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**Annual Dues**

With every summer issue, the annual dues are now payable to the Secretary Treasurer. The dues are $50 USD for members and $20 USD for students. Retired members may pay according to their ability. Please send your check to:

Frederick J. Parrella  
Dept. of Religious Studies  
Santa Clara University  
500 East El Camino Real  
Santa Clara, CA 95053

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**Call for Proposals**

Tillich Jahrbuch 2017  
Deadline for proposals: July 31 (information sent by email to many members in early July)

In the first volume of his Systematic Theology, Tillich describes his method of correlation as “a
way of uniting message and situation.” He expresses a hope that both theologians and non-theological thinkers after him will find that this method helped them “understand the Christian message as the answer to the questions implied in their own and in every human situation” (p. 8). Scholarly focus on this method in the next Tillich Jahrbuch can include: (1) discussion of to what extent earlier Tillich writings incorporated this method; (2) to what extent he truly follows it in his own writings; (3) assessing the influence and incorporation of this method by contemporary thinkers; and (4) evaluating its effectiveness for addressing religious issues today.

Proposals (1 - 2 pages double-spaced) should be sent to Mary Ann Stenger by JULY 31, 2016 at: masten01@louisville.edu OR masten01@gmail.com

Proposals will be evaluated in August. For this Jahrbuch, there will be four (4) English contributions, twice the usual accepted. The final papers must be completed by December 15.

**CALL FOR PAPERS**

**International Congress of APTEF, NAPTS and the DPTG, University of Jena, 3 to 6 September 2017 (7 September, Group Excursion)**

**Reformation and Revolution in the Perception of Paul Tillich**

Reformation and Revolution represent a tension-filled pair of opposites in the self-understanding of the modern era. This pair points to the Reformation of Martin Luther as well as to the French Revolution as basic events of our cultural memory. On the other hand, the history of Protestantism itself can be understood within these two historical events. Paul Tillich concerned himself in many ways with the aforementioned field of tension between the Reformation and Revolution. It is highly appropriate, therefore, to examine the background of Tillich’s ideas concerning the Reformation and the Revolution as we approach the 500th anniversary of the Reformation. It is a highly appropriate subject to discuss at the international congress of the APTEF, the NAPTS, and the DPTG, together with the Netherlands and the Brasilian Paul Tillich Societies from 3 to 6 September 2017 to be held in conjunction with the faculty of the University of Jena.

In the name of these three societies all interested invitees would like to take part by delivering papers in the field of Reformation and Revolution. Proposals not longer than one page should be sent to christian.danz@univie.ac.at by December 31, 2016. We will announce the acceptance of papers in February 2017. We look forward eagerly to your suggestions as well as the international congress, the first congress to include all Tillich Societies.

With friendly greetings,
Christian Danz, Martin Leiner, Frederick Parrella


**Reformation und Revolution in der Wahrnehmung Paul Tillichs**


MEMORIAL ADDRESS: A TRIBUTE TO PAULUS JOHANNES TILLICH

STEPHEN BUTLER MURRAY

[Editor’s Note: Rev. Dr. Stephen Butler Murray is President and Professor of Systematic Theology and Preaching at the Ecumenical Theological Seminary, Detroit. It was presented at the New Harmony Athenaeum on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the Interment of Paul Tillich in the Paul Tillich Park in New Harmony, Indiana.]

Please allow me to say at the outset how delighted and honored I am to be here with you this evening to speak about Paulus Johannes Tillich, the theologian who undoubtedly has shaped my theological perspective and imagination more than any other. When I was doing my Ph.D. at Union Theological Seminary in New York City, my doctoral advisor was the Womanist theologian Delores Williams, who held the Paul Tillich Chair in Theology and Culture. She lived in what had been Paul Tillich’s faculty apartment, which had an enviable outdoor balcony that looked out upon the majesty of The Riverside Church’s soaring architecture, and which still retained some distinctly European accents that Paul and Hannah Tillich had added to their apartment, including a shower where one was struck by water from four different directions, a sort of aquatic stereo. When I was finishing my dissertation at Union, I had resolved to make a pilgrimage to New Harmony, Indiana to visit the Paul Tillich Park and pay my respect to the theologian whose work had so informed my own theological orientations, but as it turned out, my new chaplaincy at Skidmore College, moving into an old farm house, and the birth of our son, Hunter, made sure that pilgrimage from New York to New Harmony never materialized. Lo and behold, twelve years later, how wonderful finally to make the pilgrimage to New Harmony and be with you this evening.

Professor Kent Schuette of the Robert Lee Blaffer Foundation invited me to speak with you, and reminded me that, unlike when I speak at the American Academy of Religion or before the North American Paul Tillich Society, that tonight, I am not speaking to a crowd of people who are themselves professional systematic theologians, but local folk who may have stopped and poured over stone-inscribed words that touched their hearts in the Tillich Park, people who might have read The Courage to Be or Dynamics of Faith when they were in college and experienced an unexpected intellectual and spiritual surge that stayed with them across the years, people who have heard the name in passing time and again throughout their lives, people who want to know more, people who wonder why a small town in southern Indiana adheres so strongly to a German theologian’s legacy, when in fact that legacy may not be known well to them.

So what I endeavor to do with you this evening, the charge given to me by the Blaffer Foundation, is to share with you something of who Paul Tillich was and what his legacy is.

Born on the boundaries in Starzaddel in 1886, a Prussian part of Germany that now is part of Poland, Paul Tillich was the oldest of three children raised in the home of a conservative Lutheran pastor father and a far more liberal mother. He studied at the universities of Berlin, Tubingen, and Halle, before receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Breslau in 1910 and then his Licentiate of Theology from the University of Halle, and ordained a minister of the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union in Berlin in 1912. He served for two years as an Assistant Preacher in the Moabit, the workers’ district in Berlin and in Berlin-Lankwitz, before serving from 1914-1918 as a German Army chaplain on the Western front in World War I, an experience that shaped and influenced Tillich enormously. His longtime friends, Wilhelm and Marion Pauck, later described his transformation as, “the traditional monarchist had become a religious socialist, the Christian believer a cultural pessimist, and the repressed puritanical boy a ‘wild man.’” Tillich be-
lieved the change in himself reflected a change in Western civilization. Nonetheless, he served honorably, and was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, in June of 1918, and he finished his service as an army chaplain in Spandau, Berlin.

From 1919-1924, Tillich served as a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin, which in our American parlance might be similar to an untenured Lecturer or Assistant Professor. During his years at Berlin, Tillich became deeply involved in the bohemian world of artists and political agitators. Unlike many young scholars who often spend years commenting on the work of other significant theorists in their field, Tillich became a constructive philosophical theologian in his own right away, offering before a meeting of the Kant Society in Berlin the first public lecture on his own thought, titled, “On the Idea of a Theology of Culture.” This lecture is fascinating because it an important glimpse into the future of Paul Tillich’s theological impact. We see herein the beginnings of what became his method of correlation, an approach that correlates insights from Christian revelation with the issues raised by existential, psychological, and philosophical analysis of the culture around him. So, Tillich, a Lutheran theologian, refutes the veracity of Martin Luther’s “sola scriptura” (by Scripture Alone) as a source for theology, and he brushes aside the Roman Catholic doctrine of Scripture and church tradition together providing theological authority; instead, he points to the present moment, the experienced and lived moment, wherein it is possible, even necessary, to interpret theology through the lens of the culture within which one lives. And herein, within this theology of culture, we can see the beginning nuances of a theologian who refused to confine his theological imagination to the doctrinal boundaries of traditional Christian theology. He sought out and engaged other artistic and social scientific modes of thought including architecture, depth psychology, and political theory as innate and inextricable partners for the task of the theologian. Here, I would argue, we find the origin stories of one of the most important theological movements of the later twentieth century: the radical contextualization of liberation theologies, which interpret theology through the cultural and existential lens of oppressed persons and communities. In these years in Berlin, Tillich participated in founding Berlin’s religious socialist circle.

In 1924, Tillich married his second wife, Hannah, who became his partner and interlocutor for the rest of his life, before moving first to a year on the faculty of the University of Marburg and then for four years as Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the Dresden Institute of Technology, teaching these disciplines at an institution devoted to engineering and the sciences, similar to MIT or Cal Tech in this country. Tillich’s thought was strongly influenced by three philosophers: Friedrich Schelling (on whom Tillich wrote both of his dissertations); Soren Kierkegaard; and Martin Heidegger (who also taught at Marburg while Tillich was there, but there is no evidence of any serious engagement between the two. Heidegger was a giant, while Tillich was just getting started.)

In 1929, he joined what arguably was the most prestigious philosophical faculty in Germany at the University of Frankfurt. During these years, he joined the Socialist Democratic Party in 1929, and in 1932 he published The Socialist Decision, just as Hitler came to power, a devastating critique of the political romanticism of Nazism in its “myth of origin” related to blood, soil, or community. This political activism and publication, combined with his decision to expel from his class Nazi students who had beaten Jewish students at the University of Frankfurt, led to Tillich’s suspension on April 13, 1933, as the first non-Jewish German professor to lose his professorship; he was barred from holding a university post in Germany by the Nazi government. That summer, the prominent American ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr of Union Theological Seminary in New York City, who had grown up in a German-speaking family in the Midwest, was visiting Germany. Already impressed with Tillich’s writings, when he learned of Tillich’s dismissal from Frankfurt, he arranged for Paul Tillich to have visiting academic posts in philosophy at Columbia University and Union Seminary. On November 3, 1933, Tillich and his family arrived in the harbor of New York City. The only America that Tillich had ever seen in movies was from the gun-slinging Wild West, and so sailing into the harbor and seeing the expanse of New York City before him was a relief!
The truth is that the Faculty of Union Theological Seminary, in order to create a visiting faculty position for Paul Tillich, all took a cut in pay to create his salary, and donated furniture from their own Faculty apartments so that the Tillichs would have a furnished apartment when they arrived. At first, Tillich did not speak a word of English, and so in the first seven years, his classes were doctoral seminars conducted in German, and Reinhold Niebuhr, fluent in German, often would take him on walks through Riverside Park, helping to introduce Tillich to New York City and America in general. After four years serving in this visiting faculty position, Tillich received tenure as Associate Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary in 1937, and three years later elevated to Full Professor.

During his years in New York City, Tillich continued to reach out to his homeland and to help other Europeans disposed and fleeing for their lives from the Nazi rise to power. In 1936, he co-founded and became the first chairman of “Self-Help for Emigrés from Central Europe,” a position he held for fifteen years. The main purpose of the organization was to provide jobs for those who needed them by means of a referral service and to put newcomers in touch with one another, so to draw all refugees into a community. From 1942 to 1944, he offered a series of radio broadcasts to the German people with Voice of America, a series of speeches that were translated and published in 1998 by Ron Stone and Lon Weaver as the book Against the Third Reich: Paul Tillich’s Wartime Addresses to Nazi Germany.

It was, however, at Union Theological Seminary that Paul Tillich established his reputation in America, and he truly put his roots in the ground in America as his new home by becoming an American citizen in 1940 and buying land and a house in East Hampton in 1946, while maintaining his Faculty apartment at Union in Manhattan. By the mid-1940’s, Tillich had become comfortable enough with the English language that he began publishing books in America. In 1948, he published a collection of his essays called The Protestant Era, and the same year, the first of what would become three books of sermons, The Shaking of the Foundations. Tillich’s fellow professors at Union pleaded with him not to publish a book of the sermons that he had given at college and university chapels throughout the United States, thinking it that such a non-academic publication would ruin his reputation. In fact, the opposite occurred: his collection of sermons would give him a broad audience that most theological scholars did not enjoy, and he found that he could explain his philosophical theology to the general public far better through the sermonic device than he could through academic theology. In 1951, he published the first volume of what became his three-volume Systematic Theology, which brought Tillich considerable academic acclaim, including an invitation to give the prestigious Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen. In 1952, Tillich published The Courage to Be, based on his 1950 Terry Lectures at Yale Divinity School, which reached a wide popular readership.

By the mid-1950’s, Tillich was an academic celebrity, an acclaimed public intellectual, and a rock star on the university lecture and preaching circuit, akin to a Noam Chomsky a generation ago or a Cornel West today. His popularity and renown only increased when, in 1955, he left Union Theological Seminary after 22 years to become one of five University Professors at Harvard University. University Professors were not assigned to any one academic school of Harvard, but were able to teach in whatever disciplines that they wished, and Tillich’s office was on the top floor of the main library on Harvard Yard. Although most think of Tillich as being part of the Harvard Divinity School faculty, and he certainly oversaw a number of doctoral students in the field of religion, in fact he taught in a diverse array of fields including philosophy and psychology as well while at Harvard. In 1957, both Dynamics of Faith and the second volume of his Systematic Theology were published, and in 1959, Tillich appeared on the cover of Time magazine.

In 1960, Paul Tillich journeyed to Japan on a visit that would change his perspective. There, the innovative Christian theologian encountered the Buddhist masters in Kyoto, and Tillich was rocked by the experience. Yes, the Christian tradition may be truth, but what if truth is in fact a multi-faceted gem, and other religious traditions may speak of and to the Ground of Being as well, other facets of that gem we might call truth? An important aspect of Tillich’s theology was his understanding of symbols as something that not
merely points to, but participates in the very Ground of Being. Every symbol has a lifespan, one in which it is born, gains strength, weakens, and then passes from relevance. Might both Christianity and Buddhism be symbols participating in the Ground of Being? If we open that door, then might Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, and other religious traditions, might they too participate in the Ground of Being? As he worked on his third volume of the Systematic Theology, Tillich’s religious definitions took less of an explicitly Christian tone and more of a perspective attuned to the wealth of the world’s religions. He wondered if, in fact, he should return to the very beginning of the Systematic Theology and do it all over again with this new appreciation for other religious traditions in mind.

Despite the enormous professional and monetary opportunities that his seven years at Harvard brought him, Tillich moved to the University of Chicago in 1962 to become the Nueveen Professor of Theology. Part of his interest in moving to Chicago was due to the presence of Mircea Eliade, the prominent historian of religions, and Tillich yearned for Eliade as an interlocutor in Tillich’s desire for engagement with non-Christian traditions, especially those of the East. In 1963, he was the main speaker at Time Magazine’s 40th anniversary dinner, and in the same year, his third and final volume of Systematic Theology was published.

On October 11, 1965, Tillich delivered his last public lecture at the University of Chicago, titled, “The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian.” At the beginning of his lecture, he stated that a theologian who takes this subject seriously has already made, explicitly or implicitly, two basic decisions. “On the one hand, he has separated himself from a theology which rejects all religions other than that of which he is a theologian. On the other hand, if he accepts the subject affirmatively and seriously, he has rejected the paradox of a religion of nonreligion, or a theology without theos (also called a theology of the secular).” At the end of this historic lecture, Tillich said, “But now my last word. What does this mean for the theologian’s relationship to his own [religion]? His theology remains rooted in its experiential basis. Without this, no theology at all is possible. But he tried to formulate the basic experiences that are universally valid in universally valid statements. The universality of a religious statement does not lie in an all-embracing abstraction that would destroy religion as such, but in the depths of every concrete religion. Above all, it lies in the openness to spiritual freedom both from one’s own foundation and ‘for’ one’s own foundation.”

The following morning, Tillich suffered a heart attack and was transported to Billings Hospital in Chicago, where he passed away on October 22, 1965.

A little known fact is that Tillich did not plan to stay at the University of Chicago, but that he was entertaining offers to move either to the New School for Social Research in New York City or the University of California at Santa Barbara. In fact, he had accepted the invitation to be the first occupant of the Alvin Johnson Chair of Philosophy at the New School at the time of his death, a return to New York City that was not fulfilled.

Paul Tillich’s influence is vast, but quite interestingly, unlike his contemporary Karl Barth and the Barthian School of theology that emerged from his work, there is no real Tillichian school of theology. Certainly there are the members of the North American Paul Tillich Society, of which I served as President, and our German and French speaking sister societies, but for the most part we remain admirers, fascinated by the innovations that Tillich made in theology, but are not ourselves a school of theology that one could trace. Indeed, Tillich’s influence is remarkably far reaching. You can see it in the hermeneutical phenomenologies of David Tracy and Sally McFague; the process thought of John Cobb; the general philosophy of science in Langdon Gilkey; feminist theories of culture and language in Rosemary Radford Ruether and Rebecca Chopp; the blending of social sciences and theology in the work of Gustavo Gutierrez and Wolfhart Pannenberg; and the liberation theologians’ following Tillich’s demand that future systematic theologians not fall back upon his own ontology, but always move forward in their own necessary “emphasis on the particular.”

