In this issue:

- Requiescat in Pace: John J. Carey and John Page
- New Publications about Tillich or by Tillich Scholars
- “Applying Tillich’s Creative and Transformative Justice to the Problems of Middle Eastern Violence” by Kirk R. Macgregor
- Formulating Questions, Facilitating Change: Tillich’s Method of Correlation” by Sharon Burch
- “Michael and Paulus: A Dynamic Uncoordinated Duo” by A. Durwood Foster

If you have presented a paper at the 2016 meeting of the NAPTS or the AAR Tillich Group in San Antonio, Texas, please send the paper to the editor for publication in the Bulletin. Since this is a privately circulated Bulletin, publication elsewhere is permissible.

**Requiescat in Pace:**

**John Carey**

We are saddened to share the news that Dr. John J. Carey, retired professor of religion and Presbyterian minister, passed away peacefully on March 2nd in Durham, N.C. surrounded by loving family members. He was 85. The North American Paul Tillich Society lost one of its giants this winter with the death of John Carey.

Dr. Carey was loved by many as a gifted teacher, compassionate friend, wise mentor, and devoted father. He will be remembered for his kindness, intellect, and wonderful sense of humor, in addition to his remarkable memory, love of dogs and lifelong commitment to social justice, inclusive ministry, and higher education.

Dr. Carey had a rich and fulfilling life and career, with many important achievements and ad-
ventures, but he would always say his greatest accomplishment was being the proud father to five daughters—Sarah, Mary Lynn, Beth, Joanna, and Jessica. Born and raised in Fort Wayne, Indiana, he attended Duke University as a first-generation student on a football scholarship, serving as defensive captain of the 1952 Duke team that won the Southern Conference championship. He was named to various All-Southern and All-American teams. Among his extracurricular activities, he served as President of the Campus YMCA, and as President of Alpha Tau Omega fraternity and honored as the national fraternity member of the year his senior year. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Following graduation from Duke, he entered the Yale Divinity School, receiving his B.D. and S.T.M. degrees from Yale in 1956 and 1957. He received his Ph.D. degree from Duke in 1965 and conducted post-doctoral work in Germany and several institutions throughout the United States.

Dr. Carey had served for more than 26 years at Florida State University, coming on board first in 1960 as University Chaplain, then later in a variety of positions, including Professor of Religion, Dean of Students, Vice President of Student Affairs, Chair of the Department of Religion and Director of Graduate Studies in Religion, receiving several teaching and service awards. He also served as the President of Warren Wilson College in Swannanoa, NC from 1986 to 1988, and as the Pendergrass Professor of Religion at Florida Southern College in Lakeland, Florida.

In 1989, he joined the faculty at Agnes Scott College as the Wallace M. Alston Professor of Bible and Religion and Chair of the Department of Religious Studies. He remained at Agnes Scott until his retirement in 1999. A year after his retirement from Agnes Scott, after his daughter Jessica had moved to Alaska, Dr. Carey agreed to serve as Interim Pastor of Immanuel Presbyterian Church in Anchorage, Alaska. He served Immanuel for two stints, finally retiring in 2009.

He moved back to the “lower 48” in 2014, residing in Chapel Hill and in Durham, N.C. with his wife of 47 years, Mary Charlotte McCall, who survives him. Also surviving are a sister, Mary Whitmore, of Cedarburg, Wisconsin; his daughters Sarah Kathryn Carey (Chad Hunsaker) of Gainesville, Florida; Mary Lynn Carey, Tallahassee, Florida; Beth Ann Carey, Tallahassee, Florida; Joanna Carey Cleveland, Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Sam Cleveland); and Jessica Carey Graham, Anchorage, Alaska (Jason Graham); and five grandchildren (Jada Marina Graham, Jolie Cay Graham, Jersey Meridian Graham, John Carey [“Jack”] Cleveland, and Susanna Elizabeth Cleveland). He is also survived by his first wife and dear friend, Sally Stanback Malloy.

John Carey will always be remembered and will be deeply missed by his family. They intend to hold celebration of life services for John later this year in Tallahassee, Florida, and in Anchorage, Alaska. Details about those services when planned will be shared with the institutions and congregations that Dr. Carey served. The family encourages all those who loved and cared about John to go forth and act with kindness and compassion to all in his honor.

Obituary in The Tallahassee Democrat
13 March 2017

John Carey, a progressive ordained minister who was the moral compass of university administration during a tumultuous time at Florida State University, has died.

Carey died March 2 in Durham, N.C., the city where he was a football star at Duke University in the 1950s. Carey, who had suffered a series of severe illnesses in recent years, was 85.

Carey spent 26 years at FSU, from 1960 to 1986. He arrived as university chaplain, helped found the department of religion and served in several administrative roles. He was FSU’s first vice president for student affairs in 1967.

He left FSU in 1986 for a two-year stint as president of Warren Wilson College, a private Presbyterian school in North Carolina. He then resumed his career as a college professor of religion for 12 years at Florida Southern University and Agnes Scott College. He came out of retirement in 2000 to become pastor of a church in Alaska and returned to North Carolina in 2014.

In Tallahassee, Carey was renowned as a liberal political activist, both on campus and in the community. He was involved in the civil rights movement, spoke out on women’s issues, led vigils against the death penalty, and started a peace studies program at FSU.
He wrote or edited 12 books and published more than 60 scholarly articles. He was one of the nation’s leading authorities on influential theologian Paul Tillich. He won major FSU awards for undergraduate teaching and service to the university.

“John was just a born leader,” said FSU professor emeritus Robert Spivey, Carey’s college classmate at Duke who joined Carey at FSU to found the religion department. “He had good courage and excellent judgment. He made a career that reflected his faith and personal priorities. If something needed done, John was there to lead it.”

After graduation from Duke, as a Phi Beta Kappa member, Carey earned two divinity degrees from Yale University. He then spent three years as a professor of religion at Catawba College in Salisbury, N.C.

He was hired as FSU’s university chaplain in 1960, just as civil rights demonstrations were beginning in Tallahassee, with black students from Florida A&M University and white students from FSU staging sit-ins at Tallahassee’s segregated lunch counters.

Carey joined the Tallahassee Council on Human Relations, a group of black and white residents, seeking racial change in Tallahassee. As university chaplain, he served as liaison between protesting students and the FSU administration.

In 1965, after earning his Ph.D. from Duke, Carey became one of the half-dozen founding faculty members of FSU’s Department of Religion and later served six years as department chair. Previously, religion courses had been taught through the philosophy department. But FSU became one of the first public universities in the nation to establish a religion department, fending off claims a public institution should not be in the business of promoting religion.

“There was a fear that the study of religion would be a study FOR religion rather than ABOUT religion,” said Spivey, the department’s first chair. “It was unusual for a public university to go about teaching religion in an unabashed way.”

Letter from Mercer Press Editor

Fred

As the publisher of a book with John, I would like it to be known that he was a delight to work with. I would like to have published a book every season with John just to have the chance to work with him.

We at Mercer University Press will miss him greatly.

Marc

Marc Jolley

Director, Mercer University Press

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Requiescat in Pace: John Page

Editor’s Note: The North American Paul Tillich Society regrets the passing of John Page. Although not a scholar, John was one of the most devoted Tillichians that I have met. His gentle and gracious manner, when he could attend our meetings, will be missed. Here is a letter from his daughter:

[From John Page’s Daughter, Carolyn Webb]

I am writing to let you know of the death of John Page—928 S. Chicago Apt. 24, Geneseo, IL 61254. He died on Oct 14, 2016 shortly after he had renewed his membership to the NAPTS.

He had been a member since the late 90s, and I believe attend a couple of conferences. He never forgot having afternoon tea with Jane Owen in New Harmony.

He was a self-taught student of Paul Tillich since the 1960s; what Tillich wrote was important to him and he liked to share Tillich with others.

At his funeral service, Tillich and some things my dad wrote in response were referenced. One of the attendees, a 30-year old friend of our son’s was deeply moved by Tillich’s words. I think her quote was, “What beautiful writing.” My father would have been pleased to think he might have sparked an interest in Tillich in a young person.

Thank you for welcoming my father into your group. He was not a scholar, but he was a deep thinker.

Sincerely, Carolyn Webb
Among the most intractable problems of the postcolonial era stands Middle Eastern violence, a phenomenon of which the world has become painfully aware since the birth of the modern state of Israel in 1948. Any hope of finding a lasting solution to this problem must lie in the combination of a metaphysically deep understanding of justice and an accurate assessment of the worldviews of groups endorsing violence in the Middle East. Just as Tillich ranks among the most perceptive recent philosophers of justice, so the contemporary scholar of religion, Reza Aslan, ranks among the most perceptive observers of current religious extremism. Accordingly, this piece brings Tillich’s Love, Power, and Justice into conversation with Aslan’s Beyond Fundamentalism for the purpose of applying Tillich’s ontological analysis of creative and transformative justice to the root issues of religious Zionism, Islamist violence, and Jihadist violence. This application will support two mutually polar and synthetic theses regarding group relations. First, where there exists the drive of one group toward some form of unity with another group, the distinctiveness of each, creative justice, via love, demands democracy (i.e., the free and equal political participation of the members of each group) as the way to creating unity. Second, where there exists the drive of one group to directly or indirectly deprive another group of being (i.e., to destroy another group or to unite with another group at the price of its distinctiveness), transformative justice, via power, demands whatever level of coercive force is sufficient (i.e., no more and no less) to arrest the aspirations of the aggressor. Both the democracy of the first pole and the compulsion of the second pole should, per love, be (initially) facilitated by a third party or parties that have the energy and resources to maintain these poles without threat to their own being.

Religious Zionism

The root issue of religious Zionism is the tension between the fulfillment of certain Jews’ religious aspirations and the possession of space, and therefore of being, of the Palestinians. As Tillich points out, “The basis of all power of a social group is the space it must provide for itself. Being means having space or, more exactly, providing space for oneself.” Although in 2012, the General Assembly of the United Nations granted Palestine non-member observer state status—a statehood recognized by 136 of the 193 member states of the United Nations—the Israeli government continues to occupy most of the areas comprising Palestine and refuses to acknowledge Palestinian statehood. This refusal is backed by the governments of the United States (Israel’s most important foreign ally), Canada, Mexico, most of Western Europe, and Australia. Despite the position of Israel’s government, no less than 52% and as many as 74% of Israelis desire peace with Palestine, including the withdrawal of troops and a two-state solution where Israel recognizes Palestinian statehood and vice versa. The realization of this aspiration is demanded by transformative and creative justice. Although Tillich used “transformative justice” and “creative justice” synonymously, I differentiate the two according to the various works of love that constitute the principle of each. The principle of transformative justice is the strange work of love, utilizing compulsion to destroy what is against love. The principle of creative justice is the proper work of love, exhibiting charity and forgiveness. Transformative and creative justice, respectively, uphold the


autonomous being of both Palestine and Israel and unify the separated parties around their mutual national recognition, thus actualizing power and love. However, Aslan detects that such a realization is presently blocked by religious Zionists, whose allegiance is to the biblical land rather than the secular state of Israel and who exert a disproportionate influence on Israeli politics through the right-wing Likud party, led by current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.6

To this problem, the second (transformative) pole and first (creative) pole regarding group relations pertain, in that sequence. The coercive force to arrest the religious Zionists should stem primarily from the majority of Israelis, whose individual power of being is compromised if they fail to act. This, oftentimes silent, majority ought to use its democratic power both to remove from office politicians who support Jewish settlement of land recognized by the United Nations as belonging to Palestine and to install politicians who will pass and enforce laws preventing any future Jewish settlement. They should also demand, through vote and voice, that all elected officials desist from the exploitation, damage, depletion, or endangerment of Palestinian natural resources and support the right of Palestinians to seek restitution for previous destruction. Such tactics amount to an appropriate conjunction of love with compulsory power, as power is used only to destroy the work of those who foment hostility toward Palestine but not to destroy those who foment hostility toward Palestine. As Tillich observes, “Love, through compulsory power, must destroy what is against love. But love cannot destroy him who acts against love. Even when destroying his work it does not destroy him,”7 that is, his essential being.

