rather on the basis of the covenant through which God has pledged himself to his people, or by reference to the events on which the church rests.

These two types, which have been briefly described, each emphasize another element of the holy. Both poles, however, stand in a particular relation to the categories of space and time. And this is of decisive importance for our problem: the sacramental as the holy that is given can be grasped and seen. One can deal with it; it is bound to this place; it is limited by space. The holy is given; one can see, hear, and taste it; it is present in this thing, this event, this person, this group. Everything that exists must have its own space. To be means to be in a space. This is meant in a simple geographical sense; in order to exist we must have a place in the world or on the earth. But beyond all this there is also a spiritual, social, and political space, a space where we are at home, which limits us and protects us from being devoured by an infinite number of possibilities. We must have somewhere not only as possibility but also actuality. To be actual means to be present, and to be present means to have an opposite, a place where we stand and from which we look at what is opposite.

This analysis of the relations between space and sacramental holiness enables us to understand polytheism, this puzzling phenomenon in the history of mankind. The gods of polytheism are gods limited by space. This is their power and this is their boundary. Not plurality but adjacency characterizes polytheism. Adjacency constitutes space. In polytheism, adjacent spaces are given unlimited validity; people obtain holiness, which is symbolized by gods who control a certain space, be it geographic space which is reserved for a god, or a social space over which a god rules, or a sphere of values represented by a god. Restriction of the holy to space leads to the conflicts between god and god that characterize polytheism. The holy, that which concerns us ultimately, is itself unconditioned. Each polytheistic god, therefore, makes a universal demand upon us. He presses beyond the space reserved for him, and wants to conquer all space. Political imperialism is merely one side of the imperialism of polytheistic gods. It is the imperialism of a god who, on the one hand, is absolute, and, on the other, is bound by space. This results in the struggle for universal space. The passion, the impetus, the dedication without which there would not have been an empire, follow from the feeling of an absolute demand which one’s own space and the god representing this space must make. Naturally, a will to power, as well as the full weight of economic interests, stands behind every imperialism. But history has also shown that, without the impetus, which faith in the superiority of one’s own god or one’s own system of values provides, imperialism has no possibility of being realized.

This structure produces the conflict of the gods and with it the conflict of the empires and their mutual destruction. It is as in individual life where the conflict of absolute values leads to the destruction of the individual personality. Either the unity of the personal center breaks up or one value subjugates all others, but in such a way that they are suppressed without being included in the unity. In both cases, the personality is threatened. The same is true with respect to imperialism and its polytheistic background. Polytheism is not something of the past. Polytheism is an omnipresent possibility. Every nation and every group has the tendency to absolutize its own space in the name of the holy, and to oppose every other space. This age-old conflict of polytheism results in the justification of social and political injustice. Sacral injustice is the background of all other injustice because it gives a religious blessing to injustice. This can be observed in a feudal order where the lower sacral ranks are suppressed by the higher ones; or in the suppression of one nation or race by another that places itself at the top of the polytheistic order of values. This is the world against which the prophets had to fight and against which the prophetic spirit must fight in every age.

In every sphere of the prophetic, not space but time is decisive, and since the future is the authoritative mode of time, prophecy is directed to the future. Surely, since everything that exists must have a place, the prophetic also originates in a particular place; however, it breaks up the confinement to this place, not in favor of a universal space as in imperialism, but rather in favor of time. There is no story that would be as characteristic of this situation as the story of Abraham’s call. Here everything we have said about the conflict between space and time is expressed in classical symbols. Abraham is called out of the space to which he is bound, away from the social, cultural, and religious ties that gave him his being. He is called out of space into time. The sacram tally consecrated space that he shared with everyone
is broken through. This does not mean that space as space is denied. He is to go into a country that God will show him. But future space remains undetermined. It is a space that is determined by the mode of the future, and the future is the decisive mode of time.

The event symbolized in Abraham’s call has always repeated itself in Jewish history. The event through which Israel was created as an historical reality is traditionally called Exodus, the going out from a space, namely out of Egypt where Israel lived, even if not independently. The later history is a history of perpetual exile, which means banishment from the space to which one belongs. Israel’s history becomes a history of the Diaspora, i.e., the dispersion into other nations and a new exile, namely banishment from these nations. The Jewish people also have a space; without one, they could of course not be. But it is not their own space. It is a guest-space and the guest-space is not secure since it can be and has been refused at any time. This means the transition of the Jewish people from confinement to space to connection to time. This has a threefold consequence: the line of time is the line of history; it to space to connection to time. This has a threefold consequence: the line of time is the line of history; it is the line of monotheism; and it is the line of justice.

History as history is determined by the future. Written history has to do with the past, but life in history is the life that moves into the future. The Historismus of the late 19th century confused the writing of history with the living of history, and it created that mentality of the late bourgeoisie that was marked by a tremendous historical knowledge and no consciousness of history. History is pointed to something indefinite, something new, something other than that from which one comes. History does not repeat itself. Something new is created by it. Historical time, therefore, is irreversible. Physical time can be reversed, but not historical time.

History, therefore, is always a history of the struggle with the demands of the gods of space. Hence, the nation that represents time against space is necessarily the enemy of all space-limited nationalisms and imperialisms. There existed a Roman anti-Judaism before there was a Christian one. In the Roman pantheon, the gods of all spaces were gathered together, but they were all subject to the god of Roman space. And the Romans felt that the Jews, through the God of time whom they served, attacked the space of the Empire. He was not the ultimate and absolute for the Romans and for their subject nations. The feeling of the Romans was justified. Judaism represents an attack on the pantheon of the gods because it is essentially monotheism bound to time. Polytheism is not merely a plurality of gods; monotheism does not mean one god against many. Rather, polytheism means being bound to the gods of space, and monotheism means being bound to the God of time. As long as the Jewish god, as a national Jewish god, stands over other national gods, he is a polytheistic god bound by all space like all others, even if he is only one. Only when the prophetic criticism cut through the bond between Jahweh and his people, did the God of Israel become the God of monotheism. This happened when he became the God of time.

The God of time is universal, and so is the God of justice. God is not bound to Israel if Israel breaks the covenant based on justice. It was one of the greatest events in the history of mankind when Amos, the first of the great prophets, threatened Israel with destruction and divided God from his assigned space. The pagan gods are virtually dependent upon their space. They live from the sacrifice that a historical group offers them. The God of Amos proclaims that every appeal to election and the priestly cult is in vain if justice is destroyed. Amos’s proclamation, which was taken up by all prophets, represents the hour of the birth of genuine monotheism, a monotheism that is different from the polytheism that knows only one god. The god of genuine monotheism stands against every sacra!ly blessed injustice. He denies all sacramentally based privileges; he subjects the bearers of the holy to what should be, to judgment, and to promise. He is the God of history and of time.

The history of Judaism is a constant conflict between the power of space to which everything that exists is subjected, and the demands of time that are torn out of the securities of space. The making of the covenant, the choosing of Israel, the presence of God in Israel, the gift of the Law, and the community of God and people stand in opposition to the breach of the covenant by Israel, the division between God and nation, and judgment and rejection. Rejection does not invalidate the election. There is always a remnant that remains obedient to the God of time and carries on Judaism’s function to be the people of time. Judaism, therefore, remains for all time a thorn in the flesh of all idols of space, all nationalisms and all imperialisms.
Christianity, too, is part of this history. In the proclamation of John the Baptist, one finds a radical attack on the particular, nationalistic tendency in Jewish history. Jesus continues this proclamation. This is why the first Christians thought of themselves as fulfillers of the prophetic tradition of Judaism. They believed that, for the first time, in the event that they called the appearance of the Christ, complete universality was reached; and the principles of monotheism and justice were accomplished. Christianity was justified in having this faith as it broke through the space limitations of Judaism and gathered the elect from all peoples. Christianity also did not avoid the conflict between space and time. The faith that the Messiah had already come could lead to a new space limitation. Neither Mount Sinai, nor Mount Zion, but rather Golgotha is the spatial center for Christian thought. What occurred on this mountain at approximately 30 AD determines the entire future. In this event, the Holy appears. It has acquired presence and sacramental reality.

Christ can be called the first sacrament of Christianity. He is the source of all the sacraments in the church and, on this basis, the early Catholic church with its strong cultic-sacramental elements was formed; and on this basis, the church of the Middle Ages developed, with Rome as its holy space. And yet, the prophetic element in Christianity has not been lost. Christianity speaks of a second coming of Christ. Christianity knows the boundaries of fulfillment within the church; Christianity knows that the fulfillment must yet come. Thus Christianity stands in tension between the holy that is given and the holy that is to come, between the “already” and the “not yet” of fulfillment. The question is always which of the two elements is stressed. If the “already” is stressed, then the sacramental achieves a strong upper hand. The religious life turns towards the past, to tradition, authority, and to everything in which the given holy appears—people, holy writings, infallible dogma, liturgical forms. Polytheistic tendencies make themselves felt, and justice suffers damage. That is the background of all theological attacks of the Jews upon Christianity.

In a conversation with a Jewish friend, I was told that he would find it impossible to call someone “the Christ” who had not changed reality. As historical reality, the twentieth century is not more perfect than the first. World history, as such, does not provide an argument for the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ. And how could one, said he, call someone the Christ whose work has failed? Such discussions disclose the struggle between time and space, which is a struggle between Judaism and Christianity as well as a conflict within Judaism and within Christianity.

The conflict within Christianity is sharpened by the fact that the Christian nations give their own national culture the sacramental blessing of Christianity. The holy, which is seen as present in the church, is used in order to give a blessing to the national reality and thus to make it absolute. This resulted in the unity of church and state as it was established relatively early among Christian peoples. It made prophetic criticism of the state as well as of the church almost impossible. The establishment of the Christian state-church meant an almost complete conquest of the prophetic by the sacramental. And yet, the prophetic was not dead in Christianity. Church history exhibits continuing inner-church prophetic reactions against the sacramental-hierarchical reality. The bearers of these reactions were frequently the so-called sects that the great churches commonly treated with contempt. But not only have many of these sects themselves become large churches, the sects, even when suppressed by the church, represented an attack on the church in its identity with the state and society. The critique by the sects is directed against the attempt of sacramental religion to remove itself from every prophetic criticism. In this sense, the sects have continued what the prophets began: they keep alive the holy as a demand as well as an anticipation of the future.

The Reformation also was such a prophetic reaction. The principle of Protestantism is the prophetic principle, namely the rejection of the claim of anything finite that by virtue of its consecration is entitled to take the place of God. Such a claim was advanced by the sacramental church of the Middle Ages and it is emphatically continued in modern Catholicism. This is why there exists a close relationship between Protestantism and Judaism. This is why Luther believed that it would be possible, on the basis of a common prophetic protest, to absorb Judaism into the Protestant movement; this is why he was deeply disappointed when this did not occur.

There are prophetic and quasi-prophetic movements, not only within the religious spheres but also in the cultural. The struggle of the Enlightenment against the tyranny of the churches, against the superstitions and the distortions of Christianity in all of its forms, was a prophetic attack in secular terminol-
Jews are and must remain the people of time. When they fall victim to a bondage to space. The national groups and over against the Christian churches keep the spirit of prophecy awake over against nationalism, the question of the relation between Judaism and Christianity. We are especially able to say what the function of Judaism is again and again driven out of his own space. The Jews are and must remain the people of time.

**Lecture Four**

The question which is to be answered in today’s lecture is this: what does the fundamental religious analysis offered in the third lecture mean for the groups we have mentioned—the Jews, the Germans, and the Christians?