Paul Tillich was, in many ways, a Renaissance man who consistently existed on the boundaries of what one might guess a German theologian would be and love. When he lived in New York
City, he would get out of engagements to socialize with Columbia faculty and Manhattan socialites to go listen to the flair and melancholy of jazz in Harlem. When he was at Harvard, he invited students over to his home to listen to a street musician that he had seen and thought was wonderful, a street musician who turned out to be rather well known a few years later as Joan Baez. He found the ocean to be gorgeous and mysterious, and would love to stand on the beach, watching the periphery of the expanse between water and sky ebb and flow. He was someone who loved art and music, who cherished imagination and intellectual entrepreneurship, who found the boundaries to be the luminous and liminal places of intellectual excitement and wonder.

**Embodying Ultimate Concern**

David Nikkel

Human beings are radically embodied. Our bodies root, orient, and enable us in a meaningful world, natural and social, involving intelligibility or knowledge—and value, which always includes affective and aesthetic dimensions. As a biological organism, the body is differentiated from but consonant with its environment, as it makes real contact with that environment, with other bodies, and physical realities. Indeed, as sentient organism, the body constitutes the very correlation of subjectivity and objectivity. The body is a self-organizing system always in correlation with the dynamic systems of its environment. Body and environment co-define or co-specify each other in some fashion. The embodied self never exists in a “pure” state in complete isolation from any environment. And as long as the self-organizing body endures, it always has some effect, even if a small one, on its environment. Evolutionarily speaking, organisms, including sentient ones, have evolved to have some basic “fit” with their environment, to attune to that environment so as to survive and even thrive. This suggests that animals experience a basic at-home-ness or sense of belonging in the world. The normal experience of animals then, including humans from infancy, is one of living in a meaningful world, rather than that of being thrown into existence and tasked with manufac-

turing meaning out of whole cloth, as some existentialists and constructivists would have it.

Ecological psychologist James J. Gibson described the meaningful embodiment of sentient organisms in terms of “affordances” the environment supplies, particularly things that possess sensorimotor meaning, involving a joint project of organism and environment (1979). Philosopher of cognitive science and mind, Evan Thompson, writes of sentient cognition as inherently involving the values of a self-organizing body acting in its milieu: “Cognition is behavior or conduct in relation to meaning and norms that the system itself enacts or brings forth on the basis of its autonomy” (2007:126). Or in a similar vein, “a cognitive being’s world is not a pre-specified, external realm, represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought forth by that being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment” (2007:13). Biologist Terrence Deacon adumbrates that life processes of an organism interacting with its environment entail “teleodynamics,” in which telos or ends, goals, purpose, or function emerge, and that in conscious organisms awareness of telos emerges (2012). Philosopher Mark Johnson puts it this way: “An embodied view of meaning looks for the origins and structures of meaning in the organic activities of embodied creatures in interaction with their changing environments” (2007:11).

Our radical embodiment entails that all meanings are bodily, that no possible human meaning can be completely disembodied. Our bodies as they orient us and enable us in an environment, a world, constitute the very roots that make possible all our living, knowing, and valuing. Our lived bodies, or “phenomenal” bodies to invoke phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s term (1962), or “mindbodies” in the coinage of philosopher of religion and culture William Poteat (1985), serve as surd for human life. Our bodies ground the on-going correlation of our attentive, embodied effort to make sense of things and other beings, to make sense of the world, which call us into a mutually constitutive relationship. As such they limit and define us at the same time they grant us all our potentialities. Constructivist-essentialist debates are parasitic upon (and typically tacitly assume) the range of possibilities our bodies provide. These potentialities mean that the body always partially constructs its world. At the same time, this construction functions in correla-
tion with a givenness, not just from the side of the world but from the body: The givenness of an individual body—some common to the species, some unique to that individual—sets parameters for how we engage our environment. Clearly, such givenness changes throughout one’s life in accordance with one’s body, environment, and experiences.

The dependence of all meaning upon the body is never merely instrumental but always substantive. The radical nature of our embodiment entails that the practical distinction between substantive and instrumental is never absolute, for the nature and aesthetics of the body color all our meanings. Our radical embodiment does not deny the tremendous creativity and the diversity of human culture; it simply recognizes that all culture relies substantively upon bodily meanings. Radical embodiment does not minimize our human capability to forgo pressing bodily needs; it only affirms that such sacrifice draws substantively on other bodily meanings. The body then serves as the inescapable and irreplaceable mediator in all our doing and knowing and all our concerns.

This mediating status, however, does not mean that the values we realize lie beyond the mediation, simply extrinsic to it, that the body is mere means but not end. As the correlation of subjectivity and objectivity, embodied values are not those of a pure subject(ive body) in itself nor of objects in themselves but always of a lived body engaging its world: moving, dancing, seeing colors, viewing spatial relationships and configurations, hearing sounds, pitch, and rhythm, smelling, tasting, touching, feeling warmth and divers skin sensations, feeling emotions, encountering other embodied selves, sexual desiring and pleasing, as well as less immediate ideas and images—not directly perceptions of our primary senses, but nevertheless relying upon bodily orientation and movement in order to mean anything. This entails what Mark C. Taylor terms “intrinsic finality” or “inner teleology,” crediting Kant with broaching the concept, noting Kant’s example of the living organism (2009:114-117), and quoting Kant’s description of “an organized natural product . . . in which every part is reciprocally both means and ends” (1973:22, quoted in 2009:115). Similarly, Thompson credits Kant with recognizing the “intrinsically teleological” nature of an organism as “a self-organizing being . . . that is both cause and effect of itself” (129-130).

Much of this reliance upon our bodies is acritical and tacit. That is, we are normally aware of our ubiquitous rootedness in and reliance upon our bodies in only a tacit manner; since we do not usually focus our attention on our bodies, we are not explicitly aware of them. For example, with “simple” seeing, the very complex activity of positioning one’s head and focusing one’s eye muscles happens below our conscious awareness. In dayto-day living this is necessary and usually benign, indeed, healthy. Neurobiologist Antonio Damasio regards this “hiding of the body” as an “adaptive distraction,” meaning that we are “distracted” from directly attending to our bodies so we can attend to our environment (1999:29). But when this tacit dimension is assumed but not acknowledged in culture, philosophy, and religion, we become vulnerable to dualistic and discarnate pictures of human knowing and human nature.

According to philosopher of science and epistemology, Michael Polanyi, whose work focused on the “tacit dimension” (1966), our attending or attention in general bears a from-to structure: we attend proximally from tacit and subsidiary particulars, distally to a focal and comprehensive meaning. The holistic nature of meaning for a living organism indicated here parallels the holistic nature of the organism itself, which, though involving differentiation within itself, functions as a unit, wherein the whole is neither identical to nor reducible to the sum of the parts when their properties are considered linearly, separately, individually. As the base and basis of all our activity, our body figures prominently in all tacit knowing: “Our body is the only assembly of things known almost exclusively by relying on our awareness of them to attend to something else. . . . Every time we make sense of the world, we rely upon tacit knowledge of impacts made by the world on our body and the complex responses of our body to these impacts” (Polanyi, 1969:147-48). Indeed, many of the tacit particulars not so obviously “bodily” as those involved in perception, motion, and feeling not only rely substantively upon these “bodily” particulars, but in some sense also become part of our body: “when we make a thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our body—or extend our body to include it—so that we come to dwell in it” (Polanyi, 1966:16). This applies to an “external” physical object such as a cane used by a visually impaired person or something more “inter-
nal” and mental, as in this quote from phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty:

…I do not need to visualize the word in order to know and pronounce it. It is enough that I possess its articulatory and acoustic style as one of the modulations, one of the possible uses of my body. I reach back for the word as my hand reaches toward the part of my body which is being pricked; the world has a certain location in my linguistic world, and is part of my equipment (1962:180).

(Both Polanyi and Merleau-Ponty recognize that inside and outside one’s body depends upon the context of our knowing, as when looking at one’s arm, to use another example.)

Human culture, dependent upon symbolic forms, especially language, allows for a plethora of meanings unavailable to other animals (as well as to prelinguistic infants). Analytic philosophy has tended to admit that only linguistic propositions have meaning, while most other scholarly thinking, even if admitting nonlinguistic bodily meaning, has separated bodily from linguistic meaning and typically subordinated bodily to linguistic meaning. The cultural-linguistic may so pervasively affect our lives that no “pure” bodily experience of the natural world “untainted” by culture exists for language users. Overlooked however is the profound, prior, foundational, inalienable effect of the body and nature upon language and culture, especially in the realm of prereflective givenness. Indeed, I claim that human rationality and language build upon the base of—radically and tacitly rely upon—our bodily being in the world, upon our seeing, hearing, smelling, tactile, motile, emotive, social, sexual bodies. That is, all language, both semantically and syntactically, relies upon spatial, postural, kinesthetic, perceptual, and emotional body schemas and their metaphorical and metonymic extensions in order to make sense, to mean anything. As Potteat puts it, “language is structured upon and therefore structured like our sentiently oriented and motile mindbodies” (1985:187-88). All language then is body-shaped.

Mark Johnson (with linguist George Lakoff) argues persuasively for the cruciality of nonpropositional embodied schemas for the very intelligibility of language. These schemas arise from our perceptual interactions with the world, bodily posture and movements, and manipulation of objects (1987:29). Many types of schemas orient us spatially. These include the container schema (in-out), the source-path-goal schema (from-to) (1987:30ff; 1999:31-33), and bodily projection schemas such as front-back, near-far, left-right, up-down, straight-curved (1987:30ff; 1999:34-35). Force-dynamic schemas rely upon bodily movements and interactions: “pushing, pulling, propelling, supporting, and balance” (1999:36); compulsion, blockage, counterforce, diversion, removal of restraint, enablement, and attraction (1987:44ff). Other less easily categorized schemas are also rooted in bodily interactions with the world, including part-whole, full-empty, mass-count, cycle, iteration, link, contact, and adjacency (1987:121-126; 1999:35). Johnson’s earlier work tended to leave the impression that each word could be mapped back to a single bodily schema source domain (Slingerland, 2008a: 174-88). In more recent work, Johnson notes that much basic language often stems from two image schema source domains (2007:142). Moreover, language not only builds upon basic structural image schemas but also upon “felt qualities” and “vitality affects” of perception, motion, the flow of time, and emotion (2007:19-28, 41-49, 143-45). While most language we commonly refer to as “literal” metaphorically builds upon one or two bodily image schemas or felt qualities in a fairly straightforward manner, what we commonly recognize as a “metaphor” blends several source domains and/or extends the use of the underlying bodily metaphor in novel fashion (2007:185).

Linguistic syntax permits far-flung extension and manipulation of body schema concepts or perceptual images. Given the abstract nature of syntax, is it plausible that it, too, like semantics substantively relies upon our embodiment? Does syntax itself emerge from bodily semantics? And what of mathematics and abstract or formal logic? Nobel Prize winning neuroscientist Gerald Edelman regards the human ability to place concepts in an ordered relation as an embodied operation present not only in syntax but in a “pre-syntax” of some animals and prelinguistic infants (1989:147). Lakoff has categorized examples of this dependency: hierarchical structure stems from part-whole schemas, grammatical and coreference relations from link schemas, and categories from container (in-out) schemas (1987:289ff). Harry Hunt cites psychological experiments supporting the theory that gesture is a key stage of the organization of sentences, externalizing their otherwise implicit
spatial design (1995:154-56). With regard to mathematics, imagine a disembodied consciousness as a blank slate with no experience of objects: it would have no basis to understand numbers or their ordering. Lakoff with others has devoted a book to how mathematics stems from embodied experience of quantity and quantitative relationships. With regard to logic, Johnson notes that William James (and fellow American pragmatist John Dewey, who built upon James’ work) “saw that logic lives and moves in embodied experience, and that it cannot be understood apart from purposive human inquiry…Real logic is embodied—spatial, corporeal, incarnate” (2007:102).

Neuroscientist Damasio holds that all knowledge comes embodied in “dispositional representations.” (Neither Damasio nor Edelman understand mental “representations” as mirrors of a world independent of our enactment [E.g., Damasio 1999:322; Edelman 2004:104ff].) “Dispositional” means that neural networks are patterned in such a way that representations can become active “images,” whether visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, body-state or other. Damasio concludes that thought is made up largely of such images. While acknowledging the obvious, that thought includes words and non-image, abstract, arbitrary symbols, he urges that focusing on this truth causes many to miss a converse fact: “both words and arbitrary symbols are based on topographically organized representations and can become images.” Indeed, Damasio continues, if our words “did not become images, however fleetingly, they would not be anything we could know” (1994:106). The import of Damasio’s words here can hardly be exaggerated: Any and all human signs and symbols must involve some connection with bodily sensorimotor and feeling imagery to be comprehensible, indeed to exist in the first place.

To conclude this section on language, I quote Poteat, who has succinctly and forcefully expressed the bodily basis of language: “…language—our first formal system—has the sinews of our bodies which had them first; the grammar, syntax, meaning, semantic and metaphorical intentionality of our language are preformed in that of our prelingual mindbodily being in the world which is their condition” (1985:9).

Tillich’s claim that all humans have an ultimate concern and that all human creations manifest an ultimate concern stands as Tillich’s most well-known idea. Certainly, it is the one that students in Introduction to Religion classes have encountered the most. The textbook I currently use, Gary Kessler’s Religion: An Introduction through Case Studies, contrasts Tillich’s definition or theory of the nature of religion with Spiro’s, which centers on “superhuman beings” (2008:21-22). Of course, a Tillichian would note that Spiro’s theory tends to reduce the divine to a being, perhaps even the highest being, as opposed to being-itself. I do emphasize that Tillich’s theory should not be conflated with the simplistic and way too broad theory, a theory that some novice scholars of religion offer every time I teach Intro to Religion, namely, that religion is whatever is the most important thing in one’s life. For Tillich, ultimate concern involves more than what is urgent or important at a particular moment in one’s life. Rather it is what gives one’s life its ultimate meaningfulness. For a youth in Nazi Germany in the 1930’s, it would not be a romance that could provide a sense of ultimacy, but Nazism did offer an ultimate seriousness, albeit demonic, in a culture lacking depth, according to Tillich (1959:152).

Of course, Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern banked on an immediate point of identity between the human being and the divine, a mystical a priori. Even when humans invested their ultimate concern in finite manifestations or conduits of the infinite, even mistakenly, even demonically, their awareness of ultimacy resulted from an immediate awareness of the ultimate reality, of the divine. That assumption stemming from Tillich’s German Romantic Idealist heritage is no longer credible to many today. In light of this change in milieu, I will offer a reconstruction of the idea of ultimate concern in terms of human embodiment as outlined above.

Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio expounds upon background feelings of our body states. Normally tacit rather than attended to with full consciousness, they are always actual. Damasio learns from patients lacking normal background feelings, namely, anosognosiacs (literally, “no knowledge of disease”), victims of left-side paralysis but with no immediate or functional knowledge of said paralysis. Anosognosiacs claim to feel fine: any knowledge of their paralysis is external and fleeting; they are emotionally flat and unconcerned about their future (1994:62f, 153). Damasio surmises that, incapable of normal body-state background feelings, they remember and
report a now quite outdated image of their bodies (1994:154). Damasio goes on to hypothesize that such background feelings, such “primordial representations of the body,” play an important role in consciousness, “provid(ing) a core for the neural representation of self” (1994:235ff; see also 1999:110, 285-287). Indeed, they bestow “the feeling of life itself, the sense of being” [alive] (1994:150). Thompson describes “sentience as the feeling of being alive,” enabling an organism “to feel the presence of one’s body and the world” (2007:221). Interestingly, Thompson finds a French philosopher from the late 18th through early 19th century, Maine de Biran, who contested Descartes’ notion of consciousness as disembodied by instead finding the “feeling of existence (le sentiment de l’existence)” in the sentence of motile organisms, specifically “in the bodily experience of exercising effort in movement” (2007:229). While Damasio agrees that our bodies always exist in correlation with an environment, with background feelings he focuses on what it is within an organism that enables consciousness. Damasio stipulates that emotions, which he categorizes as background, “primary,” or “social,” are never simply neutral (2003:43ff, 93). He characterizes joy as the primary emotion associated with preserving and enhancing the self (2003:13-14). Given Damasio’s perspective on emotions, I submit that joy constitutes an intensification of normal animal background feelings of one’s body, of the sense of being alive. That is to say, background feelings are normally positive, furnishing a positive emotional sense of integral bodily presence. Obviously, diseased states like anosognosia associated with an impaired sense of self can radically compromise normal background feelings. Additionally, major injury or disease can compromise these feelings. For a couple of days following major surgery, the effects of the surgery and lingering anesthetics most definitely deprived me of my normal sense of being alive. Furthermore and again obviously, experiences of physical and/or psychological suffering may overwhelm these background feelings such that one’s overall affective state is negative. Still, that the background feelings of animals, including humans, are usually positive offers support for a basic and primordial goodness to life, which is affirmed by many religious traditions, especially those that valorize more than they denigrate the body.