Consequently, the Israeli majority should, in love, reach out to the minority of religious Zionists in its midst in an attempt to reestablish internal unity. This, I submit, will occur if the majority can persuade the minority that its interpretation of various passages of the Tanakh—specifying that Yahweh gives to Abraham’s descendants the land from the Wadi of Egypt to the Euphrates River (Gen. 15:18; cp. Jer. 12:14-17) or everyplace upon which the invading Israelite armies set their feet during the Conquest (Josh. 1:3-4; cp. Joel 3:2)—is not in accord with the “ultimate relation,” the “holy community” that Israel seeks to be.8 Such persuasion occurs through what I call a hermeneutic of creative justice, reading the disputed passages in conversation with the wider canonical witness through the lenses of listening, giving, and forgiving.9 Listening to the Palestinians’ religious claims in the context of the Tanakh as a whole discloses that Allah is not analogous to any Canaanite deity but is the same as the God of Israel (Ps. 47:1, 8; 65:5; 66:1; 67:7; 68:32; 82:8; Isa. 37:16; 45:22; 55:5; Zech. 8:23). In light of this fact, the Palestinians must be granted the Torah-guaranteed right to be included alongside the twelve tribes of Israel and to share in its inheritance: “The alien living with you must be treated as one of your native-born. Love them as yourself, for you were aliens in Egypt” (Lev. 19:34; cp. Ex. 12:48-49; Num. 9:14; 10:32). Contending that true justice demands that even persons unacceptable in terms of proportional justice should be accepted into the unity of forgiveness, the Israeli-majority ought to induce the religious Zionists to seek their own unity with Israel’s longsuffering God by forgiving the Palestinians for any perceived or real wrongs, such as those perpetrated by Hamas. To the problem of Hamas and other Islamist groups we now turn.

Islamism

The root issue of Islamism is the desire of certain Muslims to establish their countries—whose perceived borders may not align with those demarcated by the United Nations—as distinctively Islamic nations, founded on an Islamic moral framework. Islamists hold that citizens of majority Muslim nation-states should create their collective identity not based on some measure of ethnic homogeneity, culture, or civic agreement, but on the religion of Islam. All instances of religious nationalism, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively aim to transform historic Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt into Islamic nations.8 There is nothing inherently wrong with Islamism, so long as Islamism transpires through non-violent means. Indeed, many Islamist groups are quite willing to use democratic means to achieve the goal of a state predicated on Islamic values and mores. However, when individuals work peacefully and steadfastly for nation-
alistic social change only to have their aspirations suppressed—and suppressed violently—it is only natural that they would turn to violence and revolution. To borrow an illustration of such violent suppression from Aslan, today if a politician in Egypt says, “I would like to change the constitution of Egypt so that it is in better alignment with the Qu’ran,” that politician will never be heard from again. S/he will be thrown into prison, tortured, and very likely executed. Simply being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood today is enough to get one killed. And outrages like this provoke the violent rejoinder.

To this complex problem the first (creative) pole regarding group relations applies, and the United States and its allies should be the principal actors owing to their security and sole possession of the requisite power. As poll after poll in nearly every Muslim majority state has indicated, members of Islamist groups (and Muslims in general) feel disempowered by their lack of political rights and desire democracy. For instance, a Pew poll found that, although most of the Western public thought democracy was “a Western way of doing things that would not work in most Muslim countries,” majorities in every single Muslim country surveyed flatly rejected this argument and called for democracy in their own nations. Hence only through genuine democratic reform can the tide of Islamist militancy be stemmed. So the United States and its allies should ensure that, for any Islamist group that is willing to put its guns down and pick up ballots, this group possesses the ability to participate equally in the political process, so renewing their power of being. This requires that the United States put vigorous and sustained pressure on Middle Eastern nations receiving billions of American dollars in economic and military aid every year to yield to the growing demands of their populations for a voice in government, to halt arbitrary imprisonments and the silencing of political opponents, and to allow for full political participation by religious nationalist groups willing to commit to responsible governance. As a fulfillment of its vocational consciousness, the United States must therefore do all in its power to forestall, in Tillich’s words, “social conditions which prevent spiritual freedom either generally or for the great majority of people.” But there are obviously risks in pushing political reform in a volatile region. It could be argued that the 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel, sparked by a Hezbollah attack on an Israeli army patrol and the subsequent war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, are powerful reminders of the dangers of promoting democracy in this part of the world. Indisputably, some governments that will emerge from truly democratic elections in the Middle East may maintain positions and pursue policies contrary to America’s interests.

Nevertheless, whatever risks there may be in promoting democracy in the Middle East, they pale in comparison to the risks involved in continuing to stifle political reform in the hope of achieving stability in the region. As Tillich reminds us, the law of justice “must be applied to the concrete situation in a daring decision, and the decision is made by members of the ruling group… a foreseeing risk…is taken by members of the ruling group.” For so long as dictatorial regimes in Middle Eastern countries ignore their demands of their people—with at least the covert if not the overt approval of the United States—while Islamist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood work to address their socioeconomic needs, populations throughout the region will continue to throw their support behind the Islamists, as they arguably should. Even if some positions of Islamist groups (such as Hamas’ proposal that Palestine re-expand to swallow up Israel) are inimical to the interests of the United States, at least Islamist groups fundamentally want something concrete—they want an Islamic nation. In that case, there is room for discussion, dialogue, and negotiation. As recent history has shown, as Islamist groups gain increasing responsibility to “keep the lights on” (i.e., run a national infrastructure), the radical elements of their ideology proportionally go by the wayside. Aslan observes that after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey—a banned Islamist group fifteen years ago—was given the opportunity to take part in the political process, it grew to become the single most democratic political force Turkey has ever known. It has brought Turkey back from the edge of fiscal collapse, improved ties with Israel, the United States, and the European Union, and granted the country’s oppressed Kurdish minority greater freedoms. Conversely, when Islamist opposition has
been suppressed, militancy and extremism have mushroomed. The civil war that ravaged Algeria for nearly a decade in the 1990s is a case in point: the rise of the ultraviolent Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was the direct result of the Algerian government’s decision to ban political participation by the Islamists of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).\textsuperscript{15}

Jihadism

The root issue of Jihadism is its humanly unrealizable aim of erasing all borders and eliminating all nations, thereby creating a single world order of religious communalism under one caliph. It is a movement that has elevated \textit{jihad} into, in Osama bin Laden’s words, “an object of worship.”\textsuperscript{16} One of the hardest things for a Western audience to understand about Jihadism is that Jihadists want nothing at all that can be actualized in real or measurable terms, such as land, resources, or peace in Palestine. Their ideology and hopes rest on a completely different plane. All instances of religious transnationals, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Book Haram are fighting what Aslan calls a “cosmic war” of good versus evil, a war over existential identity in an indeterminate world.\textsuperscript{17} Employing an “us versus them” mentality, Jihadists identify themselves as good and everyone not themselves (especially the majority of the world’s Muslims) as evil. Although often referred to as anarchists, Jihadists are closer to utopians, who believe that God will solve all the world’s ills if only they fight to the end for God against the forces of evil. Accordingly, Jihadists have no policies. Aslan observes that in all the writings and speeches of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (ISIS’s stipulated caliph) and Osama bin Laden, there is never any attempt to provide a social program, alternatives to the world’s ills, or answers to the many grievances they submit. These grievances include the suffering of the Palestinians, American support for Arab dictators, the lack of political, social, economic, and religious rights, and development in the Middle East, and the West’s treating the Middle East like a giant gas station.\textsuperscript{18} While legitimate grievances, for Jihadists these are not issues to be addressed or opportunities for new policies to be enacted; they are no more than abstract symbols to rally around which help recruit new members. After all, at no point did the Jihadists think that bringing down the Twin Towers would suddenly bring peace to Palestine. Certainly, the Jihadists have no interest in the Palestinian aspiration for nationhood; they want to get rid of all nations, Palestine or not.

To the Jihadist problem, the second (transformative) pole regarding group relations applies, as Jihadist groups seek to either destroy or forcibly subjugate the members of other groups. Unlike Islamists, Jihadists cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of interest in any material or political resources. Hence the only option left to transformative justice is the police response: to hunt down Jihadists, either destroying or incarcerating them. In Tillich’s words, transformative justice “includes the possibility of sacrificing the other one in his existence…it may mean the demand to resist and to restrain and to deprive.”\textsuperscript{19} Owing to its basis in love, however, Tillich perceives the redemptive grace that comes out of such necessary tragedy: “[L]ove’s strange work, the compulsory element of power, is not only the strange but also the tragic aspect of love. It represents a price which must be paid for the reunion of the separated”—namely, the reunion of the Muslim \textit{Ummah} (community) and the reunion of the \textit{Ummah} with the rest of the world. The strange work of love, per Tillich’s phenomenology of power, ought to be carried out by nations who can take it upon themselves without threat to their own existence, using their power to serve nations currently lacking the power of self-defense and so lovingly enhancing these nations’ power of being, such that they can maintain a dynamic self-affirmation which conquers internal and external resistance.\textsuperscript{20}

But Aslan perceives that merely seeking out and destroying Jihadist militants, though an essential response, is not enough to extinguish the fires of Jihadism around the world, fueled by the aforementioned grievances. Any sufficient response must work to solve the grievances, taking away the appeal of Jihadism and so making its cosmic impulse irrelevant.\textsuperscript{21} And these grievances can only in fact be solved by putting power into the hands of the Muslims whose lives are directly affected by them. In short, the sufficient response to Jihadism is the previously outlined response of creative justice to Islamism. As a manifestation of
nationalism, Islamism stands as the best foil to the trans-nationalist Jihadism. For contrary to Jihadists whose aims and aspirations rest on a cosmic plane, Islamists possess material goals and legitimate ambitions that can be addressed by the state. While Jihadists interpret political participation as an act of apostasy, Islamist parties throughout the Middle East have demonstrated that, given firm political rules to obey and a fair chance to govern, they can develop into responsible political actors committed to addressing Jihadism’s stated grievances. They have shown a commitment to democratic ideals of human rights, women’s rights, government accountability, the rule of law, pluralism, and judicial reform. So predictions that electoral victories by Islamist parties would inevitably result in the collapse of democracy have proven false.

**Concluding Reflections**

We close by creatively synthesizing our proffered solutions to the root problems of religious Zionism, Islamist violence, and Jihadist violence in the light of recent historical events. However one views the cycle of violence between Israel and the Palestinians (as a conflict over land and resources or a religious war for divine favor), whatever confidence one places in the idea that Islamist groups can evolve into responsible political parties, and however one views the hope for peace in the Middle East, one fact is clear. It was not the promise of democracy but the retraction of that promise that caused the splintering of the Palestinians, the blockade of Gaza, the war between Hamas and Israel, and the destruction of 1.5 million Palestinian lives. Democracy is, I propose, the ontological concatenation of love, power, and justice in intra-national relations, and safe negotiation between democratic nations of varying power is the ontological concatenation of the three Tillichian metaphysical elements in international relations. So it will not be the reversal of democracy but rather its continued promotion that, over the course of time, brings peace and stability not simply to Palestine but to the whole of the Middle East. In support of this argument, we need only look to the many successful peaceful Islamist democratic movements in Indonesia, Malaysia, Senegal, Morocco, and Bangladesh. On that score, it will be the firm, patient, aggressive push for greater political participation by all Middle Eastern parties that ultimately defeats Jihadism, since it is precisely the absence of such participation and the resultant grievances that keep the movement alive. In sum, Western powers must strive to create, wherever they can without infringing on other Middle Eastern nations’ autonomy, an open religious and political environment in these nations that will blunt the appeal of religious Zionism, violent Islamism, and Jihadism.

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6 Ibid., 107, 115.
7 Ibid., 84-86.
8 Aslan, *Fundamentalism*, 32.
9 Ibid., 169-170.
10 Ibid., 172. Gallup International found that 78% of people in the Middle East considered democracy “the best form of government” (www.voice-of-the-people.net).
13 Ibid., 61.
14 Ibid., 97.
15 Aslan, *Fundamentalism*, 173.
16 Osama bin Laden, interview given to *Ummat* magazine, Karachi, 28 September 2001.
Editor’s Note: This paper was first presented at the annual meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society, Friday, November 22, 2013, Baltimore, Maryland.

Throughout my career, I have found the method of correlation a compelling idea. When I was teaching it was an organizing principle of my pedagogy. I wanted to train a generation of seminarians to thoroughly investigate, to sensitively formulate, and to creatively address the existential questions that faced the people to whom they ministered. My goal was to prepare students to accurately describe their faith in terms of their Christian heritage by identifying the major movements out of which critical tenets of the Christian faith were crafted. They would be equipped to explain clearly why the doctrines, dogmas, rules, and rituals now in place best expressed the system of faith that they espoused and taught.

