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- The Atlanta Meeting: Programs of the NAPTS Sessions and the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture” Group at the AAR
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- “How Does the Letter Kill? The Tillichian and Lutheran Understandings of Law” by Kimberly R. Miller

THE NORTH AMERICAN PAUL TILLICH SOCIETY ANNUAL MEETING

PROGRAM

See map of Atlanta on page 23

The annual meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society will take place in Atlanta, Georgia, Friday, November 21 and Saturday, November 22, 2003. As always, the meeting will be held in conjunction with the meeting of the American Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature from November 22 to 25, 2003. The two sessions of the Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group at the AAR meet on Sunday and Monday afternoons.

If you are attending the meeting, please bring the Newsletter with you for the Program and Banquet information as well as the map of Atlanta.

The annual banquet will take place at Pittypat’s Porch Restaurant, a few blocks from all the convention hotels. The distinguished speaker will be Jean Richard. The 2003 Paul Tillich Prize for the Best Student paper will also be presented.
North American Paul Tillich Society Newsletter

Volume 29, number 4
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Don Arthur, Ballwin Missouri
Presiding

Paul H. Carr, Air Force Research Laboratory
A Theology for Evolution: Haught, Teilhard, and Tillich

Michael DeLashmutt, University of Glasgow
Tillich and Teilhard: Christology and Cosmology as Expressions of Techno-Theological Hope

James Hutchingson, Florida International University
Realms of Complexity: The Relationship of the Inorganic and the Organic in Paul Tillich and Teilhard de Chardin

3:45 Break

4:00 Robison James’s Tillich and World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Today
Copies can be ordered on line at www.mupress.org/webpages/books/james.html

Owen Thomas, Episcopal Theological Seminary
Presiding

Panelists:

John J. Thatamanil, Vanderbilt University
Kenneth T. Rose, Christopher Newport University
S. Mark Heim, Andover Newton theological School

Responding:
Robison B. James, University of Richmond

6:00 – 9:00 PM

North American Paul Tillich Society
Annual Banquet
(See banquet reservation form included)

Pittypat’s Porch Restaurant
25 Andrew Young International Boulevard
404.525.8228

The restaurant is located on Andrew Young International Blvd. between Peachtree Street and Spring Street, within easy walking distance (approximately 3 blocks) from the four convention hotels. It is also a block from the Peachtree Center Station of MARTA, the Atlanta subway line.

Distinguished Speaker:
Jean Richard, Université Laval

Reservations for the Banquet:

• Email: fparrella@scu.edu
• Voicemail: 408.554.4714
• Fax: 408.554.2387
• Price: 50 USD

For those who reserve a place at the banquet, payment must be made to the treasurer on the day of the banquet.

All reservations must be received by Monday, November 19, 2003.

Saturday, November 22, 2003

7:00 – 8:30 AM
Hilton–Jefferson [AM 51]
Breakfast Meeting of the Board of Directors of the North American Paul Tillich Society

9:00 – 11:30 AM
Hyatt–Cairo [AM 80]
Liberationist and Feminist Engagements

Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville
Presiding

Maria T. Davila, Boston College
Anthropologies in Dialogue: Paul Tillich and José Ignacio Gonzalo-Faus, S.J., and Anthropologies of Liberation

Gabriella Lettini, Union Theological Seminary
The Unbearable Maleness of New Being: Tillich’s Influences in Mary Daly’s Spinning and Weaving
10:00  Bernard Donnelly’s The Socialist Émigré: Marxism and the Later Tillich

Ronald MacLennan, Bethany College

Presiding

Panelists:

Matthew Lon Weaver, University of Pittsburgh
Terence O’Keeffe, University of Ulster
Ronald H. Stone, Pittsburgh Theological Seminary

Responding:
Bernard Donnelly, University of Ulster

Sunday, November 23, 2003

11:45 – 12:45  Marriott Marquis–Chardonnay  [AM 159]

Annual Business Meeting of the Society

Tentative Agenda:

(1) Acceptance of the minutes from the 2002 Meeting in Toronto
(2) Report of the President: Michael Drummy
(3) Report of the Secretary-Treasurer: Frederick J. Parrella
(3) Report of the Nominating Committee: Robison B. James, Chair
(4) Election of new officers
(5) Proposal on the structure of the Board of Directors
(6) Report of the Collected Works Project Committee
(7) Topics of future meetings
(8) New publications on Tillich
(9) Items of business from the floor

1:00 – 3:30 PM  Marriott Marquis–Chardonnay  [A 134]

Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group

Why Tillich? Why Now? Building Bridges

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, Harvard University
FRAMING, FRAGMENTING, AND FREUD (?): MODELS OF THE SELF AND FAITH FORMATION IN PAUL TILLICH AND IRIS MURDOCH

Jonathan Rothchild

Editor’s Note: Jonathan Rothchild of the University of Chicago received the Paul Tillich Prize for the best paper submitted by a graduate student at the annual banquet in Toronto in November of 2002.

Consistently a thinker situated on the boundary, Paul Tillich appropriates disparate symbolic resources to illuminate the inherent tension between the fragmentary character of existence and the transcendent status of human essence. The purpose of this essay is to probe two such resources, art and psychoanalysis, which constitute self-reflexive models of the self. The objective of this analysis is to gain critical purchase on Tillich’s diagnosis of the self and its relevance to faith formation. Art and psychoanalysis share affinities with Tillich’s method of correlation and its interconnection between culture, morality, and religion. That is, in terms of Tillichian language of the spirit, art draws upon self-creativity, but it also can induce the experience of “ecstasy” and self-transcendence, while psychoanalysis lays bare the experience of “insight” or self-integration. Pursuit of these inquiries will be enhanced by engagement of an interlocutor, philosopher Iris Murdoch and her magnum opus, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, for her notions of the flawed self and moral transformation and her realist retrieval of moral ontology resonate deeply with Tillich’s sensibilities.

I argue that Tillich and Murdoch are unique thinkers who, despite their divergence on significant points (e.g., Good and good, work and grace, and metaphysics and ontology), can redress general inadequacies of postmodern models of self and faith formation—the dearth of self-critique, the reduction of ontological and metaphysical claims, the disavowal of consciousness and moral perception—because they reconfigure banal pictures of the self into dynamic conceptions of humans as creative and transcendent agents within culture, morality, and religion.

The first section of the essay concentrates on the import of art for self-understanding, the interrelation between religion and culture, and the development of faith and morals. Tillich and Murdoch contend that the experiences of pictures and symbols function as sine qua non vehicles for accessing the depths of the human condition. The importance of symbols underscores the extent to which humans are image-bearers and image-receptors who conceive of themselves, others, and the world through visual prisms. As Platonic realists of different sorts, Tillich and Murdoch appreciate the allegory of the cave (Republic, Book VII: 514-520d) as its metaphorical pictures disclose the basic human mode of being in the world: using efficacious metaphors and images (Murdoch) and transcendent symbols (Tillich) to picture the real and to do the good. Consequently, art—both by embodying polyvalent structures of form and by engendering the dissolution of form—can reify the fragmentary condition and the transformative capabilities of humanity as well as disclose the metaphysical reality of others (Murdoch) and express ultimate concern (Tillich). The principal difference between Murdoch and Tillich on this point derives from Murdoch’s attention to literature as a normative source, which problematizes Tillich’s preference for painting as the preferred artistic expression.

The second section considers another model employed by Tillich, psychoanalysis. Tillich submits that the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis “interpenetrate” the implicitly theological notions of estrangement, the centered-self, and healing. His insight gainsays overtures of the collapse of theology after Freud; rather, psychoanalysis can marshal resources that facilitate—rather than the current perspective, that is, to deconstruct—the conceptualization of the self as flawed but redeemable and the formation of faith as ultimate concern. The inclusion
of Murdoch again becomes relevant because she attenuates the contribution of psychoanalysis; in her judgment, it further perpetuates the illusions of the relentless ego. The attitudes of Tillich and Murdoch vis-à-vis psychoanalysis become perplexing when, through the hermeneutical lens of Paul Ricoeur, one notes the intrinsic relationship between reader and text and analyst and analysand. The previous discussion of literature is thus reconceived in light of questions raised by psychoanalysis pertaining to the self and faith formation.

The conclusion attempts to synthesize these points and to offer constructive proposals for contemporary visions of the self and the formation of axiological concerns and moral convictions. Tillich and Murdoch can contribute significantly to contemporary discussions of the self and faith formation because—in contrast to thinkers who privilege narrative or the primordial claims of the other—they mediate between the importance of theoretical transformative models and the relevance of the vicissitudes of the situation.