To begin with, when I consider Judaism in relation to space and time, as a non-Jew, I feel a certain insecurity. This insecurity is multiplied by the fact that, as has been shown in the last lecture, the usual sociological categories are inadequate for a description of Judaism. It must be stated, first of all, that Judaism is not a religious community in the same sense that is true for most other world religions. One cannot compare the Jews with a group of Buddhists or Muslims who live in the oriental world and who have preserved the religion of their fathers. The position of Judaism within Christianity is qualitatively different from that of any other religious minority. And yet, Judaism is a religious community. The category “religious community” is and is not applicable to the Jews.

The same is true of the word nation. In the 18th century, one spoke of a Jewish nation, but Judaism is not a nation like other nations. It did not come into being through *natus*, through birth, nor is it preserved by historical destiny. Judaism, in contrast to other nations, is a people whose character and existence are determined by religion. This is something unique and singular. But every consideration of historical phenomena must acknowledge such appearances and yet must not dissolve them in general categories. One could say that in Jewish history, history has expressed her secret. In Greek history, by contrast, history has kept its secret hidden; history remains subject to nature, and time remains subject to space. When we regard Judaism from this point of view, we must say that Judaism is a nation, but a nation in a unique sense. It is people and not-people in the same sense in which it is church and not-church. The situation of Judaism, of being people and not-people, is expressed by the fact that the Jew is again and again driven out of his own space.

Let us look more critically at the concept of the Diaspora, the dispersion, which we mentioned in the previous lecture. For Jewry, the Diaspora is not an historical accident but rather an idea that expresses the character of the Jew himself. With reference to space, the Jews live necessarily in dispersion. Whenever a nation is dispersed among other nations, it is absorbed by them; the problem of Diaspora is solved through adaptation. This is not true for the Jews for whom the Diaspora is a genuine destiny. To say “nation of time” or “nation-that-is-not-a-nation” is the same thing. The majority of Jews, whenever they feel or recognize this situation, try to avoid it. This is not a moral defect but rather the almost inevitable result of the contradictory situation in which the Jews find themselves. There are two ways in which one can avoid Diaspora. The first is assimilation. One avoids the conditions of Diaspora by giving up that side of Jewish existence according to which it is a nation; one identifies himself with the foreign space in which one lives, not only geographically but also psychologically, sociologically, and culturally. Giving up the nation-element does not necessarily mean giving up the religious elements. One can be assimilated without becoming a Christian. I think of specific groups of American
Jews, in particular the liberal ones. Here an astoundingly broad cultural assimilation has taken place, and yet the same group did not have to give up its particular religious existence. Where, however, assimilation succeeds, the meaning of the Diaspora, namely the special mission that Judaism has in the dispersion, has become lost. Then, frequently, the religious separation is also lost, and a total submersion into the Christian culture takes place.

Although the Jewish assimilation has suffered shipwreck in Europe, there are (especially in America) still Jewish circles that attempt this solution. In general, however, Judaism has taken another road and followed it with amazing energy. It is the attempt of Judaism to create a new space for itself that is its own space. This happened in the Zionist movement. The success of Zionism, the creation of a Jewish state, and the settlement of Palestine, means the end of the Diaspora for a considerable number of Jews. This is true not only of the function of Judaism and of the sociological categories to which we have pointed, but it is also true also of the spiritual structure. Qualities that characterize the Jews in the Diaspora disappear. Their responsibility for their own land and people produce ideas and ideals that are similar to those against which Judaism has fought in foreign lands. The position of the basic classes of society (for example, the agricultural population) becomes similar to the position of the same classes in other lands. The bearers of Judaism as a genuine nation speak and act like the bearers of the national consciousness in other nations. This does not remain unnoticed by those Jews who hold fast to Judaism as a people of time and to the Diaspora as its symbol. Sharp conflicts arise from this reality in the new nation as well as in the numerically much larger Diaspora. One is critical of the establishment of a Jewish state, an event that goes way beyond that which earlier Zionists wanted. Or one tries, once the Jewish state exists, to organize it theocratically, namely to subject the whole of national life to the religious ideal. That is the way of certain orthodox groups within the Jewish state. In the daily conflicts resulting from this structure of Israel’s national existence, there is manifested the old paradox of the nation that is no nation and that of the religious community which is no such thing. When one calls the aim of these groups “theocratic,” one must not confuse “theocratic” with “hierarchic.” Hierarchy is the rule of priests, and theocracy is the rule of God, expressed through the laity and theologians. A secular state can be theocratic but it cannot be hierarchic. It is theocratic whenever the laws of its existence, the laws of the family, of the schools, of justice, are subordinated to basic religious law. In a theocracy, the will of God is the basis for political structure. It is, however, naturally questionable whether it is possible to construct a modern national state on a theocratic basis. The development of Israel to date speaks against this.

These are two ways in which many Jews seek to avoid the metaphysical destiny of the Diaspora. The question is whether one is justified to condemn this evasion morally or religiously. A glance at the history of Israel in Old Testament times makes it easy to find an answer. Every attempt to identify the Kingdom of God with a nation must fail. This was the problem with which all leading men of the Old Testament had to struggle. They discovered that the chosen people constantly resisted that for which they were called, that they constantly betrayed their mission and the covenant on which the mission was based. On the other hand, these men could not believe that divine providence is destroyed by human guilt. The solution to which they were driven was the idea of the “holy remnant” as the bearer of demand and promise. This is an idea in which despair in human possibility is blended with faith in God. When, in view of this solution, we consider the existence of the many Jewish people in the world, we must ask ourselves whether it makes sense to condemn the average Jew in the world for wanting to escape the fate of the dispersion or for refusing to belong to the nation of time, the nation without its own space. The problem was simpler when the social form of the ghetto, into which the Jews were forced, made an escape impossible. There was then only one way to escape, namely conversion to Christianity, and this was almost completely impossible psychologically. This situation no longer exists. An escape, be it through adjustment, be it through immigration to Palestine, is possible. Can one say, therefore, that Jews who chose either of these two ways have done something that gives us the right to condemn them? Can one demand of the average Jew, who after all is an average human being, that he belong to the “holy remnant” merely because he is born as a Jew? Apparently, one cannot. And one cannot, above all, do this when one stands outside the Jewish community and demands something that one does not take upon oneself.
Once this is recognized, we must ask the question: is it possible that the space that Israel has found as its own space may lead to new embodiments of the prophetic spirit, and that from this new impulses will arise for Israel, as well as for the Diaspora? This seems possible in view of the fact that this space is psychologically and sociologically completely filled by the Jewish spirit. On the other hand, this seems to be impossible in view of the dangers that arise when a nation is confined to a certain space. We cannot calculate history. My question is a question directed to the future and it is a hope for the future. It is also calculate history. My question is a question directed to the future and it is a hope for the future. It is also possible, however, that modern nationalism will triumph completely, that Israel will become a nation that is only a nation, and that the element of the re-

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to the future and it is a hope for the future. It is also possible, however, that modern nationalism will triumph completely, that Israel will become a nation that is only a nation, and that the element of the religious community will be lost. Concerning this fear, one can offer reasons and counter-reasons, and there is no certainty.

We come now to the second question: what results from this analysis for the German situation? We could say we no longer need to consider this solution because of the fact that the Jews have almost completely disappeared from German life. But this is no solution. For the individual Jew is not the object of anti-Semitism but rather “the picture of the Jew” as a type, about which we have spoken in the second lecture, is the object. And this type would remain in the psyche of the anti-Semite even if no single Jew lived in Germany; indeed, it would remain even if all Jews were to disappear from the face of the earth. What would happen then would be that one would look for another object of this typification. The typical picture of the Jew is determined not by the reality that it describes but rather the functions that it must fulfill. One of these functions is the transfer of the dissatisfaction of the masses with the ruling classes onto a minority. Another is the transfer of self-hate onto an object that one can hate. A third function is the possibility to accuse another specific group, of being responsible for one’s failure to achieve external success. These functions are constant. And they produce anti-Semitism or, if there were no more Jews, another anti-movement would take over the same function. The disappearance of the Jews would be no solution of the anti-Semitic problem. It is, however, also no solution if one removes the exaggerated negative side in the picture of the typified Jew and replaces it by an over-emphasis upon the positive side. Many Germans are at this time driven to such philo-Semitism by a bad conscience but there is no solution in this because it is

insincere, even if it is subjectively sincere. It is without stability since it is anti-Semitism turned upside down. Many Jews react to the exaggerated praise of themselves no more comfortably than to the distorted disparagement of themselves. They feel that these positive and negative sentiments come from the same source, namely from an aggression that has turned itself inside out and is transformed into its opposite but remains basically aggression.

It is also no solution to adopt a patronizing friendliness toward the Jews and to try to fight anti-Semitism with enlightenment. Enlightenment would be meaningful only if anti-Semitism had rational roots. But since it does not, one can rationally refute every single reproach that is made against the Jews. In such a case, another criticism will quickly occur which one can easily refute factually only to be confronted by a new objection. This game can go on endlessly, since the picture of the type is unchangeable, and since anti-Semitism is determined by its function and not by factual content. Attempts at enlightenment are not entirely worthless even if they only serve to have us come to know one another. One part of all animosity between people depends on the fact that a distorted picture is superimposed upon the reality of the other one. When I was about to travel in Italy about five years after the First World War, I was criticized by a shocked Marburg colleague who felt that a German should not go into a country that belonged to “the enemy camp.” These people had an instinctive feeling for the fact that one must cut oneself off in order that the picture of such a thing as an “enemy camp” may not be disturbed by the reality of the real enemies. This is the reason why anti-Semitism is almost always destroyed when the not-yet fully fanatical anti-Semite meets a real Jew. Nevertheless, this is not really effective since anti-Semitism has a perverse function in the household of the soul: it springs immediately again into being with the assertion that this specific Jew is an exception. Therefore, one can make individual people stop and think by means of enlightenment and personal encounter or one can try to protect individuals from becoming victims of its perverted structure as long as they not yet exposed to it. Yet, I would say that this is also not a solution for the problem of the relationship between the Germans and the Jews. It can be important in individual cases, but it does not lead to a fundamental change in the situation. Therefore, we must ask: is there a solution
which goes deeper, which can transform the basic relationship between Germans and Jews?

This question leads us back to the five-fold German guilt that I mentioned earlier. The first solution of the “Jewish question as a German problem” is that the past be purified. The past can be purified not by confessions of guilt but rather by an inward assumption of responsibility for what happened without covering it up by a quantitative balancing of guilt and punishment. If this does not happen, if this “cleansing sacrifice,” which is a genuine sacrifice, does not take place, I see no solution of the Jewish question as a German problem. I do not have public declarations in mind; I do not believe that human beings will take guilt upon themselves when this guilt is not theirs (in terms of our first definition of guilt). Rather, I have in mind that the responsibility for what happened must necessarily be acknowledged by every German. If one were able to apply the concepts of depth psychology to groups, one would say that the German people must undergo a collective analysis that would raise up the past into consciousness; such an analysis would have to approach the unconscious in order to understand the unconscious background of the tendency to typify the Jew as Jew. Such a collective analysis would uncover the irrational and perverted structures that lie at the base of the anti-Semitism of recent German history. I believe that the problem of the Jews and Germans cannot be resolved without such a collective analysis. It is obvious that a collective analysis cannot be brought about by having every single individual analyzed but rather by having those who mold public consciousness subject themselves to this painful process.