As above, this integral bodily presence always exists in correlation with an environment. Our basic orientation to our environment always involves cognitive, aesthetic, and affective elements. Here the cognitive element concerns knowing where we are—spatially, temporally, socially, culturally. Usually we do succeed in knowing where we are rather than being confused about our basic orientation. The aesthetic element, crucial for animal and human meaning, tends to be overlooked or slighted. As suggested above, Johnson, drawing on Dewey and others, targets the qualitative aspects of experience involving perception, proprioception, kinesthesia, thinking, and feeling. In this sense, aesthetics refers to the beauty or goodness of any experience or situation (or negatively its ugliness or badness), with art constituting a heightened and more or less formalized case. In my own thinking, probably even before my attention was explicitly drawn to the centrality of embodiment, I resonated with the crucial nature of the aesthetic dimension. For, if in the final analysis, the experience(s) of life are not on the whole good or beautiful, knowledge may be a consolation but only a small one. Similarly, if life were not fundamentally good, ethics would have a much diminished role in human experience.

I claim that the inextricable aesthetic element of our orientation to our environment is normally positive. We humans and other animals have evolved such that there is a fundamental fit in our organism-environment interactions; the normally positive aesthetic and positive affect of our bodily orientation constitutes part of this basic attunement to or consonance with our environment. Recent evidence of the health benefits mentally and physically of time outdoors and exposure to greenery and other aspects of nature resonate with this notion (Hamblin, 2015). The positive nature of our orientation to our environments offers further support for the primordial goodness of embodied life. In relation to the orientation of motile organisms to their environment, Gibson uses the term “ambient array.” When it comes to particulars, our environments typically offer many opportunities or “affordances,” to again invoke Gibson, for our more particular embodied aesthetic and affective meanings. Of course, our attempts to reach desired meanings may be thwarted, sometimes in terrible or tragic ways. But meaning is not something extrinsic to or alien from our embodiment in the world, but part of that embodiment. The correlation of hu-
man and other animal organisms to their environments entails a basic at-home-ness of sentient life on earth (of course, *adam*, human being in Hebrew, literally means “earth being”).

Especially through the sense of our bodily integrity, the sense of being alive, produced by our background body feelings and the aesthetic and affective value of orientation to our environment, our embodiment evokes an intuitive sense of the goodness of life, a positive sense of the meaningfulness and sacredness of life, an at-home-ness in our skins and world, a feeling that we are in some sense “meant to be here.” My “ultimate” claim, if you will pardon the pun, is that this positive sense of bodily integrity and harmonious attunement to our environment entails and explains our sense of ultimate concern, rather than an immediate sense of the unconditional divine à la Tillich. In our postmodern age—or whatever age this is—this intuitive sense of the sacredness of life and why anything about our lives finally matters offers a plausible account of our ultimate concern, unlike Tillich’s mystical a priori. Now this sense of the goodness of embodied life may stimulate intuitions and ideas about whether any ultimate reality stands behind this universe. But I fear that Tillich’s “ontological approach” can no longer convince many folks today and that we are left with an approach in some sense “cosmological” in Tillich’s terminology, an approach that relies on embodied human experience of this cosmos. I do make my students aware of the distinction between these two approaches as Tillich defines them (1959:10-29).

For Tillich, ultimate concern involves a basis for judging the adequacy of religions, including secular culture insofar as it manifests ultimate concern. The only rightful recipient of that ultimate concern, the divine depth and ground of being, constitutes that basis. A finite reality that claims ultimacy for itself is thus idolatrous and even demonic. Can my refashioning of ultimate concern provide any basis for judging the adequacy of religions? As I have stated, an important aspect of this sense of ultimate concern involves our basic biological orientation to our environment. For human beings, with our reflective, linguistic, and artistic capabilities, this pre-reflective ultimate concern can find expression in attempts to orient ourselves to the largest worlds of meaning we can imagine. Reflection on the intuitive sense of the sacredness of one’s embodied life in the world should rather obviously lead to respect for every life as sacred and to ecological concern for the environment that enables and sustains life. Of course, my sense of ultimate concern entails a primordial sense of the goodness of life in the body—of the background feelings of our bodily integrity and of our embodied orientation to our ambience. Such attempts to orient ourselves may provide the basis for a normative theory about the nature of religion, even as Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern grounded his theory of religion. Therefore, a theory based on this notion of ultimate concern would judge as deficient religious beliefs that deny the ultimate significance of the body and embodiment. It would also call them on importing notions of embodiment even as they deny the body. For, from the perspective of our radical embodiment, whatever visions of life or afterlife or mystical experience they conjure that attempt to escape the body must perforce invoke bodily images to have any meaning—in order to be understood or to have any value for us at all. Abandonment of the certainty of the mystical a priori may invoke even greater respect for the ultimate mystery of existence than Tillich’s system allows. Even so, the sense of the primordial goodness of our embodiment as ultimately concerning us may invite the inference of a good source of the environment in which “we live and move and have our being” and imaginative thought about the nature of that ultimate source.

**Works Cited**


be denied that as the body dwells at the border between self and world that shapes so much of Tillich’s ontological framework, any serious wrestling with our understanding of body will have an impact on the structural conditions of Tillich’s theological efforts. As such, I am not sure the body is simply a mechanism posing a series of existential questions that can be easily subverted into his method of correlation; the body poses a deeper problematic for constructive theological work that is done in the spirit of Tillich.

What follows is a test case for that problematic. Here I will examine how one particular understanding of the body—the cyborg body—intersects with Tillich’s understanding of ultimate concern. My hope is to show through this test case what are both the more general potentialities and challenges that arise in understanding the
Ultimate Concern, Justice, and Final Revelation

In his *Systematic Theology*, Tillich begins his discussion of the meaning of God through a phenomenological description: God is humankind’s ultimate concern—the answering correlate to the implied question of our finite being. There is, though, a tension between what is *ultimate* and what is *of concern* that Tillich identifies as “an inescapable inner tension in the idea of God.”¹ Our ability to be concerned is in direct correlation to the concreteness of the object of our concern. For a universal concept to be of concern at all requires that it be represented through finite, concrete experiences. In contrast, for something to be truly ultimate it must transcend everything finite and concrete. As this transcendence occurs, however, that which is ultimate becomes increasingly abstract.

This is the inner tension of our being ultimately concerned: if God is what concerns humankind ultimately, then as God is identified *with* and *through* finite, concrete experiences our concern is increasingly engaged to the diminishment of realizing the ultimacy of God; vice versa, as the finite is transcended in realizing the ultimacy of God, the concreteness that fosters our concern is diminished. This is the basic problem of the doctrine of God: it is the projection of divine symbols and images onto this framework of ultimate concern that constitutes “religious” phenomena for Tillich.² Moreover, this concept of ultimate concern is fundamental to how Tillich conceptualizes the existential quality of humankind’s relation to God’s ultimacy as faith: whereby faith is the ecstatic act of the entire personality surrendering to the identified concern.³

For the time being, I want to focus on the phenomenological descriptions Tillich offers regarding ultimate concern, bearing in mind what has already been stated: that the ultimacy of a concern is perpetually self-negating the concreteness of the concern. As Tillich seeks to describe it, we find ultimate concern is intimately tied to his notion of the existential and the holy. With regard to both the existential and the holy, he notes that a concern is holy or existential as it describes a participation which transcends the cleavage between subjectivity and objectivity that is fundamental to Tillich’s four-fold ontology.⁴ In his description of this self-world structure that is an ontological condition by his account, there is a constant interplay between the self that experiences itself in the midst of a world that is the “unity of manifoldness” to which the self belongs. The self has and is *bad* by a world.⁵

Symbols of ultimate concern are holy or existential to the extent that they trouble this self-world or subject-object division in this polarity. Specifically, an ultimate concern is able to transcend this subject-object divide, for Tillich, to the extent that it correlates to the infinite. A legitimate or functional expression of ultimate concern is one in which the ultimate concern gives depth and meaning to all other penultimate concerns, giving direction and a sense of centeredness to the whole personality that might well be characterized as faith. “Faith…is not a matter of the mind in isolation, or of the soul contrast to mind and body, or of the body (in the sense of animal faith), but is the centered movement of the whole personality toward something of ultimate meaning and significance.”⁶ This centered movement towards wholeness is what Tillich is searching for in characterizing the holy or the existential that transcends a subject-object or self-world separation.

Before moving on, it is worth noting that the wholeness sought for is not a union of self and world without distinction. It is an overcoming of the separating, disjunctive tension that characterizes our experience of self and world in existence. In various places, we find Tillich names this overcoming “love.”⁷ I do not wish here to delve into how he characterizes this term, but I do want to point out that it clearly implies for him an integrating power, whereby the various polarities Tillich describes are driven towards a union that supposes difference.

In contrast to a legitimate ultimate concern, false ultimacy is identified by the finite claiming to be infinite (i.e., when the concreteness of a concern falsely claims to be ultimate itself instead of being symbolic for the ultimate).⁸ Tillich also refers to this as idolatrous. Idolatry in the existential or the holy is resisted by the criterion of justice, which judges the tendency of any particular concern to destroy the centered personality of the individual who in faith surrenders to that particular concern. The principles of justice give expres-
sion to the form of essential being that promotes the wholeness of a centered personality—an essential unity transcending the separation of subject-object or self-world—which is in agreement with our fundamental characterization of the holy.9

In his short work Love, Power and Justice, Tillich identifies four principles of justice that are relevant here: adequacy, equality, personality, and liberty. Adequacy refers to the correlation of form and content: justice must be pursued in a form that does not inhibit the actualization of the holy. Tillich identifies that adequacy is most often violated when laws outlive their usefulness (i.e., when laws inadvertently create systems of injustice because, while adequate in the past, they are no longer adequate in the present). Equality is qualified for Tillich by describing the dignity due any person as one who, admittedly partially, actualizes the power of being. Personality refers to the need for justice to treat people as ends and not means. Finally, liberty is the principle referring to the preservation of freedom and self-determination that is fundamental to personality.10

I would suggest that by Tillich’s account, we might use these four principles to guide our interpretation of what concerns can justly claim to symbolically manifest the ultimate or holy to us. The concerns should be those that seek unity between self and world while promoting a sense of justice characterized by adequacy, equality, personality, and liberty. Further, we can follow Tillich’s lead in distinguishing religious symbols that possess some truth and those that are true according to the principles of justice: “A religious symbol possesses some truth if it adequately expresses the correlation of revelation in which some person stands. A religious symbol is true if it adequately expresses the correlation of some person with final revelation.”11 A concern symbolically reveals the ultimate either partially or entirely depending of its correlation to final revelation for Tillich. Final revelation is that which is unsurpassable—a revelatory criterion that is normative for all others. To be final, such a revelation must survive the power of negating itself, becoming completely transparent to that which it reveals. This happens through being united with the ground of being in surrendering the finitude of a symbol in order to be transparent to the infinite that is being-itself.12 Thus, with regard to the question of bodies manifesting ultimate concern (as religious symbols), I am suggesting we can use Tillich’s internal criteria to make such an assessment: (1) do bodies provide a means of evidencing unity between self and world; (2) does the analysis of such bodies support the four principles of justice; and (3) does the analysis of bodies adequately express final revelation? It is the third question that will most likely require a constructive leap beyond what Tillich himself might affirm about ultimate concern.

Cyborg Bodies

What is critical to contemporary discourse about cyborgs is a characterization of the activity and interplay between human beings and technology that troubles conceptions of individual agency.13 With the cyborg there is a blurring of the boundary between organism and machine that opens up new freedoms and manifestations of agency, forcing us to question fundamental aspects of human autonomy.14 The important point here is that if we think deeply through the implications of hybridity in the cyborg, then human bodies are decentered. The stable, fixed notion of a natural body separate from its world, bounding what is legitimately me (subject) as distinct from everything else (object), is antiquated in light of the posthuman.

Instead, discourse on the cyborg follows the question that Donna Haraway asks so provocatively in her “Cyborg Manifesto”: “Why should our bodies end at the skin or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin?”15 Thinking with cyborg bodies call for a recognition of an “attunement” whereby the body incorporates something from the world around it. I think of my daughter learning to swing a baseball bat. At first, the bat is foreign to her an object in the world that stands against her body. Gradually, with practice and time, she has come to swing the bat more naturally: to experience it as an extension of her arms and hands in hitting a baseball.

Still, there is something lacking in this example. The hybridity of the cyborg forms an indelibly shaping relationship with technology that is highly somatic.16 While my daughter may put down the bat when she is done playing baseball, cyborg hybridity calls for a more permanent fixture in this incorporation to the body. The permanence or fusion that is a part of this cyborg hybridity can resonate with Haraway’s insight that incarnation is
prosthetic. The key is to recognize that our bodies are not natural phenomena inscribing natural wholeness, but what Sharon Betcher calls “prosthetic erratics”: a stitching together of body and machine unconstrained by unspoken normativity that marks the use of prosthetics to reestablish a mythical wholeness. 17

Disability theology is a critical dialogue partner in this regard as it looks to those who take up prostheses each day and it consistently draws the cyborg futurist back from any transcendent dream of enhancing the body towards the realization of a (mythical) perfect body. 18 As Nancy Eiesland well realizes, “Unless the notion of embodiment is deliberately deconstructed, the cultural norms of ‘body as natural’ seep into the subtext,” and we can lose sight of “the mixed blessing” of the body in the real, lived experience of people with disabilities” who help us imagine how to “explicitly deconstruct any norms which are part of the unexpressed agenda of ‘normal embodiment.’” 19

Eiesland’s examination of the narratives of Dianne DeVries and Nanci Mairs remains helpful in pursuing this end. 20 For both DeVries and Mairs, the presentation of their body space includes devices and technologies that confound any sense of a normalizing body pattern. For DeVries, this took the shape of persistently rejecting prosthetic devices from childhood that technologically complex, but it incorporates technologies that augment functionality in the world around it. But, this incorporation is not limited to ambulatory and mechanical devices. In light of the highly technological features the cyborg brings to mind, speech generating devices or other communication devices for ALS patients, referred to as Augmentative/Alternative Communication (AAC), can be a good example for imagining this same issue of the incorporative body space as it relates to a more technologically complex example. 21

However, appreciating the importance of this hybridity requires a shift in beliefs about the incorporation of technology in order to embrace the idea of cyborg existence. In this regard, the critical critique offered by Sharon Betcher of the cyborg is invaluable. Speaking from her own experience with leg prostheses, she observes the body patterns that are too often reinforced by the cyborg. As she eloquently puts it,

That this unveiling (of the donut hole of my limb loss), rather than the curious, cosmetically covered endoskeletal structure standing in for my leg, should throw off the light switch of desire is a clue for me that Haraway’s analysis may be slightly off course. When considering inclusion among the human community, the cyborg’s machine/human interface seems not to be as troubling as a prosthetically unprosthetylized body—a disabled body refusing social comeliness or seamliness. 22

If the prosthetic limb covers over a social disgust and discomfort, then Betcher fears that thinking about the cyborg inadvertently inscribes a sense of bodily holism and wholesomeness. Betcher admits that this is certainly not an organic wholeness, but rightfully fears that the fusion of organism and machine covers, instead of (dis)covers, the somatic realities and discourses of real bodies using prosthetics most akin to her notion of the cyborg. 23 Betcher’s critique is critical to keep in mind because the hybridity of the cyborg will be lost if the technology with which we are fused is merely passive: if nature and technology are even remotely thought of as tools to approximate a prevenient wholeness or even a means of enhancing a natural wholeness then we simply return to a social problematic about what counts as natural and the use of these tools. How then can this technology be thought of as an active partner in the hybridization of cyborg bodies?
To get at this question, we can think of an early technology for human beings: shoes. Putting on shoes prevents us from cutting our feet while traveling, allows us to walk longer distances more comfortably, and is a technology that has been readily adapted by human beings for millennia. The technology is incorporated to our bodies, on a very regular basis in many places in the world, but in common-sense parlance we would not often say that we are ‘hybridized’ with our shoes. They are a technological tool, but not something fused with who we are as cyborgs. While, technologies are usually construed as a passive feature of the world around us, a tool for which the meaning is inscribed by human use, the key to the cyborg hybridization is that all elements of the hybridity are active in their conceptualization.

This technological enhancement of cyborg bodies must have implications for a wider breakdown of traditional boundaries reconfiguring conceptions of human subjectivity and environment. ‘This reconfiguration of human subjectivity through the increasing integration of self and environment makes this technological-biological merger an ontological, not merely practical, matter.’56 There is a hybridity to the cyborg that throws as well bounded concepts and calls for a critique of our conceptualization of environment or ‘nature’ as partner in thinking about cyborg bodies.