I. A Symbols and the Import of Art

Theologian James Mackey discusses the role of art and its ramifications for humanity and reality. Contending that postmodernity’s putative dualism between mind and body—the perduing consequence of a corruption of Descartes’ philosophy exemplified in thinkers ranging from Hume and Kant, Sartre and Levinas, and “the holy Trinity of postmodernism—Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida”—results in the loss of the self and, concomitantly, the loss of reality. Mackey envisages art as a means to re-conceptualize properly self and reality. He argues, however, that appeal to art creates an interesting dilemma for students of the human condition. This appeal will “make at once too much and too little of humanity” because, on the one hand, it can focus too extensively on humanity and on “talk of humanizing reality.” yet, on the other hand, it can concentrate too exclusively on fragility and the “permanent existential threatenedness” that risks vitiating the reality of humanity. Tillich, following Plato and Schelling, remains acutely cognizant regarding the dangers of idolatry and the splendors of expressive profundity of artistic images. As we will soon discover, Tillich, like Murdoch, perceives the necessity of art to render meaning for human creatures who are not bifurcated between mind and body, but who are transcendent and yet fragmented and estranged from themselves, others, and the world.

In his autobiography On the Boundary, Tillich poignantly describes his first experiences of art during World War I: “I recall most vividly my first encounter—almost a revelation—with a Botticelli painting in Berlin during my last furlough of the war. Out of the philosophical and theological reflection that followed these experiences, I developed some fundamental categories of philosophy of religion and culture, viz., form and substance.” These existential encounters with art and the derived structural categories permeate Tillich’s discussion of the various dimensions of reality. Tillich writes in The Courage to Be: “Modern art is not propaganda, but revelation. It shows that the reality of our existence is as it is. It does not cover up the reality in which we are living.” Art exposes levels of reality in all their ontological, epistemological, and axiological complexities, and, as Tillich iterates throughout his Systematic Theology, art may constitute revelation because it can grasp us as an absolute and engender ultimate concern in a method similar to genuine symbols.

The most apposite religious symbol for Tillich is the picture of the New Being in Jesus Christ. Tillich describes the transformative power of this image: “through this picture the New Being has power to transform those who are transformed by it. This implies that there is an analogia imaginis, namely, an analogy between the picture and the actual personal life from which it has arisen.” This analogia imaginis underlies humanity’s encounter with and construal of cultural symbols and invites participation in these realities. Tillich’s examination of the relevance of art remains consonant with his envisioned task of a theonomous analysis of culture: “It is the task of deciphering the style of an autonomous culture in all its characteristic expressions and of finding their hidden religious significance.”

I. B. Tillich on Painting and Literature

Let us consider a specific example of a painting embraced by Tillich for its “hidden religious significance” and its ability to express ultimate concern. Commemorating the tragic bombing of a Spanish town by Fascist forces, Pablo Picasso’s Guernica is denominated by Tillich as “the best present-day [1950s’] Protestant picture.” How can a secular entity be tantamount to a religious symbol? Tillich isolates its style, or that which points to its self-
interpretation and meaning, and states: “Picasso’s Guernica is profoundly religious in this implicit sense because it expresses so honestly and powerfully modern man’s anguished search for ultimate meaning and his passionate revolt against cruelty and hatred.”10 Experimenting with abstract forms that express the struggle to discover—albeit fragmentarily amid the chaos, horror, and violence of the moment that is kairos—the meaningfulness of the whole and ultimate concern, Picasso “wrought a picture of seemingly extreme ugliness, but in actuality, a picture of great beauty.”11 This picture of great beauty is a cultural expression circumscribed in a particular historical context; yet, its style discloses in its extreme ugliness an unconditioned meaning that asks ultimate questions, thereby transcending itself and lying on the boundary between culture and religion. On this boundary, one encounters the ecstatic experience that “does not destroy the structure of reason” but drives reason “beyond the limits of its finitude”12 to the presence of the ultimate.

Tillich’s dynamic boundary between culture and religion, however, does disavow putatively religious paintings, including Heinrich Hoffman’s Christ in Gethsemane, that neither express this great beauty nor communicate the depths of the human and ultimate concern. According to Tillich in his early essay “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture,” such pictures are not truly religious because their ordinary content (Inhalt) fails to “break through” to their spiritual substance and religious import (Gehalt).13 These prosaic paintings reduce the profundity of images from one of ultimate concern that induces ecstatic awareness to a superficial portrayal that fails to challenge the human fear of reality, to transform radically ordinary reality, and to anticipate the new possibilities of being.14 Manifested, for example, in the work of Cézanne, van Gogh, and Munch, expressionism satisfies these shortcomings because, predicated on its novelty and sui generis style, it “breaks away from the horizontal movement and shows the Spiritual Presence in symbols of broken finitude.”15

Tillich is also captivated by the discursive power of other forms of art, including architecture. Tillich increasingly becomes interested in architecture, including the notion of “sacred void” and the absence of form. He envisions tremendous innovations in religious architecture: “It is quite probable that the renewal of religious art will start in co-operation with architecture.”16 Yet, for purposes of this essay, Tillich’s passion for literature is most pertinent. His On the Boundary recounts his early, intense existen-
tial identification with Hamlet as well as his sporadic, but impassioned reading of classical novels. He then summarizes his rather confounding attitude toward literature: “Literature, however, contained too much philosophy to be able to satisfy fully the desire for pure artistic contemplation. The discovery of painting was a crucial experience for me.”17 To be sure, Tillich appreciates the “artistic contemplation” and power of literature,18 but he seems reticent to affirm its self-transcendence as sanguinely as in the genre of paintings. We will revisit this point below in reference to Murdoch.

I. C. Murdoch on Art

Iris Murdoch also conceptualizes art as an integral feature and consequence of humans as “fantasizing imaginative animals” whose “[i]ntellect is naturally one-making.”19 While she does value the human imaginative capacities, Murdoch argues that we humans are tyrannized by our fat, relentless egos20 and that our fantasies dominate our performative modes of being in the world. She appropriates the Platonic image of the cave to express our limited and blemished capacities: “The mind is indeed besieged or crowded by selfish dream life. Plato used the word eikasia, best translated here as ‘illusion’ or ‘fantasy,’ to indicate the most benighted human state, the lowest condition in the Cave. He also uses the word phantasia in this sense. He connects egoistic fantasy and lack of moral sense with inability to reflect.”21 Solipsistic images, analogous to the flattened symbols repudiated by Tillich, simply reinforce this egoistic fantasy and perpetuate human blindness vis-à-vis the moral Good and the concrete reality of the other. Quite comfortable in the cave, we humans are relegated to a restricted life of mimetic shadow-making and ethical self-obsession.

Nevertheless, Murdoch asserts that deep pictures illumined by the Form provide clarifying images of the real and the good that discipline the soul and promote moral progress out of the cave. Analogous to Tillich’s claim that genuine images and symbols accommodate both moments of existence and the ontological polarities, Murdoch synthesizes metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and ethics: “This is metaphysics, which sets up a picture which it then offers as an appeal to us all to see if we cannot find just this in our deepest experience.”22 Pictures of the good, often vouchsafed in what Murdoch calls “good art,” penetrate the deepest recesses of human convictions about truth, love, and goodness. Hence,
consistent with Tillich’s language of analogia imaginis, Murdoch avers the necessity of art for the moral life and faith formation: “Serious discussion of states of consciousness, thinking, moral reflection, quality of being needs to use imagery and resort to art.”23 This “resort to art” is mandated by Murdoch’s retrieval of the import of the inner life, that is, consciousness and imagination, for moral reflection. Tillich and Murdoch share a fundamental to art as mediating the problematic nexus between existence and essence. Murdoch identifies art’s role in ameliorating the dissonance: “We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of being; it is through an enriching and deepening of concepts that moral progress takes place.”24

Murdoch grounds her claims for the importance of art and the retrieval of consciousness and imagination on the basis of attention and attachments. Attention and attachments lie at the heart of her definition of morality: “Morality, as the ability or attempt to be good, rests upon deep areas of sensibility and creative imagination, upon removal from one state to another, upon shift of attachments, upon love and respect for the contingent details of the world.”25 As mentioned above, Murdoch insists that natural human selfishness precludes suitable attention to the other; however, through the artifices of paintings, novels, and plays that induce spiritual discipline, art can “break the ego, destroying the illusory whole of the unified self.”26 The broken individual thus shifts his or her attention away from solipsistic images to expansive pictures of the self, other, and world. Sustained attention and lucid perception of truth effect—or at least facilitate the efficacy of—virtuous action. Similar to Tillich’s conception of Picasso’s Guernica as a liminal space that transforms ordinary reality, Murdoch states:

Art illuminates accident and contingency and the general muddle of life, the limitations of time and the discursive intellect, so as to enable us to survey complex or horrible things which would otherwise appall us…Art makes places and opens spaces for reflection, it is a defense against materialism and against pseudo-scientific attitudes of life. It calms and invigorates, it gives us energy by unifying, possibly by purifying, our feelings. In enjoying great art we experience a clarification and concentration and perfection of our own consciousness.27

The key for both thinkers is not the content depicted, but rather the experience of “breaking through” expressed as ultimate concern or as protracted attention to the other.