I assumed that a creative analysis of the movements out of the inherited their faith traditions would lead them to adapt, expand, and/or revise some of their assumptions and religious practices. As these well trained ministers proposed modifications, their insights would illumine the ineffable, illustrate its power, and provide ways for human beings to experience how our Ultimate Concern provides certainty and meaning in the midst of the anxiety and despair that plagues human beings.

That is the way that I imagined the Christian answer best would be provided to people facing contemporary existential questions.

Please note the use of the past tense. To my surprise (if not horror!) when I began to work carefully with these assumptions, I realized that I had failed to grasp something critical to Tillich’s method of correlation. I had appropriated what he said in a way that made sense to me, but I realized that in some ways I was unaware of important aspects of his teaching.

The major reason I returned to an examination of the method of correlation at this time is that I am impressed by the number of ideas, basic to how human beings make sense of their everyday existence, have collapsed in recent history.

First and foremost is the moment that human beings encountered the 1968 picture of our globe from space. Suddenly we had before us a photograph of the finite boundaries of our home planet. The phrase “the other side of the world” shifted—no longer was it far, far away. It was literally our own backyard. We were floating in space on a “blue green marble,” and it was a planetary body like other planetary bodies we had pictures of.

Second was the discovery that Newtonian physics does not function in the atomic realm. Those principles were the ones that reassured human beings that they had been able to define how the world works. Releasing them meant letting go of an assumption that was deeply reassuring because of its stability and predictability. Such assumptions about how much control and certainty human beings exercise are remarkably difficult to release—especially in light of the current astrophysical interest in measuring dark matter and dark energy, neither of which have scientists, as yet, been able to either quantify or define.

Third is our awareness that although language indicates something about what we hold to be true and what we treasure, it is always relatively accurate, relatively true, and relatively able to communicate. There exists within it an element of the ephemeral that prohibits its being able to do more than approximate finality and permanence.

This one I think particularly affects those of us engaged in the theological endeavor because it
makes it far harder to discuss the aseity of God when relative linguistic constructions undermine the effort even as it is being made. This list is my own idiosyncratic assessment, but these are the sorts of sweeping changes that have created shifts in the elemental assumptions that humans have long used to make sense of the world. When shifts of such magnitude occur, questions about the meaning of life and how is it to be found become both urgent and persistent.

Such considerations fall clearly into the realm of theology. Who other than theologians are mandated to sensitively formulate the inchoate questions about the meaning of life? Who other than theologians have the charge to creatively guide people out of the despair and anxiety that results from the collapse of principles that have long provided a framework of meaning? Our mandate, almost our raison d’être, is to carefully examine the effects of such changes and attempt to show how the religious impulse, in whatever form, and specifically the current state of the Christian message provides meaning in light of them. In 1951, 62 years ago now, the first volume of the Systematic Theology appeared. Tillich says:

It is not an exaggeration to say that today human beings experience their present situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness and despair in all realms of life. The question of contemporary human beings is not...as in the Reformation, the question of a merciful God and the forgiveness of sins; nor is it, as in the early Greek church, the question of finitude, of death and error; nor is it the question of the personal religious life or of the Christianization of culture and society. It is the question of a reality in which the self-estrangement of existence is overcome, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creativity, meaning and hope.

Again, please note. Tillich says that the question that human beings experience in their present situation is not the question of the personal religious life. And he says that it is not the question of the Christianization of culture and society. And I realized that I had thought, I had believed, I had trusted that I was to provide a way to Christianize culture and society, and I was to support the development of the personal religious life of human beings. What else would he mean by saying “The method of correlation explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential question and theological answers in mutual interdependence”?

I began to reexamine a number of Tillich’s writings. One of them was a beautiful sermon entitled “The Yoke of Religion,” which he had delivered at Union Theological Seminary in the late 1940s. It was not at all reassuring. In fact, it drove a stake into the heart of my naïveté on the matter.

The text of the sermon is the passage in Matthew in which Jesus says “Come to me, all you that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and you shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.”

Tillich reports that this passage was, for him, universal in scope, simple yet profound, redolent of inexhaustible meaning, and he was grasped by its majesty. He explains he finds the actual teachings of Jesus often to be characterized by this sort of truth, a truth that is absent from the words of disciples, theologians, saints, and preachers.

And he says that when we, as Christians, find ourselves responding like that to the words of Jesus we are to “…point to the ground of the power [of those words] over our souls; we must explain why, in their emotional force, the force of an ultimate truth is involved; and we must attempt to view our human situation in their light.” [Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948), 93.] In comparison to such a remarkable call to action, I realized that my interpretation of what he meant by the method of correlation was both trivial and tame. Once I had glimpsed that I had missed this far more radical application of the method of correlation, I began to find evidence of it throughout his work. For example, later in that same sermon, he said

It would not be worthwhile to teach Christianity, if it were for the sake of Christianity. And believe me, you who are estranged from religion and far away from Christianity, it is not our purpose to make you religious and Christian when we interpret the call of Jesus for our time. We call Jesus the Christ not because He brought a new religion, but because He is the end of religion, above religion and irreligion, above Christianity and non-
Christianity. We spread His call because it is the call to every human being in every period to receive the New Being, that hidden saving power in our existence, which takes from us labor and burden, and gives rest to our souls (102-103).

And in The Courage to Be Tillich suggests that although non-being cannot be obliterated and anxiety cannot be vanquished, Christian theology nonetheless can mediate the power of being that enables human beings to withstand the darkness of doubt and meaningfulness, a moment that often occurs when the symbols and constructs (such as those I’ve cited) that have provided meaning are no longer effective. Tillich argues that it will take releasing the God of theism, and encountering the God beyond God. “The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt” [The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 190.]

I realized with astonishment that Tillich was, writing some 65 years ago, accurately and poignantly describing the situation we find ourselves living through today, and most specifically addressing our contemporary disaffection with religious practices and the institutional church. For example, he characterizes those “who labor and are heavy laden” as those who are burdened by the practices, attitudes and behaviors required by religion.

During the time of Jesus, religion was controlled and regulated by temple authorities, the scribes and the Pharisees. The rules, the doctrines, the dogmas, and the rituals were firmly in place, regulated, and enforced. Worship was a privilege granted to those who were not unclean. Access to the sanctuary was limited. These specifics were humanly devised, yet invested with salvific power—this was the religious law that burdened people and under which they labored. He points out that humanly devised laws are, by definition, inconsistent. They do not suffice for everyone, in every era, and at all times. Changes, especially the sweeping ones that change our conceptions of how the world works, introduce new understandings of what comprises truth, and suggest that how things make sense and cohere can be understood in more than one way, make it impossible for the humanly devised laws of religion to remain coherent and believable.

People, pressed to obey, rebel. No more will they conform to the rules dictated by doctrines and rituals that do not make sense. No more will they accept the imposition of a belief structure urged upon them by their parents, their church ministers and priests, the traditions of their religious heritage. They will free themselves of all that nonsense. In other words, they become spiritual but not religious, and when asked about their religious affiliation, they mark “none.”

As Tillich says:

They cast away the yoke; but none can live in the emptiness of mere skepticism, and so they return to the old yoke in a kind of self-torturing fanaticism and try to impose it on other people, on their children or pupils. (97)…[Or] unable to stand the emptiness of skepticism, they find new yokes outside the Church, new doctrinal laws under which they begin to labor: political ideologies which they propagate with religious fanaticism [certainly in Tillich’s experience, the Nazi Regime would have represented this]; scientific theories which they defend with religious dogmatism [the Dawson and Hitchens crowd might be a good example here]; and utopian expectations they pronounce as the condition of salvation for the world [perhaps both Democrats and Republicans are suffering with this at this moment], forcing whole nations under the yoke of their creeds which are religions, even while they pretend to destroy religion.

I was driven to ask—if the existential question of the day is not the personal religious life, and is not the Christianization of culture and society and we are in a situation of profound change, then what is my role as a theologian, educator, and pastor? The more I considered it, the more I became aware that I am one of the seminary graduates that Mark Richardson of the Graduate Theological Union refers to as “administrative oil in the machinery of congregational life.” He suggests that in place of that outlook, seminarians should be trained to “participate in God’s mission outside the parish gates with an attitude of generosity and trust that this is the place of God’s presence.”

I find that when the time comes to actually step beyond the parish gates I have a lot invested
in my set-apart, robe-wearing authority. I like being considered spiritually advanced and deserving of at least a little bit of awe. I even like it when people have to fight with me because I am the authority against which they are struggling.

I am not so fond of anonymity, being treated with a sort of contempt because my education and point of view are considered irrelevant, and having people I meet assume they know how I feel about abortion and same-sex marriage. But the cost of avoiding this discomfort is becoming increasingly apparent. My mandate as a theologian and pastor is not to become ever more precise about the clarity of the answers I have. It is to comfort, console, energize, reconcile, and restore those who yearn for meaning.

For example, what has appeared recently in the media—the advent of what is being termed the “atheist mega-church”? One of its founders, Sanderson Jones—incidentally a comedian by occupation—is quoted as saying “If you think about church, there’s very little that’s bad. It’s singing awesome songs, hearing interesting talks, thinking about improving yourself and helping other people—and doing that in a community with wonderful relationships. What part of that is not to like?”


What does this indicate about the method of correlation? Before I encountered my own complicity in judging people from the set of humanly devised rules and rituals that I considered essential to religion, I would have wanted to study these gatherings and help them clarify that what they sought was indeed God. I would have imagined that in order for them to proceed with such a search, I would have useful suggestions about certain conventions that would be helpful for them to observe. I would then develop a list of the expressions of belief I hold to be necessary to accomplish the purpose that I discerned was their existential question, and I would tinker with them to make sure they were accessible to those gathered for the Sunday assembly.

In other words, I would go about putting in place all that I knew was best. That would be formulating questions and facilitating change. But with the new reality that I have glimpsed, I realize that Tillich charges me with a far different task. Jesus represents not a new demand, not a new doctrine or new morals, but a new reality—a reality that transforms life. It is not something that we can strive for, something that we can produce for ourselves, no matter how learned and how prepared we are in the traditional ways of doing theology. The transcendent, the true, grasps us. We cannot find it but it can find us—it is in everything, because everything derives life from it.

So, to paraphrase what Tillich said and I quoted at the beginning of this paper, I am charged with pointing to why I find something in the teaching of Jesus to have elemental power over my soul; I need to be able to explain why, in its emotional force, I receive what it means to be in the presence of an ultimate truth; and I must illustrate what it means and the difference it makes if I understand our human situation in this light. And I have to do that from the standpoint of the Sunday Assembly, from the ache that drives Dawson and his compatriots to deny the existence of a theistic concept of God, from the polarization that has resulted from the cynicism and skepticism that follows the rejection of religion.

How do I do that? How do I develop the awareness that will allow me to release the apparatus of my discipline when it is creating dissonance instead of apprehending the problem before me? How do I let go of the practices that have shaped my understanding of what it means to worship? How do I release the concepts I have created about God that I am far too likely to mistake for God, Godself?

Tillich points out that the one thing that differentiates Jesus from all others is his awareness that he did not create the New Being—that he was created by it. He knew that he could not find it—it had to find him. Can I be as bold, as faithful, as patient, as open? I am beginning to understand that such a search constitutes a very different definition of the method of correlation, and
an even greater difference in what is demanded of me as a follower of Jesus as the Christ.

Michael and Paulus: A Dynamic Uncoordinated Duo

A. Durwood Foster

1.