The cyborg body incorporates. It incorporates plastic and carbon fiber as prostheses; it incorporates hair-trigger switches of ACCs; it incorporates simple technologies and complex portable technologies of all kinds for human enhancement. These incorporations are truly a ‘taking into’ the space of cyborg bodies, but even this radically intimate action of incorporation does not make the cyborg body contiguous with the world. There is not a merger but a hybridity. Even in the proximity of hybridity there is a separation—a distance without which the proximity would not be possible and only fusion would occur. There remains a fundamental space between a cyborg body and the world that points to the active quality of technology and nature. The incorporated technologies are neither merely a tool of technoscientific production nor a passive instrument ready to be inscribed by constructivist meanings of a human subject. Instead, posthumanist accounts of the cyborg affirm an understanding of the world as a tricky agent with which our bodies reveal tentative and shifting relationships that are formative both of ourselves and the world we inhabit.

Cyborg Bodies as Holy?

I hope at this point it is clear that posthumanist accounts of the cyborg offers a vision of human being that blurs hard distinctions between subject and object or self and world. The blurring is not a fusion of body and nature either; there is a distance that is preserved as the incorporated technology is not indistinguishable from the organic body that is part of the cyborg. However, the incorporation of such a technology is not a mere adaption of a tool either. The cyborg body is a hybrid that incorporates technologies thereby opening up new freedoms and agency for the individual who incorporates said technology.

Insofar as the cyborg body opens new avenues by which a unity-across-distance is established between self and world, the cyborg body is, at least potentially, a symbol that can reveal ultimate concern insofar as it transcends the cleavage of self and world. The incorporation of technology that views said technology as more than a mere tool grafted to an otherwise “natural” body could be thought of as a centering movement of our personality—to play with the two languages employed here) centering as a faithful action intended to lovingly unify self and nature.

The incorporation of technology need not always work in such a centering way. Science fiction media provides a variety of dystopias that illustrate ambiguity of conceiving of cyborg bodies as appropriate subjects regarding ultimate concern. The cyber-punk themed Deus Ex series has played with this theme most prominently; exploring the ethical problematic of human augmentation in terms of public safety, the influence of corporations and transnational entities, and problems of bigotry and ‘othering’ between cyborg bodies and natural human beings.

In such dystopic visions the four principles of justice are clearly violated. So in the example above, liberty is clearly violated in this dystopian sci-fi fantasy (although in an unexpected way; in the most recent iteration of the game the abject bodies are the cyborg bodies that lose freedom as their grafted technologies are hacked). In real world examples of cyborgs, adequacy and equality become critical principles that limit the potential of cyborg bodies to reveal ultimate concern.
Equality is particularly problematic. Access to incorporative technologies that we would associate with cyborgs are distributed globally in ways that are wildly unequal. This alone may constitute a fundamental hindrance to perceiving of the cyborg body in terms of ultimate concern because the problem of access creates a fundamental disruption in the social fabric between the body of the cyborg and non-augmented human bodies.

Nonetheless, if we grant that cyborg bodies are able, in at least some instances, to meet the four principles of justice, we still must consider the relationship of cyborg bodies to final revelation. Cyborg bodies raise a question that we might ask of any body analyzed under this framework: can any body serve as an ultimate concern given the fundamental ambiguity that characterizes all living things in their estranged existence from Tillich’s perspective? In another sense within the Tillichian language game, this is to ask can any body be true or does it always possess some truth? The obvious answer seems to be no-body can meet the standard for expressing ultimate concern; the fundamental ambiguity of estranged existence certainly prevents any cyborg body (and perhaps any body at all) from being transparent to the ground of being as the final revelation of an ultimate concern entails. Yet, there is something unsettling about the way in which a symbol must negate itself (especially if this symbol is something living and personal) in order to become transparent to ultimate concern as a final revelation.

I have no thoroughgoing solution to this issue of self-negation, but I will offer two possibilities that seem plausible as ways of suggesting (beyond perhaps what Tillich’s own work suggests) that the cyborg body could be a subject of ultimate concern. The first approach requires injecting a Kierkegaardian distinction. Perhaps we could call the cyborg body (and other bodies as well insofar as they seek to justly overcome the polarization of self and world) an ‘indirect communication’ of ultimate concern. Kierkegaard distinguishes direct and indirect communication quite clearly. Direct communication conveys knowledge; indirect communication conveys a capability. What if what is at stake in conveying ultimate concern is not the transparency of self-negation as with final revelation, but indirect communication of the just pursuit of a unity of self and world. (I imagine this as a kind of refiguring of what constitutes ‘adequacy’ according to Tillich’s four principles). The cyborg body could be thought of as such an indirect communication—expressing a just, loving unification of self and world that is intended to inspire the capability of other bodies towards this pursuit.

The second approach might be to imagine the aspirations of the cyborg body as akin to the eschatological hope of Tillich’s vision of essentialization, more than being akin to the body as he conceptualizes it in terms of existential estrangement. In essentialization the negative element that is entangled with our estranged existence is overcome by the uniting or drawing together of ‘the positive’ with essential being contributing to the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God. The cyborg body could serve as a kind of realized Tillichian eschatology—a reconceptualization of the relationship between self and world that so fundamentally challenges the presuppositions of Tillich’s ontology that the cyborg body, when properly conceived in terms of its unity with technonature is always a proper subject of ultimate concern because it seeks to realize in the present the essentialized hope of Tillich’s understanding of new life. Yet to adopt such a position certainly would require questioning if this picture of ultimate wholeness in Tillich’s essentialization can be made coherent to a critique of holism in Betcher’s questioning of the cyborg—a question of determining the function of the world in inscribing on the body what constitutes ‘legitimate’ forms of wholeness. And much more would need to be done in order to justify such a conclusion.

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1 Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 211. Henceforth references to the *Systematic Theology* appear as ST.
2 Tillich, ST I, 212.
4 Tillich, ST I, 214 & 216; DF 11-14. See also ST I 168.
5 Tillich, ST I, 170.
6 Tillich, DF, 123.
8 Tillich, DF, 13-18.
9 Tillich, ST I, 216; DF, 28.
that one can imagine limb movement, stimulating neuronal firing that is detected by the EEG bonnet which can then be translated into equivalent manipulation of an electronic medium. The BBCI in particular is important because it is working to decrease training times for users of the interface technology as well as make the technology more adaptable to the wide variations in brain-signal variability (both between various trials and between various users). The applications here are tremendous in terms of therapeutic value. Imagine an ALS patient one day being able to move herself or communicate by simply imagining the movement of limbs; this would provide a therapy that does not involve long training time for use, but draws on the well-established motor neural pathways she has already developed.

Even with switch based AACs, these devices are excellent and recognizable examples of medical cyborgs. The device itself is highly visible, personalizable (Stephen Hawking copyrighted his voice), and the freedom and possibilities they affect are quite dramatic (enabling communication with other human beings which before would have been impossible or far more difficult). There is a blurring of the machine/human boundary as the body incorporates this technology to itself; the organism and machine are hybridized.

By contrast, one could argue that the technological enhancement of cyborg bodies inherently tends towards the four principles of justice so long as the intention of the technological enhancement is always directed towards eschatological flourishing as with Tomislav Mimetic, “Human Becoming,” *Theology and Science*, vol. 13, 4 (November 2015), 433-5.

This is a variation on the phenomenological argument made by Johanne Stubbe Teglbjaerg Kristensen in her work *Body and Hope*. She makes the argument in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh, but the relationship of cyborg to nature is akin to the philosophical project she outlines. See 170-1 & 267-70.
Clashes of Justice in Finding Life: Justice in General and the Expressive Creative Justice in Modern Cinema

Jari Ristiniemi

In *Timbuktu* by Abderrahmane Sissalo, the recent political events of northern Mali are described. The movie starts with a hunting scene: a gazelle is chased by Jihadist warriors on the dunes of southern Sahara. The movie ends with a scene of two children, a girl and a boy running on the dunes, now trying to get away from the warriors and the justice the warriors applied on the girl’s parents: both parents are dead by now. The father of the girl was condemned to death for the killing of the local fisherman. The Jihadist judge condemned the father without listening to him, the justice in general or abstract justice was applied without analyzing the conditions and motives that created the deed, among which the culture of honor is one. *Timbuktu* is about justice: Whose justice, does not justice demand something more than the application of law, the abstract justice in general? The local Imam on the other hand represents another interpretation of Islam: his is the tolerant Islam of interpretation and dialogue where people together come to an understanding of the Koran and the Islamic law. The tolerant religion is expressed in the movie. The voice of the Imam is not heard in the heat of the local/global situation. We meet in *Timbuktu* the clash between the abstract justice or the justice in general, now in the form of the Islamic law, and the right to live the traditional local way of living, which is a Muslim way with its ethical codes of affection and honor (which are not without problems here). The movie shows the central role of women in the local society, it shows that people are capable of love on their own, a love that is sensual, soul-full, cultivated, cultured. One of the women has been to Europe: she now lives in the clash between the traditional way of living and the modern “free” way of living. Local people, at least some of them, listen to their souls with a listening love.

One sign of the creative justice according to Paul Tillich is the listening love.1 Heinrich Himmler, while initiating the final solution, said to the SS-leaders that they should not listen to their souls while realizing the coming project.2 It seems to be the case that both the Jihadists and the Nazis have a normative approach to justice: they know in advance what right and wrong is and they apply that understanding in different life-situations. A normative pattern seems to set their mind-maps. We might say that the perspective “from above” is effective in the normative pattern: an abstract understanding, a formulation of justice is brought into the particular situation and it is applied there without paying attention to the requirements and conditions of the situation. Already Hegel had written that “abstract justice is ultimate injustice.” In the perspective from above a formulation or an idea, in this case of justice, is construed in advance, prior to the situation, after that the formulation or the law is applied in the concrete particular situation without listening to the demands of the situation: there is the clash between the abstract law and the particular situation. In *Timbuktu*, we meet the clash between the two justices: the justice of the law and the justice inherent in the local traditional Islamic way of living; the perspectives “from above” and “from below” clash with each other in the film.

During the last two decades of his life Tillich was moving closer and closer to a monistic ontology. Inspirations to that direction were coming from Henri Bergson, Teilhard de Chardin, and Michael Polanyi, not to speak about the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche that was central to Tillich throughout his academic life. Tillich grounded his mature view of justice in the monistic ontology, in the differential monism, and it is this view that I like to discuss here in relation to some recent ways of understanding justice both in cinema and in philosophy.

Tillich’s understanding of justice is from below

In Tillich’s understanding of justice, the clash between the abstract justice and the particular situation presents the port of entry: justice is present only if the demands of the situation are seen and admitted; justice is from below. “Every decision,” Tillich wrote, “which is based on the abstract formulation of justice alone is essentially and inescapably unjust.”4 Tillich’s understanding of justice is from below, from life or the life-experience, the coordinate from the bottom up sets his understanding of justice: “The basis of justice is the intrinsic claim for justice of every
thing that has being,” he wrote. In Tillich’s view, it is not only humans but all things have their own intrinsic and inherent drive and claim to justice. “The intrinsic claim of a tree is different from the intrinsic claim of a person,” Tillich wrote, but there is still an intrinsic claim of justice in that particular tree. Plants, animals, and humans—all things, organic and inorganic—have their intrinsic drive and claim to justice, which they realize in interaction and interdependence with each other. Tillich’s is not the anthropocentric view of justice. Recently this insight that justice has to do with all life, not only human life, has come to political philosophy thanks to Martha Nussbaum.7

During the last two decades of his life that Tillich moved into a multidimensional monistic ontology, Tillich’s was the model of differential monism.8 This model frames his “later” understanding of justice. Tillich claimed that his monistic multidimensional model is grounded in life—experience and it is from that perspective I try to read it, including his understanding of justice. The justice from the below Tillich called the creative, transforming justice, and it might also be called the expressive creative justice, so that we can point out its contrast to the justice in general. The justice in general is from above and the expressive creative justice is from below, it actualizes itself in life-situations. “Every legalistic approach,” Tillich wrote, “to a decision you have to make, does unjust to the concrete situation.”9 Further: “No moral law fits any concrete situation completely.”10 Tillich did not see an either/or between the two approaches. In justice in general or in abstract formulations of justice, the prevailing views of justice and the wisdom of historical periods have been formulated. “In the realm of law and law-enforcement the tributive form of justice (propositional justice) is the norm.”11 Law in a society, Tillich thought, is based on the proportional justice. Still, the historical laws, they might be those of the Old or the New Testament, the church or the society, or of the prevailing democratic society, do not have “unconditional validity.”12 The normative legalistic approach from above is not the right way in the realization of justice. To claim that justice is to be seen in the light of the inherent drive to justice, does not mean that law, authority, tradition, and wisdom is not to be respected; there is no lawless society. It is to say that these formulations, abstractions in general, are not the last words considering right or wrong, they are necessary for the society to function properly but they must be combined with a situational approach.

Even if justice is one, it comes to expression in different ways in differing life-dimensions. I discuss Tillich’s understanding of justice on three levels or dimensions: that how justice comes to expression in the individual as the justice of self-affirmation; in the society as the proportional justice; in culture and religion as the drive to fulfillment. If justice belongs to the driving processes of life itself, then it is not different justices we meet at the three levels but it is the same drive behind them all. Ultimately the drive to justice is to be understood in the light of future-orientation.

I will also discuss Tillich’s understanding of justice in relation to some recent political philosophers and their understanding of justice. I think we are able to find signs both of the justice in general and of the expressive creative justice in the modern world and in the modern cinema. I try to show how this struggle between the justice from above and the justice from below is to be found in three recent movies: Timbuktu, Birdman, and Ida. I think the movies are expressions of what goes on in our local global world today. “All artistic forms,” Tillich wrote, “have one element in common—expressiveness. Art creates realities in which something is expressed.”13 Different conceptions of justice are expressed in cinema today.

**Transforming justice in the individual**

In Birdman or the Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance by Alejandro González Iñárritu, Riggan Thomson, played by Michael Keaton, has arrived at a turning-point in his life, mentally and spiritually. He is about to set up a play on Broadway, this being the ultimate peak of his career. He is about to set up Carver’s short story: “What We Talk About When We Talk About Love.” For Riggan’s part, he must succeed for there is no other option, this being his conscious orientation. Indeed, he succeeds beyond his wildest dreams, even when he dies. The end of the film is open to interpretation: Riggan either dies or he does not die, the film draws us into the mirror-hall of representations. In the movie, Riggan does not only succeed with the play, he becomes reconciled with his life and with the people around him as well.
His conscious orientation, his I-orientation and conscious intentionality says one thing, but his total personality is in the hands of another orientation: the love event. His I-orientation or conscious intentionality is directed one way; in his total personality, another intentionality is working: love comes through. The love event is possible because of the unexpected virtue of ignorance. The mirror in Riggan’s dressing room has one note: “A thing is a thing, not what is said of that thing.” The note introduces us into the central theme of Birdman. The note says that that whatever we say about important things, like love, cannot catch the whole meaning of the represented. The movie starts with letters turning into the construction of words, crystallizing into a message, the essence of which is the important thing: “To feel myself beloved on the Earth”—this is the thing as such of Birdman. It is as if Birdman said that one couldn’t say what the thing as such is but one can sense it; love comes from below. The event of love is expressed in the film. I for my part think that the bringing together of the conscious intentionality and the unconscious intentionality is a central project for us as human beings: Birdman reflects our drive for wholeness.

Films are representations. Birdman puts representation upon representation: we spectators do not know when the actors are in the play or in their “real” lives. The movie deals with the cultural philosophical theme of representation or simulation. The note in the mirror says that it is impossible to say what a thing is, what love is, but this film is still about love. Love is not talked about in Birdman, as is the case in some of other films, here love is expressed and shown: the work of love is expressed in Birdman, in the change Riggan goes through. In Tillich, the love event creates the centered self, gives it form, and at the same time relates the self to a center that is bigger than the self. Creative justice realizes itself in and through an individual’s total personality. “Justice,” Tillich wrote, “is first of all a claim raised silently or vocally by a being on the basis of its power of being. It is an intrinsic claim expressing the form in which a thing or a person is actualized.” Justice in the individual is within the frames or forms of total personality with the total personality as a unity of the rational and the vital. Tillich could write that “repression is injustice to oneself,” that is, it is “self-destructive because of the resistance of the elements which are excluded.” The justice as self-affirmation, then, is the acceptance and integration of vital and rational element within the frame or the form of the total personality. In “justice towards oneself…the deciding center is just towards the elements of which it is the center.”