Markedly similar to Tillich’s censure of pedestrian art that cannot invoke ultimate concern, Murdoch designates as “bad art” those images (e.g., television) that thwart self-reflection and self-criticism. Murdoch extends her concept of bad art to include consolation, which assuages the burden of moral transformation. Murdoch’s incessant disquiet about the spiritual journey compels her to nuance the benefit of even good art: “Even good art may make us feel too much at ease with something less than the best; it offers a sort of spiritual exercise and what looks like a spiritual home, a kind of armchair sanctuary which may be a substitute for genuine moral effort.”28 She worries in particular about the consoling effects of religious art that convey salvation and grace. With some qualifications, Tillich appreciates these concerns regarding complacency and consolation; his Protestant principle, expressed most robustly and trenchantly by the cross, provides an implicit rejoinder to any definitive claims of the sacred in the finite.29

Murdoch’s own work as a novelist raises intriguing questions about Tillich’s apparent resistance to the significance of novels. A fortiori, Murdoch appeals to a number of novelists (e.g., Proust, Henry James, and Tolstoy) as interlocutors in various chapters—including chapters not ostensibly dedicated to discussions on art—of her Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals.30 This inclusion of novels in her philosophical work signals her confidence that novels can illuminate our visions of goodness and truth. Among myriad instantiations of this confidence, Murdoch holds that novels “can give us a new vocabulary of experience, and a true picture of freedom,” and compel us to undertake a “focusing of attention.”31 Murdoch upholds the “ordinariness” of novels and their abilities to present to us these very moments of ordinariness, not abstract speculations, that help lay bare the dialectic between existence and essence:

Characters in novels partake of the funniness and absurdity and contingent incompleteness and lack of dignity of people in ordinary life. We read here both the positive being of individuals and also their lack of formal wholeness. We are, as real people, unfinished and full of blankness and jumble; only in our own illusioning fantasy are we complete. Good novels concern the fight between good and evil and the pil-
grimage from appearance to reality. They expose vanity and inculcate humility.32

Indeed, there are limits to the transcendence afforded by novels, which Murdoch herself notes.33 Nevertheless, Tillich’s general characterization of literature as containing “too much philosophy” appears overstated; he undervalues the capacity of novels to depict life’s random happenings—which in themselves have metaphysical implications—that would help Tillich articulate the specific life-details constituting the “situation.”34

I conclude the discussion of art by juxtaposing two passages that provide, in my judgment, illuminating synopses of their views of the import of art. Both passages discuss Rilke and describe art’s effects—effects that supersede the aesthetic, cognitive, and moral realms and penetrate love, truth, and ultimate concern. First, listen to Murdoch’s explication of genuine attention in art that undergirds her cognitivist moral particularism and her pursuit a correspondence theory of truth:

[Rainer Maria Rilke’s] remarks (all to Clara Rilke) [about Cézanne] exhibit, in a way which we may understand if we are acquainted with any art or craft, what kind of achievement ‘pure cognition’ or ‘perception without reverie’ might be: to do with ‘animal attentiveness’, ‘good conscience,’ ‘only doing what you know,’ ‘simple truthfulness,’ the ‘consuming love in anonymous work.’35

Now, listen to Tillich’s analysis of art’s transformative effects on the whole person and the subject-object dynamic that are tantamount to a religious experience:

Art as such, whether liturgical or not, whether dealing with religious subject matter or not, penetrates, the subject-object reality in which we are living; but whether it penetrates ultimate reality is another question. One of the criteria that indicates something has been penetrated is that the meaning of one’s total existence is involved, not only one’s aesthetic existence. I remember a poem by Rainer Maria Rilke in which he spoke about a torso of an archaic Apollo and said that whenever he looked at it, it said to him ‘Change thy life.’ Now if this is experienced, the aesthetic experience is transformed; then the aesthetic has become a matter of ultimate concern and that means a religious experience has occurred.36

II. A. Psychoanalysis: Healing, Grace, and Models of Encounter

Turning to another model of interpreting the self, Tillich appreciates the import of psychoanalysis for understanding the formation of the self and its concomitant faith formation. Tillich’s own work influenced psychologists, including Rollo May, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Erik Erikson. As illustrated in his Systematic Theology, The Courage to Be, and Theology of Culture, Tillich contends that psychoanalysis, like art, helps elucidate the relationships between self and world and the ontological polarities: “The recovery of the meaning of anxiety through the combined endeavors of existential philosophy, depth psychology, neurology, and the arts is one of the achievements of the twentieth century.”37 These related disciplines are valuable because they help enrich Tillich’s language of “estrangement,” “abyss,” “eros,” and “reunion” and clarify the distinctions between fear and anxiety.

Furthermore, Tillich submits that psychoanalysis can disabuse theologians of notions that the functions of the spirit can operate efficaciously without a critical recognition of the complexity of human nature.38 Influenced by Schelling and Jacob Böhme, Tillich posits that the constitutive parts of this nature include a demonic element, which psychoanalytic research helped reintroduce into general discourse. Tillich applauds this fact because “wherever the demonic appears there the question as to its correlate, the divine, will also be raised.”39 Psychoanalysis then, despite its general trajectory against the legitimacy of religious beliefs and practices, actually stimulates discussion of these beliefs and practices when it expatiates on the demonic element within the human. Thus, for these reasons, psychoanalysis provides Tillich with another bridge to navigate between the existential vicissitudes of life and the essential character of ontological structure.

This bridge usually appears in the form of accrued knowledge of the self. Tillich appropriates the model of knowledge as “insight” or “gnosis.” This insight facilitates self-integration through self-transformation and reunion:

Recently the term ‘insight’ has been given connotations of gnosis, namely, of a knowledge which transforms and heals. Depth psychology attributes healing powers to insight, meaning not a detached knowledge of psychoanalytic theory or of one’s own past in the light of this theory but a repetition of one’s actual experiences with
all the pains and horrors of such a return. Insight in this sense is a reunion with one’s own past. Such a cognitive union produces a transformation just as radical and as difficult as that presupposed and demanded by Socrates and Paul.10

This insight, the “reunion with one’s past,” effects a “radical” transformation because it functions similarly as forgiveness through love: it heals through the “drive towards the unity of the separated.”11 Yet, Tillich distinguishes the disparate natures of these healing encounters so that we comprehend the limited and specific healing within psychotherapy. The “acceptance of the unacceptable” secured through agape exists on an ontological level, whereas any denouement through therapy exists on a cognitive and emotional level: “There are striking analogies between the recent methods of mental healing and the traditional ways of personal salvation. But there is also one basic difference. Psychotherapy can liberate one from a special difficulty. Religion shows to him who is liberated, and has to decide about the meaning and aim of his existence, a final way. This difference is decisive for the independence as well as for the co-operation of religion and psychotherapy.”12 Psychotherapy can disclose to an individual the motivation behind and the meaning of his/her actions, and thus help clarify his/her mode in the existential realm of being; religion, however, can disclose the “final” meaning of the interrelation between the existential and essential realms of being.

Tillich further probes this interpenetration between psychoanalysis and religion in the notion of awareness of the distance between essence and existence; thus, existentialism enters the picture. Similar to his reconciliation between ontology and Biblical religion in Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Tillich contends that the Biblical religion and psychoanalysis share similar conceptions of existential awareness: “The principle of awareness is related to contemporary depth psychology, but it is as old as religion itself and is sharply expressed in the New Testament. It is the principle according to which man in the process of sanctification becomes increasingly aware of his actual situation and of the forces struggling around him and his humanity but also becomes aware of the answers to the questions implied in this situation. Sanctification includes awareness of the demonic as well as of the divine.”13 This awareness of the demonic and the divine vis-à-vis the actual situation reiterates Tillich’s claim about the affinities between existentialism and psychoanalysis. Despite the counterclaims of other thinkers, Tillich argues at length that existentialism and psychoanalysis possess similar sensibilities and have mutually influenced one another in their common exploration of human estranged existence.14

The notion of mutual influence between existentialism and psychoanalysis, at first blush, seems easily problematized: to what extent can the radical freedom of existentialism be reconciled with the seeming determinism endemic to psychoanalysis? Tillich believes that such reconciliation is rendered possible because both identify questions arising from human existence. Consequently, existentialism and psychoanalysis merely describe the human situation and ask questions of it without providing the definitive answers. These questions function as critical guides for understanding existence, but they must be correlated with the answers afforded by the ontological dimension of religious faith. Hence, Tillich affirms that it is “[o]nly in the light of an ontological understanding of human nature can the body of material provided by psychology and sociology be organized into a consistent and comprehensive theory of anxiety.”15 This collaborative effort encapsulates the limited, but important contribution of psychoanalysis for understanding the self.