Polanyi and Tillich are congruent and divergent heroes in modernity’s ongoing struggle for meaning, especially with a Christian twist. They are indeed a dynamic duo but never gelled as they might, which challenges their Societies with unfinished business. Born six years apart, Tillich first in 1886, they share bourgeois middle Europe in harrowing transition from 19th Century progressivism through scientific upheaval, social convulsion, and Nazi barbarism, under threat of which the targeted Jew and the distrusted academic—first to meet decades later—emigrate to England and America. Both devote serious attention to socialism, but come to eschew Marx as well as Soviet oppression. In Eliot’s postwar Wasteland they join—philosopher-scientist and philosopher-theologian—the insurgency of humanist existentialism against objectivist scientism, as titanic new ethnic and global energies start to seethe. From early on, Tillich the Christian strikingly appreciates Judaism, while Polanyi the Jew receives baptism and saliently intones Christian faith—which may be the reason Jewish thought stays cool to him. In 1914, our duo enters the military of the Central Powers, as chaplain and medic respectively. Ailing, discharged early, they return to their research. Tillich, the burgeoning Berlin Privatdozent, startles his profession with the “Idea of a Theology of Culture” (1919), just as Polanyi receives a Karlsruhe Ph.D. and emigrates from Hungary, a promising new hands-on talent in German physical chemistry. He corresponds with Einstein and will awaken thoughts of a Nobel Prize, yet feels increasing pan-disciplinary duty to “Science and Society.” It becomes his transcendental “calling” to restore the humanity of knowledge and reinsure the significance of culture.

2.

In 1923 Tillich publishes a system of all the Wissenschaften. Three years later, his Religious Situation critiques every cultural domain as enthralled by “self-sufficient finitude” through which, however, the Transcendent is perceived to break anew. This book classically models theology of culture until, arguably, upstaged by a more provocative work, Polanyi’s Gifford Lectures of 1951—i.e., “upstaged” substantively though Polanyi never appropriates Tillich’s idea of such a theology. Tillich meanwhile mainly addresses church theology, the counterpart to that of culture. In the same year as Part One of Personal Knowledge there emerges the first volume of Systematic Theology. Each magnum opus, Tillich’s Systematic Theology and Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, aims to overcome malignant loss of meaning in modern life. For Polanyi, the problem’s core is the ideal of impersonal detachment pervading science and epistemology, typified by Laplace in the 18th Century and Skinner now. There results from this ideal of positivist objectivism—which Polanyi rebuts as untenable—not only undermining ethics and religion but also conceptual abolition of the free person and free society. Tillich’s overlapping diagnosis of the human predicament (elaborately rethinking original sin) is much more complex but has come by 1951 to include a critique of that “controlling” knowledge which denies pervasive participation of the subject and reduces the human to manipulable objectivity. The stage is set for our duo to meet, and Richard Gelwick gets Charles McCoy to arrange this in Berkeley during Tillich’s Earl Lectures of February, 1963.

3.

To use Polanyian parlance, there are several documentary sources that crucially comprise the subsidiary matrix focusing to the “Berkeley Dialogue” at the Claremont Hotel, which lasts about an hour and a half on the evening of February 21, 1963. (The hotel is not actually in Berkeley, but just over the Oakland line.) It seems pertinent to recall that in Personal Knowledge a decade earlier, Polanyi, had named Tillich his favored theologian (pp. 280, 283n.), citing from Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality and Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, the coupling of doubt and faith and critique of fundamentalism. More recently he was troubled in reading Dynamics of Faith by Tillich’s “separate dimensions” strategy for avoiding con-
flict between science and faith. [Hereto, see Michael Polanyi’s article “Science and Religion: Separate Dimensions or Common Ground?” in Philosophy Today 7 (Spring, 1963) 4-16, written right after the Berkeley encounter.] Contrary to Tillich, Polanyi affirms (p. 4) his own belief “that our knowledge of nature has a bearing on our religious beliefs; that, indeed, some aspects of nature offer us a common ground with religion.” (Bob Russell, on our panel, will recall how such a belief later moved some of us in Berkeley to found under his lead the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences.) Here indeed is one of the big issues between Polanyi and Tillich, but it was left very much unpacked on February 21. For what actually transpired that night between them, the most essential record is Richard Gelwick’s 1995 article in Tradition and Discovery XXII, 1, which includes Polanyi’s four and a half page summary of the conversation. Regretfully, there is no resume by Tillich, though some weeks later in two letters to Polanyi (included in Gelwick, op. cit.) he is pleased by how much they agree and notably with Polanyi’s assertion that Tillich has “fought for the purification of faith from religious dogmatism” while Polanyi supplemented “this by purifying truth from scientific dogmatism.” Tillich adds that Polanyi has excellently shown “the continuity between the different types of knowledge” and then in the second letter identifies the essay to which he refers Polanyi in the conversation as “Participation and Knowledge: Problems of an Ontology of Cognition,” his contribution to the Festschrift Max Horkheimer zum 60 Geburtstag (published in Soziologica, pp. 201-9, hrsg. Adorno and Dirks, Frankfurt a.M., 1955, bound in Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie, Bd. 1.)

This statement has been put on the website as the most axial “subsidiary clue” to the interface from Tillich’s side. With these sources I would further place the second of Tillich’s Earl Lectures, “The Nature of Present Day Thought: Its Strangeness to Traditional Christianity” (available in the published lectures, The Irrelevance and the Relevance of the Christian Message, Pilgrim Press, 1996, pp. 23-41) Polanyi heard Tillich deliver this lecture just prior to their conversation, but did not (I understand from Richard Gelwick) attend any other of Tillich’s formal presentations that week—including the Wednesday afternoon lecture at U.C. Berkeley on “Science, Philosophy and Religion,” which (from a remark attributed to him in Polanyi’s summary) Tillich might be taken to assume Polanyi did hear. (I cannot, by the way, locate any extant text of this lecture.) Finally, as to salient documents bearing on the Claremont Hotel encounter, it seems pertinent to cite Tillich’s statements in his letter to Polanyi of May 23, 1963 (Gelwick, op. cit.) that he first envisaged an epistemological “hierarchy of involvement and detachment” when he wrote System der Wissenschaften and that he has “carried it through “rather fully” in the forthcoming third volume of the Systematic Theology. This clearly implies that an assessment of where Tillich stood and came to stand vis-à-vis the Polanyian epistemological project calls for a close look also at both those works.

4.

However, the first document of interest in our case to examine is doubtless Tillich’s essay “Participation and Knowledge,” regarding which he makes his most meaty intervention during the Berkeley conversation and then follows up in the second letter to Polanyi with bibliographic data and the promise of help if needed in finding the piece. The Frankfurter Beiträge were in fact hard to access, and I understand Polanyi never did get to read what Rob James calls Tillich’s “little gem” of epistemology. Ironically, Tillich could have given far simpler directions to the document. It was widely available (in a German translation of the original English) in Band VI of his Gesammelte Werke, 1961. Like Karl Barth, Paulus could not recall where to find all he had published! It is even more ironic, however, that the pith of what Tillich had to say epistemologically, so far as it bears on the Polanyi project of establishing personal participation in all cognitive domains, had already been before Polanyi when he read Systematic Theology, Vol. 1. This we know from Polanyi’s article, referred to above, in Philosophy Today wherein the author, after citing what he does not like from Dynamics of Faith (viz., the “separate dimensions” strategy), says the following in Footnote 1: “The present paper responds to this statement (from p. 81 of Dynamics of Faith) and more directly to recent lectures (sic) at Berkeley in February, 1963. The following formulation that comes nearer my own position (to which my attention has been called) can be found...
in *Systematic Theology* I (which we recall was cited in *Personal Knowledge* as a favored theological source), p. 97: “The element of union and the element of detachment appear in different proportions in the different realms of knowledge. But there is no knowledge without the presence of both elements.”

5.

We find ourselves knee deep herein the question: How does Tillich’s “Participation and Knowledge” of 1955 differ from the epistemology formulated in *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1 (1951), (especially pp. 94-100, dealing with the cognitive function of existential reason)? One might presume there is variance, given the four-year hiatus in publication—for Tillich’s detailed conceptualization continuously mutated. But in this respect there is something that does not meet the eye, namely that Tillich’s “Personal Knowledge” (not to be confused with Polanyi’s!) originated precisely at the time *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1 was coming out. The impression given in Polanyi’s summary of the Berkeley meeting (see Gelwick, op. cit.) that Tillich says he did the piece while “still in Germany” (i.e., before emigrating in 1933) is quite misleading; Tillich must have said something like “for a German publication.” Peter John, to whose voluntary labors as amanuensis to Tillich (despite the latter’s discouraging attitude) we are manifoldly indebted, has preserved a very early (and obviously not entire or un-garbled) version of the “Personal Knowledge” essay from its provenance in the spring of 1951. It seems that in the late winter of that year it was Tillich’s turn to give the paper for a club of philosophers who met monthly for dinner and discussion at Columbia University. Obviously he drew from thematization in press for *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, which would appear in May, no doubt using a compressed outline, as was his wont. Soon thereafter (April 30) Peter John was among a group of students at a Tillich open house to whom Paulus presented a redaction of what he had shared with the group of philosophers, with their salient responses. True to form, Peter preserved a shorthand account showing many of the elements re-formulated and polished a few years later for the Horkheimer *Festschrift*.

6.

While the final version of Tillich’s “Personal Knowledge” still largely coincides with *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, there is one new idea: a proposal in the third paragraph from the end as to how knowledge can include, besides the moment of separation, also the moment of union which transcends the subject-object structure. The key, he says, is temporal alternation. “It is the time difference between the moment of uniting participation and separating objectivation which makes religious and—in some degree—all knowledge possible. This does not mean that a former participation is remembered and made an object of cognition. But it does mean that the moment is present in the cognitive moment and vice versa. Participation still persists in the moment of cognitive separation; the cognitive encounter includes moments of predominant participation, which I have called the perceptive moments, as well as moments of predominant separation, which I have called the cognitive moments. These alternate and establish in their totality a cognitive encounter. This is the situation in all realms, and it is the structure which makes religious knowledge possible.” (*Main Works*, 1, 389.) Do we find anything like this elsewhere in Tillich? One has to think a moment, but then yes, we do, in *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 3’s elucidation of the mystical element in a Protestant theology determined by faith. “The question which arises,” declares Tillich, “...about faith and mysticism in Protestant theology is that of the compatibility and, even more, the interdependence of the two. They are compatible only if the one is an element of the other; two attitudes toward the ultimate could not exist beside each other if the one were not given with the other. This is the case in spite of all anti-mystical tendencies in Protestantism; there is no faith (but only belief) without the Spirit’s grasping the personal center of him who is in the state of faith, and this is a mystical experience, an experience of the presence of the infinite within the finite. As an ecstatic experience, faith is mystical, although it does not produce mysticism as a religious type. The same is true from the other side. There is faith in mystical experience” (*Systematic Theology*, Vol. 3, p. 242). Here Tillich desists from the “temporal alternation” floated in “Personal Knowledge.” His thinking of “one within the
other” suggests rather the “eschatological panentheism” affirmed at the very end of Systematic Theology, Vol. 3 (p. 423). However, temporal movement reappears when normative Protestant mysticism is described as “every serious prayer leading into contemplation” (Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, p. 192). In contemplation “the paradox of prayer is manifest, the identity and non-identity of him who prays and Him who is prayed to: God as Spirit” (ibid.). What is notable in the wrestling with these matters, in relation to Polanyi’s epistemological project, is Tillich’s evident awareness of a cognitive bifocality fusing—without being abolished—into a unity. One term is more participatory, the other more detached. At the much more primitive stage of “Personal Knowledge” preserved by Peter John (p. 3 of his transcription), Tillich gets into heated discussion with Prof. Hendel of Yale as to how cognition “must participate in terms of the presence of sense impressions, otherwise we cannot have even controlling knowledge.” I am sure Polanyi’s ears would have pricked up at that! His “tacit dimension” theory compasses sensation far more thoroughly than does Tillich, but it is surprising how much the two of them, mutually unaware, fished in the same waters.

7.