Let me talk, as an analyst would, about a symptom that in and of itself is not important but is meaningful as a symptom: when I returned to Germany, after an absence of fifteen years, I was struck by the fact that the Germans always spoke of other nations in the singular. They said, as they still do today, “the Jew,” “the Russian,” “the Englishman,” “the German.” Before Hitler’s time this expression did not exist. I often asked myself, “What has happened?” In my time, one spoke of “the Jews,” “the Germans,” “the Russians.” Today people of whom one cannot say that they consciously wish to stereotype use the singular. I believe that the general tendency to stereotype lies behind this expression. The individual human being who belongs to a nation or to a race is no longer regarded as an individual. One sees the individual only through the image of the type. When one says, “the American,” one abstracts from everything that distinguishes the individual American person, and one refuses to see that this is refuted by every single American person. Such stereotyping is disastrous when it occurs between nations and races. It was disastrous for the relationship between the Germans and the Jews. And it was and is all the more disastrous when it occurred in the unconscious and embodied itself in the language.

A third possible solution of the Jewish question as a German problem can be found in something that the Germans can learn from the Anglo-Saxons, namely sober judgment of an actual situation. It is not sober to see the Jews or any other group in the image of an abstract type, above all when this type has been formed by hostility. Nor is it sober to see the Jews in terms of an ideal type. It would be sensible to say that they are neither worse nor better than average human beings; it would be sensible to say that they have specific historically determined characteristics for which Christian anti-Judaism is in part responsible.

A fourth possible solution of the Jewish question as a German problem is the need for the German to overcome his inferiority complex and the attempt to compensate for it by arrogance. Arrogance that transcends the sober recognition of the integral value of every living being is always the result of an inferiority complex. He who is certain of himself, he who boldly takes upon himself his guilt and responsibility, does not think of himself as inferior nor is he arrogant. It seems decisive to me for the German people to become sober about themselves through collective analysis, in order to discover the ability to be sober in relation to the Jews as well as to other nations.

A fifth possible solution of the problem is the integration of the Germans in western civilization. This is necessary not because of any present military requirements but because the unity of Christian humanistic culture is being threatened at its deepest level, perhaps more so than we know. I do not have in mind primarily the present political constellation but rather two events in the German past that prevented Germany from opening itself completely to Christian humanism. The first event was the failure of the Romans in their attempt to conquer middle and north Germany and to bring to it, with the conquest, the values of Greco-Roman antiquity. The second event I have in mind is the way in which
northwest Germany resisted Christianity and was forcefully converted by Charlemagne, and therefore never opened itself from within to Christian values as much as western and southern Germany did. Thus, northwest Germany became a fertile soil for the pagan elements of National Socialism. The German nation can achieve an understanding of the prophetic-humanistic character of Judaism only if it finds its proper place in the Christian humanism of the west.

This suggests a final problem: what is the religious solution of the Christian-Jewish problem? I have already pointed out the need for Christendom to accept the Old Testament as an integral portion of the Christian Bible, and the religion of the Old Testament as an integral element of Christian existence. I have pointed out that, as early as the first centuries, religious syncretism invaded Christianity and turned against the Old Testament. The Old Testament represents the God of time, of creation, of justice, of redemption, the God of prophetic judgment and promise. Where this concept is missing, the Christian congregation is changed back into a pagan sect of an occult-mystical kind. The church has resisted this temptation, but the Old Testament has yet another function that has become visible in the last centuries in connection with the awakening of the "social conscience" in the Christian churches. The Old Testament, particularly through the prophetic message, speaks of nations, social classes, and political forms in relation to the religious message. We find very little about that in the New Testament. The New Testament was written at a time when national groups were dissolved, when the Roman Empire had absorbed everything, and when Roman rulers controlled the destiny of individuals and nations, a destiny that was formed by no single individual. Therefore, New Testament piety is, first, the piety of individuals. New Testament piety produced a new community, the community of the church. However, the church had no inner connection with national communities and destinies. It was the function of the Old Testament, especially for religious-social movements of the last century, to help others to see national destinies in the light of the prophetic teaching.

The second challenge that Christianity must face is the struggle against its own anti-Judaism. Anti-Jewish utterances go back to the later books of the New Testament. From that time forward, anti-Judaism existed in all periods of church history. In order to fight this tendency, religious instruction should indicate that in the Fourth Gospel everything individual has at the same time a typical symbolic meaning. In the Fourth Gospel, the Jews with whom Jesus struggles represent a kind of piety that can be found in all religions, including Christianity. It is the piety of the law that claims to possess absolute truth and on this basis rejects the Christ again and again. If the churches had said this more clearly, they would have applied anti-Judaistic criticisms not only to the Jews but also to themselves. When the church directs anti-Judaistic criticism to itself, its anti-Judaism cannot degenerate into anti-Semitism.

This leads me to the third thing that the church must do in relation to the Jews. It must understand Judaism as representing a prophetic critique of itself. I have previously pointed to the Pauline idea that all pagans must embrace Christianity before Israel, too, can join this universal unity. This idea is a profound anticipation of all later historical development, for it implies that Judaism is needed so long as there is paganism within and outside Christendom. Even in the Middle Ages, the existence of the Jews was regarded as a warning against the paganizing of the church. Modern nationalism makes this warning still more necessary. One of the functions of Judaism is to hold up before the church the mirror of its own relapse into paganism.

There is one point where Christianity and Judaism separate from one another and where, as far as I can see, they will be unable to achieve an agreement. This point is Christian faith that Jesus is the Christ, the conviction set over against the question of Judaism of how can some one be the Christ when he has not fulfilled the function of the Christ, namely, to transform reality and bring about a new reality? Is not Jesus who died in despair on the cross the opposite of that which the Christ means? This is the deepest point of division between Judaism and Christianity. The question is: has the Messiah come or will the Messiah come? The contrast seems absolute. And yet, there is in it a converging line, for Judaism also contains something which has already come, namely the covenant that God has made with it in the past. In the same way, Christianity contains something that is not in the past, but in the future, namely the symbol of the second coming of Christ. In this symbol, Christianity expresses the feeling that the work of Christ is not finished. These are converging lines, and yet there remains the fundamental difference: in Christianity, the turning toward
the Christ who has come, and in Judaism, the turning toward the Messiah who is expected.

This is the point where analysis stops, and where one can only preach. The content of such a sermon would be to say to Christians that the only argument that you have against the Jewish argument is to show that through the coming of Christ a new reality has actually appeared. Although this reality is fragmentary and ambiguous, it is able to overcome the conflicts of human existence. The Christian answer is not argumentative. It is an indicative answer. It is an answer of being. Perhaps it is not unjustified to hope that there will emerge from Christian Being that power that will destroy the demonism of anti-Semitism and create a new community between Christianity and Judaism not only in the German nation but also in all nations.


THE PRIMACY OF ETHICS: RELATIONALITY IN BUBER, TILLICH, AND LEVINAS

GUY B. HAMMOND

One aspect of Tillich’s theology that generated considerable discussion during his lifetime and that continues to evoke commentary at present is the matter of relating the ontological to the personal/ethical categories. As is well known, Reinhold Niebuhr and others criticized Tillich for losing the concreteness of the Biblical narratives in favor of ontological abstractions.1 Tillich, of course, mounted a vigorous defense of the primacy of ontology, while attempting an account of personal relationships within an ontological framework.

In this connection, Tillich on a number of occasions entered into dialogue with Martin Buber, who was then, and perhaps is still now, the preeminent philosopher of the interpersonal. Another thinker who deserves to be brought into this conversation is the French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. A younger contemporary of both Buber and Tillich, Levinas (1906-1995) was decisively influenced by his co-religionist Buber, but, as far as I have been able to ascertain, did not interact in any significant way with Tillich. The purpose of this paper is to attempt, in a preliminary way, an engagement of Tillich and Levinas, employing Buber as an intermediary between them.

There were important areas of agreement between Buber and Tillich, as Tillich regularly acknowledged. Buber’s famous distinction of the two primary “words,” I–Thou and I–It, has, according to Tillich, been embraced by Protestant theology as a way of avoiding the pressures toward objectification characteristic of modern society. Tillich agrees with Buber’s claim—and here Buber exerted a major influence on contemporary theology in general—that selves are constituted as such in interpersonal relationships. As Buber says, “I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is meeting.” 2 Tillich also agrees with Buber that “the other” sets limits to my control of the world about me. I can to some extent control (or “manage”) the objects in my world. But in relating to a “Thou,” I encounter a presence that I cannot dominate or manipulate without turning the Thou into an “It.” Tillich and Buber both understand the unconditional character of the moral imperative to be in fact the demand to acknowledge the personhood or “Thouness” of the other. This is, no doubt, a Kantian theme endorsed by both. Finally, Tillich, in accord with Buber that I-Thou encounters are at least one of the ways that ultimacy is experienced, agrees as well that they are one of the ways that God appears in human experience without being objectified.3

At the same time, Tillich offered criticisms of Buber’s formulations. These seem to me to center upon Tillich’s commitment to preserving the distinction between humanity’s essential nature and the existential situation of estrangement from that nature. In his essay, “Existential Analyses and Religious Symbols,” Tillich suggests that “Martin Buber’s famous phrase, ‘the I-Thou relationship,’—can be understood in essentialist terms,” i.e., can refer to the essential intersubjectivity of human nature. But,
he argues, Buber went further when he “tried to remove the universals from the encounter between ego and thou, and to make both speechless, because there are no words for the absolute particular, the other ego.” By implication, Tillich opposes this existentialist “invasion.” I believe that Robison James was correct in his essay cited above in disputing Tillich’s interpretation of Buber at this point. There are, for Buber, words to address the “you” even if absolutely particular, that is to say, there are words that do not lead to objectification. (Levinas gives a detailed analysis of this matter, as we will see in a moment.)

Tillich’s rather cryptic comment must, I think, be seen in the broader context of his analysis and critique of existentialism in general. There is, he contends, a danger that in existentialism’s turn to the absolute particular a total break with essentialist philosophy will occur, and thus existentialist theology will surrender “all rational criteria for theological thought.” Whether Tillich’s interpretation of Buber is correct is, at least, debatable, but I would contend that Tillich early and late upholds the view stated in the above-mentioned essay, “there can be no ethics without an essentialist analysis of man’s ethical nature and its structures.” This is an epistemological/ontological assumption on the part of Tillich: that we must know or intuit something about humanity’s true being in order to make any moral judgments regarding our present estranged existence. We will note shortly that Emmanuel Levinas makes what I take to be the exactly opposite criticism of Buber: that Buber leaves in place some essentialist elements.

It is in order to deal with the existing individual, it seems to me, that Tillich attempts to reconstruct an ontology using existentialist analysis. He grants the limitation of objectifying thought which equates reality with objective being. Objective thinking cannot grasp personal existence; for this, in his view, “a special type of concept” is required. Maintaining that such concepts are “psychological notions with non-psychological connotations” and are “half-symbolic, half-realistic indications of the structure of Reality itself,” he postulates the possibility of “an ontology which restricts itself to the structure of finitude.” This structure is found in personal existence; hence, for existentialism, and for Tillich, “the way to ontology passes through the doctrine of man.” Tillich insists on the validity of this ontology of finitude, and he asserts that the analysis of finitude leads to the question of the ground of finitude, the power that sustains it in being. This question is at the same time an analytical and an existential question, but by either path, one is led beyond both objectivity and subjectivity. This commitment by Tillich to essentialist analysis and to ontology would evolve through several versions, but would remain a key feature of his perspective. Since Levinas offers an alternative view of ontology, a comparison here can serve as a focal point of an engagement between the two.