Tillich thought that there are different kinds of truths: truths of science, truths in human encounters, and ontological truths or truths of being itself. Truths of science are informative claims considering things out there: they are representations built on the objectifying relation. When we talk about a thing, we know what we are saying…Truths in human encounters are our insights into human nature or essence in and through the moral imperative. The moral imperative is constitutive of an I and Thou encounter. Truths of being itself have relational, symbolic, holistic, and expressive character. Justice from below belongs to the second and the third group. As an answer to the challenge of representation, Tillich would say that the things we say about being itself, God, love, and justice in the informative sense do not hit the point, their sense and meaning does not fall within the frames of the informative language in which we can say what a thing is. Being itself is no object; God cannot become an object; love is not an object of controlling knowledge; justice, like love, is an element of life itself, expressing itself in several dimensions. When we talk about God, justice, and love, we talk a language that has expressive character: we talk the language of inwardness, the soul-language. In a world where the body disappears, even the soul and the soul-language are gone. Tillich wrote: “All things and all human beings, so to speak, call on us with small and loud voices. They want us to listen, they want us to understand their intrinsic claims, their justice of being. They want justice from us.” To live in the just way is for Tillich to help things: plants, animals, and humans in their justice of being, that is, it is to help them to the realization and actualization of their innermost potentialities; we help them to become that what they are able to become. We are able to listen to the expressive language of human-to-human encounters and we are able to listen to the expressive language of spirit-to-Spirit encounters. Art gives us those languages and it gives them through its cultural forms. Even if we talk about the self-affirmation in the total personality, in the individual, this affirmation is always interactional and relational: the choices we make have implications for ourselves,
others and for the whole universe. In Tillich’s view, individual, society, and culture are in interaction with each other: “For healing the personality without healing the society is ultimately impossible.” The transforming justice on the societal level and the transforming justice in the individual interact: art, cinema is a transforming agent. 

The drive to justice comes to expression in the moral imperative in an I and Thou relationship. The moral imperative says that we should treat each other as persons, as ends, and not as means for our own purposes. The moral law is, as Tillich wrote, and “individual’s essential nature, put against him or her as law.” The law expresses our alienation from our true being. The law, so to say, shows the negative relation: we are not that what we should be and we cannot act the way the moral imperative demands. It is not the law that links us with our essential being, but it is love and justice that does that; ultimately love and justice are one. “Our essential being is related to the being of the other in terms of justice and love,” Tillich wrote. In the event of love between human persons, we are capable of seeing what the other person, Tillich wrote, “really wants namely wants with his or her essential being and not with his or her contingent [self, missing].” What do we really want, what is Tillich’s answer to that question? We like to become united with ourselves. “Just as what agrees with the inherent justice of a thing...The inherent claim of a thing is that it is reunited with that to which it belongs. Justice demands that it is preserved in its own power of being if it enters a union of love.” Tillich thought that this reuniting act does not only happen within the frames of the individual self (a thing or an individual is not only preserved in its own power of being), in the love event the center and the form of total personality is affirmed, the self and the individuality is also there, at the same time as the self is related to that what is beyond the self. The self is relational. In Tillich’s view, “the Spiritual power gives a centre to the whole personality, a centre which transcends the whole personality and, consequently, is independent of any of its elements.” Self-transcendence, then, is not self-denial: it is the affirmation of the self as self by that what is bigger than the self. “Justice, power, and love towards oneself,” Tillich wrote, “is rooted in the justice, power and love which we receive from that which transcends us and affirms us.” Kierkegaard had a very similar relational view of the self and the ground of self or God.

The self, both Kierkegaard and Tillich thought, has its living territory in relation to other human beings and in relation to the transcendent ground of the self or God as the ground of all being. For Tillich, the territory of the self included the physical/material dimensions of being; “the religious significance of the inorganic is immense,” he wrote.

The inherent drive to justice is congruent with “the drive of the total person” and “it can drive us only if it drives also from our unconscious,” Tillich wrote. The total personality has passion, libido, desire, and “the desire is not contemptible, is not despicable, is not something low, but is something which belongs to life and is a directing power in all life...this is something which belongs to the dynamics of life as a whole.” In real life the unity of form and matter, the unity of rationality and passion deteriorate, fall apart; we are lost in alienation and estrangement. In this light, the over-emphases of cognitive/rational capacities, as is so common in Western/global culture today, is a rather a sign of alienation that of reasonability! The falling apart has happened and happens for Riggan Thomson, but he is also on his way back from estrangement and alienation. The separated in the event of love, Tillich would say, is driven to reunion in the center of his personality. Riggan is driven to reunion with himself and the people around him and, perhaps, he is also driven to reunion with the universal center beyond his personal center. Justice and love, in Tillich’s view, is not only about personal reunion or reunion with other people; it is also the act of self-transcendence in which the self is grounded in that what is beyond the self. That very relation makes freedom possible, the very freedom Protestantism stands for.

When all is representation, people lose the sense of life; Tillich thought that this is what happens in the modern world. One major question today is how to acquire the sense of life, despite all the things that threaten the sense and the meaning of life. We are Lost in translation, we live in Pulp fiction, we are threatened by Aliens, we shake in our Winter bones. In Birdman, the whole being of Riggan revolts against the shape he is in: there is the collision between the conscious and the subconscious I: his psychological otherness becomes visible. Coming from the inner world, his other self, the fictive Birdman accuses him;
coming from the outer world, the critic Tabitha Dickinson (a New Yorker) says to him that she hates ignorant Hollywood celebrities. Riggan lives in the crossfire of inner and outer demons. His desires deteriorate, but in and through the event of love his desires start to take form in his total personality. We might say that he tried to justify his life through his conscious I-orientation, but now something else is happening in him.

**Theories of justice**

In today’s world people look for sense and meaning in the lives they live, they look for the sense of life in how they live their lives, and they do so in terms of culture, art, and meaning-creating projects, not only for themselves but for community, refugees, animals, nature, and cosmos. It is in those areas that Amartya Sen finds justice; his idea of justice is from below, or at least his idea of justice weights in the way people factually live and like to live their lives. His criticism of recent philosophical theories of justice is that these theories do not take account of how people actually live their lives. His criticism is directed not only to the arguments these philosophies put forth but also against the whole setting the arguments rest upon.

We have identified a kind of a normative pattern among Jihadists: a formulation of justice is taken from the Koran and this understanding of justice is applied in the particular situation, without having regard to the demands of the situation. In relation to the empirical realm, there is the a priori formulation and, secondly, the application. This seems to be the underlying normative pattern, the cultural pattern, one is tempted to say. In much of the modern political philosophy, we find the normative pattern. I am not saying that the recent political philosophers applying the normative approach are fundamental Jihadists, I only point to the similarities in the mindset. The normative pattern is to be found both in John Rawls and in Martha Nussbaum. Rawls construes the original position in reflection, in that position he lays down what justice is, after that he construes the principles that, finally, are to be applied in the empirical realm or in the actual society. He stands in the contractarian tradition to Locke, Rousseau, Hume, and Kant. Here the realm of reflection, thought, and reason comes first and the application second; the approach is from the top down. Reason is above the empirical, the rational is above the empirical, as Kant says. The frame is dualistic. When Hegel said that the abstract justice is the ultimate injustice, he had turned away from the normative dualistic pattern; “the theoretical,” he wrote in his *Philosophy of Right*, “is essentially contained in the practical.”

If the theoretical is contained in the practical, there were no over-emphases of the rational in Hegel. In Martha Nussbaum’s view, John Rawls over-emphasized the power of rationality; still she does not, I think, go far enough into the empowerment point of view—seeing justice from the below—but she stays half-way between them. She does not let the normative pattern to go; still she is open to the empowerment point of view. The empowerment point of view is not a No to rationality: it is a Yes to the integration of the rational and the vital. It is a No to rationality as the exclusive point of departure in trying to realize justice.

We find the coordinate from the top down in Rawls as the basic coordinate in his map of orientation in discussing justice. We find the normative pattern even in Martha Nussbaum: she discusses what justice is, mostly in relation to Rawls, and she arrives at clear intuitions of some central elements and conceptions of justice. Once these conceptions have been laid down and the list of and for justice is created, the list might be applied in the local/global situations. The direction is even here from the top down. Nussbaum writes that she likes to create a holistic vision of justice and to create conditions for justice in our common world. If there is a normative pattern as the basic structure of thought, then the approach is dualistic and hierarchical, not holistic. When Tillich claims that justice is realized in human to human encounters and in interaction and interdependence with the universe, he does not bring a definition of justice into the life-situations from the outside, but he finds justice as one of the driving elements of life-processes themselves. His is a holistic vision of justice. For Tillich, “life is the dynamic actualization of being. It is not a system of solutions that could be deduced from a basic vision of life. Nothing can be deduced in a life process, nothing is determined a priori, nothing is final except those structures which make the dynamics of life possible.” Tillich’s ontology is about those structures and processes that make the dynamics of life possible, including justice. It
is in this perspective we are to discuss his ontological view of justice. Justice and love Tillich finds in life, in life-experience and in life-encounters, as deduced systems of solutions: people’ telling other people what to do and how to live their lives does not fulfill the demands of justice and love. The normative systems do not hit the point with justice and love. There are clashes of justice, not only in modern cinema, but also in modern philosophical theory.

In trying to find a right or just way of living, we, in Amartya Sen’s view, are not only interested “in the kind of lives we manage to lead, but also in the freedom that we actually have to choose between different styles and way of living.” Following the dialogue between Arjuna, the warrior king, and Krishna, Arjuna’s friend, in the Bhagavadgita, Sen picks up Arjuna’s point that considering justice we should take account of “the relevance of the actual world,” leading Sen to talk about “the significance of human lives as a ground of justice.” In Sen, one minimum condition for justice is the reasoning from the bottom up, expressing a pluralistic and independent view of ideas, positions, and ways of living. In this plural, interdependent world, Sen wrote, that Martin Luther King’s words are accurate: “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”; our ‘neighborhood’ now effectively extend across the world.” Both Nussbaum and Sen have what they call the capability approach, at least Nussbaum, refers directly to Aristotle. Tillich grounds his understanding of justice in capabilities, potentials, and possibilities, and his approach is a modified realism and Aristotelianism. Nussbaum’s is not an anthropocentric approach, as if justice only concerns human beings, but it also concerns animals and all living things. This is the zone of justice for Tillich also. It is not only humans who are capable of realizing themselves in coordination with other beings and things, but all things are part of the entelechy of the universe; the world is one and all living and non-living things are part of the same coordinate and interdependent whole. His mature position was that of the differentiated monism. It is in this perspective that Tillich’s talk about the form or forms through which justice is realized becomes interesting. In Aristotle’s world, perhaps even in the world of the “later” Plato, the most interesting things in life happen at the form-level of things. The aim of justice for Tillich is community and communication at the essential level of things.

The sacred and the secular

The movie Ida opens with a scene of Ida restoring a statue of Christ, perhaps wiping the tears of Christ. The movie is about inwardsness, and the most important things are expressed without words. The statue is carried by four nuns out of the house into the front-yard; the next scene depicts the statue standing in the middle of a circle drawn in snow and the four nuns praying behind the statue. For Carl Gustav Jung, the circle is a symbol of perfection; it is a symbol of the self as the goal of the process of individuation and number four is such as well. Jung even thought that the circle and the number four are symbols of the divine: the Godhead with the Father, Son and the Holy Ghost will need the feminine element to be a whole. For Jung, the symbols express the psychological self or the archetypal structures in the human psyche. For Paul Tillich, symbols go beyond psychology (or rather, before psychology) and they express depth-dimensions of ontology. Tillich’s multidimensional ontology gives means to integrate the psychological and the ontological symbols with each other. Tillich agreed with Jung’s idea of the symbol-creating collective unconscious. The film Ida is more than psychology, as it expresses spiritual inwardsness and existential decisions we humans have to make in our lives: it is a political/ spiritual film; it is about justice. The film is about what is the right thing to do: to go into what the autonomous secular culture has to offer or to listen to the call of the spiritual self. There is the clash between the justice of the autonomous secular culture and the inner voice. In terms of Tillich’s cultural categories, the film expresses a certain way of seeing on the relation between autonomy and theonomy. The view expressed in the film, considering their relationship, differs from Tillich’s view.

Ida is about which language we should listen to in our lives: the politically loaded language of the secular culture or the language of expressive inwardsness. The film draws a sharp either/or line between the two realms. In this, there is a difference compared with Tillich’s view. In Tillich’s view, autonomous human culture has rights of its own, but this culture is to be open to the self-transcending dimensions of life, the depth-
dimensions of life, to which religion, among other things, points to. In Tillich, there is a both/and between autonomy and theonomy; in *Ida* there is an either/or. It is obvious that Ida as a person listens to the language of inwardness, that language is present in her whole being, in her face, in her body; the film is about body as an organ of spirit—”the religious significance of the inorganic is immense.” The Aunt Wanda, whom Ida meets after Ida has left the cloister to seek information about her parents, regrets that she loses sexual experience by becoming a nun. Before Ida takes wows, she has to find out what happened to her family during the Second World War, and she leaves the cloister. The aunt works now as a judge in the communist Poland, where she has been a state prosecutor, the highest representative of people’s justice. With words mixed with pride and contempt, she says that she has sent people to death, such a high power she has had as the prosecutor. It is at her funeral (the aunt jumps out of the window and takes her life) that a representative of the government and the party emphasizes that she has worked for the people’s justice. We might take this as an expression for a normative/ideological understanding of justice: the party, in this case the Communist Party of Poland, led from Moscow, had a definition of justice and the bureaucracy of the party had the duty of applying Moscow’s understanding of justice in socialist countries. I think that there are strong reasons to believe that justice in Poland during the 1950s and 60s was defined in the normative/ideological way, prior to the actual situations in which it became applied. The direction of that justice was from the top down. I believe that people in the former Communist countries are really tired of the people’s justice!

*Ida* is about the place of religion in Poland’s history; it may be read as an expression for the return of religion, but I do not know if religion has to return in Poland, because perhaps it has always been there. The movie shows that it was not only the German Nazis who did the terrible things but some Polish people partook in the killing as well. There is a strong contrast between autonomy and theonomy in the film. The profane way of living is hopeless, filled with self-seeking desire and pulsating passion, symbolized by Aunt Wanda and her one night stands. Ida has a love affair with a young man; he wants them to marry, build a family, have children, but Ida’s question is: “What then?” Her drive to self-transcendence pushes her beyond and away from the societal life, which is not her goal. Only religion or the religious way of living satisfies her spiritual yearning. There is a No to purely human concerns and a Yes to religious concerns in the film. At the end of the film, Ida returns to the cloister, walking back confidently on a narrow road; she has made her choice. Tillich did not see such a sharp line of demarcation between autonomy and theonomy; theonomy is in the depth dimension of autonomy; the secular or autonomous realm with its relative formulations of justice on the personal and the societal level is there on its own. Tillich did not religion and culture separate from each other, but claimed that religion is the substance of culture and culture is the form of religion. What he wanted to do was “to overcome as far as it is possible...the fateful gap between religion and culture, thus reconciling concerns which are not strange to each other but have been estranged from each other.” The Western interpretation of justice has separated law and love from each other, but they are not strange to each other in Tillich’s interpretation.

Western culture has separated law and love from each other, the proportional justice is applied since the Code of Hammurabi: “An eye of an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” 4,000 years back in time. The principle of proportionality, in Aristotle as the distributive and retributive principality has laid the foundation, with Roman law, for Western legislation. What Tillich does in his understanding of justice is that he breaks with this 4,000 years of cultural legislative tradition and introduces a new way of seeing the relationship of law and justice. Instead of proportional justice, he speaks about the creative and transforming justice. This justice is on the level of “the structure of the most developed form of reality.” The creative and transforming justice, the expressive creative justice, is to be read in the light of love as the driving element of life. The drive to justice has come through in the historical eras in different cultural forms: in antiquity, the Aristotelian Neo-Platonic hierarchy determined the understanding of justice; during the Middle Ages, the feudal hierarchy did the same; in modern democracy, we try to build just institutions based on equality and freedom. Instead of a hierarchical model or form, Tillich offers the integrated multidimensional holistic model of justice. Perhaps he saw in the end of his
life that the integrated model gave means to express something of “the most developed form of reality”? 

The event of love

Spinoza’s God is from below, so is his understanding of justice. In Spinoza, justice is the virtue of loving one’s neighbor, it is, he wrote, “only through love of one’s neighbor that one can perceive or be conscious of God, and thus no one can discover any other attribute of God except this love, insofar as we participate therein.”