This pertains not only to cognition’s sensory or “material” component but also to what Aristotle further taught Western philosophy to call the “formal” and the “final” aspects of any causative transaction. Note in Tillich’s published “Personal Knowledge” what he dubs the “structural presuppositions of experience” (Main Works, p. 384). “There is,” he insists, despite the disputes over particular renditions of these—whether by Plato (the ideas), Kant (the categories), Husserl, Scheler, or whomever—“an irreducible though indefinite minimum” of such presuppositions in every cognitive encounter. They comprise a medium of in-escapable participation of the subject in the object of knowledge and vice versa. Math and logic are, of course, in the front rank here, without which the “hardest” of the physical sciences would dissolve. Actually, from early on, Tillich is as aware of this as is Polanyi. We could certainly wish, at this precise apposition, that the latter would somehow have read the former’s System der Wissen-
schaften in 1923! Beyond the “Personal Knowledge” text Peter John reports Tillich relating, at that open house in 1951, that some of his philosophical acquaintances, apparently in the club that met monthly at Columbia, had urged him now to turn his creative powers, still at high tide, to a major work in epistemology. Having completed the arduous task of getting Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, into galley proofs, if he plowed on with the system he faced the controverted terrain of Christology and Pneumatology where he was less systematically au courant. Besides, he seems to have experienced a somewhat galling frustration in not having secured yet better underpinnings in the philosophy of cognition, where he once scintillated prodigiously. Hence the somber remark of Paulus remembered by Sarah Terrien: “I will be damned for my mystical theory of knowledge.” Tillich asked the students in his home that evening, says Peter John, after they heard the resume of “Personal Knowledge,” what they thought he should do. It was a typical gesture of the theological giant. But the seminary middlers, of course, were way beyond their depth. Providence decreed, if partly by default, that the magnum opus should be completed. Maybe it was, as some thought might be true of Barth’s Kirchliche Dogmatik, that the Lord God could not bear to miss the denouement of such magisterial constructs. In Tillich’s case, at least here on earth most would rejoice that the Systematic Theology got finished. Yet who has read both Tillich and Polanyi can doubt that, in epistemology and the whole gamut of culture as well, something still profoundly needed could have commenced to flower had the one’s immense gift melded with the other’s prophetic genius in empirical scientific and cultural diagnostics. Suppose after that April evening, which Peter John was privy to, Paulus had tabled the Systematic Theology and gone to Britain to hear Polanyi deliver the Gifford Lectures. Suppose Michael, settling in Berlin to do science at the Faber Institute in the 20s, had also walked blocks away to the Kant Gesellschaft and let his irrepressible mind ingest disparate yet dynamically pair-able Tillichian stem cells? Dream on, ye fatuous! Or maybe get busy, for the need—our cultural crisis, darkened by deadly feuds with fanaticism—is no less ominous.
8.

But we’ve gotten ahead of ourselves. Because it is so important also to Polanyi, I want to bring out Tillich’s emphatic recognition for all knowledge of the determining valuational Gestalt. In society as well as the individual or the research team, knowing is always established and sustained, expanded or corrected, within a contextualizing tradition. Meaning, devolving from ultimate valuation and commitment, shapes the whole matrix within which physics, as much if not more than theology, transpires. This is the zone of the Aristotelian “final” or teleological cause, which as modernity unfolds Francis Bacon and Galileo, unknowingly preparing for Laplace and Skinner, will bracket for untrammeled study of nature. Polanyi as physical chemist (ipso facto becoming philosopher too) blows here a shrill whistle and engages the now homongous phalanx of purposeless objectivism in no-holds-barred study of nature. Polanyi as physical chemist (ipso facto becoming philosopher too) blows here a shrill whistle and engages the now homongous phalanx of purposeless objectivism in no-holds-barred dissent. After much earlier lightning flashes this begins to happen programmatically, I take it, by the time he writes the lectures for Science, Faith and Society, 1946 (Cf. Moleski/Scott, Michael Polanyi, 2005, pp. 200, 258, 100, 154, passim). It gains a grand if sprawling fruition, of course, in the Gifford Lectures, 1951-2. Tillich’s contemporaneous Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, wherein Polanyi found salient points of agreement, contains upfront the following pregnant passages.

In every assumedly scientific theology there is a point where individual experience, traditional valuation, and personal commitment must decide the issue...If an inductive approach is employed, one must ask in what direction the writer looks for his material. And if the answer is that he looks in every direction and toward every experience, one must ask what characteristic of reality or experience is the empirical basis of his theology. Whatever the answer may be, an a priori of experience and valuation is implied...In both the empirical and metaphysical approaches, it can be observed that the a priori which directs the induction and the deduction is a type of mystical experience. Whether it is ‘being-itsel’ (Scholastics) or the ‘universal substance’ (Spinoza), whether it is ‘beyond subjectivity and objectivity’ (James), or the ‘identity of spirit and nature’ (Schelling), whether it is universe’ (Schleirmacher) or ‘cosmic whole’ (Hocking), whether it is ‘value creating process’ (Whitehead) or ‘progressive integration’ (Wieman), whether it is ‘absolute spirit’ (Hegel) or ‘cosmic person’ (Brightman)—each of these concepts is based on an immediate experience of something ultimate in value and being of which one can become intuitively aware (pp. 8-9).

9.

In these passages Tillich is talking focally about religion and theology, but it is clear what he says intends to apply to cognition generally. He repeats this in the “Personal Knowledge” essay. When did he begin to think this way? Here let me cite from System der Wissenschaften thematization which is the obvious preformation of what was just quoted from Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, three decades latter. “Erkannt ist, was als notwendiges Glied einem Zusammenhang eingeordnet ist” (Main Works, p. 115). The necessary Zusammenhang, if it too shall belong to knowledge, must finally fit into an all embracing system, and


By no means had Tillich always so envisaged the basic layout of knowledge. In this frenetically creative phase of his maturation, spurred by favorable attention from Ernst Troeltsch, conceptual breakthroughs were attaining warp speed. Only four years earlier, in the thunderclap that first gained him wide attention, he opened his lecture “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture” by contrasting the “empirical sciences” with the “systematic sciences of culture” in just the way Polanyi would later indict as nefariously deceptive. “In der Erfahrungswissenschaften,” avers the opening sentence of that lecture, “ist der Standpunkt etwas,
was said to be the largest audience ever to crowd the gym, Tillich would have diverged drastically from what had been for decades his standing view? Well, in public presentations, he did sometimes foreshorten his complex positions, and there are many oddities in what has come down to us about the whole affair. Why, for example, would Tillich parry Polanyi’s opening thrust the way he does—i.e., by reminding that his lecture had also noted the wider responsibility of scientists for our shared world—if the lecture had more relevantly addressed Polanyi’s pivotal concern. Polanyi’s following intervention justifiably dismisses Tillich’s riposte as irrelevantly adding a “dual function” (the social responsibility of scientists). Of course, we must not forget we are enclosed here within Polanyi’s notes, which hardly can accurately embody all Tillich said. The plain truth is we never can precisely know what went back and forth that evening between our dynamic duo, but it is incontestably about as uncoordinated as one can get.

11.

It is disappointing that Tillich knows nothing about Polanyi. Further, it is hard to avoid concluding, in spite of epistolary courtesy, that he also failed to learn anything from the interface. Renate Albrecht had reason for not mentioning Polanyi among the many “Encounters” of Tillich she records in Volume XII of the Gesammelte Werke (Begegnungen, 1971). The Paucks similarly did not regard anything that happened in Berkeley in 1963 as deserving notice in their account of Paulus’s life (Paul Tillich, vol. 1, 1975). Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, when it appears the following summer, does show passages we might argue are tinctured Polanyian, except for knowing they were in press when our heroes met—and that, as seen, propitious Tillichian soil for them existed earlier. Tillich never did become privy to Polanyi’s courageous and brilliant expeditions in the infrastructure of empirical science. He never grasped, or even confronted in its prime thrust, the theory spelled out in The Tacit Dimension. Nor could Tillich assimilate Polanyi’s completely unintimidated attitude of bearding practitioners of science in their own den. He felt keenly his lack of credentials—which Polanyi had—to debunk scientific dogmatism at the laboratory level. Besides, Tillich,

10.

Polanyi’s summary of the Berkeley dialogue shows he is emphatically unsatisfied with Tillich’s attempt to envisage participation also in the natural sciences (Cf. Gelwick’s article referenced above). But how well has he understood Tillich’s attempt? I do not see how we can ever know, but prima facie he seems to misrepresent Tillich in the opening assertion that “The method of absolute detachment you (Paul Tillich) ascribe to science in contrasting it with philosophy and religion is a method which scientists falsely ascribe to themselves.” (If Gelwick is right that Polanyi did not attend the afternoon lecture at University of California, Berkeley on “Science, Philosophy, and Religion,” then Tillich must have lent him the text before the dialogue commenced. I have already noted I cannot now discover anything about this text—even whether it existed; it seems if it had it would be in the Harvard archives). But can we believe that at UCB that afternoon, before what
especially as he aged, was almost overly “nice,” close sometimes to being unctuous. Note him saying (in Polanyi’s resume) that when philosophers like Nagel “would accept none” of the “Personal Knowledge” essay’s inclusion of participation in every branch of knowledge, he “did not dare to pursue it further.” Even though what he states here (i.e., what Polanyi says he states) is rather misleading, since he had long previously held and kept right on holding there is participation in all knowledge, the utterance is *attitudinally* true to Tillich. It resonates completely with his deference *vis-à-vis* Martin Buber, Hans Reichenbach, and others when they visited Union during my student days there. (I think what Tillich must actually have said to Polanyi is illumined by Peter John’s report from the open house (cf. supra). After the presentation of “Personal Knowledge” at University of California, Berkeley in early 1951, some friends of Tillich urged him to shelve the *Systematic Theology* and undertake a major work in epistemology, but Ernest Nagel, who had great prestige around New York City and certainly with Tillich, advised against it. Though a stringent positivist, Nagel fraternized genially with Rabbi Louis Finkelstein and others in the local theological community.)

12.

How could Tillich be so nescient of Polanyi prior to the meeting? Was not this the Paulus justly famous since the 1920s for an almost too watchful eye on contemporary culture, especially philosophy, with which to “correlate” his theological work? Yes, but it seems even would-be polymaths can overbook. For one thing, Tillich’s speed in English never matched what it was in German; he concentrated on learning to write.

Meanwhile, a spate of invitations had pulled him from every direction since *Time* magazine’s cover (ca. 1950) christened him “Mr. Theology.” But for the last years, pressing anxiety to complete the system overhung everything, as his angina pectoris worsened. He *did* for that matter read valiantly—Heidegger, Whitehead, Hartshorne, recently Teilhard de Chardin, even novels like 1984, *de rigueur* scholarly papers for meetings and dissertations, always trying as well to scrawl a personal word on the term papers his assistants graded. On the other hand, for whatever reasons, at Union in the mid-50s Polanyi’s work was hardly known by anyone. Before I left in 1953, the only sounding of his name I ever heard was by Aristotelian expert Richard McKeon of Chicago. He had to spell it as he told Rabbi Finkelstein and his steering committee of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion of this “Hungarian scientist now living in Britain” who argued Aristotle’s *pistis* (in the *Prior Analytics*) was a skeleton in the closet of modern natural science. Some at Union would have picked up on a possible relation to the *credo ut intelligam* of Medieval Christian theology, but Tillich was not one of those. I do not know when he may first have heard of Polanyi, but it was relatively late, after becoming preoccupied with *Systematic Theology*, Vols. 1 and 2, and all the folderol of moving to Harvard and then Chicago. Then, following the Berkeley dialogue, Tillich had but a short time to live. He returned to Chicago absorbed in his history of religions teamwork with Mircea Eliade, worried at East Hampton about glitches in the English text of *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 3 as he tried to oversee its German translation, kept frenetically responding to multifarious initiatives, including a post at New York’s School of Social Research, and barely mustered strength for that notable swan song lecture in Chicago. There was just no chance to mull over Polanyi. Among my puzzlements about the tangled skein of *how come* and *what if* is why the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion did not seek out Polanyi, as his interests and qualifications were very much in their ballpark. From about 1940 they had a cosmopolitan program going annually in New York to which he could have spoken very incisively, and then a much more receptive Tillich would perforce have become aware of him. Did the animus toward Polanyi (e.g., in British analytic philosophy), or his endorsing Jewish *assimilation*, also poison more distant waters? Even today one notices, in the quite recent Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich, there is, for all the hundreds of modern trivia, no entry at all for Polanyi.

13.

All the initiative for and in the Berkeley encounter was taken by Polanyi. He had been significantly impressed by Tillich’s writing for at least a decade. But, that being the case, why is *he* as un-
steeped, as it seems he is, in the complexity of Tillich’s thought? Polanyi was a phenomenally omnivorous reader. Why would he not have digested, if not earlier then down at Stanford where he was spending the semester, Tillich’s treatise on the sciences? (I happen to know it was in the library there.) Even closer in, why would he not have carefully reread *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1, which he praised in his Gifford Lectures? During or after the encounter, he tells us in the *Philosophy Today* article, someone had to call his attention to the passage from that volume, which he acknowledges is closer to his own position. There are in fact lots of passages in the volume that resonate quite deeply with Polanyi’s concern and “calling.” Here is one further example (from pp. 98-9):

Most cognitive distortions are rooted in a disregard of the polarity which is in cognitive reason. This disregard is not simply an avoidable mistake; it is a genuine conflict under the conditions of existence. One side of this conflict is the tension between dogmatism and criticism within social groups. But there are other sides to it. Controlling knowledge claims control of every level of reality—life, spirit, personality, community, meanings, values, even one’s ultimate concern, should be treated in terms of detachment, analysis, calculation, technical use. The power behind this claim is the preciseness, verifiability, the public approachability of controlling knowledge, and, above all, the tremendous success of its application to certain levels of reality. It is impossible to disregard or even to restrain this claim.