Turning now to Levinas, let me emphasize the preliminary nature of my reading. He was not a prominent influence on American theology in the seventies and eighties, coming more belatedly to attention on this side of the Atlantic. Reading Levinas is like reading Hegel or Heidegger; you make of him what you can, never being sure you have grasped his point. Certainly though he belongs as a participant in the Buber/Tillich dialogue in which we have just engaged.

I would like to explore the approach Levinas takes to the relationship of ontological to personal/ethical categories, examining the implications of his thought for commentary upon and critique of Tillich’s approach to the same theme. In general terms, one can say that Levinas radicalizes Buber, thereby sharpening the potential for critique of Tillich. At the same time, by seeing the direction Levinas takes Buber, one may find reason to side with Tillich.

The place to begin an inquiry into Levinas is with his assertion of the “primacy of ethics.” According to his approach, ethics is relationality; the primacy of ethics is the primacy of relation with the other person. Simon Critchley writes: “It is this event of being in relation with the other as an act or practice—that Levinas describes as ‘ethical.’” It seems clear that he is not simply asserting the intersubjective constitution of selves—a theme he in fact shares with many other contemporary currents of thought. His focus is not on the “significant others” of one’s childhood. As Fred Alford suggests, the constitutive relationships are those we “live from” without experiencing them as other. Further, Levinas is not referring to reciprocity, to mutual recognition, in Hegel’s sense. Rather, he centers upon the awakening of responsibility when I encounter the irreducible other and acknowledge my obligation to him or her. Speaking psychologically, he is describing the move from the narcissistic self to the moral self. (Alford comments amusingly that “for Levinas we move directly from babies to saints.”) Thus,
more accurately Levinas asserts the primacy of moral relationality.

Levinas finds this theme in Martin Buber, but by pressing forward to implications not found in Buber, he issues two challenges to the entire Western philosophical tradition. Insisting on the priority of ethics for him means rejecting the priority of ontology, and rejecting the priority of objectifying rationality. Put in brief, centering on the I-It relation leads to the priority of ethics and objectification; centering on the I-Thou relation leads to the priority of ethics. Framing Levinas in terms of the history of philosophy, he contests Heidegger’s focus on a renewal of the “quest for being,” reminding his readers that Plato placed the Good beyond Being (cf. Plato, The Republic, 7. 509b). In place of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*, which highlights the subject’s consciousness of itself as an object, Levinas substitutes “here I am” (*me voici*), that is, he begins with the subject as responsibility rather than with the subject as self-consciousness.

In another expression, for Levinas it is not consciousness, but conscience, not complacent self-approbation, but moral demand, that is the starting point of philosophy. And conscience is awakened by the “face” of the other. The Intersubjectivity that interests Levinas is not “the fortunate meeting of fraternal souls that greet one another” but “the exposure of my freedom to the judgment of the other.”

Thus, Levinas postulates a realm of meaning or signification that is other than being and beyond objectification. Though he finds a critique of objectification in Buber, Levinas grants that Buber makes use of ontology, arguing that the persistence of ontology in Buber is “anomalous.” By focusing on the “face” or particularity of the other, Levinas also closes off the avenue of abstract universality in developing an ethics, the path taken for example by Kant. To Levinas the ethics of abstract universal rules is another form of objectification, the effort to construct an autonomous subject who can dominate an objectified world. Instead of endorsing the Enlightenment ethic of autonomy, Levinas embraces heteronomy.

Here his language becomes remarkably stringent: “I am not simply responsible for the other,” says Levinas; I am “taken hostage” by the other. “[The I] is a hostage for the other, obeying a command before having heard it, faithful to a commitment that it never made, to a past that has never been present.”

As I suggested earlier, Levinas addresses the question whether language, which is based upon universals, can deal with the absolutely particular, with the “Thou.” He asks: “Can language as *Said* respect the immediacy of the I-Thou relation?” Dialogue, when content-laden, is, he contends, “a modality of the I-It... But what of language as Saying? Is it absorbed into the *Said* without distinction? Can it not be examined in its purity? It says this or that, but at the same time it says Thou.... In it there resounds a call, an event that does without mediation, even that of a precursory knowledge or ontological project... Does not the immediacy of the I-Thou of which Buber speaks reside... in the very urgency of my responsibility that precedes all knowledge? Here we are indeed taking a few steps outside Buber.... [The irreducibility of the Thou to an It] means that saying Thou is not an aim, but precisely an allegiance to the Invisible, to the Invisible thought not only as the non-sensible, but as the unknowable and unthematizable per se, of which one can say nothing. The saying of Thou to the Invisible only opens up a dimension of meaning in which, contrary to all other dimensions of thought, there occurs no recognition of being [essence] depicted in the *Said*. Neither representation nor knowledge nor ontology; but a dimension in which the other person, addressed from the start as Thou is placed.”

Thus, Levinas argues, beyond Buber, but against Tillich, that there is a dimension of meaning in the I-Thou relationship that is beyond the realm of objectifying, universalizing knowledge. Is this meaning still a form of knowledge? If so, it is beyond conceptual thought, and, as Levinas says at one point, it is “a rationality prior to all constitution” (that is, beyond all constituting on the part of the subject).

What does this say? Colin Davis suggests that, as far as thematizing is possible, it simply says, “here I am,” with all the rich implications of that phrase.

Levinas’s ethical theory is incomprehensible, I think, unless understood in the context of its religious dimension. For Levinas the call to responsibility experienced through the face of the other becomes for the individual the trace and witness of the Infinite. The other is for the self not simply limit and demand; the face of the Thou also conveys the ideal. Levinas writes:

The other is not simply another freedom; to give me knowledge of injustice, his gaze must come...
transcendence for Levinas signifies a move to the denial of transcendence. Instead of opting for the ultimacy of being and efficacy (i.e., causality) over signification, the ultimate question is to submit to the primacy of being and efficacy (i.e., causality) over signification, and to the denial of transcendence. Instead of opting for the ultimacy of being, he finds another philosophical choice, “the Platonic word, Good beyond Being.”

Transcendence for Levinas signifies a movement beyond being as well as beyond knowledge.

Turning to a comparison of Levinas and Tillich, we can start with major areas of agreement. Both view the other as a limit, as properly beyond my control. They both want to resist the philosophical tendency to appropriate and absorb the other, setting against Hegelian totalization the irredcible alterity of the other. (We will refer to a Tillichian qualification of this agreement later.) They are in accord in opposing the ideal of Enlightenment autonomy, the tendency toward deification of the monadological self. They both recognize the danger of objectifying rationality, the drive toward reification of persons as well as of the natural and social worlds.

Levinas goes further, however, to accuse the entire Western ontological tradition of “totalization”—i.e., of “trying to find myself in everything and everyone I encounter,” or of reducing the Other to the Same. Colin Davis expresses Levinas’s point as follows: “To preserve the Other as Other, it must not become an object of knowledge or experience, because knowledge is always my knowledge, experience always my experience; the object is encountered only as it exists for me, and immediately its alterity is diminished.” Thus, Levinas radicalizes the critique of objectification, and extends it to ontology as such.

Tillich accepts the Kantian critique of rationalist ontology. Further, there appears to have been a time, early on, when he proposed to go beyond ontology altogether. In the 1933 work, The Socialist Decision, speaking of prophetic expectation, Tillich writes:

The expectation of a new heaven and a new earth signifies the expectation of a reality that is not subject to the structure of being, that cannot be grasped ontologically. The old and the new being cannot be subsumed under the same concept of being. The new being is intrinsically unontological. It cannot be derived from the original state.

Tillich here associates ontology with “myth of origin” and with space, in a footnote he elaborates: “Ontology thus has the same degree of justification as does the bond of origin as such, i.e., it is justified only insofar as it has been broken by a philosophy of history. The notion of an abstract ‘fundamental ontology’ free of any relation to history is thereby excluded.” This expression points in the direction Tillich would later take; he wants to preserve a link with the “bond of origin,” hence with ontology, but it must be “broken” by history.

Tillich later, instead of attempting to go beyond ontology altogether, combines the emphasis on history with the existential analysis referred to earlier,
constructing an ontology that “passes through the doctrine of man.” One might suppose that this ontology “broken by a philosophy of history” would be thoroughly intersubjective and social. It is not clear that Tillich fully accomplishes this; his categories continue to be predominantly psychological. Perhaps his thinking here was influenced more by Kierkegaard and Heidegger than by Buber.

A comparison of Tillich and Levinas can be brought into focus by examining their respective approaches to the infinite, the ultimate reality, or God. As is well known, Tillich insists that one ought not to claim that God “exists,” i.e., that God stands apart from all else as a being. All beings can become an object for some subject, and God cannot become an object. To this extent, Tillich agrees with Levinas: God is beyond the beings.36 But Levinas finds traces of a God “not contaminated by Being”37 through the transcendence proper to ethics. We encounter here a difference of basic intuitions. Levinas alludes to a “calling into question” that is older than the questioning of the source and power of being. He writes: “Not the questionable nature of the question that asks: ‘Why is there being rather than nothing-ness?’ But of the question that is contranatural, against the very naturalness of nature: ‘Is it just to be?’ Bad conscience! The most repressed question, but older than that which seeks the meaning of being.”38

Tillich of course views the questioning of being—why is there something and not nothing—to be absolutely basic; God is heard through the shock of possible nonbeing. Recall Tillich’s reference to the experience of “the nothingness of an absolute radical No,” which can be transformed into “an experience, no less absolute, of reality, into a radical Yes.”39 Or again, Tillich comments that on one point he can make no concession—“the ultimacy of being.”40 He is not immune to the voice of a bad conscience, but it seems clear that for him the shock of potential nonbeing is more basic.

Possibly the difference between the two thinkers can be couched in terms of the distinction between mysticism and morality, Tillich in the end allowing for the former, Levinas dwelling exclusively with the latter. When Levinas aligns himself with the Plotinian One that is beyond all intelligibility, he sounds most like Tillich.41 But intimations of this Infinite, beyond Being, appear for Levinas in morality, in the moral demand deriving from the other. Levinas’s view is well summarized by Alphonso Lingis in the Foreword to Otherwise Than Being:

[In transferring religious language to the ethical sphere, Levinas no doubt divinizes the relationship with alterity.... Not so much that God would be a postulate required to render the ethical imperative intelligible, nor that God would be revealed in ethical phenomena—but that God is the very nonphenomenal force of the other, that God ‘exists’ in his voice, which speaks in the ethical imperative....[God for Levinas] is the Good that calls unto being and to expiation for the wants and faults of being.42]

Tillich acknowledges the moral aspect of our encounter with the divine, but he would want to add a reconciling aspect, the transmoral, transpersonal experience of participation.43 Tillich characteristically takes a both/and approach—both separation and participation. Levinas no doubt would argue that Tillich has opted for Hegelian totalization, while he himself would hold out for an irreducible alterity.