God, justice, and love in Spinoza is from below. Tillich talked about “the multidimensional love which affirms the other one in the act of reunion.” As one side of the love event, there is the strange work of love as well. Life is a blend of the positive and the negative and so is each individual as well. Love exposes the negative, shows what it is, and this it can only do in the light of the positive. There are human deeds for which no proportionality is able to count for or to satisfy; the proportional justice comes to naught in the face of the monstrous crimes; human history has shown its demonic dimensions. For Tillich, “justice means more than proportional justice...God is not bound to the given proportion between merit and tribute. God can creatively change the proportion, and does it in order to fulfill those who according to proportional justice would be excluded from fulfillment. Therefore, divine justice can appear as plain injustice.” Given the event of love, “every act of love implies judgment against that what negates love.” The negative and the demonic (crime, murder, lies) that Tillich identified as “negativities,” so also with the demonic: it has no positive being of its own but it lives from the destruction of the positive) are targeted as the object of love’s strange work, as that which must be destroyed. Justice “fulfills also the truth in the demand for punishment by destroying what must be destroyed if reuniting love is to reach its aim,” Tillich wrote. The strange work of love, destroying that which is against love, is active in the individual, in the society, and in the drive of the universe to fulfillment. The punishment does not mean that individuals are placed in an eternal hell or in purgatory, but the punishment is to found oneself in despair. In the face of the eternal the negative, after it has been confronted, is negated; “it is not remembered at all,” Tillich wrote. The created goodness of things and individuals is affirmed. Tillich wrote: “The Divine Life is the eternal conquest of the negative: this is its blessedness... Eternal blessedness is also attributed to those who participate in the Divine Life, not to man only, but to everything that is.” The Eternal Life is not without differentiation: all individuals preserve their identity in relation to the Eternal. The “creative justice is the form of reuniting love,” Tillich wrote. The self-transcending process of life, driven by love and justice, opens itself for the dimension of essences. I think it is at this level the saying that the “creative justice is the form of reuniting love” is to be read: love brings us together in our common humanity; at the same time as it keeps us apart, the individual identity is somehow preserved. I think it is here we find “the most developed form of reality.” This is a step further from Hegel’s identification of the state as the place of “the highest absolute truth of the world-spirit.”

4 Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p.15
5 Ibid., p. 63.
6 Ibid., p. 63.
8 Monism in Mark C. Taylor’s view disregards difference and he rejects the monistic view: “The true Infinite is neither dualistic nor monistic but is the creative interplay in which identity and difference are co-dependent and coevolve.” Mark C. Taylor. After God (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 346. In differential monism, difference and individuality are maintained.
10 Ibid., pp. 13f.
11 Tillich, Love, Power of Justice, p. 64
12 “The laws created by wisdom (for example Ten commandments) are guides to decisions, but they have no unconditional validity. They are valid on the basis of what lies behind them in revelatory and ordinary experiences, but you can never apply them to any concrete situations unambiguously.” Paul Tillich, “Question and answer sessions with Peter John,” bMS 649/39 (2), February-March, 1960, p. 9.


14 “In all likelihood, there is an important reasoning process going on nonconsciously, in the subterranean mind, and the reasoning produces results without the intervening steps ever being known.” Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (London, Vintage Books, 2012), p. 276. See even Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003), p. 260, where he writes that “Freud’s system requires the self-preservation apparatus Spinoza proposed in his conatus, and makes abundant use of the idea that self-preserving actions are engaged nonconsciously.”


16 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 70.

17 Ibid.


19 Virilio points out that we live in a culture that has lost its bodily dimension: “Today we are no longer seers [voyants] of our world, but already merely reviewers [revoyants], the tautological repetition of the same, at work in our mode of production [i.e. industrial production], is equally at work in our mode of perception… If we are really so worried today about our resources, about the exhaustion of natural energies, it is also necessary that we consider the sensorial privation to which we are now subjected.” Paul Virilio, Negative Horizon. An Essay in Dromoscopy (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 37.

20 Ibid., p. 84.

21 Paul Tillich, “Man’s Spiritual Functions, Their Unity and Their Conflicts,” Religion and Culture, Cole Lectures and Minister’s Convocation, bMS 649/46 (21), 1959, p. 1.

22 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 76.

23 Tillich, “Question and answer session with Peter John,” 25/2 1960, p. 3.

24 Ibid., p. 13.


26 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 120.

27 Ibid., p. 122.


29 Tillich, Systematic Theology III, p. 18.


31 Ibid., 17/3 1960, p. 10.


36 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 41.

37 Sen, The Idea of Justice, p. 117.

38 Ibid., p. 213.

39 Ibid., pp. 402f.


42 Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 29.

43 Ibid., pp. 144f.


46 “In accepting the individual into the unity of forgiveness, love exposes both the acknowledged break with justice and the claim inherent in him or her to be declared just and to be made just by reunion”. Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 85.

47 Ibid., p. 66.

48 Tillich, Systematic Theology III, p. 179.

49 Ibid., p. 226.

50 Ibid., p. 400

51 Ibid., p. 405.

52 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 66.

53 “But the state does not arise until we reach the third stage, that stage of ethical observance or spirit,
which both individual independence and universal substantivity are found in gigantic union. The right of the state is, therefore, higher than that of the other stages. It is freedom in its most concrete embodiment, which yields to nothing but the highest absolute truth of the world-spirit.” Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, I.

Adolf Hitler, to every murderous Nazi
To the Gambinos, to the Gottis, to every mafia atrocity
Child pornography, babies starving and dying in poverty
Serbians fighting Croatians in Yugoslavia
Muslim women being raped, up to 40,000 in the war in Bosnia
The 50 million killed in the second World War
The government’s poisoning the minds and the bodies
Of the babies that are born poor
Airplanes blown up by Islamic extremists
In religion there’s always drama
Whether worshipping the Prophet Mohammed or Jesus
Small pox to Napoleon’s troops dying from typhus
From the Spanish flu to the black plague, today it’s AIDS virus
Bodies in coffins, political extortions
Racist mobs murdering, Willie Turks, Michael Griffith and Yusef Hawkins
Check the murder rate, is it human nature to murder and hate?
The Catholic church claimed women were witches and burned ‘em at the stake
Pedophile predators attacking
.38 Beretta used by Ghandi’s assassin
16 bullets in Malcolm, it happened uptown Manhattan
And the homicide, Reagan ‘80s epidemic of crack
And soldiers in action dying in Iraq and never coming back
And now let’s

In this multidirectional multiplicity of words, ideas, emotions, and historical equations that are New York legendary underground rapper R.A. The Rugged Man’s verse as just displayed, we see the bottomless pain and despair of the human situation, bleeding through the depths of the presented aesthetic. As Tillich was able to read Picasso’s “Guernica” and give voice to the existential pangs of actual entities as their diversity uni-

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**Grounds of Being Becoming: The Possibility of a Tillichian-Inspired Process Theology as Displayed by Underground Rap**

*Jon Ivan Gill*

**Abstract**

I hope to instigate a detailed conversation between Whiteheadian process thought’s idea of “becoming” and Tillichian ideas of “being,” asserting that they not only can and should be used to inform each other, but also share a similar synergy that Tillich may have overlooked. In the *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, Tillich dismisses Whitehead’s idea of ultimate reality, stating that it offers only a cosmological account of religious experience and trades human historical meaning for processual transience. However, the Whitehead of *Adventures of Ideas* incorporates the metaphysic of *Process and Reality*, a way that mysteriously joins process with historical being attributed to humanity by Heidegger, Tillich, and others. It is my contention that when the religiously symbolic language of Tillichian *being* is compared with the robust metaphysic of Whiteheadian *becoming*, a hybrid theopoetic that is both pluralistic and secularly theological appears. I propose and briefly make the case that that this is evidenced in the sacred texts of United States and global underground rap.

**Introduction**

From Genghis Khan to Vietnam I can smell the napalm
Rape victims, ripped stockings
Redneck clan members doing church bombings
Innocent fetus’ being aborted with no options
Human governments ruin ‘em
Worrying what weapons could be used to be nukin’ ‘em
Jesus was crucified in Jerusalem
Slaves treated like property, to Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima to Nagasaki

From the Spanish flu to the black plague, today it’s AIDS virus
Bodies in coffins, political extortions
Racist mobs murdering, Willie Turks, Michael Griffith and Yusef Hawkins
Check the murder rate, is it human nature to murder and hate?
The Catholic church claimed women were witches and burned ‘em at the stake
Pedophile predators attacking
.38 Beretta used by Ghandi’s assassin
16 bullets in Malcolm, it happened uptown Manhattan
And the homicide, Reagan ‘80s epidemic of crack
And soldiers in action dying in Iraq and never coming back
And now let’s
fies into the gruesomeness of wars, racism, gross capitalism, doctrinal religious wars, and more, so it is with R.A.’s “rugged” articulation of no-holds-barred reality in this verse from his song “Learn Truth” with Talib Kweli. Tillich holds that the representation of such ruptures in works of art and art itself display through aesthetic prophetic insight via style the estrangement of humanity from that which not only sustains it but also offers the possibility of its very being, or being itself. In other words, the style of a work of art (not necessarily its content) gives a message of depth about the context within which it finds itself, a depth which can be referred to as “religious” insofar as it reminds its audience of the ultimacy of the ground of being.

Alongside this, the process philosophy/theology of Alfred North Whitehead, known for its metaphysical focus on how the empirical world creates ideas of what Tillich would refer to as “ultimate” and “ultimacy,” would read R.A.’s verse in somewhat of a different way. While Tillich may say that “Learn Truth” illuminates the ground of being and serves as a means of luring us from our estrangement into a reconciliation/reuniting with that which is truly ultimate, the Whitehead of Adventures of Ideas, Process and Reality and Modes of Thought seems to indicate that his metaphysic/philosophy would hold that “Learn Truth” points toward a ground of being that is not really being but perpetual becoming. In other words, Whitehead’s categories of that which is ultimate always involve change. Therefore, if a work of art is to point back to anything foundational in this system, it would always have to point back to something that actually has no foundation at all. The work of art would never point toward the same ultimate since the ultimate is in continuous change. Columbus Ohio’s conceptual rap genius, Illogic, says it best when he utters, “Your time is sure to come because change is the only constant.” Being is not presupposed and underlying; it is created and revised as the universe flows through chaotically beautiful poiesis.

How do we reconcile Tillich’s ideas of being with Whitehead’s becoming? And why should we? Maybe they are different, but not as different as even Tillich suspected. The second question will receive an answer first. I hold that Tillich’s ground of being language and its connections with aesthetics provide a conceptual weight and symbolic influence to ideas of ultimacy that Whitehead describes in mostly technical language. In other words, a coupling of Tillich’s idea of a fixed and non-empirical ground of being inseparably connected to the world with Whitehead’s naturalistic and seemingly impersonal understanding of the universe and ideas of ultimacy creates an interesting theopoetic secular theology that is independent of confessional articulations of process theology, while skillfully grounding the understanding of the ultimate in an embodied non-technical existential location. A processual Whiteheadian God and creativity, when theopoetically treated with Tillichian existential and “religious” sensibilities, produces an ultimate that is as mythical as it is evolutionary, and able to transform in ways that exemplify, deeply embody, and persuade the particularities of its context. Tillich’s ground of being is a means by which a secularly theological Whiteheadian process theology can truly be called “theological.” The paper aims to illustrate this claim of Whiteheadian-Tillichian similar difference through the aesthetic medium of underground hip-hop. And the paper by default will also answer the “how” question. If I told you now, it wouldn’t be any fun, now would it?

Tillich’s Ground of Being and its Aesthetic Resources

Theopoetics can be described as holding ideas about the ultimate to be uncertain, unpredictable, and adventurous. Therefore, the theopoetic enterprise is not about dogma or theological positions as housed in academic literature, but about the possibility of revision, reevaluation, and abandonment of these for firsthand experience of the universe. For L. Callid Keefe-Perry, it is, “a transformative power in the creative articulation of embodied experience of God and faith.” For theopoetics, this mysterious, multiplicitous experience of the universe in its fullness is primary theological data, not proofs, arguments, and the like. How art manifests Tillich’s idea of the ground of being in one sense demonstrates a theopoetic character: when the ground of being is transmitted through works of art, a thing that radical orthodoxy says is impossible at the most or unlikely at the least, the ground of being in its mysteriousness is shredded of any doctrinal postulates of certainty. Rather, the ground of being in its depth confronts the onlooker through the emotion, techniques, and style of the work of art,
and this is largely a confrontation with ultimacy that cannot be captured by words. In this move of
the work of art, we respond to the vortex it opens
for us, a vortex leading to the ground of being
from which we are estranged; the sensory experi-
ence of the work of art establishes an uncanny
theopoetic relation between the human and the
world through the ground of being that emanates
in the work of art, throwing us into the heart of
the multiplicitous existential situation aestheti-
cally. Tillich captures the “risk” of the theopoetic
enterprise when he says that the theologian must
“...be open for new experiences which may even
pass beyond the confines of Christian experi-
ence...” The various shapes taken by the ground
of being and its complete manifestation through
none attest to the vastness of being itself, and
the theopoetic impulse inspires us to resist the ossifi-
cation of dogma and theological and philosophi-
cal assertions, binding our interaction with the
ground of being to any particular form.

Though the experience of the ground of being,
or God, in the work of art can be thought of
as multiplicious and in some sort of flux in its
presentation/ re-presentation of this mystery, the
ground of being itself in Tillich’s understanding is
spoken of as that which does not undergo the flux
attributed to both Whitehead’s idea of creativity
and God. For Tillich, the ground being is just
that: a ground. As the possibility for all existence,
it serves the role of a Platonic receptacle, though
more than just space. While it is definitely that
within which we live, move, and have our being,
the ground of being as the possibility of existence
itself provides it with a definite characteristic of
what Otto would call the “mysterium tremendum,”
encoding within it not just a natural relation
between universals and their manifestations
but a deep connection with the “underlying activ-
ity” that rivets the ultimate existential and awe-
inspiring attention of the human. In other words,
Tillich asserts that the traversing of the impasse
between the human self and the ground of being
is the heart of human meaning, and the existential
realization of the estrangement that the human
experience is soaked in serves as a magnetic force
that pulls one back to reflection on and transfor-
mation of the new being. Tillich is referring to a
ground of being that is more or less constant in
how it situates and determines the universe. Es-
trangement is conquered by a Hegelian dialectical
return to a ground that, judging from how Tillich
talks about it, is unchanging. The only process
that shows up is the motion of the physical enti-
ties as they return to their essence. Tillich’s de-
scriptions show little or no flux in the ground of
being.

This lack of flux that Tillich attributes to the
ground of being plays into the reasons he dis-
misses process philosophy. Tillich does not see
any compatibility between the ground of being
and process thought’s understanding of the cate-
gory of the ultimate as, in the words of White-
head, “flux, “the nontemporal accident of creativ-
ity,” and “conceptual valuation,” to name a few.
Tillich’s theology, as presented in the Systematic
Theology and other texts, is based on a transcen-
dental reality that is not merely, as Whitehead
would say, the exception to the rhythm of the
natural universe (or more commonly known as
the “laws of nature”) but the chief exemplification
of said rhythm. Tillich’s construction of the
ground of being is one that evades the reduction-
istic tendency of naturalism and its manifestation
through experience, for if ideas of the ultimate are
situated in, emergent from, and dependent on a
natural world continuously in flux as Whitehead
suggests, then what can be said to be its consist-
tent character? Can such a transient God, who
appears by default as a result of the universal crea-
tivity combining the “many” into the “one” that
serves as the underlying foundation of the per-
petuation of the world, indeed, have anything
permanent and definite about it? Can such a re-
working of God and God’s relation to universal
creativity as evidenced in process philosophy pro-
duce an ultimate able to provide meaning in the
way a “divine being in the traditional sense” would? Tillich wants to assert the possibility and actua-
ity of an ultimate that, while part and parcel
with the existential angst of the historical context,
has a life that transcends it. Tillich makes this
point better than I can in the introductory seg-
ments of Systematic Theology. He says:

If experience in this sense is used as the
source of systematic theology, nothing can
appear in the theological system that tran-
scends the whole of experience. A divine be-
ing in the traditional sense is excluded from
such a theology. Since, on the other hand, the
whole of experience cannot be of ultimate
concern, a special experience cannot be of ul-
timate concern, a special experience or a spe-
cial experience of the whole experience must
be the source of systematic theology. For instance, the value-producing processes (Whitehead) or the uniting processes (Wieman) or the character of wholeness (Hocking) can be called religious experience. But if this is done, one must have a concept of what a religious experience is. Otherwise, one would not recognize it within the whole of experience. This means that there must be another kind of experience, an immediate participation in religious reality, preceding any theological analysis of reality as a whole. And here is the initial obstacle, process thought’s rock of offense for a Tillichian ground of being: a process God, a God that flows from a natural theology based on the empirical influence of the world constituting the consistency of ideas of the divine, cannot hold the status of the ground of being since it cannot assert any existence apart from the world. Tillich goes so far as to say that natural theologies such as Whitehead’s are empowered by “…their participation in a concrete religious reality, from their religious experience in the mystical sense of experience. And they try to discover the corresponding elements within the whole of experience. They seek a cosmological confirmation of their personal religious life.”

So, according to Tillich, Whiteheadian process thought, in all of its flux, creates an idea of the ultimate that seeks to account for personal ecstatic experience of the ground of being by asserting that that which is outside of the empirical realm is nested within it. Whitehead’s thought in a Tillichian evaluation can be said to reduce a divine mode of being to merely language that has the potential to become anthropomorphic if applied in such a way.