II. B. Murdoch and Psychoanalysis

While she asserts that she is “not a ‘Freudian,’” Murdoch avows the truth of Freudian theory vis-à-vis its construal of “the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by its own individual history, whose natural attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand or control. Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings.”16 Murdoch, influenced by Plato’s Timaeus and Freud’s theory of ubiquitous libidinal energy, advocates that the moral life consists of shifting attachments and harnessing energy. Hence, one would deduce that Murdoch would have affinities with psychoanalysis in that she intends to marshal forces to mitigate this natural selfishness.

However, Murdoch admonishes her readers about the consoling perils of psychoanalysis that imply facile answers to complex phenomena. For example, psychoanalysis promotes efforts to retrieve the self through personal narration and mimetic role-playing. Murdoch recognizes the intent of such
practices, but she cautions: “We want to control the tale ourselves and give it our ending (which need not of course be in the ordinary sense a happy one). We want to make a move to a conclusion, our conclusion.”47 Hence, Murdoch submits that psychoanalysis optimistically over-determines the transformative powers of certain cognitive and volitional exercises that, as in the writings of the existentialists,48 simply reinforce egoism; she contends that the relentless ego will not relinquish its reign through exercises focusing on the self. Murdoch maintains that the ego must be displaced, even “shocked,” through concrete attention to the other impelled by images of the Good.49 Here we can observe a significant divergence between Murdoch and Tillich: while both seek to protect, but ultimately transform the individual, only Tillich embraces the strategies of existentialism and psychoanalysis as plausible means to accomplish this goal (even if in the limited manner as explained in the above discussion).

Moreover, Murdoch castigates psychoanalysis’s reductive tendencies to explain away idiosyncratic character traits such as sense of humor with technical jargon and deterministic categorization. She declares: “Psychoanalysis is a muddled embryonic science, and even if it were not, there is no argument that I know of that can show us that we have got to treat its concepts as fundamental. The notion of an ‘ideal analysis’ is a misleading one.”50 Another impetus for her scrutiny and dismissal of psychoanalysis derives from its historical bifurcation of fact and value. The systematic subsuming of the inner life of consciousness, convictions, and desires into mechanical compartmentalizations objectifies experience and divests it of its definitively subjective and individual character. Murdoch contends that the paramount problem of the self is and always will be the self, regardless of the scientifically derived causal explanations. She shares this concern with Tillich, for he too censures psychoanalysis’s tendency to reduce the complexity of the human condition—even if it is merely finite freedom—and to disavow the fundamental importance of human brokenness and human transcendence. He writes in the third volume of his Systematic Theology:

Today psychotherapy (including all schools of psychological healing) often tries to eliminate both medical healing and the healing function of the Spiritual Presence. The first is usually a matter of practice rather than theory, the second mostly a matter of principle. The psychoanalyst, for example, claims that he can overcome the

negativities of man’s existential situation—anxiety, guilt, despair, emptiness, and so on. But in order to support his claim the analyst must deny both the existential estrangement of man from himself and the possibility of his transcendent reunion with himself; that is, he must deny the vertical line in man’s encounter with reality.51

Let us conclude this section by re-examining the earlier discussion of literature through the lens of the current treatment of psychoanalysis. Philosopher Paul Ricoeur, among others, has argued convincingly that reader and text presents a good analogue for understanding the relationship between analyst and analysand.52 With minor variations, both models consist of actors and patients whose roles are interchangeable and mutually interpreted; both have objectives as the construction of coherent stories whereby, through the course of narrative, intelligibility of structures and constancy of self are attained. If this analogy holds true, it seems reasonable to assert that Tillich’s subordination of literature and Murdoch’s dismissal of psychoanalysis are untenable. These positions are untenable because they are inconsistent with the internal principles of their own systems.

III. Concluding Reflections

Our discussion of Tillich and Murdoch has traversed two foci within the matrix of culture, morality, and religion to demonstrate the depth and scope of their writings. Our principally synthetic method noted numerous similarities, and one should not overlook the rather stark analytic differences that distinguish these two interlocutors. Alas, these distinctions will have to be parsed on another occasion; the task of this conclusion is to sharpen the contribution of Murdoch and Tillich to contemporary discussions about the self and post-modern faith formation. These discussions of post-modern faith formation can be incredibly stimulating, but they can also collapse into various extremes that deserve brief mention. On the one hand, the retreat from a divisive world to religious narratives as the exclusive criterion for truth and goodness lacks awareness of the overall spiritual situation and fails to critique itself self-reflexively. On the other hand, the submission to the primordial claims of the other prevents the transcendental affirmation of one’s own being as part of a more significant ontological meaning.53 Through his analyses of art and psychoanalysis, Til-
lich transcends the narrow parameters of reductive claims to bring forth the essence of self, other, and morality: “True morality is a morality of risk. It is morality which is based on the ‘courage to be,’ the dynamic self-affirmation of man as man. This self-affirmation must take the threat of non-being, death, guilt, and meaninglessness into itself. It risks itself, and through the courage of risking itself, it wins itself. Morals give safety, morality lives in the unsafety of risk and courage.”

This risk, similar to Murdoch’s method of metaphysical pictures coupled with attention to others and the contingencies of life, reflects a realistic awareness of the tensions created in every moment between existential vicissitudes and essential structure. Murdoch and Tillich utilize various symbolic resources to complicate and intensify this awareness; they recognize that their methods must be capacious so as to attend properly to the profundity and complexity of the human condition.

References


1 Space precludes in-depth analysis and comparison of these principal themes. Rather, I emphasize the extent
to which their views of art and psychoanalysis signal distinct presuppositions about the self and its relation to other and to reality. I engage other postmodern thinkers by way of discussions in the footnotes.

2 The Critique of Theological Reason, 91.

3 Ibid., 226. Mackey’s principal retrieval of self and reality derives from a comprehensive metaphysics that has affinities with the Judeo-Christian conception of creation. For further comments on Mackey’s book, please see my forthcoming review in The Journal of Religion.

4 On the Boundary, 28.

5 The Courage to Be, 147.

6 For Tillich, symbols function as the organic means by which humans can conceptualize their estranged condition and ultimate reality. Symbols, an extension of the resonance between ontology and epistemology, point beyond themselves toward ultimate concern. On symbols, please see, inter alia, Dynamics of Faith.

7 Systematic Theology, Volume 2, 114-115.

8 “Religion and Secular Culture,” in The Protestant Era, 58.


11 “The Demonic in Art,” in On Art and Architecture, 110. In “Protestantism and Artistic Style,” 73, Tillich writes: “The ultimate is also present in those experiences of reality in which its negative, ugly, and self-destructive side is encountered.” This juxtaposition between the ultimate and ugliness parallels, to some extent, the perspectives of Julia Kristeva, Georges Bataille, and Jacques Lacan on the ambiguity (and even filth) of the sacred.

12 Dynamics of Faith, 76; Ibid., 77.

13 In The Religious Situation, 55, Tillich clarifies this distinction in reference to such paintings: “nowhere does one break through to the eternal, to the unconditioned content of reality which lies beyond the antithesis of subject and object.” In Ibid., 57, he also notes a comparison similar to the above: “It is not an exaggeration to ascribe more of the quality of sacredness to a still-life by Cézanne or a tree by van Gogh than to a picture of Jesus by Uhde.”


15 Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 258. Autonomous and heteronomous art, by contrast, cannot recognize this same genuine revelation; according to Michael Palmer, these styles are “forms of literalism” where “[n]either can speak of revelation as the unconditioned import of meaning ‘breaking through’ the form of meaning” (Paul Tillich’s Philosophy of Art, 156 [original emphasis]; 156).

16 “Protestantism and Artistic Style,” 75.

17 On the Boundary, 27.

18 For example, he does conjecture that “the influence of literature on the religious situation of a period, by virtue of the superiority of words over lines and colors, is both more direct and more general than is the influence of art” (The Religious Situation, 62).


20 In “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” in Existentialists and Mystics, 342, Murdoch declares that “[i]n the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego.”

21 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 317. Murdoch does not adhere to all of Plato’s teaching. She problematizes his “puritan” view toward art, and she redresses his abstract application of eros merely to ideas by advocating for the centrality of concrete attention of the other. For Tillich’s discussion of the cave allegory and its relation to theonomy, please see, inter alia, “Religion and Secular Culture” in The Protestant Era, 63.

22 Ibid., 507.

23 Ibid., 305.

24 “Against Dryness,” in Existentialists and Mystics, 293.


26 Ibid., 104. This destruction of the fallacious self is subsumed within the spiritual journey. Murdoch, “The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited,” in Existentialists and Mystics, 282, writes: “But one’s theory of art must account for the fact that experience of art is spiritual experience.”

27 Ibid., 8. The resonance between Tillich’s Guernica and Murdoch’s views become more apparent when Murdoch suggests: “The endlessly various formal separateness of art makes spaces for reflection. To resume: art cannot help, whatever its subject, beautifying and consoling. Goya’s ‘horror of war’ are terrifying but beautiful” (Ibid., 122; my emphasis).