We might conclude by asking again, to what extent is the “primacy of moral relationality” compatible with a Tillichian perspective? This question points us back to Tillich’s formulations about prophetism and the new being referred to earlier. There he contends that prophetic Judaism broke the power of the “myth of origin” by virtue of being placed under an “unconditional (moral) demand.” All convictions about the holiness of being are put under the judgment of the demand for righteousness and justice for the “other” (the stranger, the alien, the poor and needy).44 In a 1932 essay, “Protestantismus und Politische Romantik,” Tillich writes: “The prophet places the Whither, the unconditional demand, against the holiness of the bearing powers. He places Being under the judgment of the Ought. He makes the connection with the transcendent Origin dependent upon the fulfillment of the moral demand.”45 It is this orientation toward a reality to be actualized in the future that, he says, cannot be grasped ontologically. This understanding of unconditional moral demand breaking the primal identifications in Tillich’s thought is comparable to the theme of moral responsibility transcending being in Levinas. The difference is that Tillich does not advocate a total break with the powers of origin, hence with Being; rather, we should seek fulfillment of the aim of being in the new being. New being, it would seem, is real as potentiality but not as actuality. Perhaps potency is a better rendering of the term “es-
sence” in Tillich. New being exerts power as lure and goal, thus indeed as meaning, perhaps, instead of being. In this formulation, it may be that Levinas and Tillich are not so far apart after all.

It is interesting to note how the emphases of Levinas reflect a characteristically Jewish sensibility: his unwillingness to name the name of the Holy One, and yet his conviction that the Infinite is revealed in the call to righteousness. At the same time, I suggest that Levinas provides a useful standpoint from which to interrogate Tillich’s ontology. Does Tillich’s assertion that God is Being-itself serve as a conservative pole in his system, qualifying if not negating the prophetic expectation of “a new heaven and a new earth”? It is not so much that Tillich’s “being” is static or immutable; after all, for him Being-itself is the power of being, encompassing both continuity (form) and change (dynamics). But for Tillich love is reunion: consummation is return after estrangement. Is Tillich after all in thrall to Hegelian totalization, where otherness and the new are reduced to sameness and the old? This accusation deriving from Levinas is worth pondering.

I conclude that neither Levinas nor Tillich preserves a robust concept of the eternal Thou in Buber’s sense. Both highlight the unconditional moral demand. But Tillich’s “grace,” which gives what is demanded, transcends the divine-human encounter in the direction of reconciliation and unity. For Levinas the voice of the infinite other calls one into the service of the neighbor; here there is no reconciliation, though there is meaning and a sense of the ideal. I find a certain degree of complementarity between Tillich and Levinas, rather than all-out opposition. They both draw upon Buber. In criticizing and going beyond him, they engage a common set of issues, resolving them in ways that, if not identical, are at least partially compatible.

1 The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Charles W. Kegley (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1982), 252-263.
5 Four Existentialist Theologians, 280.
6 Four Existentialist Theologians, 279.
7 Four Existentialist Theologians, 280.
9 Theology of Culture, 94-98.
12 C. Fred Alford, Levinas, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalysis (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2002), 21.
13 Levinas, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalysis, 16.
16 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in Collected Philosophical Papers (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 168, 171, 188-189; Otherwise Than Being, xl-xl; Jeffrey L. Kosky, Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), xiii; “here I am,” of course, is a phrase that appears at key points in the Biblical narrative: it is uttered by Abraham, Samuel, and Isaiah, possibly others.
18 Outside the Subject, 23; cf. 36-39.
19 Cf. The Continental Ethics Reader, 50, 51.
20 “God and Philosophy,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, 165.
21 Outside the Subject, 33-34.
22 Collected Philosophical Papers, 22.
24 Cf. Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion, 189; I have been aided in my discussion of Levinas’s philosophy of religion by Kosky’s perceptive work.
25 The Continental Ethics Reader, 48.
26 Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion, 132, 147; cf. also xiii-xv.
27 Otherwise Than Being, 149.
29 Otherwise Than Being, 94-95.
30 Levinas, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalysis, 100.
31 Levinas: An Introduction, 40.
33 The Socialist Decision, 18.
34 The Socialist Decision, 166, n.6.
37 Otherwise Than Being, xlviii.
38 Outside the Subject, 92.
39 Paul Tillich, “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture,” in Victor Nuovo, Visionary Science: A Translation of Tillich’s “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture” with an Interpretive Essay (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 24-25; but note also the continuation of the passage, where Tillich draws closer to Levinas: “This has nothing to do with a new reality that stands beside or above things—rather—the reality forces itself upon us that is simultaneously a No and a Yes to things. It is not a being, it is not substance. It is not the totality of beings. It is, to use a mystical formulation, what is beyond being, what is simultaneously and absolutely nothing and something. Nevertheless, even the predicate ‘is’ conceals what

is at issue here, because it is not a question of some actual being that concerns us, but of an actuality of meaning, indeed, the ultimate and most profound actuality of meaning that convulses everything and builds everything anew.”
41 Otherwise Than Being, 95.
42 Otherwise Than Being, xxxix.
44 Cf. The Socialist Decision, 18-23.
45 Paul Tillich, Fuer und Wider den Socialismus (Muenchen: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969), 86; my translation [“Der Prophet stellt das Wozu, die unbedingte Forderung, gegen die Heiligkeit der tragenden Maechte. Er stellt das Sein unter das Gericht des Soll. Er macht die Beziehung zum tranzendenten Ursprung abhaengig von der Erfuellung der sittlichen Forderung.”]

Please send notice of any books and articles about Tillich or by Tillich scholars to the editor.

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Self, Otherness, Theology, and Ontology: A Critical Engagement between Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille

Jonathan Rothchild

Paul Tillich would no doubt be fascinated with postmodern thinkers, whom—to a considerable extent—he had anticipated in his critical appreciation of Nietzsche, Expressionism, depth psychology, and the “death of God” theologians. My purpose here is to analyze Tillich’s conceptions of self with respect to postmodern thinkers who characterize the self as the displaced self, anti-cogito, or the self as constituted by otherness. Postmodern thinkers summarily assert that the self is to be conceptualized in relational terms vis-à-vis the alterity of the other, who is trace, infinity, or lordship (Emmanuel Levinas), abject (Julia Kristeva), or ecstatic rupture (Georges Bataille). These perspectives interrogate Tillich’s theology as to its capacity to accommodate notions of otherness. They deconstruct concepts and images that totalize (e.g., being), privilege the unity of the self, or reduce otherness to sameness. They therefore present a formidable challenge to Tillich’s system, including, for example, his notions of self-centeredness, self-transcendence, and the basic ontological structure of self and world. My essay, however, attempts to render this tension productive by highlighting the fruits for both interlocutors.

My thesis is three-fold. First, I affirm sustainability of Tillich’s project by probing the relationship between self, other, ontology, and theology through the mediation of Oliver Davies’s recent work. Second, I argue that critical engagement between Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille exposes the limits of Tillich’s notions of otherness, particularly with respect to alterity, transcendence, and embodiment. Third, I contend that Tillich’s concepts of symbol and love as reunion preserve participation and selfhood and problematize notions of meaninglessness and subjugation of self to other in Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille.

The Sustainability of Tillich’s Ontology in the Contemporary Contexts

Is Tillich’s ontology still tenable within the antimetaphysical milieu of postmodernity? To ascertain the answer we will consider the recent work of Oliver Davies. In A Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradition, Davies reconceptualizes the language of being to construct a kenotic Christian ontology of difference. Appealing to Levinas and Ricoeur to address relationality in the post-Holocaust context of annihilation, Davies reinterprets being as “the medium of relation between self and other” and ontology as a narrativity of being disclosed through language-based exchanges. Davies problematizes conceptions within traditional metaphysics that emphasize being as a unity because they perpetuate essentialism and exclude and vitiate the concrete other. Yet, given the postmodern emphasis on fragmentation and attenuation of the self, Davies affirms the necessity of retrieving the language of being: “[T]he language of being offers an important resource for articulating and drawing forth the intrinsic unity of the self which, albeit deferred, is the ground for the knowledge of the world as such.” He therefore develops a theology of compassion that construes ontology as relationality committed to “the absolute primacy of the ethical relation with respect to the concrete other.”

Davies posits that the self’s affirmation of otherness concomitantly enriches or deepens the self’s existence, that is, the self’s being. Compassion compels kenosis, “a riskful giving and an opening of the self before existence,” that interconnects existence and ontology because “heightened existence represents a higher degree of ontological density.” Moreover, Davies envisages that self-displacement of compassion “sets up a flow of enriched existence which draws others towards those who in this way, as if by the attraction of being itself” and reinscribes self and other in terms of being and existence.

Davies, however, notes that the ontologies of Tillich, Bultmann, and Rahner “seem out of place in the vigorously language-centred and deconstructive landscapes of the present day.” There are no additional references to Tillich’s ontology, but evaluation of the criticisms with respect to Rahner can be illuminating for study of Tillich. Davies writes: “We differ from Rahner then to the extent that knowledge of the other is determined by…the ethical particularity of the relation of the self to the other, and that transcendence is a possibility which awakens from within that relation and not from an a priori ground of all knowing which encompasses it.” I contend that this worry about an a priori ground negating relationality and difference appears misplaced. Among possible Tillichian rejoinders, Tillich’s in-
heritance of various aspects of Schelling’s philosophy disavows essentialism and accounts for otherness. Tillich affirms the interconnections between essence and existence: “[Schelling] did not, however, abolish what Hegel and he had done before. He preserved a philosophy of essence. Against this he put the philosophy of existence. Existentialism is not a philosophy which can stand on its own legs. Actually it has no legs. It is always based on a vision of the essential structure of reality.”

This attempted fusion of existence and the essential structure of reality frames Tillich’s correlative method and his conceptions of self and reality (e.g., the tension between life and system and being and non-being).

Schelling attempts to reintegrate essence and existence because he integrates the “negative philosophy” of the a priori system of absolute Essence and the “positive philosophy” of absolute Existent. Schelling’s thought bears the influence of Jacob Boehme, whom Schelling first encountered in the work of Franz von Baader. This influence compels Schelling to posit that God assumes Being through a dialectic of Yes and No; in similar manner, humans experience freedom as spirit, but through contradiction. Drawing upon Boehme’s notion of abyss in God, Schelling in *Ages of the World* states: “Because the Godhead, in itself neither having being nor not having being, is, with respect to external Being, necessarily a consuming No, it must therefore also...necessarily be an eternal Yes, reinforcing Love, the essence of all essences.”

Tillich traces shifts within Schelling’s corpus, notably Schelling’s transformation from his early philosophy of identity between nature and spirit (articulated as a philosophy of nature in his 1800 *The System of Transcendental Idealism*) to his examination of the self-contradiction of the will and the problem of evil (expressed in his 1809 *On the Nature of Human*) to his later exploration of the dynamic of the finite and the infinite and the affirmation of existence in positive philosophy (discussed in his 1811-1815 *The Ages of the World* and the most influential on Tillich). The later Schelling’s concept of potency of being is particularly fecund for Tillich’s understanding of ontology, self, and otherness. From his reading of Schelling, Tillich places emphasis on the divine process of dialectical Yes and No that undergirds God’s existence as a personal being: “Now, however, Schelling asserted: God exists. He has separated himself from his ground and has won existence [for himself] as living personality, by letting his ground hold sway over itself and by struggling against it.”

Tillich asserts that without the otherness within God, there would no being, no life, and no personal God. To be sure, there are differences between Tillich and Schelling, but it is apparent that Schelling significantly informs Tillich’s understanding of the relationship between self, otherness, and reality. Tillich’s nuanced understanding, in my judgment, gainsays Davies’s criticisms and attests to the viability of Tillich’s writings in a postmodern context.