Being as unchanging is displayed theopoetically through Tillich’s understanding of the mystery of symbol. But, as mentioned, the symbol in its mysterious messiness is also multiplicitous and processual. In the symbol’s participation in the authenticity of that which it symbolizes, we are ushered into reconnection with the ground of being; it speaks to us in wordless ways which rumble the seismic tendencies in the place of solitude where the Whitehead of Religion in the Making tells us religion happens. Might it also be true that if the symbol is processual, then the ground of being that it symbolizes is also in flux, since the symbol shares in the life of that which it symbolizes? Considering how Tillich looked at “Guernica,” denoting it as the world’s greatest Protestant painting, Russell Re Manning says: “Guernica is ‘the artistic expression of the human predicament in our period’ that ‘shows the human situation without any cover’ (120; 95–6). Far from the calming beauty of Botticelli’s Madonna, Picasso paints ‘this immense horror— the pieces of reality, men and animals and unorganic pieces of houses all together—in a way in which the ‘piece’ character of our reality is perhaps more horribly visible than in any other of the modern pictures.”

As with “Learn Truth” in its transformation of the existential to aesthetics where words become fluent images galvanized to that which they symbolize, “Guernica” seems to allude to a possible process embedded in the ground of being. It shows this by its representation of fluid relations between entities in the universe constituted by an underlying possibility of existence that cannot be anthropomorphized. Since the ground of being transcends us as in Tillich’s framework and it is experienced though our necessary participation in it, any symbol used to describe it, such as the term “being” is inadequate. If we agree that every statement about the ground of being is mediated by inadequate symbols, do we have grounds to rule the symbol of “process” out of the list of live options of possible symbols of the ground of being? What about “becoming” makes it invalid? Tillich does indeed rule the notion of process out of permissible symbols of that which is ultimate, and gives us an answer as to what about the processual nature of becoming makes it inadequate language to symbolize the ultimate underlying activity. Tillich says,

Process philosophy is justified in its attempt to dissolve into processes everything that seems to be static. But it would become absurd if it tried to dissolve the structure of process into a process. This simply would mean that what we know of process has been superseded by something else, the nature of which is unknown at present. In the meantime, every philosophy of process has an explicit or implicit ontology that is aphoristic in character.

Tillich goes on to address the closely-related issue of historical relativism, which, if the “structure of process” is actually reduced to process itself as Tillich asserts occurs in process philosophy, must by nature be void of any definite affirmation of the nature of humanity. To this, Til-
lich succinctly responds, “Human nature changes in history. Process philosophy is right in this. But human nature changes in history. The structure of a being that has history undergoes all historical changes. This structure is the subject of an ontological and theological doctrine of man.”

So, Tillich demonstrates that his discrepancy with the process philosophy of Whitehead has nothing to do with process itself as a way to understand the continuous and inevitable motion of entities in the universe. He is fine with this. His charge is that humanity as a way of being has in its repertoire the “burden” of historical meaning: the human quest is one of understanding herself as being situated in a teleological ontology, the fastening of the finite to her place in and significance to the timeline of the infinite. Tillich reads Whitehead’s philosophy as being unable to grasp this essential nature of humanity, a nature that did not apply to nonhuman animals, and may not apply to sentient creatures after the event that is human being, but definitely relates to how humanity talks about itself presently.

So, to briefly both recap and inject a personal evaluation of Tillich’s appraisal of process thought in relation to its rendition of the ground of being (which we have not excavated yet, but we will soon engage the aesthetic labyrinth of beautiful metaphysic and religious naturalism that it is), Tillich holds that process philosophy’s notion of process and ultimate creativity as espoused by Whitehead, first, is not adequate to be the ground of being due to its flux; second, cannot symbolize the ground of being as a result of one, and, third, lacks the grounds upon which we would be able to articulate/argue for any sort of definite nature of humanity (something Tillich thinks is indispensable if we are to indeed give a mode of being the distinction “human”). In analyzing Tillich’s concerns about process, it must be recognized that Whitehead was not a theologian, but a philosopher/mathematician who approached theological language as a method to articulate a cohesive and novel cosmology of the universe being in perpetual process. Therefore, we are dealing with a thinker who did not have and should not necessarily be expected to have the theological concerns that Tillich, a thinker on side of answering the existential questions the philosopher poses, obviously did. In constructions of process theology (a fracturing and reapplication of Whitehead’s and others’ philosophy) such as that of Griffin, Suchocki, Keller, Ogbonnaya, Cobb, Coleman, and Schneider (just to name a few), there has been much work done In creating a process God that does not only embody existence but also reflects a stasis in the midst of flux; that which legendary underground rapper Aesop Rock would refer to is “etching a picture in the midst of a falling (processual) hologram” that can be updated and changes as the world changes. However, for secular theological purposes, I do hold (and plan to explain) that Tillich’s uncompromising philosophy of the ground of being, as essentially definite in its underlying of that which becomes within it, is a helpful asset in accounting for historical meaning in humans, a thing that can be lost in the multiplicitous poststructuralism that is (or can be said to be) process philosophy.

Whitehead’s Becoming and its Aesthetic Resources

The process philosophy of British philosopher/mathematician Alfred North Whitehead and its emphasis on flux as the underlying activity of the universe posits itself over against the existentialist theology of Tillich, and at this point must be connected to Tillich’s thought if it is to fulfill the promised objective of this paper. Tillich’s distinction between (1) the broader definition of religion as the “depth of everything” and “the state of being ultimately concerned,” (2) the narrow definition of religion as confessional exercises and personal communion with what one considers divine, and (3) secular culture, serves as integral connections to aesthetics. For Tillich, the state of being ultimately concerned (religion) manifests itself in a unique and indispensable way in the realm of works of art, for it is in this realm that the depth of meaning of the human situation can be courageously revealed through symbolic representations that persuade both the intellectual and the ecstatic dimensions of the human consciousness. I hold that the merit and impetus of works of art lie in the transformative energy of the ever-evolving “esthetic” ground of being, to which Tillich ascribes creative attributes. The “ground of being,” or what I call the “esthetic,” is that structure granting the possibility of existence and its creative advance that “imaginal” pictures of God (including philosophical and theological articulations about the nature and actions of God, works of art that correspond to Til-
Tillich’s categories of religious style and religious content, etc.) attempt to symbolize. Tillich’s idea of God = being is by default creative in that it is the origin and the foundation of the propagation of all creative entities. And, these pictures of God, fueled by the creative energy of the ground of being, in turn issue creatively transformative propositions and possibilities for subsequent epochs.20

In Adventures of Ideas, a strand that is seen throughout Whitehead’s entire corpus is stated clearly, namely the idea that the universe itself strives toward the creation of Beauty. That is summed up by this quote: “The teleology of the Universe is directed toward the production of Beauty. Thus any system of things which in any wide sense is beautiful is to that extent justified in its existence.”21 He also tells us that “art” is less an object observed and more a way of life, and in its own way constitutes the possibilities of existence.22 Instead of defining Beauty in an objective sense where its categories are generally defined intangibly and exist as independent concepts, Whitehead holds that Beauty is nothing without its actualization in the universe.23 It can be said that every process is aesthetic in that it adds to the ever-expanding Beauty that is the universe itself.24

I hold that the conceptual aesthetic productions of creativity, the ideas that emerge from conversion of the “many” into the “one,” are eternally taken into the ground of being and become part of its underlying framework. In other words, as the universe indefinitely expands through creativity, more possibilities are also created which change the composition of the ground of being. Those novel possibilities are aesthetic possibilities that are added to that structure of being/ becoming that is the ground of being, and subconsciously serve as “principles of proposition” for experiencing entities to perpetuate the production of Beauty.25

A Tillichian/ Whiteheadian Synthesis

Tense as it may be, Whitehead’s aesthetics as that value of the perpetual production of creativity that is non-solipsistic and rooted within experience that the universe strives toward is similar to Tillich’s definition of “religion” as that which points attention toward the ground of being, which is the depth of everything. The two differ in that while Tillich equates the ground of being (which is not an entity or a “being”) with God and therefore cannot directly correlate it to the idea of God in the Whitehead of Process and Reality that is definitely an actual entity, Whitehead’s concept of aesthetics, with creativity as its ultimate,26 reverses the Tillichian system in which the ground of being is the origin of all creativity. Therefore, the ultimate activity of creativity creates everything, including ideas of God, placing these ideas within the fabric of the ground of being for prehension by experiencing entities. The world creates God, and is persuaded to do so unceasingly as it appeals to propositions in the ground of being that by default seem to produce a conceptual archetype to embody the most valued ideals of a context or epoch.

In short, there is a dialectic of aesthetic creativity that occurs between the Tillichian ground of being and the Whiteheadian primordial and consequent natures of God. While the Tillichian ground of being27 sets the structure for and makes possible the origination and perpetuation of the universe in its quest toward “Beauty,” the Whiteheadian ultimate of creativity, which emanates from the impetus of the ground of being, gains a “primordial character” as the primordial nature of God (the exemplification of the universal principle of creative advance) and becomes the name of the unconditional valuation of all eternal objects.28 On the quest toward progressive beauty, the consequent nature of God valuates the perpetual progressions in the actual world as God’s composition is augmented by the creative emissions of the universe to become into that which it was not previously. From God’s saving activity of the past comes the redistribution to the world by God the consequent prehensions that will result in God’s most intense satisfaction.29 In this instance, not only is the nature of God, the exemplification of universal creative advance, expanding the ground of being, the “aesthetic” structure underlying creativity and determining the limits of creativity in a particular epoch is also transformed. And then the process starts again. Endlessly. Within the fluidity, the ground of being bursts fleeting permanent moments, permanent enough to “ground” what may look like being as it becomes. A freestyle, or extemporaneous rhyme, many times roots the possibility of its creation in a base of ideas, words, sentence fragments, historical or current images, and more. This base as a unit could be said to revolve around itself and be self-contained. However, there is something fluid.
about this base of the freestyle, so fluid that what inkling of datum will wind up where is never known, and many times even evades the possibility of linear description. This foundational base is not only fluid. It allows other bits of pieces to be added to its assorted mosaic full of colors, and it forces us with knives to our throat and swords to our back to rethink what “base” or “ground” means. In its providing the possibility and the playing field for interrelation of all that is, because of and in spite of its transcendence, a Tillichian-inspired process theology asserts that being, in an act of oscillation between Whitehead’s God and Whitehead’s similar underlying ground of creativity, becomes one and the same as they eclipse in eternal change and in those moments change each other as the universe in its situational adjustment determines what “ground” must mean for the current epoch. In Bob Dylan’s words, “The Times, They are A Changing.” I smile as ground of being changes with them, for them, and around them. Now, it is time for me to cook.

The Hip-Hop Connection

This paper ends in a brief demonstration how the lyrics of underground hip-hop culture may be said to participate in this dialectic of prehending ideas of God and redistributing the “many” of eternal object influences into the “ones” of new God(s) that all fall under the category of what Whitehead would call “God.” Immortal Technique, Crazy Legs, Rime, Atlanta via Chicago’s own DJ Precyse, DJ PNS, Atmosphere, Armand Hammer—those who know underground hip-hop know these names, names of rappers, graffiti artists, so-called “break-dancer” and DJs that have set and maintain the precedent of what the worldwide subculture of underground hip-hop has become. It is here where the Tillichian-inspired process theopoetic emerges. In its exemplification of Tillichian symbol robustness that proves to embody authentic historical meaning and passion alongside a Whiteheadian drive to update that underlying ultimate processual ground, a style of rap that recreates what it means for ultimate being to be/ come in the spirit of the Protestant principle is born. One example must be cited for you not to just hear, but to also live within.

New York City duo Armand Hammer’s “CRWNS,” taken from their second album, Furtive Movements, showcases Tillichian-process secular theology well. The video and the song charts through tongue-in-cheek subversive speech the 400 plus year colonization project of Afro bodies by Europeans in a little over three minutes. The hook goes, “They are who we thought they were”

It perfectly captures the vicious onslaught of Euro-domination of the Americas. Armand Hammer member Elucid is telling us that our instincts, which cry against not the people but the concept of (well, maybe the people also) White supremacy, were not wrong. They are spot on. The sort of being that they are enacting is the being of homocentrism, a being that needs to be processed into another ground of being lacking such oppressive characteristics. If the ground of being, that which peacefully provides the structures fueling slavery, genocide, and economic disproportion, is unchanging, we may run into serious difficulties when asserting that it has something fresh and liberating to say to systemic injustice against people of color. We must note that Tillich’s understanding of environment is vey akin to his understanding of being; just as self determines environment, self also determines what the ground of being is and how we understand it. If we fail to illuminate the possible role of what Tillich calls the “structure of being” in holding vast dangerous potential for systemic injustice, we can never get past Armand Hammer’s chorus. They will always be what we thought they were.

“CRWNS” is a siren song screaming for an examination of any ground of existence that does not readily present the possibility of substantially addressing the suffering of people of color at the hands of European domination. If the Tillichian ground of being, the by-product of European and Euro-U.S. schools of philosophical and theological thought, grounds without critical scrutinizing of how the ground of being as it stands can be said to ratify privilege, power, and persecution, how can we expect to theologize a truly authentic liberation for more than just the privileged, as Cone vociferously argues in Black Theology and Black Power? This is the secularly theological message of Armand Hammer, where the ground of being becomes that which can truly support the justice of all people. However, if the symbolic language of Tillich’s ground of being is admitted to be the symbol that it is, even admitting that the assertion of God’s nonexistence due to God’s
transcendence is more blatant a symbol than what I have called the “picture Gods” in my own critique of the concepts of confessional and post-structural process theology (not included here), we come to a Tillichian secular process theology that theopoetically leaves ground for multiplicitous mystery while simultaneously echoing the need for symbols that loudly and meaningfully reflect reality. It shreds theological formulas and replaces them with ecstatic possibility and awe. This is the possibility of not only surpassing Christianity as Tillich mentions, but also the possibility of surpassing and reinventing the western philosophical Christian Hegelian structure of being which projects any symbolic transformations that may still remain intrinsically Christian. Armand Hammer, and others like them, submit “CRWNS” as a Whiteheadian lure for feeling, persuading us by surrounding us with the bitter reality of the existential situation to invigorate the underlying ground of being with passion until it ruptures and produces a renewed ground, a ground that makes the possibility of all humans being valued as full persons, a real option. Tillich’s existential symbolism of being is combined with Whitehead’s ultimate universal flux of becoming, and we are left with a secular theology that can give a sense of substantial meaning while knowing that as the structure of the ground of being changes, substantial human meaning changes also. In other words, a Tillichian-inspired process theology can be said like this: The ground of being becomes.” I’m out.

Beginning

On the 50th anniversary of Tillich’s death, I remember the import his work has had on shaping and reshaping how I understand theology, culture, and the intersections of the holy and the profane. As much as a process thinker as I claim to be, the double entendre of returning to Tillich instead of a continuous flux beyond him is always present. Let these inadequate stutters of coherence and blocks in the path of philosophical and theological reflection stir a conversation between two strands of thought that have not yet come into the unity that their diverse natures makes possible. The “adventure” of the contrast between Whitehead and Tillich is what makes a portrait containing colors from them both as beautiful as the sounds of John Coltrane were to the writer of the formative and transformative theological texts we assemble to honor at this AAR session.

Works Cited


Illogic. The Only Constant. Weightless Recordings, 2003. CD.


1 Illogic, The Only Constant (Weightless Recordings, 2003), CD.


5 Systematic Theology Vol 1, 94.

6 Ibid, 265, 287.
not a structure, but the exemplification of creativity. While the primordial nature gives us a field from which to ingress eternal objects, it still draws its energy to exist from the ground of being. For before the exemplification of creative advance, there is the creativity that it exemplifies.


29 Ibid, 227.

30 Armand Hammer, “CRWNS,” (Backwoodz Studioz, 2013), CD.

In the Fall Bulletin:

- Annual Program and Banquet Information
- “Faithful Expectation: Hommage à Paul Tillich” by Fred Dallmayr
- “Tillich and the ‘Personal’ God” by Durwood Foster
- “Constructing a Political Theology on Tillich’s Theology of Culture” by Ted Peters

Please remember to remit your dues at your earliest convenience.

Thank you!
I. Identifying the Case

Paul Tillich self-identified as a Lutheran, but he also operated with relative creativity in relation to that tradition. In the session on “Tillich and Lutheran Theology” at the 2015 AAR Annual Meeting in Atlanta, I attempted to draw connections from Tillich to another creative Lutheran who lived in the 19th century, the theologian Hans Lassen Martensen. An assumption I was working with is that both of these theological thinkers were affirming how the appropriating of Christian faith contributes to a fulfilled life and how Christian theological formulations can be developed in correlation with ideas from philosophy and culture.