(The last clause here is *not* acceptable to Polanyi, and yet the resistance and frustration he experiences in pursuit of his “calling” exemplify its truth—or let me rather say its partial truth. For Tillich himself is pursuing the same calling—and so are others like Karl Jaspers and Buber, and the cause has never been altogether lost.) The public mind is so impregnated with its methodological demands and astonishing results that every cognitive attempt in which reception and union are presupposed encounters utter distrust. (Shall we here call Prof. Nagel to the stand?) A consequence of this attitude is a rapid decay of spiritual (not only of the Spiritual) life, an estrangement from nature, and, most dangerous of all, a dealing with human beings as with things. In psychology and sociology, in medicine and philosophy, man has been dissolved into elements out of which he is composed and which determine him. Treasures of empirical knowledge have been produced in this way, and new research projects augment those treasures daily. But man has been lost in this enterprise. That which can be known only by participation and union, that which is the object of receiving knowledge, is disregarded. Man actually has become what controlling knowledge considers him to be, a thing among things, a cog in the dominating machine of production and consumption, a dehumanized object of tyranny or a normalized object of public communications. Cognitive dehumanization has produced actual dehumanization.

This is vintage Tillichian theology of culture. Polanyi’s distinct and original voice harmonizes well with it, and we can be gratified and hopeful in the power of their modulated consonance. But any actual duet to come forth from our duo is one we shall need ourselves to arrange.

14.

Alas, these two “kings of high C” never get to sing together. When they meet in Berkeley, why does Polanyi (once again if we follow his resume, our sole definitive source, unless Richard Gelwick will correct it) so aggressively pin Tillich to the wall with his summation of the latter’s position? And then follow with a staccato recital of his own views? Why not ask Tillich whether he has him right? Polanyi’s impatience does show a throbbing earnestness we cannot but salute. On to the *Sache selbst*! Still, might we not have expected more scrupulous prior review of his favored religious thinker? And why no reference at least to the Earl Lecture given just several minutes before, which Polanyi came to hear, and in which Tillich had indicted “Skinnerism’s” turning persons into things as the current extreme of “calculating reason” run amok (*Irrelevance*, pp. 25, 31, *passim*)? Focus on this point alone would show the inadequacy of casting Tillich simply as the seminary teacher countering fundamentalism, vastly important as that is. True, Paulus seems to acquiesce in this settlement with Polanyi, like a harried busi-
ness man “agreeing quickly with the adversary” so as to get on with his main agenda. But there are bones to pick that Wednesday evening that are still far from ever having been stripped clean. One we already have noted is that Tillich does not perceive how manifoldly and thoroughly the empirical sciences in their experimental infrastructure and their existential underbracing and control depend tacitly upon a fiduciary matrix of social and personal preconditions. On the other hand, he is awed by the achievements of science while being unexposed to the sweaty disconnects and seat-of-one’s-pants guesswork that Polanyi knew all too well. Of course, even more than Tillich, Polanyi also reveres science, but he can and does loudly sound the note as well that in monotone was projected by the book Science is a Sacred Cow (by Anthony Standen, 1950). That was a kind of book Paulus tended to deprecate.

15.

Unaware of the weight of Polanyi’s scholarship, Tillich could have gotten the impression his interlocutor was too exercised, not to say obsessed, by his pivotal insight, however correct and important it doubtless was, We have no objectively intended utterance to the point from Paulus; the courteous blandishments can hardly count. Certainly he would have deemed it too simple to ascribe our universal human malaise only to the false ideal of objectivity, since for him the human predicament was compounded transcendentally of unfaith, hubris, and concupiscence—this being our fallenseness or sinfuless—continuously issuing in more concrete configurations and specific actions of estrangement. Not that Polanyi really was so tunnel visioned! The grounding and range we know from Personal Knowledge—as well as (post-Tillich) Meaning with its incisive addresal of the whole scope of culture—would have doubtless evoked even in a preoccupied Paulus much more hermeneutic alacrity. It is a shame to have to say the Claremont Hotel dialogue of our dynamic duo was largely a reciprocal fizzle, and yet for Polanyi, too, it seems to have pretty well finished turning him off to Tillich, with whom once he had been coming on so strongly. I can find no subsequent expression of interest in Paulus other than the Philosophy Today article that is mainly predicated on Polanyi’s disenchantment with Dynamics of Faith, published in 1958. His disillusion—re: his own cutting edge—probably began whenever it was he perused that work. His deep respect for the “upper story” of Tillich’s theology apparently stayed in place, even while he pigeonholed Paulus off to the side of the axial quarrel with science. In my case, animadversion to the “separate dimensions” strategy (cf. Par. 3 above) for mutually pacifying religion and science seems in Berkeley to have gone on engrossing his attention in a practical parallel to Tillich’s overloaded agenda. He likewise does not appear to have learned anything new about his interlocutor by coming up from Stanford that day, or later—setting instead for the rhetorical concord of his tackling scientific false consciousness and Tillich religious fundamentalism. This is all the further borne out if Richard Gelwick is correct that Polanyi never did get around to looking up the Horkheimer festschrift essay. But for me the principal earnest of it is the fact that, in Meaning crucially, the theosophical work in which Polanyi has latterly become interested is that of emergent evolution and Whitehead. There are sanguine reasons why he would have, as we shall see below. But, as he obviously did not realize, there was much more in Tillich too that might have creatively boosted the project to which he was called.

16.

In the resume, after Polanyi presents his position, Tillich inquires, “Is this view based on Gestalt psychology?” Far from just making apt conversation, as it might appear, the specificity of the question is loaded with residual Tillichiana. In System der Wissenschaften, Paulus had proposed Gestalt psychology as the pivot to overcoming the stultifying conflict of methods especially within the “sciences of being” vis-à-vis the “sciences of thought.” It seems worth our while to adduce here further the flavor and stringency packed into this 1923 volume which I continue so much to wish our same-year Hungarian immigrant to Berlin had somehow managed to ingest—or, indeed, even more, emulate with a comparable “Systematik” of the sciences. Tillich was not out simply to arrange concepts but was intent on solving live problems:

Nachdem im Vorhergehenden die seinswissen-

His architectonic grounding, particularly in psychology, was ever a large resource in Tillich’s ongoing career, re-anchored in enduring friendships with the Gestalt neurophysiologist Kurt Goldstein and such psychotherapists as Harry Bone, Karen Horney, and Rollo May. Fructifying insights devoted not only for depth psychology but also Paulus’s fresh thinking in Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, regarding the wholeness and centeredness of personal life—thus fortifying him to stand up to B. F. Skinner during the Harvard professorship. An inestimable catalyst to the co-thinking he did in those very late years with Goldstein and others might have but sadly did not come from Michael, for whom similarly we may desiderate more helpful “think tank” context than he appears to have garnered from fellow scientists or philosophers (with the beneficent exception of Marjorie Grene, Bill Scott, and a few others).

17.

At the Claremont Hotel, Tillich’s rich background goes untapped. Polanyi has started the bidding and remains completely in charge. When asked about Gestalt psychology, he acknowledges its initial significance for his “way of discovery” (to use Richard’s fine phrase) but immediately conveys his severe disappointment with the tack taken by Wolfgang Koehler, the name most of us readily associate with the Gestalt movement. This could have opened the door for a truly basic Anseinandersetzung between our dialoguers, one with immense import for the Polanyi project and also for Tillich’s theology. The crux of the issue is the causal role of purposive freedom in the cognitive process. In other words, we are propelled headlong here into the solar plexus of Aristotle’s grammar of causality—the fourth or final (teleological) cause. Koehler’s experiments with apes’ learning to join sticks to reach food had promisingly cued Polanyi toward his climactic insight into tacit knowing (cf. Personal Knowledge, Torchbook ed., pp. 340-1, passim). In Tacit Dimension, the most succinct statement of his flagship theory, Michael favorably refers to Hans Driesch, noting that, “Biologists who recognize the basic distinction between mechanistic and organismic processes consider living functions to be determined at all stages by a combination of a mechanism with organismic regulation.” Note how close we
are to the terrain of Tillich’s ruminations in the long passage just cited (Par. 16) from System der Wissenschaften. “Gestalt psychologists,” Polanyi continues, “have often suggested that the processes of regulation are akin to the shaping of perception, but their insistence that both perceptual shaping and biological regulation are but the result of physical equilibration brought this suggestion to a dead end” (Anchor Books, 1967, pp. 43-4). Koehler, and in Polanyi’s generalization the whole school, had capitulated to impersonal physical determinism. This is neither how Tillich saw the situation in 1923 when he firmly held “Jede Gestaltwirklichkeit ist eine Einheit von äquivalenter und produktiver Kausalität” (ibid., 145), nor does it cohere with the viewpoint of such neuroscientists as Goldstein, by whom Tillich felt aided and abetted in depicting human beings as finite freedom. Maybe the general situation had by 1963 considerably worsened, with Crick and Watson, for instance, simply taken for granted that, “religion was a mistake,” or Stephen Weinberg announcing “the more we understand the universe the more meaningless it becomes.” But whatever may have been happening in Gestalt theory—or later in Prigogine; Eccles. Wilber et alii—it is noteworthy that Polanyi and Tillich solidly agree the meaningful creativity of human personal and cultural life is urgently challenged by current science’s reductionist causal determinism. They agree de facto, that is. Polanyi has no inkling of how much the preceding, or how surprisingly some of the very late, thinking of Tillich may agree with him.

18. There at the hotel, why doesn’t Paulus just tell him? We already spoke to this, but more needs saying. Increasingly, as I go on reimagining the dialogue I poignantly regretted having to miss, I am very glad I was not there. Paulus was winded, done in from a grueling day of orating and interacting. He was set back on his heels by Michael’s pent up steam. He was 75, with a heart condition. As someone who always spoke from notes, his mind was juggling possible tacks to take on the morrow to round out the final Earl Lecture. Then, as Polanyi approaches the end of his concentrated allocution, he reasserts the fixed idea that Tillich completely acquiesces in the false ideal of strictly detached scientific knowledge. This was precisely the kind of point at which Paulus would always emit a sigh too deep for words and simply shut up. The only thing left to do was keep smiling and get some relevant reading into Michael’s hands, as the follow-up letters attempt. O.K. But there is still more that could explain the muteness of Tillich if the foregoing were insufficient, and these not yet mentioned factors considerably thicken the plot left over for us, the Societies to untangle.