28 Ibid., 91.

29 To be sure, Murdoch and Tillich differ on the extent to which “genuine moral effort” by itself can facilitate moral transformation. Nevertheless, it is interesting that both thinkers observe a tension within images that encapsulate the inherent ambiguity within culture, morality, and religion.

30 One of the ways to navigate Murdoch’s rather amorphous text is based on a structural schema: chapters 1-5 discuss image-making, appearances, and art, chapters
6-12 address consciousness and the inner life, and chapters 13-19 contemplate transcendent reality.


32 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 97

33 This derives, in part, from her adherence, pace Derrida, to Plato’s concerns about writing and the usurpation of consciousness by the contemporary turn to language. Writing for Murdoch does not function as the divine, say, as it does for Julia Kristeva, who views literature as “taking the place of the sacred” “because it hence decks itself out in the sacred power of horror” (Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, 208; 208).

34 Tillich, in the introduction to his The Religious Situation 12, defines situation as an “unconscious faith which is not assailed because it is the presupposition of life and is lived rather than thought of; this all-determining, final source of meaning constitutes the actual religious situation of a period” (my emphasis).


37 Systematic Theology, Volume I, 191.

38 Systematic Theology, Volume III, 240.

39 The Religious Situation, 32. See also “The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis,” in Theology of Culture, 123.

40 Systematic Theology, Volume I, 96.

41 Love, Power, and Justice, 25.

42 “Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics,” in Theology of Culture, 143.

43 Systematic Theology, Volume III, 231.

44 Philip Rieff, in his Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, 96, argues: “Psychoanalysis—at least programmati-
cally—does not aim at achieving a more critical view of the self, as does existentialism, for example, which has sponsored a heightened introspection in order to validate a more negative and critical view of both self and world. Rather psychoanalysis seeks to ease the burden of responsibility and engagement.” For Tillich’s argument to the contrary, please see his “The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis” in Theology of Culture, 112-126.

45 The Courage to Be, 65.


47 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 105 (original emphasis).

48 Murdoch eschews the existentialists’ focus on radical freedom, the volitional capacities of the will, and leaps between stages of existence. For Murdoch’s full-length treatment of existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, please see her Sartre: Romantic Rationalist.

49 Murdoch does not conceive of psychoanalysis as a form of critique of the ego, which is advocated by thinkers such as Jacques Lacan. Murdoch interestingly does not engage Lacan, most likely because he employs conceptual tools from structuralists and post-structuralists that Murdoch abrogates as obviating consciousness and ordinary truth. She therefore would not accept Lacan’s (Lévi-Straussian influenced) notion that “the unconscious is structure like a language” (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 20; original emphasis). Lacan’s emphasis on language is further illustrated through the development of conceptual models to depict alienation: “This alienating or is not an arbitrary invention, nor is it a matter of how one sees things. It is a part of lan-
guage itself” (Ibid., 212 original emphasis). This linguistically informed model conflicts sharply with Murdoch’s link between vision, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. One can point to a certain resonance concerning Mur-
 doch’s image of shocking the ego and Lacan’s pursuit of the real via the other. However, I submit that Lacan’s notions of “the split, of the stroke, of rupture” (Ibid., 26), analogous to Georges Bataille’s language of sacrifice, differ from Murdoch’s views because they pertain to a radical heterogeneity that while real, is unknowable. By contrast, Murdoch envisions the shock as a shift of con-
scious attachment from self-obsession to disciplined at-
tention to the other as metaphysically and concretely real: self and other still exist, but as an attenuated self in a dif-
ferent relation to the other. For Murdoch’s account, please see her “M and D” example in “The Idea of Perfection,” in Existentialists and Mystics, 312-318, where, contra the behaviorists, she describes the vacillations and moral progression of a mother’s consciousness vis-à-vis her daughter-in-law. I may also note in passing that Tillich would disagree with Lacan’s notions that the unconscious is “pre-ontological” as it is “neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized” (Ibid., 29 original emphasis; 30).


51 Systematic Theology, Volume III, 281.

52 On this point, please see Ricoeur’s “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding?” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 268, Time and Narrative, Vol-

53 I have noted similarities and differences between Murdoch and Tillich and several post-modern thinkers who privilege the other. To be sure, both Murdoch and
Tillich recognize the claims of the other, but these claims are always interpreted within larger structures of meaning (e.g. Tillich’s formulation of the ontological polarities including individuation and participation, his construal of self and world as the basic ontological structure, and his notion of reunion through agape and Murdoch’s contention that the magnetic impulses of the Good illuminate the goodness of individual beings and compel concrete attention to the other). They do not exclude notions of embodiment or affectivity, but these formulations differ, say, from Emmanuel Levinas’s lordship of the other (with the principle, has allowed the law to have a positive significance for human beings—both for those who are “old beings,” living under sin, and those who are reborn. By contrast, Tillich makes little allowance for a positive use of law. Under the conditions of actual existence, the law only oppresses. Under the Spiritual Presence, human beings are increasingly free from the law; in fact, the law disappears. Tillich does permit a theological use of the law, but his understanding of the law’s convicting and unmasking power is much weaker than that of Lutheran theology.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Tillich’s theology of law in light of a standard Lutheran view. For this “standard Lutheran view,” I rely on the Book of Concord, the collection of confessional documents Lutherans accept as normative. I begin by observing how and why Lutherans view law as a fundamental good for human beings. I then explore Tillich’s position, comparing and contrasting it with the Lutheran model. Finally, I conclude with some reflections on the core theological and anthropological assumptions at stake in the debate.

Before beginning, however, I would like to say a word about why I am undertaking this topic at the present time. A debate currently rages among Lutheran theologians about theology of law and the relationship between law and Christian freedom. Within this debate, David Yeago and Reinhard Hüttner portray Tillich (along with other post-Kantian Lutheran thinkers) as a modern antinomian. As I will show in this essay, this claim has some basis. I am less certain whether Lutherans should adopt Yeago and Hüttner’s proposed solution to this antinomian trend, a solution that draws in part upon character and virtue ethics and the recovery of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In my estimation, it is worth ask-

HOW DOES THE LETTER KILL?
The Tillichian and Lutheran Understandings of Law

Kimberly R. Miller

Editor’s Note: This is the Newsletter’s annual student paper. Kimberly R. Miller is a student at Yale Divinity School. This paper, written for a course taught by Professor David Kelsey, was chosen by Professor Kelsey as the most outstanding in his class. The editor is grateful to Professor Kelsey for his selection of this paper for the Newsletter.

In an autobiographical essay, Paul Tillich wrote, “I, myself, belong to Lutheranism by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection. I have never stood on the borders of Lutheranism and Calvinism. The substance of my religion is and remains Lutheran.” Although Tillich was by no means a confessional Lutheran theologian, he incorporated many Lutheran themes in the development of his constructive position, including justification by faith, the two kingdoms, and the sola gratia principle. Tillich also translates the traditional Lutheran claim that the law neither saves nor justifies: it neither reunites our essential with our actual being nor gives us unambiguous life. Only by being accepted—only by grace—do human beings receive unambiguous life. On first glance, then, Tillich’s theology of law seems quite Lutheran in substance.

A closer examination of Tillich’s view of law, however, suggests that assessing its Lutheran character is more complicated. Traditional Lutheran theology, while maintaining the sola gratia
ing whether we have resources within our own tradition to combat the antinomian spectre before we step outside of it!

**Lutheran Confessions on the Law**

In what ways does the Lutheran tradition view the law as a fundamental good for human beings? Although many of the documents in the *Book of Concord* focus on the limits of the law in light of the *sola gratia* principle, it is possible to detect several ways in which the law has a positive function. These ways are the three uses of the law—civil, theological, and what is variously called the “didactic” or “guiding” function. The law’s civil use was and is uncontroversial; therefore, I will not examine it here. After looking at the second and third uses of the law, I will then consider the concept of law operative in Reformation thought. I will then have established a “Lutheran standard” with which to compare and contrast Paul Tillich’s treatment of law.

According to the Reformers, the law’s primary use is theological: it makes us aware of our sin. This particular use of the law must be understood in light of the *simul* doctrine, which maintains that Christians are both justified and sinners. The danger in human nature is that we like to lose sight of our sinfulness; complacent in our justification, we imagine that our lives are perfectly holy and upright.” The law shatters such complacency:

The foremost office or power of the law is that it reveals inherited sin and its fruits. It shows human beings into what utter depths their nature has fallen and how completely corrupt it is. The law must say to them that they neither have respect for any God or that they worship false gods. This is something that they would not have believed without the law. Thus, they are anxious, terrified, humble, and despairing.

Several things are important here. First, Luther (the author of the passage quoted above) assumes a fairly strong understanding of the law’s epistemological function: it does not retell or remind, but communicates what human beings would not otherwise know. Second, experiencing the law is not what we might consider a pleasant experience—unless one finds pleasure in terror and despair! As it is put elsewhere in the *Book of Concord*, the law “kills.”