This paper strives to make a mountain out of a molehill. Three pieces of evidence point to a conclusion of fact. However, since there is little direct evidence supporting that conclusion, the task becomes one of offering circumstantial evidence from multiple areas that reinforce one another in support of the factual conclusion. At the paper’s end, a case will have been made, but it will not have arrived at a terminal point outside the arena of speculation in which the inquiry began. I hope here, then, to present a compelling interpretive narrative reporting the results of my investigative detective work on Tillich’s theology in relation to Martensen’s. The paper points toward intriguing connections between these two thinkers rather than definitively establishing Tillich’s dependence on Martensen.

II. The Pieces of Evidence

So let us explore the three items. The first evidential point is anecdotal. Thirty-five years ago, I went to Copenhagen to do research for my doctoral dissertation on Hans Lassen Martensen, Kierkegaard’s teacher and the target of his criticisms. I had a few conferences with Niels Thulstrup, the head of the Kierkegaard Library at that time, and in one of them the topic turned to Paul Tillich. Thulstrup right away referred to Tillich as “the twentieth-century Martensen,” as if that were common knowledge. I had not heard of that connection or formulation of it before, but it did make some sense.

The term anédota in the Greek referred to “things unpublished. “My second evidential point was published, but it involves anecdotal information. Hermann Brandt wrote a dissertation on Martensen and it was published in 1970. Brandt acknowledged his indebtedness to Danish theologian Regin Prenter for cordially allowing him to quote from a letter Prenter had sent Brandt about a conversation Prenter had with Tillich. In the letter Prenter had indicated:

At a visit with me in connection with a guest lecture (perhaps in 1954) Tillich stated, when I said that his theology reminded me of Martensen’s (for example, his interpretation of the classical dogmas, especially his logos Christology), that in reality he felt like the right-wing Hegelian theologians Marheinecke and Martensen were the theologians who stood closest to him, and that among other things this was bound up with the significance Schelling’s philosophy had had both for these theologians and for him.²

The admission is not that Tillich stood close to Martensen but that Martensen stood close to Tillich. It does disclose to us, though, that Tillich knew enough about Martensen’s theology to make that claim.

The third evidential point consists of comments that Tillich makes in notes of his 1910 dissertation on Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development. In all his writings, Tillich nowhere discusses Martensen’s views at any length. He merely identifies Martensen as a “theologian of mediation” in discussing Kierkegaard in his Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Theology.³ But in his first dissertation Tillich does make three references to Martensen in the notes. In the context of treating Schelling’s understanding of “the self-unfolding of God in the world of ideas as the ‘true transcendentally theogony,’” he quotes Martensen as an example of a theologian of mediation who is contending against the old theological principle that “God is pure and simplest simplicity.” The quote is of a statement Martensen makes in his Christian Dogmatics, which reads: “Just as certainly as God must reveal himself as the blessed self-consciousness, so must there also unfold in God a pleroma, a realm of essences, of ideas, of powers and forces, an internal
uncreated world (κόσμος νόημας [the intelligible cosmos of forms and intellects]).” Tillich refers to a second Martensen quote in discussing Schelling on the personal God. The quote, again from Christian Dogmatics, states: “God is the eternal Father, as the ego, who from his unbegotten natural ground unfolds himself in self revelation and brings forth his fullness in the contemplation of distinct ideas.” The third reference to Martensen is made in the context of discussing the mystics’ distinction between the Godhead and God. He notes that Martensen writes, “Mystical theology is in error when it says that pure ‘Godhead’ is better than ‘God.” These quotes are pulled out of rather detailed discussions of Martensen, so their inclusion shows that Tillich, at the minimum, had read some portions of Martensen’s Christian Dogmatics.

III. Drawing Connections

Paul Tillich was a human being whose religious commitments needed to be situated within the framework of a comprehensive understanding of the world. Martensen too embodied fides quaerens intellectum or faith seeking understanding in a form that desired nothing less than an expansive grasping of the whole. These two shared an appreciation for faith as sponsoring questing that does not stop short of the whole. This seems to have stirred both of them to do theology in such a way that their claims about theos needed to cohere with their claims about cosmos.

In this main section of the paper, I attempt to draw connections between the two religious thinkers, making some quick comparisons at least as far as the terminology utilized by each. In what follows, I first identify a theme explored by Tillich, and then I consider this theme as Martensen has considered it.

Justification and Doubt

A central theological principle of Luther and Lutherans is that of justification by grace through faith. This principle is central for Tillich as well, and it functions for him as the Protestant Principle or as the material principle of authority, just as the Scriptures constitute the formal principle. Tillich’s understanding of justification is somewhat distinctive insofar as he holds that regeneration precedes justification. So in Volume II of his Systematic Theology, he discusses “The Threefold Character of Salvation,” with regeneration as participation in the New Being coming first, followed by justification as acceptance of the New Being, and with sanctification, rounding out the discussion, as transformation by the New Being. Regeneration precedes justification, because, as he writes, “justification presupposes faith, the state of being grasped by the divine presence.” Also provocative is Tillich’s view, as influenced apparently by Martin Kähler, that justification deals with doubt as well as sin. As Robert Scharlemann has pointed out, the thinker who doubts is justified in spite of the doubt, for truth is expressed in spite of the untruth.

Some similarities on these points can be seen in Martensen’s theology. Of course, for him too, justification by grace through faith is the article on which the church stands or falls. He regards justification by faith as the material principle of theology with the Scriptures serving as the formal principle. Furthermore, he understands regeneration as preceding justification. Regeneration is at once the breaking out of grace and the breaking out of freedom in the human as a new personality is established in this one becoming “a new creature.” On doubt, he does affirm some of the same ideas as Tillich. These come forth in his 1874 book on Catholicism and Protestantism, where he highlights doubt as a key characteristic of Protestantism. We should remember here that the First Vatican Council had taken place in 1869-70, so Martensen’s book, published not long after that, is responding especially to views of the Roman Catholic church as expressed in that Council, namely, its concerns about the contemporary problems of the ascending influence of rationalism, liberalism, and materialism. Martensen contends that Catholicism demands that doubt be concealed and suppressed by the dominating power of the church’s authority, with the believer left to fall into the arms of the church to be given external protection and security. Protestantism, on the other hand, demands that doubt be expressed and struggled through in faith. This doubt, he says, is “from the truth” and “is related to faith, because it is faith which through doubt is sought.” Martensen presents Luther himself as exhibiting such doubt in his searching, and through his doubting, being led not to external guarantees of security but to internal experience of forgiveness that pro-
vided him with a certainty that ran deeper than doubt.\textsuperscript{13}

**Pantheism**

Luther had given potent expression to the immanence of God within creation, with some of his statements verging on being pantheistic. Tillich introduces pantheism at numerous times in his writings, usually being quick to clarify that by pantheism is not meant that God is all things or everything but rather that God is the ground of all things with this ground being understood either as cause or as substance.\textsuperscript{14} Pantheism rightly endorses God as the power of being in all that is, and to that extent Tillich cannot reject it outright. Tillich also employs the term “panentheism,” which “means that everything is in God,” in characterizing Calvin’s affirmation of all things having an instrumental character insofar as “they are instruments through which God works in every moment.”\textsuperscript{15}

Martensen embraced pantheism as the truth that lies at the heart of all religion. It is the basis for affirming the unity of God with all created reality. However, religion ought not stop with pantheism, because it ends in a confusing of God and creatures. Pantheism needs to be transcended because it holds to the idea of God’s external infinitude or extensive absoluteness, instead of holding to the idea of God’s internal or intensive central absoluteness, with this latter being the result of divine self-limitation.\textsuperscript{16} Martensen’s theology can be characterized as panentheistic.\textsuperscript{17}

**Learning from the Mystics**

Wilhelm Pauck notes how Tillich appreciated “the Lutheran principle finitum capax infiniti (the finite is capable of comprehending the infinite), and on this basis Tillich explained and defended his propensities toward mysticism and in particular what he called his ‘mystical participation in nature.’”\textsuperscript{18} Mysticism contributed to Tillich’s thinking from beginning to end. The first dissertation dealt with mysticism, especially as the Lutheran mystic Jacob Boehme had influenced Schelling on mysticism and guilt consciousness; and Boehme, as mediated through the later Schelling, of course, had a shaping influence on Tillich’s understanding of the abyss-aspect of God and the demonic. Boehme’s *Ungrund* or “abyss” in God became Tillich’s “Unconditioned.”\textsuperscript{19} The abyss houses non-Being, as μὴ δὲ, relative non-Being, or meontic non-Being,\textsuperscript{20} as opposed to ὅπως δὲ, absolute non-Being, or oukontic non-Being. Then, in the fifth and last part of his *Systematic Theology* on “History and the Kingdom of God,” Tillich had articulated the notion of essentialization as influenced by the thought of Meister Eckhart.\textsuperscript{21}

It is interesting that Martensen early on (1840) had published the book *Meister Eckhart: A Study in Speculative Theology*.\textsuperscript{22} In this book, he engages in an investigation of the mystical consciousness in which he utilizes the correlative notions of mystery and revelation, together with the third concept of the highest good in relation to virtue. The last of these involves essentialization.\textsuperscript{23} I have summarized Martensen’s account as describing “mysticism’s eschatological vision of the presentation of the essentialized self within the life of God, as the self’s self-will” being “destroyed while the goodness created by the self’s decision-making is preserved in God’s eternity.” Martensen’s analysis of the mystical consciousness is still today acknowledged as valuable. With Tillich’s interest in the mystics, it would have been strange if he had not examined that *Meister Eckhart* work. Then near the end of his life (1881), Martensen published a book on Jacob Boehme. This 350-page work, which he thought was his best, is full of references to Schelling; therefore, it is hard to imagine that Tillich would not have found his way to it. Time and again in this book, we encounter the theme of “nature in God”; but this nature is, in comparison with what we call Nature, something infinitely more subtle...not matter at all, but rather a source for matter, a plenitude of living forces and energies.\textsuperscript{25} In the depth or abyss of God, he writes, there is this “πληρωμα of Nature,” “a totality of forces,” a complex that has not yet developed itself,\textsuperscript{26} which comes to characterize the Trinity as constituted by the Father (the will of the abyss), the Son (who “reconciles the austere and angry Father and makes him loving and compassionate”), and the Spirit (who proceeds from the Father and Son and functions as an Artist in fashioning, shaping, and completing the manifoldness of the pleroma).\textsuperscript{27} This pleroma, which Martensen suggests “is best thought of as a pleroma of ideas, streaming forth in multiplicity from the Father—is gathered by the Son into intellectual unity, and
is shaped by the Spirit into a world of ideas, distinct from God, and yet inseparable from Him.”

These ideas are possibilities, or noumenic non-being, which Martensen distinguishes from ontic non-being.

**Reason and Revelation**

Reason and revelation is another theme where some connections could be drawn between our two thinkers. For Tillich, reason of the ontological and technical type points, on the one hand, to the structure of the mind enabling it to grasp and transform reality, and on the other hand, to reason’s capacity for reason. Reason’s depth precedes reason and is manifest through it, in cognitive, aesthetic, legal, and communal realms, and reason’s depth explains the emergence of myth and cult. Ecstasy takes place when reason transcends the subject-object structure of its basic condition and this “ecstatic reason makes possible revelation.” “Revelation is the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately,” and revelation is always “for someone in a concrete situation of concern.”

Martensen too has interesting thoughts on the relation of reason and revelation. For him, although there is only one system of reason, two degrees or stages are involved in reason’s revelation. He contends that “it is only through regeneration that the human mind, darkened by sin, can be lifted up to that stage of life and existence, at which it can have a correct view of divine and human things. Regeneration expresses itself in faith.” And in describing Eckhart’s thought he employs the category of ecstasy as the means of entering into true unity with the Godhead or the God beyond God that is the mysterious ground and possibility of the divine personality. Martensen affirms, then, according to my formulation, “the interrelatedness of reason and revelation in that each has its ground in the other, so that the immanence of God is seen insofar as the essence of divine revelation is what human self-consciousness arrives at and the transcendence of God is seen insofar as the depths of the human’s self-consciousness is the divine self-consciousness.” That is why Martensen writes in his dissertation on *The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology* that the human’s need for an incarnation or for a visible God…is so deep-rooted and engrained in Christ that if it had not literally occurred, humanity itself necessarily would have invented it.

**Theonomy**

Another theme is that of theonomy and the attending terms of autonomy and heteronomy as they come to play in developing a theology of culture. This is one of Tillich’s major contributions. Theonomy, for him, is “autonomous reason united with its own depths.” Reason needs to be saved, and that happens in Tillich’s view in theonomous reason, or reason in revelation. He also characterizes “Theonomous knowledge” as “Spirit-determined Wisdom.”

At the beginning of his theological career Martensen arrived at a position that he described as “theonomic.” During his lifetime, he developed his theonomous theology in relation to many different situations facing him. Throughout decades of theological formulating, in which he was concerned with various academic, ecclesial, and societal contexts, he remained committed to the central root-metaphor of theonomy. Theonomy, for him, is the notion that human freedom, in its individual and social expressions, rightly realizes itself when it uses its autonomous power of self-determination to acknowledge its dependence upon the divine power that is its source. When freedom, in relating itself to itself, relates itself to the divine Other, this is theonomy. And Martensen uses the terms heteronomy and autonomy in his considerations of theonomy.

**Logos Christology**

Finally, we have the theme of Logos Christology. For Tillich, “the rational structure of the universe is mediated through the Logos.” He claims that “some kind of Logos doctrine is required in any Christian doctrine of God.” For him, affirming the living God and the creation necessitates differentiating between the abyss of God and the revelation of God, between God’s ground and God’s form. The Logos doctrine facilitates making such a distinction by serving a twofold rule: “Logos is the principle of the divine self-manifestation in God as well as in the universe, in nature as well as in history.” The theologian distinguishes between the universal logos and “the Logos ‘who became flesh,’ that is, the logos manifesting itself in a particular historical event.” But
the Christian also claims that the incarnate logos is at the same time the universal logos. He reminds us that, when “Jesus as the Christ is called the Logos, Logos points to a revelatory reality, not to revelatory words.” That manifestation, which is called the New Being, is based on Paul’s “new creation” and “this is the Christian message.”

Martensen also affirmed a universal and particular manifestation of the Logos. This double life of the Logos is due to the Son’s mediating the divine presence to the world in two ways, namely, in “the general revelation of the Logos,” where the Son is the mediator of Creation and is creatively active in the world, and in “the revelation of Christ,” where the Son is active in redeeming the world and bringing it to completion. In general revelation the Logos works in the kingdom of nature, and in the revelation of Christ the Logos’ sphere of activity is the kingdom of grace. So, the Logos is double in function as both the world-creating and the world-perfecting principle, and these two are one in that they are both expressions of the Son. In Martensen, this twofoldness assumes an exitus-reditus quality:

We must distinguish a two-fold activity in the Godhead. The one activity proceeds forth from God, establishes and sustains created life in a relative existence apart from God; and this is exactly the conception of an all-creating, all-sustaining, all-enduring logos-energy. The other activity leads back to God, and makes perfect, transforming the relation of contrast into one of union, that God may be all-in-all; this is exactly the conception of the Christ-energy.

In this area as well, then, parallels can be found between Martensen and Tillich.

IV. Closing Statement

In considering “Tillich and Lutheran Theology,” this paper has attempted to trace a trajectory from Martin Luther through the Lutheran theologian Hans Lassen Martensen to the Lutheran theologian Paul Tillich. In doing so, connections have been drawn between Martensen and Tillich on the themes of justification and doubt, pantheism, learning from the mystics, reason and revelation, theonomy, and logos Christology. It seems that in a less than direct manner, the case has been made that Tillich, besides reading Luther, also read Martensen and found in him a Lutheran brother who provided a source of support and encouragement for operating as a free-thinking Lutheran theology. Both thinkers, guided by their religious commitments, sought to set their theological claims within a comprehensive understanding of the world, and found inspiration in thought-worlds that shared much. One can understand why Thulstrup referred to Tillich as “the twentieth-century Martensen.”


2 Hermann Brandt, Gotteserkenntnis und Weltentfremdung: Der Weg der spekulativen Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), p. 257, n. 16. In this same note Brandt indicates that “these continuing congenialities between Martensen and Tillich are also quite emphatically demonstrated through a neglected document, namely, through the ten theses, upon which P. Tillich disputed on the occasion of his [1912] dissertation.”


8 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. II. p. 178.

34 Martensen, Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 31 / Christian Dogmatics, p. 23.
37 Between Hegel and Kierkegaard, p. 34.
38 Between Hegel and Kierkegaard, p. 95.

Martensen stated that the theonomic standpoint he arrived at under the influence of [Franz Xaver von] Baader is expounded in all his writings. And he stated in his Dogmatiske Opflynsinger. Et Leilighedsskrift (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1850), p. 68, that his writings consistently gave expression to the concept of the theonomic.”

54 Martensen, Den christelige Dogmatik, p. 85 / Christian Dogmatics, p. 70.
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