19. The first of these more subterranean items is the great disparity between the meaning of faith for Polanyi and its meaning for Tillich. At first blush, Polanyi’s meaning is the more commonplace. It is more or less what Aristotle meant by pistis 2300 years ago; namely, a conviction that lacks certainty. A synonym for this meaning of faith is belief. (In German, there is in effect only one word—Glaube—for the English pair.) As Polanyi says in the next to last paragraph of his resume, “it is of the essence of knowledge to be held to be true by a man’s mental effort.” But this meaning of “faith” (which as here put could also be expressed as “effortful”—Fürwahrhalten in German) is exactly what Tillich tried strenuously to insist religious (and Christian) faith is not. Dynamics of Faith—on another but not unrelated aspect of which Polanyi had gotten hung up—from stem to stern tries to drive home an absolutely pivotal difference between belief, a conviction lacking certainty about a matter of fact, and faith, being grasped by “God” or ultimate concern. Ironically, the smudging and even widespread modern obliteration of this difference sometimes seemed comparable in Tillichian diagnostics to the false ideal of detachment in Polanyian. For Paulus, as he says in his magnum opus, authentic faith is always and only “the state of being grasped by that toward which self-transcendence aspires, the ultimate in being and meaning” (Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, p. 131). Above (especially Par. 8), I compared to Polanyi’s insight into faith being presupposed by science Tillich’s long-standing recognition of a “mytical a priori” in all systems of thought. But even though it creates a hermeneutical circle analogous to that of Christian theology, Tillich never calls this a priori faith. We
also have seen throughout this discussion that subjective “participation” was ascribed in some degree by Paulus to all cognitive domains. But again he never calls this participation faith. Now there were around Union Seminary when I was there (1946-1953) various versions of the idea, “that every worldview rests ultimately on a faith.” Augustine’s nisi credideritis non intelligam or the medieval motto credo ut intelligam were cited in support, and it was taken to be an apologetic corollary of this truth that one might not need worry about critical attacks coming from alien faith systems—which meant in effect coming from anywhere, since there was really no neutral science ungrounded in a faith. I was reminded of this attitude some time ago in the Polanyi Newsletter by the slant of Evangelical Biblical Professor Esther Meek, who wanted to claim support from Michael Polanyi in not having to worry about radical criticism. There is a problem here to which we shall have to speak before concluding, but for the moment, I want simply to bring out that Tillich was not among those who espoused this kind of apologetics. Several times in my hearing, he made clear his unhappiness with it. I hasten to add I personally feel he never cogently established mutual exclusion between faith and belief, even though it was axiomatic for some of his utmost theological concerns. It is no wonder so many, including his would-be friend Polanyi, have been incredulous or uneasy about Paulus’ edict of total separation of faith from the “preliminary” findings of science. In any case, coming back to the Berkeley dialogue, the profound problematic that looms in and under their disparate notions of faith—though Michael is quite unaware of it—would have been all too palpable to Paulus, and very understandably would have clinched his motivation at 10 p.m. or so to call it an evening.

From Socrates to Scotus, Augustine to Arminius, Calvin to Kant, Jansenism to the Jesuits: it is all over the map and then some! Let me say for myself that Polanyi’s handling of this enigma (epitomized, e.g., in The Tacit Dimension, Anchor Book ed., pp. 42-5) has been groundbreaking. I deem his envisagement of the emergent causality of purposive commitment to be the most significant element in what he calls the “from-to” sequence from a “fiduciary matrix” of subsidiary clues to the focality of accomplished knowing. It picks up in a fresh, empirically convincing way from Peirce, James and so many others a full parsing (which is impossible here) would require. As for Tillich, trying to discern how cognition, freedom and faith converge in the hemispheres of his cerebrum is indeed a formidable task. There is first the fact that Paulus is always amphibious, always “on the boundary” or going back and forth across it—the boundaries here being saliently those between science, philosophy and theology. But in addition to territorial adaptations there occur in Tillich major changes over time, and—mirabile dictu—one was just then underway as our duo sat together in the Claremont. To say the great systematizer was constantly evolving is heresy to some interpreters, though I salute it as a corroboration of his remarkable openness—one thing about him that never changed. From early on there is plenty in Tillich’s utterances re science and philosophy wherewith to support a robust yet sensible doctrine of human freedom. Up to a point this is likewise true of his theology. As bearing on the human factor, in any dimension but the vertical, we have the deciding self-center. Then, in the dipolar structural ontology, dynamics, individualization and freedom are equally enfranchised with form, participation and destiny. Paulus would never have wanted to retract System der Wissenschafter’s definition of freedom as “das individuell Schöpferische” (Main Works, p. 144) or that work’s culminating mandate that “Nur in der vollkommenen Einheit von Theonomie und Autonomie kommt die Wissenschaft, wie jeder sinnerfüllende Akt, zu ihrer Wahrheit” (p. 262). One can only conclude that a hefty part of his conceptual viscera could and did buy Michael’s insight that willing commitment is integral to knowing the truth (with unavoidable risk of falling into error.) But Michael construed this as what faith was about, and here Paulus had a
massive block. In spite of his scientific, philosophical and humanological espousal of freedom, a prime taproot of his spiritual being von Haus aus (very literally when we think of “Vaterchen,” his authoritarian dad) was the venerable Christian and especially Lutheran principle that “faith is not a human act” (Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, p. 178) but rather entirely a work in us of divine grace. Tillich saw this as indispensable to St. Paul’s “justification by faith alone,” which Luther had made the “article by which the church stands or falls.” In the Marburg Dogmatik (1925) Paulus went so far as to deny that even the humanity of Jesus contributes anything to our salvation. “Das in Jesus Christus ererbene Heil ist allein durch sich selbst bedingt. Seine Wirkung ist unabhängig von jeder durch den Menschen geschaffenen, Voraussetzung, sowohl vor wie nach seinem Durchbruch” (p. 375). This was his determined orientation over against any qualification by liberals like Brightman or Hartshorne. His celebrated message “You are Accepted” gained its force precisely through the “in spite of” of our total lack of a reciprocating condition. It was predicated indispensably—so one would have thought—on “the basic theological truth that in relation to God everything is by God” (Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, p. 135).

21.

Something strange, however, was going to happen shortly, and it must have been fermenting that night in Berkeley. When Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, appeared in the late summer of 1963, there surfaced about 20 pages from its end the Tillich-anly unprecedented motif of essentialization, which thereafter arguably dominates the denouement of Paulus’s whole magnum opus (Cf. my article “Tillich’s Notion of Essentialization,” in Tillich-Studien 3, ed. G. Hummel and D. Lax, 2000, pp. 365-83.) I am still trying to pin down exactly when, how and why this novel epiphany in Tillich’s text occurred. As of now, it cannot be ruled out that the encounter with Polanyi was causally involved. The word was borrowed from Schelling, but “essentialization” (German Essentifikation) was used by Tillich to express ontological fructifications significant for God that is achieved by a finitely free creature. “The world process means something for God,” he can now intone (almost proleptically privy to Polanyi’s Meaning, pp. 162-3, written a decade after Paulus’s death.) God “is not a separated, self-sufficient entity who, driven by a whim, creates what he wants and saves whom he wants. Rather, the eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has the freedom to reject and to accept love” (Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, p. 422). It is this amplifying of his thinking—after prolonged jousting with process thought—that justifies Tillich finally dubbing it “eschatological panentheism” (op. cit., p. 421). Charles Hartshorne noted the change (in Charles Kegley, The Theology of Paul Tillich, rev., 1982, pp. 230-1), but the only Tillich scholar, of whom I am aware, to anticipate my own perception of a “radical reversal” in Paulus was Alex McKelway (in his 1964 overview The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 244.) My point about the whole matter at this particular juncture is in the first instance merely that internal seismic rumblings around the issue of human “vertical freedom” (freedom toward God) may well help explain Tillich’s somewhat unusual taciturnity at the Claremont Hotel dialogue—or should we almost say monologue? Be that as it may, the substantive importance of the issue in itself puts it on the overarching agenda of sorting out where the contacts and disconnects of our dynamic duo leave us today.

22.

It is exceedingly interesting that Polanyi, continuing his aggressive reading in all cultural directions, had delved hungrily—by the time Meaning appeared—into Peirce, James, and Whitehead, endorsing their “looser view of teleology” as a desirable alternative to what he had come to see as “the Good forcing itself” on everything else (Meaning, pp. 162-3). This was a decade after Tillich’s death, and it seems a shame Michael could not have known about “essentialization bursting on stage at the very end of Paulus’s concluding and, to his own mind, most authoritative testament, which the three volumes of the Systematic Theology indisputably were. I have the impression that following their time together, except for the courtesy of two letters, Polanyi never read another line of Paulus. I greatly wish I had more access to Michael’s candid reaction to the theological opportunities and occasions that had reached out to him through the 1930s and 1940s as well as there-
after. He seems (in the Scott/Moleski chronicle) to have keenly appreciated initially and then been rather frustrated by the British group convened by J. H. Oldham. Was he disappointed by its Barthian ethos, which far less than Tillich was prepared to accord any theological significance to human enterprise? One thing is unmistakable: Polanyi was unswervingly inspired by the sacredness of human freedom, whereas Christian theology has no such consistent score sheet. By 1966, in The Tacit Dimension, Michael is convinced modernity’s dilemma cannot be resolved “by the enfeebled authority of revealed religion”; the reciprocating split between critical cynicism and moral fanaticism, which has hounded humanity since the Enlightenment, must first be healed on secular grounds (Anchor Book ed., p. 62). Is this in part fallout from his Tillichian disillusion? I continue to ponder such imponderables. It is upbeat in any case that Michael, in a theological coda to his own swan song (Meaning, p. 215), manages to hit a surpassingly high note, or actually a chord, that is quite reminiscent of Reinhold Niebuhr and Tillich where they harmonized. Even before his Gifford Lectures, a cantus firmus for Polanyi had been the Pauline rendition of the Christian moral vision. His valedictory summation of this is as good theology is Reinie or Paulus ever wrote.

Perhaps it has been the clear moral call of Christianity that has left behind in us a distillation which causes us to burn with…hunger and thirst after righteousness. If so, it should be possible for us to find in this same Christianity the antidote for [the] poison of moral perfectionism; for what this religion has also told us is that we are inescapably imperfect and that it is only by faith and trust in the all-encompassing grace of God that we can project ourselves into that supreme work of the imagination—the Kingdom of God—where we can dwell in peace and hope of the perfection which is God’s alone and thus where we can, in a wholly inexplicable and transnatural way, find our hunger and thirst after righteousness satisfied at last—in the midst of all our imperfections. As Saint Paul tells us his God told him: ‘I will not remove your infirmity. For my strength is made perfect in weakness…”

23.

I like to think this poignant paragraph speaks for Polanyi himself, and yet it is not his very last word. He goes on to represent also the wider cultural oikumene, those who stand outside the Christian or any religious stance, affirming our world’s need—which has meanwhile become all the more dire—for tolerance and mutual understanding “within the free society,” as in our common yet so differentiated humanity we seek universal truth (ibid., pp. 215-6). Michael seems in fact to espouse this Christianly uncommitted stance, as though he is “on the boundary” and/or crossing over. We have here of course the unfathomable problem of how Harry Prosch’s editing may have shaped the text. Even so, I cannot believe it stretches things to see a parallel between Michael’s farewell witness and that of Paulus, in his October 1965 Chicago address on “The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian” (The Future of Religions, ed. Brauer, 1966, p. 94). Tillich, too, remains “rooted in his own experiential foundation,” which is Pauline Christianity, while urging upon all the endeavor to formulate our roots in “universally valid statements” with “openness to spiritual freedom both from one’s own foundation and for one’s own foundation.” Just a few months earlier, in his eulogy for Martin Buber (Gesammelte Werke, XII, pp. 320-3), precisely that commitment to openness had been identified as what Paulus would most hope to emulate in his own life. I argued last year, in a paper for the Tillich group in Washington, that in that eulogy it comes to light that Paulus’s concept of sainthood is best of all fulfilled in Buber. I believe, however, that had Paulus known Polanyi better he might well have canonized him too. For all their missed connections, there winds up being an amazing compatibility between them.

24.

Note, for instance, how Polanyi and Tillich both posit a double registry—a bipolarity—of the ultimate fulfillment of meaning. Despite their uncoordination, they both finally embrace fully the indicative of unconditional divine grace and the imperative of free human creativity summoned to serve beauty, truth, and good, in what Rilke calls “die wunderbare Stadt der Zeit.” This corresponds to what Christianity names, perhaps nowadays too
obsolescently, “justification,” and, perhaps nowadays too moralistically, “santification.” The general history of religion mirrors variously the same problematic, and so, one can hardly not infer, does the human plight to which religion speaks. There is on the one hand a need for undiscriminating and absolute Divine help, and on the other a finite but still radical need for creative human effort to be needed and appreciated. In no theology has the integration of “grace and works” ever been completely or unparadoxically achieved, even while disputes about their relationship have instigated terrible religious hostility. I frankly think Polanyi could have helped Tillich as much or more than Kurt Goldstein on the dynamics in faith too of cognitive commitment, after Paulus at the last moment was ready for such help. Our duo also share a profound instinct with Karl Barth to “Let God be God”—to honor the unthinkably Divine mystery, even in their mutual devotion to intense ratiocination. They affirm categorically the symbolic character of religious language. Surely Polanyi would agree with Tillich’s mature insistence that the only non-symbolic statement we can make about God is that “everything we say about God is symbolic” (Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, p. 9), even though, like Buber, Michael has no taste for ontological language and the partially de-symbolizing constructs, such as “being-itself” or “the infinite,” to which Paulus has recourse in relating Christian witness to the wider world.

25.