The Reformers, however, implicitly distinguish between the character of the experience itself and the theological assessment of such an experience. The law’s killing, threatening, and punishing work is part and parcel of God’s creativity, and is therefore good. It puts to death the old, sinful being so that the new might take its place, or, to use the catechetical phrase, the law drives the sinner to Christ. The killing, punishing work of the law is not the problem; *sin* is the problem. We should also note that Luther and the other authors of the documents understand the particular use of the law as God’s own use. They assign it on occasion to Christ, but most frequently to the Holy Spirit:

The Holy Spirit admonishes them [i.e. Christians] to do these works, and where because of the flesh they are idle, indolent, and recalcitrant, he reproves them through the law. Thus, he combines both functions: he “kills and makes alive, he brings down to hell and he raises up.” In this he functions not only to comfort but also to punish, as it is written, “When the Holy Spirit comes, he will reprove the world (including the old creature) because of sin and righteousness and judgment.

One consequence of the theological use of the law is a relativization of human morality, codes of conduct, and values. The Reformers understood the law to have a particular content—namely, the will of God, expressed most clearly through the Ten Commandments. Chief among these is the First Commandment, “You are to have no other gods,” from which all of the others follow. In the light of this commandment, human values appear to be nothing other than idolatry. The rich man might be honored for his wealth and status, but if he placed confidence in his wealth, he has a false god. The poor man might be pitied for his sorry state, but if he “doubts and despairs” as though he had no God, he too is an idolater.

The point is not only that all persons are judged, but that our ways of judging others are revealed to be merely human standards; our laws are not God’s law. In this sense, then, the law is good, not only because it convicts as sinners, but because it adjusts our own vision of our world in light of God’s will.

In addition to its theological use, the law also functions as a guide to those who are reborn—that is, the third and most controversial use. Some Lutherans, both at the time of the Reformation and today, claim that there is no such third use of the law. The authors of the Formula of Concord, however, agreed that the law has such a function and therefore we may rightly claim it as part of the Lutheran tradition. Fundamentally, the third use of the law affirms that there are goods in the Christian life apart from justification, and that one such good is *obedience* to
God’s law. Even if a person is justified by grace and not by works of the law, s/he is not released from his/her obligation to obedience: God still insists that God’s will be done: 

[We] unanimously believe, teach, and confess that, although Christians who believe faithfully have been truly converted to God, and have been justified and are indeed free and liberated from the curse of the law, they should daily practice the law of the Lord...For the law is a mirror that accurately depicts the will of God and what pleases him. It should always be held before the faithful and taught among them continuously and diligently.8

The “daily practice” to which this passage refers applies to believers as both old beings and new beings. In this respect, there are some logical problems with how this third use relates to the theological use: how can an old being effectively “killed” by the law survive to need its guidance? To sidestep this difficulty—a full discussion of the problem is not possible here—it may be best for us to consider how “daily practice” applies to “new beings.” The issue at stake is Christian freedom. In affirming a third use of the law, the Lutheran tradition denied that Christians could “perform service to God on the basis of their pious imagination in an arbitrary way of their own choosing.”9 In other words, they are not free to do this or that as they see fit, but they obey God’s commandments through the teaching of the Holy Spirit. Such obedience is “free” in the sense that it is done without coercion and threats. Obedience is, therefore, not opposed to Christian freedom, but is incorporated within it.

Why emphasize obedience in this way? This question leads us to consider the concept of law assumed by the Lutheran Reformers. In the Lutheran Confessions, we can identify snippets of a divine command theory. God communicates God’s will to us through the commandments. This communication—these commandments—are good on account of their divine origin; if God is good, God’s will must be also. These are the premises upon which Luther builds his explanations of the Decalogue in his catechisms. Luther proclaims without hesitation what God wants from and for us in each commandment.10 Whether we are “reborn” or remain “old beings,” we are never independent of God’s will, for it is by that will that we exist and that our lives are preserved. On account of our creation and preservation, we are obliged to obey God—a fundamental tenet (in Luther’s interpretation) of the Christian faith.11 The reality, however, is that the God’s will for us is so very good, and that we are so sinful, that full obedience is not possible. The theological use of the law obtains not because we never do any of its works and are therefore condemned, but because we do not fulfill it in its great majesty. It is true that I have never killed anyone, but Luther (and his fellow theologians) would claim that this is not sufficient for full obedience to the fifth commandment. To obey this commandment, I should exert myself to see that all of my neighbor’s needs are met, something I daily fail to do. In this respect, the Reformers viewed the justification by works not only as an affront to Christ’s saving work, but as an intolerable compromise of the law’s greatness:

Paul understands the “veil” to be human opinion about the entire law (the Decalogue and the ceremonial laws) as when hypocrites suppose that the external and civil works satisfy the law of God and that sacrifices and rituals justify before God ex opere operato. But this “veil” if removed from us (that is, the error is taken away) when God shows our hearts the impurity and the magnitude of our sin.12

The Lutheran evaluation of sin is so negative because the divine vision of how our lives are supposed to be is so great.

In conclusion, the Lutheran Reformers viewed the law as intrinsically good because of its divine source and understood its use to be good for human beings. Its convicting and punishing work is ultimately creative. As a guide to the justified, it shapes freely given obedience. With all of this in mind, we are now prepared to turn to the central question of this essay: how does Tillich’s theology of law compare with the confessional Lutheran position?

Tillich on Law

To answer this question, we must tackle two elements of Tillich’s theology of law. First, we will examine his concept of law and trace its relationship to other aspects of his systematic theology and note some problems with it. Second, we will determine what consequences this particular concept of law has for understanding how the law may be used. An assessment of Tillich’s “Lutheranness” is our final task, although we will refer to the Lutheran model occasionally through the exposition of Tillich’s theology.
2. A. Tillich’s Concept of Law

Tillich quite explicitly rejects the concept of law found in the Lutheran Confessions as a communication of the will of God to human beings. He writes: [The Will of God] is not an external will imposed upon us, an arbitrary law laid down by a heavenly tyrant, who is strange to our essential nature and therefore whom we resist justifiably from the point of view of our nature...It is not a strange law that demands our obedience, but the “silent voice” of our own nature as man, and as man with an individual character.¹³

Two elements in this quotation need explanation: “essential nature” and the notion of resistance from its point of view. “Essential nature” is Tillich’s abstract designation for what we fundamentally are; it is our divinely created potentiality. One element of this essential nature is our freedom. According to Tillich, we are deliberating, deciding, and responsible creatures. We confront our world, weigh the motives of our actions, and act individually.¹⁴ Given this individualistic, self-legislative character of freedom as an element of our essential being, the idea of resistance to an externally encountered will of God or a “strange tyrant” becomes clear. If Tillich maintained that the will of God was indeed external to our nature, and if he considered the will of God to be of crucial importance, he would need to revise his concept of essential being to include obedience to this external law. Essentially, then, human beings would not engage in pure deliberation and decision, but deliberation and decision with respect to divine prescriptions and prohibitions. Given this cherished commitment to human freedom, Tillich cannot build up his ethics on the basis of divine commands.

Even if Tillich’s understanding of human freedom allowed an ethics built on divine commands, other aspects of his theology would not. To advance a divine command theory, a theologian must do two things. First, s/he must establish that the conditions of the divine-human relationship are such that God can address human creatures as moral agents. (As we saw above, the Lutheran Reformers simply assume this to be the case). Second, s/he must offer reasons why obedience to divine commands is justified. One commonly given reason for obedience is that human beings owe God a debt of obligation because God creates and preserves them. Obedience to God’s commands is expected from humans because it fulfills this debt of obligation (again, the Lutherans assume this view). In my view, Tillich’s impersonal concept of God, his doctrine of revelation, and his doctrine of creation would make it difficult for him to make these arguments. It is unclear that a “ground of being” has the capacities to speak in the literal, non-symbolic sense of the term. Further, revelation, for Tillich, is revelation of a mystery, not of particular propositional content (i.e. specific imperatives) or, as Tillich puts it, “information.”¹⁵ What propositional content we have about the mystery is a human expression of the experience of the mystery, not divine communication.¹⁶ Finally, Tillich also does not have the doctrine of creation, which would support the notion of obedience. Tillich’s God does not create concrete lives, but only their potentialities. Human beings, in his view, are secondary agents in their own creation; they “leave the ground” of being in order to “stand upon” themselves.¹⁷ Given this picture, we could imagine a human being saying to a commanding God, “Why should I obey you? After all, I am partly responsible for my concrete life. Why should I respond to you as though you had taken sole responsibility over my life?” With his doctrine of creation, God, revelation, and human freedom, Tillich thus disentangles the idea of eternal law from the will of God.