**Postmodernity, Otherness, and Ontology: Bataille on Ecstasy and Nonknowledge**

Bataille, Kristeva, and Levinas in disparate ways address suffering, exploitation, and annihilation in the world; each is concerned with the relationship between self and other in terms of communication—but not communication couched in terms of rational discourse or systematic project. Bataille asks: How can one communicate to the other the excess of desire and experience without explaining away the profundity of this experience or this other? Through Nietzschean inspired fragments, Bataille insists that one must disentangle knowledge, communication, and self: “If we didn’t know how to dramatize, we wouldn’t be able to leave ourselves...But a sort of rupture—in anguish—leaves us at the limit of tears: in such a case we lose ourselves, we forget ourselves and communicate with an elusive beyond.”

This anguish functions to undercut the totality of knowledge or the “satisfaction” of the “prison” of the Hegelian project, Bataille’s primary target. Rupture unfolds ecstasy, which Bataille understands to be a “contestation of knowledge” or “the defeat of thought” that discloses excess without annihilating otherness and demands supplication of the self in the “horror of surrender.” This horror of surrender entails anguish and despair, yet it is manifested as rapture and joy. Shorn of the limits of discursive experience that enclose the self and sublimate otherness, ecstasy engenders an “inner presence which we cannot apprehend without a startled jump of our entire being, detesting the servility of discourse.”

In the realm of inner presence, ecstasy, sacrifice, eroticism, laughter, and the sacred converge in a transcendence that eviscerates project and creates a situation “whereby life situates itself in proportion to the impossible.”

A conspicuous example of ecstatic attempts to surmount the “servility of discourse” occurs in
Bataille’s contemplating the image of a decapitated Chinese man. Subjected to gruesome torture or, as Bataille puts it, laceration, the afflicted man paradoxically appears to Bataille to be in a sublime state of joy. Despite ethical questions regarding instrumentality raised by interpreters such as Amy Hollywood,39 contemplating the victim induces rupture in Bataille: “I loved him with a love in which the sadistic instinct played no part: he communicated his pain to me or perhaps the excessive nature of his pain, and it was precisely that which I was seeking, not so as to take pleasure in it, but in order to ruin in me that which is opposed to ruin.”30

No narrative can explain this relationality, for that would be tantamount to Hegelian satisfaction, not transcendent ecstasy. This ecstatic experience constitutes a sacrifice that is effusive in that “it destroys the depths of the heart, the depths of being, by unveiling them.”31 Though Bataille abrogates the soteriological underpinnings of the Passion, the cross communicates intense pain that disabuses self-interested project.

**Tillich’s Response to Bataille: Ecstasy and Rational Structure**

Is Tillich’s work tantamount to “project”? To address Bataille’s criticisms, let us consider Tillich’s employment of the term ecstasy. Tillich conceives of ecstasy in terms of a self-transcendence experienced in and through rational knowledge; unlike Bataille, Tillich does not perceive an incompatibility between ecstasy, knowledge (reason), self, and other. Tillich’s basic ontological structure of self and world does not preclude notions of otherness or ecstasy; a fortiori, ecstasy is necessitated by the otherness of non-being that threatens self and world. Tillich describes the tumultuous, but intimate relationship between reason, ecstasy, and the encounter with non-being:

The threat of nonbeing, grasping the mind, produces the ‘ontological shock’ in which the negative side of the mystery of being—its abysmal element is experienced. ‘Shock’ points to a state of mind in which the mind is thrown out of its normal balance, shaken in its structure. Reason reaches it boundary line, is thrown back upon itself, and then is driven again to its extreme situation.33

Tillich, therefore, concurs with Bataille’s vision of the traumatic effects of ecstasy, but he does not equate this disorientation with Bataille’s non-knowledge. Appropriated from Scriptural and Neoplatonic, sources,34 ecstasy according to Tillich “is the classical term for this state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence” that “drives the spirit of man beyond itself without destroying its essential, i.e., rational, structure.”35 In contrast to the destruction of the demonic, ecstatic reconfiguration is creative because it promotes self-transcendence, yet it preserves participation within the ground of being. This transcendence/participation dialectic occurs in and through the theonomous interpenetration of reason, ecstasy, and revelation, for “[e]cstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the ground of being and meaning. And, conversely, there is no revelation without ecstasy.”36 Ecstasy, reason, and revelation converge in ultimate concern, where ecstasy is not reduced to project but is self-transcending reason that assumes disparate forms, including prophetic witness, agapic love, and prayer.37

**Julia Kristeva on Alterity and Embodiment**

Influenced by Freud and Lacan, Julia Kristeva’s work intersects semiotics, psychoanalysis, and feminism. She shares Bataille’s disquiet towards the hegemony of the Hegelian project in the Western mindset. Kristeva characterizes otherness as the abject or the discarded that destabilizes self and society. In *Powers of Horror*, Kristeva construes abject as “the jettisoned object [that] is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses.”38 Similar to Bataille’s notion of ecstasy as communicating non-knowledge and, as we will see below, Levinas’s repudiation of totality, Kristeva’s abject resists reduction to preconceived meanings. Abject precludes simple elision between self and other, “[f]or the space that engrosses the deject, the excluded is never one, nor homogeneous, nor totalizable, but essentially divisible, foldable, and catastrophic.”39 Moreover, just as Bataille interweaves anguish and rapture, Kristeva associates annihilation of the self and jouissance or radical joy.

Kristeva extends her analysis further by juxtaposing the abject and the maternal body. The maternal body, particularly with its the liminal boundaries constituted by the fusion of fluids, dependencies, and identities, has been muted in Western thought such that a woman “will not be able to accede to the complexity of being divided, of heterogeneity, of the catastrophic-fold-of-being.”40 Additionally noted by Levinas,41 the maternal body’s unrepresentable abject stands in opposition to the complicity of the
linguistically and socially constructed narcissism. In *Tales of Love*, Kristeva contends that the image of the Virgin cannot express the otherness of motherhood because it signifies “the woman whose entire body is an emptiness through which the paternal word is conveyed...[and thereby] had remarkably subsumed the maternal 'abject.’”

**Tillich’s Response to Kristeva: Body as a Dimension of the Person**

Tillich’s treatment of the body is admittedly limited, though his attention to the ontological structure of self and world does not obviate considerations of the body. In *Dynamics of Faith*, Tillich develops his concept of self-centeredness, where “body, soul, and spirit are not three parts of man. They are dimensions of man’s being, always within each other.”

Centeredness of the self enables Tillich to account for these distinct, but interrelated spheres of human existence. Perhaps Tillich’s most sensitive treatment of embodiment, assessed by interpreters such as Mary Ann Stenger, is illustrated in his critique of the father-image of God within Protestant theology. Tillich suggests that “[t]he attempt to show that nothing can be said about God theologically before the statement is made that he is the power of being in all being is, at the same time, a way of reducing the predominance of the male element in the symbolism of the divine.”

Kris teva concurs with Tillich’s hermeneutics of suspicion vis-à-vis gendered theological construction, but she would problematize Tillich’s perduring image of self-integration. According to Tillich, self-integration coalesces body and mind, “for only then is mutual strangeness and interference excluded.”

Kristeva’s concern for the ineluctable “heterogeneity” of the body therefore appears underappreciated by Tillich even if he is acutely aware of estrangement.

**Levinas: Totality, Communication, and Otherness**

Writing in a post-Holocaust context, Emmanuel Levinas censures the totalizing tendencies of Western thought from Parmenides to Hegel to Husserl to Heidegger. These various models cannot appreciate otherness: “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle term that ensures the comprehension of being.” Levinas argues that his philosophical mentors subsume otherness into rubrics of intelligibility (Husserl’s transcendent reductions and the search for absolute foundations) and homogeneity (Heidegger’s preoccupation with *Dasein*).

Levinas intends to debunk the Western project of ontology and its proclivity toward totality. Consequently, he embraces the hyperbolic, the superlative, the exteriority, and that “which is not a mode of being showing itself in a theme.”

Ontology reflects the domestication and reduction of otherness; it is encapsulated in what Levinas denominates as the said, “the birthplace of ontology.” Levinas affirms communication between self and other, but communication as the saying whose “articulation and signifyingness [are] antecedent to ontology.” Levinas upholds saying because it does not efface the other, it does not imprison the infinity and trace of the other, and it functions as “exposure” and not (Hegelian) “recognition” in that it induces the self to denude, strip itself, and submit to otherness. Levinas insists that to be truly for-the-other one must experience an intersubjective encounter with otherness that puts one’s entire being into question. Levinas holds that ethics is metaphysics, not ontology, because metaphysics invites desire, infinity (e.g., the Good beyond Being in Plato and Plotinus because “[t]he Good is before being”), fracture (because “the breakup of essence is ethics” manifested in the “[r]upture of being qua being”), and otherness that precede the thematizing and totalizing character of ontology. This otherness imposes “unlimited responsibility” that denies individual freedom: “It is because there is a vigilance before the awakening that the cogito is possible, so that ethics is before ontology. Behind the arrival of the human there is already the vigilance for the other. The transcendental *I* in its nakedness comes from the awakening by and for the other.”

This primordial “awakening” challenges Tillich’s ontological structure of self and world. Levinas contends that otherness annihilates this structure: To transcend oneself, to leave one’s home to the point of leaving oneself, to substitute oneself for another. It is, in my bearing of myself, not to conduct myself well, but by my unicity as a unique being to expiate for the other. The openness of space as an openness of self without a world, without a place, utopia, the not being walled in, inspiration to the end, even to expiration, is proximity of the other which is possible only as responsibility for the other, as substitution for him...[I]t is because newness comes
from the other that there is in newness transcen-
dence and signification.  

Responsibility for the other, not the essential
countenance of the self, radically shapes the formation
of the self’s conscience. Levinas asks: “Is not the
face of one’s fellow man the original locus in which
conscience calls an authority with a silent voice
in which God comes to mind? Original locus of the

Tillich’s Response to Levinas

In contrast to Levinas’s notion of the silent voice
induced by the face of the other, Tillich contends
that the silent voice of the moral imperative, the
confrontation with one’s essential being, becomes actual-
ized in and through one’s own conscience. Tillich
conceives of conscience as a fundamental mecha-
nism for overcoming the problem of the dividedness
of the self. Though Luther’s view of conscience as
an inner voice informs Tillich’s understanding of
conscience, Heidegger’s appeal to silence also has
significant import for Tillich’s view. Heidegger
describes the call of conscience as declaring a silent
nothing: “In the appeal Dasein gives itself to under-
stand its own potentiality-for-being. This calling is
therefore a keeping-silent...Only in keeping silent
does the conscience call.”  

Though Tillich appropriates Heidegger’s image of conscience as the silent
voice,  

Tillich submits that “the self to which the conscience
calls is the essential, not as Heidegger believes, the
existential self. It calls us to what we essentially are,
but it does not tell with certainty what that is.”

It is critical, however, to note that Tillich does
not disengage this silent call of the essential from
relationality. For example, in a 1943 radio address,
Tillich impels his German listeners not merely to
confront an abstract evil but also to undertake practi-
cal measures in response to the suffering of others:
“So speak the voices from the land of the dead to
you, the voices of the Jewish children and women
and old people murdered by the Nazis under your
noses. And when you ask where this voice of the
dead is speaking to you, you yourselves know the
answer: it is the voice of your own conscience...You
can no longer silence this voice within yourselves.”

This convergence of essence (the inner voice) and
existence (the voices of the suffering) underlies the
reasons why conscience is both “the most subjective
self-interpretation of personal life” and a trans-
moral judgment “according to the participation in a

realty which transcends the sphere of moral com-
mands.”  