An outcome of the “Berkeley Dialogue” might be seen as Polanyi’s proposal he and Tillich should thenceforth focus respectively on combating objectivism in science and fundamentalism in religion. Though Tillich gave his nod to the formula, it seems in fact merely to signify the mutual resigna-
tion of our duo that each would go his own way inattentive to the other. That was as it had been previously—entirely for Tillich and really, so far as concerns objectivism in science, entirely for Polanyi too, since Michael was indebted to Paulus at key theological points but never looked into his sweeping study of science. Then, after the Berkeley encounter, as we already noted, other than parting cour-
tesies they paid one another no heed. But quite apart from their not tuning in to each other, we need to ask what did Polanyi and Tillich actually do about the twin demons of scientism and fundamentalism? Surveying, this adequately extrudes way beyond my present contract and is an ongoing challenge to both our societies. Still, we cannot ignore what to begin with makes our duo dynamic, and I first note another irony in the whole tableau—specifically in their recipe of divided tasks. For though they put it the other way around, fundamentalism was arguably more Polanyi’s problem than Tillich’s, and scientism or the false ideal of detached objectivity was at least as much Tillich’s problem as Polanyi’s. Thus the divisional formula of concord they floated after the Berkeley meeting was intrinsically nonsensical. Happily they both did go on counteracting both the more cultural abscess of scientism and the more formally religious one of fundamentalism.

26.

Tillich’s teaching pulls the rug from under fundamentalism in his categorical premise that religious knowledge is altogether symbolic. Then he also removes from faith anything to be fundamentalist about by insisting its cognitive aspect, being a matter of ultimate concern, can in principle neither rest upon nor be threatened by the preliminary concern operative in empirical science—including especially historiography, the principal test case in Tillich’s arguments with peers, but also cosmology, and psychology where formidable challenges loomed. But Tillich never spent any-
time contending with fundamentalists, who avoided him and Union like the plague. Also, the idea, which he himself wafted to Polanyi, that he ever told students what to put in next Sunday’s sermon, is completely fatuous. His insistence that “the biggest barrier to religious understanding is literalism” (often reiterated orally and frustratingly eluding me for documentation) fell equally on the ears of orthodox, liberals, neo-orthodox, and scientifically brainwashed seekers—and was as pertinent to their respective confusions as it was to fundamentalism. A striking example here is Albert Einstein, who was notably, albeit gently, critiqued by Paulus for literally rejecting the Personal God (“The Idea of the Personal God,” Union Theological Seminary Quarterly Review, II, 1, 1940, pp. 8-10). Though it was hardly appropriate for Polanyi to assign our duo to the separate operational theatres he did, Polanyi himself does seem to have received direct help from Tillich in steering his
own religious way around the shoals of fundamentalism. His reiterated envisagement “of an indeterminate meaning which floats beyond all materially structured experiences ultimately pointing at unsubstantial existence” (Document X, p. 4) was his ontologically unsophisticated way of expressing the Tillichian symbolism culminating in being-itself. However, Michael consistently deplores fundamentalism also because it violates his norm of scientific integrity in defying the consensus of expertise he would rely upon to establish empirical probability. (The best statement I have found of this is in Meaning, Chapter 12, “Mutual Authority”). Now in spite of partial dependence on the notion of symbol shared with Tillich, Polanyi—as was noted above in Paragraph 3—became aware in reading Dynamics of Faith that he seriously differed with Paulus regarding faith’s relation to science. Michael did not believe the two could be totally separated. Already in Personal Knowledge, apparently unaware his thought is here contrary to Tillich’s, Polanyi writes, “an event which has in fact never taken place can have no supernatural significance; and whether it has taken place or not must be established by factual evidence” (p. 284). After all, it is not enough simply to reveal the overreaching of scientism. Increasingly Michael seems concerned with the intrinsic plausibility of faith. (Cf., toward the end of Meaning, how he desiderates empirical and philosophical support from emergent evolution and cosmic teleology.) Thinking along these lines inevitably brings one onto Tillichianly avoided terrain where, unless one becomes a fundamentalist, collision with fundamentalism must occur. Michael, of course, was not about to become one or acquiesce in anybody doing so. But it is this would be militant presence, so to speak, in the theatre of operations where faith can conflict with or receive support from science, that leads me to say—if we had to choose one of our duo to battle fundamentalism—the more plausible choice is arguably Polanyi. I say this partly because, along with many others who have carefully studied Tillich’s position on faith and science, I am not convinced these can be so cleanly disjointed as Paulus asseverates—either in historiography or cosmology or psychology. And I also would put Michael in top command here because, presupposing what he shares with Tillich, I find his mandate of universal openness to expert testing and consensus to be the most plausible antidote we actually have to fundamentalism at ground level. I believe Ian Barbour’s appealing redefinition of objectivity, which I personally adopted decades ago, is largely inspired by Polanyi, viz., that post-critical objectivity has to mean “intersubjective testability and commitment to universality” (Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, p. 177). This is our motive, is it not, in coming to the AAR, aside from fun with friends?

27.

The other battlefront, scientific objectivism, is an arena where prima facie Polanyi might seem almost a shoo-in to head the fighting, especially to hear him tell it, and if the only alternative is Tillich. But, as we saw, Polanyi is unaware of the case for Tillich in regard to science. On alternatives, we are, of course, talking here of our duo, henceforth dividing their efforts, prescinding from a much larger field that could not exclude contemporaries like Buber, Marcel, Berdyaev, Shostov, and numerous others, not to mention the capital figures like Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. Tillich used to mention especially Bergson and Simmel. And James seems more and more important. All these fecund minds do bear relevantly on the “sclerosis of objectivity,” to use Jaspers’ incisive phrase. With due allowance for the fact that Paulus and Michael were addressing just their own division of labor, there is something a little unreal in their rhetoric (“You have done for science what I have done for religion,” etc.)—one more, perhaps, of the oddities that stud this intermezzo. For one does not sense hubris, I think, in either of our duo. They are too consecrated to their calling. While Polanyi is naturally more surefooted in the forward trenches of experimental work and its logical calculus of uptake, and while no one can rival his pioneering expose of scientific pretense, Tillich offers a magisterially comprehensive and deeply anchored matrix in which to unpack, diagnose, and treat the pathology of egregious and culturally tyrannical cognitive detachment. The suasive whoIsm of his vision transcends necessary critique in transparency to the gracious Unconditioned manifest as universal cruciform Love. As the current world crisis widens under simultaneous onslaught of
cynical reductionism and all too credulous fanati-
cism, can we even think of dispensing with the
services of either of our doughty duo? As I can-
not imagine trying to do philosophy without both
Plato and Aristotle, I adamantly refuse to furlough
either Paulus or Michael to some more circum-
scribed task. As for Tillich, it is just now becom-
ing clear how very much unfinished business
there is in the full outworking of energies, hori-
zons, and strategic shifts so richly packed into his
intellectual estate. The early and the late phases of
it—not to speak of the thick 1923 study of sci-
ence—have not been at all adequately assessed.
There is a specific crying need to pick up the
sharp pang Paulus felt when he was tempted, as
Peter John reports from that 1951 open house
(above, Par. 7), to shelve the *Systematic Theology*
and undertake a major work in epistemology, of which
the *Personal Knowledge* essay is a suggestive nucleus.
I have just been zestfully reawakened to Polanyi,
and if I could only have back my worthy col-
league, Charles McCoy, I would never tease him
again for ranking Michael the greatest mind since
Plato. That may be slightly exaggerated, but who
cares? We need to have our consciousness raised.
Polanyi has been shamefully ignored by the phi-
losophical and theological gatekeepers. He is an
extremely potent catalyst and resource, not only
for going on further with Tillich but in mar-
shaling the best aid we can get to deal with the
Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and all the varied
legion who reductively deny or uncritically bloat
the possibility of meaningful faith to light our
human future. In his last Berkeley lecture follow-
ing the Claremont encounter, Paulus pleads with
us all “to fight an uphill battle” (*Irrelevance*, p. 63)
and at the end of *Meaning* thirteen years later Mi-
ichael says “We do not see the end in sight” (p.
214).” It is challenging, and it may be daunting,
but with our dynamic duo we do not despair.

**German Translation** of Passages in Durwood
Foster’s “Michael and Paulus: A Dynamic Unco-
ordinated Duo”

These passages are my off-the-cuff translation
from the text of *Das System der Wissenschaften*
in Main Works 1, from *Über die Idee einer Theologie der
Kultur* in Main Werke 2, and from *Dogmatik*, ed. by
W. Schüssler. There is an English translation of
*Das System der Wissenschaften* by Paul Wiebe, done
in 1981, to which I do not have access as I pre-
pare for our session in San Diego. *On the Idea of a
Theology of Culture* is widely available in English,
but the *Dogmatik*, I believe, is as yet not in En-
lish. In our scholarly societies, I strongly favor
using the original text bequeathed by Tillich,
whether in German or English.—D. Foster

In Par. 9, beginning with “Erkannt ist,”
“Known is what is fitted as a necessary part into a
context...The living force of a system is its im-
port...” (*Gehalt* is a term needing interpretation
according to the user. I suggest for Tillich “the
distinctive thrust of meaning anything holds”—
DF), “…its creative standpoint, its primordial in-
tuition. Every system lives from the principle on
which it is grounded and with which it is con-
structed. Every ultimate principle however is the
expression of an ultimate outlook on reality, a
ground-laying attitude toward life. In this way
there pervades the formal system of the sciences
in every moment an import which is metaphysical,
that is, which lies beyond every individual form
and therefore can never become, in the manner of
a false metaphysic, one form among others. The
metaphysical is the living force, the meaning and
blood of the system.” Six lines later: “In the sci-
ences of experience the standpoint is something
that must be overcome, in the systematic sciences
of culture the standpoint belongs to the matter
itself.” At the end of the paragraph: “In a closer
look it becomes apparent...that these three groups
are indeed not so radically separated, that each
element is more or less represented in each.”

In paragraph 16, beginning with “Nachdem”;
“After in the preceding the science-of-being sys-
tematic has been positively grounded, a glance at
how the debate stands may show our conception
is able to solve the current problems. There are
presently contending with each other a methodo-
logical and an objective trend. The methodologi-
cal trend, which is linked to epistemological ideal-
ism, divides science into natural sciences and sci-
ces of culture. The objective, epistemologically
realistic trend divides it into natural sciences and
sciences of the spirit (*Geisteswissenschaften*). For the
first trend psychology belongs to the natural sci-
ences, since it like these proceeds methodically,
that is, by generalizing. For the second trend psy-
chology is the groundwork of the *Geisteswissen-
schaften*, since it deals with the same object as they,
the spiritual (or mental) life. The position of psychology is thus the criterion of both trends. Thereby this apparently so formalistic dispute gains an extremely real significance. In it is decided the fate of the Geisteswissenschaften, of the conception of spirit and of culture. If psychology is the groundlaying Geisteswissenschaft, spirit loses its individually unique character; instead of a creative resultant it becomes a structured law; thinking destroys being; rational form triumphs over the contradiction of irrational import. The methodical trend escapes this, but it also suffers from several deficiencies. It does not differentiate the history of (i.e., done by) the sciences of being from the purely systematic Geisteswissenschaften and drives these likewise to a rationalistic conception in which the creative character of the spiritual (or mental) is lost. But this trend also does not do justice to the objection which the objective method raises that psychology is something other than a physical natural science. It cannot meet the objection, for it overlooks the central sphere of the Gestalt-Wissenschaften, in the middle of which psychology has its place. The methodical trend is finally unable to do justice to the historical elements in the physical and organic group, since it confines the historical method to the sciences of culture and does not know the distinction of autogenous and heterogenous methods. The reality is richer than can be divided by two methods, and precisely the method of the Gestalten, which has been forgotten in the dispute of methods, is the authentically central and concrete method, the method which is appropriate to thought-formed reality and which therefore is able to solve the problem of method.”

In paragraph 19, there is the single word “Fuerwahrhalten”—“holding for true.”

In paragraph 20, there is “das individuell Schöpferische”—“the individually creative,” and then the sentence “Only in the perfect unity of theonomy and autonomy does science, as every meaning-fulfilling act, reach its truth.” Near the end of the same paragraph there is the passage “The salvation manifested in Jesus Christ is conditioned only by itself. Its efficacy is independent of any humanly created presupposition either before or after its breakthrough.”
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