Instead, Tillich identifies the will of God as our own potential being. He writes, “The ‘Will of God’ for us is precisely our essential nature with all of its potentialities, our created nature declared as ‘very good’ by God.”¹⁸ “God’s will” is “law” for Tillich in the sense of natural law, or what Tillich prefers to call “structural law.”¹⁹ The first and most important effect of this move is that it avoids opposing the self-legislative character of human freedom with the divine will: God’s will for us is that we freely deliberate, decide, and confront our world. The second result is that any discussion of the “will of God” for us as moral agents must be incorporated within, and not proposed in addition to, an ontological analysis of our lives. This is, of course, one of Tillich’s central moves in the third volume of his Systematic Theology. For Tillich, the making of a concrete life is not an event but a process: we constantly attempt to re-unite our actual beings with our essential beings. Tillich identifies “self-integration” as one function of this continuous process. In self-integration, Tillich thinks, we move out from ourselves, from what he calls our “personal center,” to engage in new experiences. Ultimately, we return to our personal center, integrating our experiences into it. There is a limit, however, to what we can integrate into our own selves, and that limit is found in...
our neighbor: we cannot violate the integrity of his own being by completely absorbing him/her into ourselves, nor can we allow him/her to absorb us. Thus, our life process has a moral dimension. This limit is not a stumbling block for Tillich. It is simply a feature of our essential being—we are created to be persons within a community of persons.

A problem arises, however, because human beings do not fully actualize their essential being but are, to a degree, estranged from it. Tillich’s abstract designation for our estrangement from our essential being is “existence.” Under the conditions of existence, we hear the will of God as prescriptive of what we should become:

[T]he moral law is experienced as law only because man is estranged from the structural law of his essential being, namely, to become a centered person. This law belongs to him. It is his nature, and it would never become a commanding law if he did not try to break through it. But if he is estranged from it, if he contradicts it in his existence, it becomes law for him.\(^20\)

To translate the Tillichian terminology into traditional Christian idiom: we do not sin against the commandment, but we have the commandment because we have sinned. This is a key point. Commandments do not give shape to human lives; they do not function as orientation toward some kind of good that we can follow or not. Rather, the very existence of an imperative already implies a lack, the absence of something: they express something about ourselves. Commandments, for Tillich, thus have no status apart from the human beings who experience them. In disentangling the will of God from “external law,” he ultimately paves the way for commandments to become anthropocentric expressions of our own state of being.

A further measure of the anthropocentricity of the Tillich’s understanding of law consists in how Tillich thinks that commandments receive their material content. Our estrangement from our essential being does not issue in specific commandments, but rather only the formal ordered demand, “become a person within a community of persons.” When we hear commands, however, we do not hear, “become a person” but rather “Thou shalt not kill,” “Do not drink too much alcohol,” and “Write excellent seminar papers.” In Tillich’s view, these commandments receive content from the particularities of historical situations and cultures: “Culture provides the contents of morality—the concrete ideals of personality and community and the changing laws of ethical wisdom.”\(^21\) It is through the function of the life-process that Tillich calls “self-creation”—through artifacts, technology, social organization—that we experience the voice of our essential being over our actual being, and give that voice concrete expression through specific prohibitions or prescriptions for action. Both the existence (in the non-Tillichian sense of the term) of the formal demand and its material content are therefore dependent upon human beings.

Before moving on to the consequences of this anthropocentric concept of law, we should note one interesting inconsistency within Tillich’s position. Tillich’s view that the commanding form arises from our existential estrangement becomes complicated in light of Tillich’s interpretation of Adam’s fall. Tillich interprets God’s commandment to Adam not to eat from the tree of knowledge to be indicative of his existential estrangement:

If Adam had been one with his true being, the negative commandment would not have been necessary. But as a man, he had the freedom to contradict his true being. In a condition of temptation, he had not yet done so, but the tendency was in him, which means that he was already separated from the natural unity with God. The law appeared when the first symptoms of separation appeared.\(^22\)

Because the existence of a formal demand expresses separation, or estrangement, Tillich concludes that God’s commandment implies that Adam was already separated. He locates that separation, however, within Adam’s freedom. As we noted earlier, freedom is an element of our essential being. Freedom, in this passage, is the very element of Adam’s being which leads to separation from God and consequently to the commandment. It seems, then, that Tillich should say that our essential being, and not our existential estrangement, results in commanding law, but this Tillich wants to deny. This observation is tangential for the wider purpose of this essay, but it is crucial to note in any treatment of Tillich’s concept of law.

2. B. The Uses of Law

What consequences does Tillich’s concept of law have for his understanding of how, in traditional Protestant language, the law may be used? In this section, I will show that Tillich’s anthropocentric understanding of commandment leads Tillich to make little room for a positive significance of the
law for human beings. I examine three topics: his rejection of commandments as a basis for ethics in our concrete lives, his understanding of “freedom from the law” as an aspect of sanctification, and the presence of a “theological use” of the law in his theology.

That the commanding law is not a solid foundation for ethics is one of Tillich’s most insistent claims. He charges, “Tables of laws can never wholly apply to the unique situation.” It is easy to interpret this charge as a claim based on observation of how commandments work in our lives and the moral dilemmas striving to obey them can create. For example, we could observe how the commandment “you shall not kill” does not address the situation of a man faced with either shooting an armed and dangerous criminal or allowing him to shoot a hostage. “You shall not kill” does not provide criteria for judging the situation, but it functions as a standard that could leave the man with a sense of guilt whether he decides to shoot the criminal or allows the hostage to be shot. Tillich’s claim that commandments do not reach the “here and now” of a particular situation, however, is not based on perception of how commandments operate, but is a consequence of key ontological claims. In the previous section, we identified Tillich’s two abstract designations of our being: our essence (the divinely created potentiality) and our existence (estrangement from essence). The key word here is abstract: neither essence nor existence makes a concrete life; concrete lives are always constituted of a mixture of both essential and existential elements. Moreover, because life is a dynamic process, this essential/existential mixture is constantly changing, resulting in countless ambiguities. In any moral situation, this mixture of elements is also present, and therefore we cannot easily separate good from evil. Commandments fail as adequate ethical markers because they represent the voice of the abstractly good over the abstractly evil, not the concrete, ambiguous amalgamation of both.

If commandments do not function as accurate ethical guides, how do they function in ethical situations? Tillich’s answer is that they oppress and limit us:

[The written code] kills the joy of fulfilling our being by imposing upon us something we feel as hostile. It kills the freedom of answering creatively what we encounter in things and men by making us look at a table of laws. It kills our ability to listen to the calling of the moment, to the voiceless voice of others, and to the here and now. It kills our courage to act, through the scruples of the anxiety-driven conscience.

As we saw earlier, Tillich rejects the notion of an external, divine law because it is at odds with his ontological description of the freedom of our essential being. Here, we see the incompatibility of freedom and law from a different angle. As deliberating, deciding, responsible creatures, we should be able to judge and respond to unique situations. Commandments limit that ability by forcing us to look away from the situation and to hard-and-fast rules that can never address the particularities of the moment. In this way, we experience commandments as hostile to our freedom. In philosophical terms, the commandments are heteronomous. To be sure, the rule of the commandment is heteronomy born of our own sin, of the gap between our actual being and our essential. Because they depend on our own state of being, the commandments are not heteronomous in the strict sense as the rule of one party by another, but are experienced as such. Because the commandments ultimately represent the abstract voice of our essence over our existence, they are indeed “strange” or “alien” to our concrete lives, in which both elements are mixed. In concrete situations, they oppress; they do not guide.

Given this negative view of the ethical usefulness of commandments, we should not be surprised to find that Tillich’s description of sanctification includes increasing freedom from law. Again, the ontological architecture is in place for him to make this move. Tillich defines sanctification as a process of human life under the impact of the “Spiritual Presence,” Tillich’s term for the “God-Present” to us in the concrete lives. The Spiritual Presence, according to Tillich, “grasps” us and “creates unambiguous life.” Among other things, “unambiguous life” means the reuniting of our essential being with our actual being and the healing of the rift between essence and existence. From this description of the impact of the Spiritual Presence, it should become clear why we are free from law under its impact: the essential/existential gap, the very condition for the existence of law, is healed, and thus the law disappears. Free from the law, human beings are free to judge and decide upon appropriate moral action in the light of any particular situation. Fully saved human beings (as traditional Christian language would have it) do not need a guide for how to be and act.

At this point, we might wonder whether Tillich is an antinomian, as some Lutheran theologians have.
charged. If antinomianism means that total freedom is given to the individual to determine the demands of a moral situation and to respond in the way that s/he sees fit, then Tillich is an antinomian. Moreover, he is a proud one: he boldly declares that ethics under the Spiritual Presence never loses its autonomous character.\textsuperscript{27} If, however, antinomianism means that the Christian may be indifferent to morality, doing whatever s/he wants without attention to the situation, then Tillich is not an antinomian. Tillich builds two concepts into his treatment of morality under the Spiritual Presence in order to combat such a charge. The first is the “maturity” of freedom under the Spiritual Presence. “Mature freedom,” according to Tillich, is the power of resisting both internal and external forces which drive toward disintegration or estrangement; in other words, mature freedom resists sin.\textsuperscript{28} The second concept (deserving an essay of its own) is agape. The free person under the Spiritual Presence does not make moral judgments without criteria, but with the unambiguous, absolute criterion of love.\textsuperscript{29} Love, according to Tillich, reunites centered person with centered person. Our freedom from law does not mean that we may distort others, drawing them into ourselves or ruling them, but that we may participate in them and allow them to participate in us, all the while remaining integrated, whole individuals. We should note again that Tillich does not think of the limit of the other person’s centeredness as a limit upon our freedom: relating to another person as a centered person is the very expression of freedom. To do otherwise is not an exercise of freedom, but is instead willfulness.