Levinas worries about “our indifference of
‘good conscience’ for what is far and what is near;”
Tillich similarly disabuses this indifference with re-
spect to the demands of essence (an absolute impera-
tive) and existence (the particular circumstances of
the situation).

Does this analysis of conscience mitigate the
claims that Tillich’s ethics constitutes an overly in-
dividualistic ethic (and thus reinforces Levinas’s critiqués of totality)? Eberhard Amelung points to
individualistic tendencies in Tillich’s thought: “Til-
llich has done more than most German philosophers
and theologians in order to overcome the individu-
listic approach of German idealism. And yet, perhaps
due to the influence of C.G. Jung and psychother-
rapy, the self remains the center of the system. As
Tillich grew older this tendency became stronger. In
the course of this development his ethic also re-
ained strongly individualistic.”

Though Amelung and Ogletree too discover shortcomings in Tillich’s system with respect
to encounters between others: “Consequently, we
still do not find in Tillich’s work an account of the
actual manifestation of the material meaning of the
moral imperative in the concrete encounter between
persons. What is even more disappointing is that
Tillich, while seeming to give central place to the I-
thou encounter in the constitution of moral expe-
rience, continually subordinates that encounter to the
dynamics of self-integration.”

Ogletree concludes that a solution lies somewhere between a Tillichian self-integration and a Levinasian call of the other.

Though Amelung and Ogletree are correct in press-
ing Tillich on this crucial issue of self and other, I
argue that both thinkers do not fully appreciate the
aspects of relationality and community (undertaken
comprehensively in the third volume of the System-
tatic Theology) that underlie and sustain questions of
self, otherness, love, and justice and to which we
now turn to as a conclusion.

Tillich’s Insights: Symbols and Love as Reunion

The dialogue between Tillich and the postmod-
ern thinkers has revealed both the limits and insights
of Tillich’s ontology. One insight that has been dis-
cussed pertains to the dynamic between transcen-
dence and participation, where the self is tran-
scended in its encounter with disparate forms of otherness, yet the self is irreducibly preserved in that it remains embedded in the essential structures of reality. Symbols constitute one dimension where transcendence and participation co-exist in a fruitful tension; symbols open the self to new levels of transcendence, but they affirm the presence of meaning even as they nullify and disintegrate this meaning.\(^7\)

Love as the reunion of the separated functions similarly along the transcendence/participation dialectic. As Tillich writes: “Love is the drive toward the reunion of the separated; this is ontologically and therefore universally true.”\(^72\) This drive toward reunion, exemplified in agape but funded by the desire of eros, entails “participation in the other one through participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life,”\(^73\) and it is manifested as “participating knowledge which changes both the knower and the known in the very act of loving knowledge.”\(^74\) This “loving knowledge,” even if fragmentary within the Spiritual Presence, mediates between absolutism and relativism and enables Tillich to respond to postmodern critics of ontology. Love as reunion affirms, yet transforms self and other, intersubjectivity, and justice, in ways that Bataille, Kristeva, and Levinas\(^75\) appear to abdicate in their attention to otherness. As recent works in Tillichian scholarship\(^76\) demonstrate, engagement between Tillich and postmodernity should continue to yield constructive conversations.

**Bibliography**


Davies, Oliver. *A Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradi-


Peperzak, Adriaan, ed. *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Phi-


1 A Theology of Compassion, XVII.

2 Davies explains the ways Bakhtinian dialogism and pragmatics pertain to an enhanced being: “Within such a dialogical view of the self, the encounter with the other as interlocutor becomes central to our own self-possession as speaking and reflexive creatures, and becomes, as we have argued, the epiphany of being, as the existential realization of our own dialectical self-transcendence” (Ibid., 159). To reify such connections between narrativity and being, Davies appeal to the stories of Holocaust victims Etty Hillesum and Edith Stein and an unnamed victim of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

3 Davies implicates modern figures in his indictment of ontology: “We need not progress along the Leibnizean and Heideggerian path of asking what is the meaning of being as such, which would inevitably be to replace our preferred paradigm, which is concerned specifically with the self in relation to the other, with the model we have called ‘Being and Oneness,’ which focuses upon the medium of being itself, to the relative exclusion of the concrete being” (Ibid., 52).

4 Ibid., 53.

5 Ibid., 73. Davies explains: “Compassion is the recognition of the otherness of the other, as an otherness which stands beyond our own world, beyond our own
constructions of otherness even. But it is also the discovery of our own nature, as a horizon of subjectivity that is foundationally ordered to the world of another experience, in what Paul Ricoeur has called ‘the paradox of the exchange at the very place of the irreplaceable.’ It is here then, in the dispossessive act whereby the self assumes the burdens of the other, and thus accepts the surplus of its own identity, that we should recognize the veiled presence of being” (17).

6 Ibid., 33.
7 Ibid., 35.
8 Ibid., 220.
9 Ibid., 158.

10 Ibid., 43. Davies does commend Rahner’s ontology for its anti-reductionistic character, yet he asserts that Rahner ontology continues to disqualify notions of the self as ineluctably mediated by otherness: “But [Rahner’s ontology] is still in a Kantian-Heideggerian world, governed by the cognitive faculties of the self, rather than a world that comes to existence only as the self is given over, without remainder, into the alien power of the other” (Ibid., 158).

11 For Tillich and Davies, there is a dialectic relationship between ontology and existence that disavows total essentialism. Moreover, both thinkers envision the encounter between self and other in self-reflexive terms. Davies describes this impact on the self as transfiguration, or the appropriate word for transcendence that “retains the irreducible mutuality of self and other, albeit as unity in opposition” (Ibid., 43). Tillich speaks of the self-reflexive impact on the self as insight, conversion, or reunion (albeit ambiguously experienced) of the self with self, other, and world.

12 A History of Christian Thought, 438. Tillich offers a similar assessment in Theology of Culture, 92, original emphasis, when he asserts that “Schelling follows Hegel in emphasizing the ‘subject’ and its freedom against Substance and its necessity. But while in Hegel the ‘subject’ is immediately identified with the thinking subject, in Schelling it becomes rather the ‘existing’ or immediately experiencing subject.” In his own writing, Schelling identifies Hegel’s method as one demanding that “[philosophy] should withdraw into pure thinking, and that it should have as sole immediate object the pure concept” (On the History of Modern Philosophy, 134).


14 Ages of the World, 73. Schelling’s contentious claim of the Yes and No of God is further intensified by the order envisaged by Schelling: “The negating, contracting will must precede into revelation so that there is something that shores up and carries upward the grace of the divine being, without which grace would not be capable of revealing itself. There must be Might before there is Lenity and Stringency before Gentleness. There is first Wrath, then Love. Only with Love does the wrathful actually become God” (83). Robert Brown, in The Later Philosophy of Schelling, 269, comments that here Schelling moves beyond Böhme: whereas Böhme accounts for the dialectical character of God’s freedom, “Ages moves only in the opposite direction. God begins as a duality, and attains his unity only as an achievement, a voluntary duality-in-unity.”

15 Tillich renders potency as “[t]he real, dark principle of the philosophy of nature [that] is nothing other than the actualization of this contradiction. Freedom is the power to become disunited from oneself. Consistent with the meaning of the word, Schelling now calls this power potency” (The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and Principles, 48). Schelling makes the same point in The Ages of the World, Section 226, 17: “A being cannot negate itself as actual without at the same time positing oneself as the actualizing potency that begets itself.”

16 Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, 99 original emphasis. In The Courage to Be, 180, Tillich further elaborates on the importance of the Yes-No dialectic for the living God: “Nonbeing makes God a living God. Without the No he has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the divine Yes to himself would be lifeless. There would be no revelation of the ground of being, there would be no life.”
Bataille reiterates that “the impossible is the loss of the unfinished system of nonknowledge.” The trinitarian symbol of the Logos as the principle of divine self-manifestation in creation and salvation introduces the element of otherness into the Divine Life without which it would not be life.”

For elaboration on these differences, please see Jerome Stone’s “Tillich and Schelling’s Later Philosophy,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 3-35. Stone’s list includes some straightforward distinctions (e.g., Schelling was not a theologian), but it also notes an important “shift between Schelling and Tillich from the language of speculating to the language of symbol” (35). Additionally, Ian Thompson, in his Being and Meaning, 89, writes: “Schelling tends to subordinate theology to the philosophy of art, whereas in Tillich’s case art is put to use in the service of theology.”

Each of these writers themselves experienced these phenomena in varying degrees. Bataille battled a pulmonary disease throughout his life to the point where it became debilitating; Kristeva emigrated from Bulgaria to France; and Levinas endured a double tragedy: his family died in the Holocaust, and as a French soldier, he became a prisoner of war in Germany.

Though Bataille concentrates his critiques on Hegel, Amy Hollywood describes the extent to which Bataille’s disdain toward project also distinguishes his views from Sartre’s: “Sartre’s and Bataille’s opposing attitudes toward human projects are crucial here. Sartre insists that to be human is to engage in projects; Bataille argues that inner experience is the opposite of project; thus he generates endlessly recursive negations of his own attempt to provide a method for attaining inner experience” (Sensible Ecstasy, 30). Indeed, there is a certain paradox within Bataille’s writing in that he seeks to refute system by constructing his own system of atheology or of the unfinished system of nonknowledge.

Bataille reiterates that “[t]he impossible is the loss of the self” (Ibid., 24).
especially Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus uphold the unique place of ecstasy. Tillich identifies the Middle Platonist Philo as one of the earliest figures who “developed a doctrine of ecstasy, or ek-stasis, which means ‘standing outside oneself.’ This is the highest form of piety which ‘lies beyond faith’” (A History of Christian Thought, 13). This philosophical conception of ecstasy has subsequently impacted Christian theologians and mystics, including Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Bonaventure.

Ecstasy therefore helps further clarify the experience of God as being-itself or the ground of being enables one to speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time. This speaking about God refers back to the self and its ordinary/ecstatic experience of holiness: “The term ‘ecstatic’ in the phrase ‘ecstatic idea of God’ points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience without removing it. Ecstasy as a state of mind is the exact correlate to self-transcendence as the state of reality. Such an understanding of the idea of God is neither naturalistic nor supranaturalistic. It underlies the whole of the present theological system” (Systematic Theology, Volume 2, 8).

Tillich describes prophetic witness (“Prophets speak in terms which express the ‘depth of reason’ and its ecstatic experience” Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 143), agapic love (“As the ecstatic participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, agape is experienced as blessedness” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 136), and prayer (“A union of subject and object has taken place in which the independent existence of each is overcome; new unity is created. The best and most universal example of an ecstatic experience is the pattern of prayer.” Ibid., 119).


Ibid., 235 (original emphasis)

Tales of Love, 248-249. Kristeva further elaborates on this heterogeneity: “We lives on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings. A woman is neither nomadic nor a male body that considers itself earthly only in erotic passion. A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of language—and it has always been so.” (Ibid., 254).

Levinas describes the pure passivity demanded by the maternal body: “The-one-for-another has the form of sensibility or vulnerability, pure passivity or susceptibility, passive to the point of becoming an inspiration, that is, alterity in the same, the trope of the body animated by the soul, psyche in the form of a hand that gives even the bread taken from its own mouth. Here the psyche in the maternal body” (Otherwise than Being, 67).

Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 294.

“Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life,” in Being versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology?, edited by Gert Hummel and Doris Lax, Stenger probes Tillich’s interconnection of being and Word that funds his relational ontology through the Spiritual Presence. Though she concedes his appreciation of the body could be more extensive, Stenger holds that his relational ontology “resonates well with several feminist approaches [e.g., Sheila Davaney, Catherine Keller, Thandeka, Linell Cady] [because] it affirms the self, including the body, draws humans outwardly toward each other, and directs them toward that which is ultimate in a response of devotion and commitment” (296).

Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 112; Ibid., 112.

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Dynamics of Faith, 106. In Gilkey on Tillich, 29, Langdon Gilkey indicates that Tillich subsumes the fusion of these dimensions in and through self-awareness: “In us, being is ‘present to itself,’ aware of itself, its body, its environment, its space and time, its future. Here the inorganic, the organic, the psychic, and what even transcends these, are wedded together in our awareness of our own being.”

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Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 294.


Tillich’s capacious conception of the person extends to displaced persons such as refugees; his vigilance against reducing them to things comports with Kristeva’s perspective. In Strangers to Ourselves in The Portable Kristeva: Updated Edition, 265, Kristeva writes: “Let us not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner into a thing. Let us merely touch it, brush by it, without giving a permanent structure.” Similarly, in “The Theology of Pastoral Care: The Spiritual and Theological Foundations of Pastoral Care,” The Meaning of Health, 125, Tillich discusses the dehumanizing treatment of refugees as objects: “It was one of my early experiences in this country to come to the sharp realization that the refugees, who felt themselves to be persons, became objects and nothing more than objects when they were transformed into cases to be dealt with twenty minutes by the social worker. It often broke their self-awareness as a person. This example shows that the problem of becoming an object applies to all forms of taking care of some-one, be it the social, the educational, the political, the
medical, or the psycho-therapeutic function. In all of them the heart of the subject-object problem is of decisive importancenoted.

48 Totality and Infinity, 43. Levinas contends that the Western tradition “guarantees knowledge its congenital synthesizing and its self-sufficiency, foreshadowing the systematic unity of consciousness, and the integration of all that is other into the system and the present” (“Philosophy and Transcendence” in Alterity and Transcendence, 12). Levinas’s censure of ontology and system is not limited to the epistemological level; a fortiori Levinas claims that the totality of ontology and system underlies the totalitarianism of the state (e.g., Nazism): “Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (Totality and Infinity, 46). Tillich contends that power underpins love and justice, but love and justice impose constraints on power.

49 Levinas, in “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” (with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by Richard Cohen, 20, contends that “Dasein is its history to the extent that it can interpret and narrate its existence as a finite and contemporaneous story, a totalizing experience of past, present, and future.”

50 Otherwise Than Being, 183. The face, in fact, “is the very collapse of phenomenality” (Ibid., 88).

51 Ibid., 42.
52 Ibid., 46.
53 Ibid., 49.
54 Ibid., 119.
55 Ibid., 122. In Ibid., 156, Levinas develops the same point: “The Infinite does not enter into a theme like a being to be given in it, and thus belie its beyond being.”

56 Ibid., 14.
57 In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael Smith, 111.
58 Otherwise Than Being, 10.
59 “The Proximity of the Other,” in Alterity and Transcendence, 98. In consonance with Kristeva’s analysis of maternity, Levinas asserts that otherness precedes one’s own body: “The sensible—maternity, vulnerability, apprehension—binds the node of incarnation into a plot larger than the apperception of self. In this plot I am bound to others before being tied to my body” (Otherwise Than Being, 76).

60 Otherwise than Being, 182 (my emphasis). In the same text, Levinas describes the same phenomenon where “one discloses oneself by neglecting one’s defenses, leaving a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to insults and wounding” (Ibid., 49). The image of “leaving a shelter” further differentiates Levinas’s account from Tillich’s notions of love, reunion of the separated, and morality, constitution of the person as person in the encounter with other persons. In “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” (with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by Richard Cohen, 22, Levinas distinguishes his preferred notion of sociality from the reductive concept of unity: “Man’s relationship with the other is better as difference than as unity: sociality is better than fusion. The very value of love is the impossibility of reducing the other to myself.”

61 “Philosophy and Transcendence,” in Alterity and Transcendence, 5. “God” as the Infinite Other receives significant treatment in Levinas’s writings, particularly his reflections on the Talmud. Levinas conceptualizes religion in terms of moral experience (“Religious experience, at least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a moral experience,” “Toward the Other,” in Nine Talmudic Readings, translated and with an introduction by Annette Aronowicz), where, for example, “[t]he image of God is better honored in the right given to the stranger than in symbols” (Ibid., 28). When comparing these conceptions to Tillich’s, we can thus note similarities (Tillich also unites morality and religion) as well as differences (Tillich prefers the language of symbols, not obligations to the others, as that which expresses the imago Dei. One should not overstate these similarities or differences. For example, I argue that there is significant resonance between Tillich’s symbol of the “God beyond God” and Levinas’s symbol of the transcendent face: “it is as if the face of the other person, which straightaway ‘demands of me’ and ordains me, were the mode of the very intrigue of God’s surpassing the idea of God, and of every idea where He would be aimed at, visible, and known, and where the Infinite would be denied through thematization, in presence or representation” (“The Old and the New,” in Time and the Other (and Additional Essays), translated by Richard Cohen, 136-137, my emphasis). For an extended comparison between notions of God in Levinas and Christian theology, specifically Barth’s theology, please see Steven Smith, The Argument to the Other: Reason Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel Levinas.


63 For Tillich’s presentation of the ‘silent voice,’ see Morality and Beyond, 24, 34 (“the silent voice of man’s own essential nature”), and 80 (‘mode of silence’).
64 *Theology of Culture*, 138-139. By contrast, Levinas submits that conscience “welcomes the Other” and “calls in question the naïve rights of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being” (*Totality and Infinity*, 84).

65 *Against the Third Reich*, 213.

66 *Morality and Beyond*, 65.

67 Ibid., 77. Thus, like Levinas where “transcendence is compressed into the sphere of intersubjective existence” (Edith Wyschogrod, “God and ‘Being’s Move’” in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” *The Journal of Religion* 62 (1982), 146), Tillich affirms transcendence as encounter (e.g., the moment of *kairos* experienced as revelation) that supersedes the self. Yet, unlike Levinas, Tillich reinscribes this transcendence as constitutive of the formation of the moral and cultural dimensions of the self: “Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit, is essentially related to morality and culture. There is no self-transcendence under the dimension of the spirit without the constitution of the moral self by the unconditional imperative, and this self-transcendence cannot take form except within the universe of meaning created in the cultural act” (*Systematic Theology*, Volume 3, 95).


70 *Hospitality of the Stranger*, 41.

71 See, *inter alia*, “Das Religiöse Symbol,” in *Main Works*, Volume 4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by John Clayton, 213-228. There Tillich develops further distinctions, including the two levels of religious symbols, the first level of “religiösen Gegenstandssymbole” (objective religious symbols) and the second level of “religiösen Hinweissymbole” (self-transcending religious symbols) (Ibid., 221-224 original emphasis). In his *Dynamics of Faith*, 41-43, Tillich adumbrates six features of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it participates in that to which it points; it opens us levels of reality which otherwise are closed to us; it unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and elements of reality; it cannot be produced intentionally; and it cannot be invented. In his 1961 “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” *Main Works*, Volume 4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by John Clayton, 415-420, Tillich identifies slightly different characteristics of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it participates in the reality of that which it represents; it cannot be created at will; it has power to open up dimensions of reality, in correlation to dimensions of the human spirit; and it possesses an integrating and disintegrating power. The negation of symbols, of course, derives from Tillich’s Protestant principle that repudiates any notion of absolutism within symbols.

72 *Systematic Theology*, Volume 3, 134. Put differently, “[l]ove as the reunion of those who are separate does not distort or destroy in its union” (*Systematic Theology*, Volume 1, 282).

73 Ibid., 134.

74 Ibid., 137.

75 The issue of justice, or the appearance of the third, poses challenges for Levinas. He affirms the centrality of justice, but he does fully resolve tensions between the relationship of self and other as hostage and lord and the order and thematization of justice: “The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other until then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentional性和 the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a co-presence on an equal footing as before a court of justice (*Otherwise than Being*, 157).

Theodore de Boer, in “An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy,” in *Face to Face with Levinas*, edited by Richard Cohen, argues that the presence of the third problematizes Levinas’s notions of unlimited responsibility: “The entrance onto the scene of the third man makes a comparison and weighing of responsibility necessary—and thereby also a thematizing and theorizing. This implies a certain correction, as Levinas puts it leniently, of the infinite demands that the other imposes upon me” (102, original emphasis).

New Publications


INDEX

Articles of the North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter and Bulletin (up to and including vol. 29)

Compiled by M. Lon Weaver


Articles by title is followed by articles by the author’s last name.

Articles by Title


“The Distortion of Faith as Belief and the Loss of the Symbolic Life: Tillich and Jung on the Hist-

“Event and Symbol in Tillich’s Christology: A Response to Fundamentalist Interpretations of Jesus Christ,” Stenger, Mary Ann, XXIII, 3 (Fall 1997): 3-11.
“Kairos and ‘Epochal Thinking,’” Boss, Marc, XXIV, 2 (Spring 1998): 2-12.


“Paul Tillich as a Military Chaplain,” Arther, Donald, XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 4-12.


“Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Greek Philosophy (Berlin 1920/21),” Sturm, Erdmann, XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 12-16.


“Schelling’s Influence on Tillich’s Theological Anthropology,” Whittemore, Paul B. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980).


“Tillich’s Ontology of Life and History vis-a-vis Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism,” Arther, Donald E. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980).


“Tillich’s Pragmatic Argument That the Christian Message Has the Strongest Claim to Be Universal,” James, Robison. XXIX, 2 (Spring 2003): 2-10.

“Tillich’s Presentation of the Trinity and the Contemporary Renewal of Trinitarian Thought: Toward a Tillichian Presentation of the Trinity,” MacLennan, Ronald B. (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 24-29.


“The Vehicle(s) of Salvation According to Paul Tillich and Stanley Hauerwas,” Weaver, Matthew Lon, XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 5-13.


**ARTICLES BY AUTHOR**


Arther, Donald, “Paul Tillich as a Military Chaplain,” XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 4-12.

Arther, Donald E., “Tillich’s Theology of Culture and History vis-a-vis Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980).


MacLennan, Ronald B., “Tillich’s Presentation of the Trinity and the Contemporary Renewal of Trinitarian Thought: Toward a Tillichian Presentation of the Trinity.” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1992): 24-29.


Pedraja, Luis G., “Tillich’s Theology of Culture and Hispanic Theology,” XXV, 3 (Summer 1999) 2-10.


Rasmussen, Barry G., “John Milbank’s Asymmetry of Love and Tillich’s Theonomy: The Divine in
Relation to the World,” XXVII, 3 (Summer 2001) 8-21.


Sturm, Erdmann, “Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Greek Philosophy (Berlin 1920/21),” XXVI, 3 (Summer 2000): 12-16.


Weaver, Matthew Lon, “The Vehicle(s) of Salvation According to Paul Tillich and Stanley Hauerwas,” XXVIII, 4 (Fall 2002): 5-13.


Whittemore, Paul B., “Schelling’s Influence on Tillich’s Theological Anthropology” (Meeting Papers, Nov. 1980).


In the Fall Newsletter:

• Articles by Rachel Sophia Baard and Stephen Butler Murray

• The complete program for the Annual Meeting of the NAPTS in San Antonio, plus information about this year’s banquet
The Officers of the North American Paul Tillich Society

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