If the law does not guide ethics in concrete life, and if it does not shape Christian freedom under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, then does it have any use at all? Tillich does maintain a version of the law’s theological use:

Nobody can flee from the voice of this written code, written internally as well as externally. And if we try to silence it, the Spirit itself frustrates these attempts, opening our ears to the cry of our true being, of which we are and ought to be in the sight of eternity. We cannot escape this judgment against us. The Spirit, using the written code, makes this impossible.\textsuperscript{30}

According to Tillich, we attempt to “silence” the voice of our true being in several ways. First, we can zealously comply with the written commandments, with the result of smug self-righteousness. In so doing, we may give attention to specific imperatives, but we ultimately ignore the severity of our ontological situation. Second, we can simply become “compromisers,” half-fulfilling and half-denying the commandments. As compromisers, we are aware that we are not fulfilling our being, but we feel that we cannot do much about it. Third, we can break the commandments completely, becoming utterly lawless.\textsuperscript{31} In these situations, the law to “opens our ears,” to the voice of our true being over our actual ontological situation.\textsuperscript{32} In so doing, it shatters our own self-righteous, compromising tendencies and forces us to seek for the reunion of our essential and existential being.

It appears, then, that Tillich has a strong concept of the law’s theological use. We should note, however, that Tillich does not think that the law really tells us anything that we should not already know. The law results from the gap between our essence and existence; it comes from us. Human beings, Tillich thinks, are conscious of “the estrangement from, and contradiction of [their] essential being.”\textsuperscript{33} Thus, the law only reminds us of something we fundamentally know but would prefer to ignore; it does not communicate anything new. Tillich’s view of the law’s epistemological function is, therefore, quite weak.

2. C. Tillich’s Theology of Law in Light of the Traditional Lutheran Position

At this point, several points of contrast between Tillich’s theology of law and the traditional Lutheran position should be quite glaring. The Lutheran Reformers believe that the law expresses the will of God; Tillich holds that law expresses human sin. The Lutherans believe that the law, as the will of God, has concrete content that relativizes all human laws and codes of morality. In Tillich’s view, human codes of morality and conduct can be elevated to the status of sacred moral law, if these codes conform to a culture’s experience of the moral imperative to “become a person within a community of persons.” The Lutherans claim that “freedom from the law” means only freedom from the coercion of the law, not the disappearance of the law itself. Tillich constructs his definition of law such that the Spiritual Presence results in the disappearance, not of the coercion of the law, but of the law itself. Luther holds a strong view of the law’s communicating, epistemological function; Tillich, a weaker view. The Lutheran Reformers allow the law to guide and shape Christian freedom; for Tillich, freedom and law are incompatible. The Lutherans allow the law to have
some positive significance for human beings, Tillich allows very little.

What explains these differences? Why does Tillich reject the law as a basis for ethics, whereas the Lutherans make space for a didactic or a guiding function for those who are fully justified and saved? At the heart of the disagreement between Tillich and the Lutheran Reformers over how and why the law may be used is a disagreement over its intrinsic goodness and its status vis a vis human beings. For the Lutherans, the law is intrinsically good because of its divine source; its commandments express God’s will and are therefore good. Because it expresses the divine will, the law is independent of human beings and their status as either sinners or justified persons. This is most evident, I contend, in the Formula of Concord’s acceptance of a third use of the law. As one reads the Lutheran Confessions, one can inquire whether the third use of the law is superfluous: after all, justified persons are supposed do good works spontaneously, without regard to any legal code. In confessing that the law was to be taught to Christian people, and that they were to use it as a guide, the Lutheran Reformers affirm that the law—as an expression of God’s will—was independent of human beings. Justification does not make the law and obedience to it disappear just as it does not make God disappear!

For Tillich, by contrast, the law is not an expression of the divine will but an expression of human failing or sin, and as such, it is not intrinsically good. Tillich’s definition of the law as arising from the gap between our essence and existence allows him to treat the law at times as though it were the problem, and not the fallen status of human beings. It is that definition that renders the commandments useless in ethical situations, in which essence and existence are mixed. We can hate the law just as we despise the cough that is the symptom of a common cold virus—something the Lutheran Reformers would not allow. To illustrate this point, let us recall how Tillich and the Lutheran Reformers interpret Paul’s phrase, “the letter kills.” On the Lutheran position, the law puts to death, an old being; as part of God’s creative work, it effects a change in who we are. The experience itself might not be pleasant, but, from the vantage point of the theologian, it is good for us. For Tillich, by contrast, “the letter kills,” not because it effects a change in a person, but because it stifles growth, creativity, and freedom. Thus, Tillich is not Lutheran in his understanding of how the law kills. Nor is he particularly Lutheran in how he assesses that experience. Instead of considering the “killing” experience to be a fundamental good, Tillich thinks that we are rightfully hostile to the law because we are essentially free. He validates that hostility theologically by making the law a problem to be rid of under the impact of the Spiritual Presence.

In short, the Tillich’s concept of law is anthropocentric whereas the Lutheran concept is theocentric. He opposes commandment and freedom; the Lutherans oppose freedom with coercion by the commandment. Though Lutheran by birth, education, and theological reflection, Paul Tillich is not a very good Lutheran on the issue of law.

Concluding Remarks

Having reached this strong conclusion about the Lutheran character about the Lutheran character of Paul Tillich’s thought the law, I would like to qualify it with some remarks about the core theological and anthropological issues at stake in the debate. The statement “Tillich is not a good Lutheran on the matter of law” is true. The real result of this paper, however, may be that these differences on the matter of law reveal a more substantial disagreement over who (or what) God is and over the nature of human freedom. The Lutheran Reformers assume that God is personal, and this personal concept of God allows them to say that God issues commands and that God’s will is distinct from their own particular state of being. Tillich’s God, by contrast, is neither agent nor person, and thus can hardly issue commands. Thus, for Tillich, the will of God is not independent of us. For the Lutherans, freedom does not mean that we should be able to deliberate and decide with respect only to ourselves; for Tillich, this is the essence of freedom. In short, it may be better simply to say that Tillich is not a good Lutheran because of his doctrines of God and of the human person.

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3 Luther, Smalcald Articles III. 2. In The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 310. All citations in this section are from this edition of the Confessions.

4 See e.g. n.5 below and the Smalcald Articles III. 3, in The Book of Concord, 313.


6 Large Catechism, First Part, in The Book of Concord, 387.


10 See, for example, Luther’s comment on the sixth commandment “[Y]ou should note, first, how highly God honors and praises this walk of life…For the following reasons he also wishes us to honor, maintain, and cherish it as a divine and blessed walk of life.” Large Catechism, First Part, in The Book of Concord, p. 414.

11 See, for example, Luther’s explanation of the first article of the Creed, “God has created me together with all that exists. God has given and still preserves my body and soul: eyes, ears, and all limbs and sense, reason and all mental faculties…For all of this I owe it to God to thank and praise, serve and obey him.” Small Catechism, in The Book of Concord, 354-355.


14 For Tillich’s discussion of freedom, see Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) 184 [hereafter abbreviated ST]; see also Morality and Beyond, 19.

15 ST III, 268.

16 Time does not permit a thorough review of Tillich’s doctrine of revelation. Here I am attempting to follow ST I, 111.

17 ST I, 255.

18 Morality and Beyond, 24.

19 See n. 20 below.

20 Morality and Beyond, 48.

21 ST III, 95.

22 Morality and Beyond, 48.

23 Morality and Beyond, 43; cf. ST III, 47.

24 Tillich writes, “If formulated in commandments, this law never reaches the here and now of a particular decision. With respect to it, the commandment may be
right in a special situation, mainly in its prohibitive form, but it may be wrong in another situation just because of its prohibitive form” (*ST* III, 47).


26 See *ST* III, 232.

27 “Actual theonomy is autonomous ethics under the Spiritual Presence.” *ST* III, 268.


29 *ST* III, 273.


31 See *ST* III, 49 and “The Spiritual Presence,” *The Eternal Now*, 60.

32 Another element in this quotation that needs interpretation is that the *Spirit* uses the law to open our ears. This emphasis on the Spirit seems to be more theological than Tillich’s anthropocentric interpretation of the law would allow. Could it be possible that Tillich here employs traditional language and concepts in the context of a sermon—concepts he would not use in his Systematic Theology?

33 *Morality and Beyond*, 33.
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