In this issue:

- An Apology and Information from the Editor
- 2015 NAPTS Dues are Due
- The Fiftieth Anniversary of Tillich’s Death: A Special Program on Tillich’s Theological Legacies
- New (and Some Different) Publications
- “Tillich’s Unsteady Affair with Being-Itself” by Durwood Foster
- “The Demonry of Christianity: Tillich’s Concept of the Demonic and the Deconstruction of Religious Racism” by Eric A. Weed

**An Apology from the Editor and News about Issues and Dues**

Your Spring Bulletin (vol. 41, 2) is being sent to you at last. I humbly apologize for the delay. A number of academic commitments and some significant personal issues made it impossible for me to finish the Bulletin on time this year.

At the same time, however, another issue deeply concerns me. I have not received the number of papers that I would like in order to create separate issues. For this reason, I am combining volume 41, numbers 2 and 3, (Spring and Summer) into this one issue.

I urge everyone who has presented a paper at the 2014 meeting to send it to the Bulletin (fparrella@scu.edu) as soon as possible. Many thanks.

**A Special Program: Tillich’s Theological Legacies**

Fifty years ago, on October 22, 1965, Paul Tillich died, just days after having given his final public lecture. Consideration of the theological endeavor between then and now highlights how seminal his thought has been within the field of religion. In contemporary parlance, it could be said that in many ways today’s Academy is Tillich gone viral. On this panel, leading scholars address how Tillich’s ideas have contributed to their work in religion and science, theology and culture, theology and psychology, black liberation theology, feminist theology, ground of being theologies, and theology and world religions. The vibrancy of Tillich’s contribution to the constructive work of these scholars indicates the lasting nature of his
influence on the field.

Panelists and Topics

—Harvey Cox on Theology and Culture
—Robert Russell on Theology and Science
—Pamela Cooper-White on Theology and Psychology
—Willie Jennings on Theology and Black Liberation Thought

Respondents

—Mary Ann Stenger on Theology and Feminist Perspectives
—John Thatamanil on Theology and World Religions

Presider
—Sharon P. Burch

New Publications

[Editor’s Note: New Publications by members of the Society are always welcome, whether they be scholarly works on Tillich, scholarship on another subject, or, as one can see in our first two listings below, a publication of a different kind: a novel of suspense and murder, and a journey into mystical ecstasy or psychosis while the author was a student of Tillich at Harvard.]


Dr. Dole is a retired professor of English at Université du Québec à Chicoutimi. After an experience in Paul Tillich’s class at Harvard and subsequent hospitalization as a schizophrenic, the author attempts to understand the relationship between religious revelation, mystical ecstasy, and psychosis.


—Praise for Jane Owen’s memoir:
“New Harmony reflects Jane Owen’s unique ability to combine contemplation with action, making the town an eternal altar that cherishes the past but looks toward the future.”
—Meryl Streep, actor

“Owen’s memoir is poetically told and is a powerful testament by an extraordinary woman who had a higher purpose. For her, sculpture was a prayer that could awaken the soul.”
—Don Gummer, sculptor


Between Two Rivers chronicles the life of noted scholar of religion, politics, and philosophy, Ronald H. Stone. From his childhood between the East and West banks of the Des Moines River through graduate work in New York between the Hudson and the East River through his scholarly career and retirement in Pittsburgh, between the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, the book highlights Stone’s focus on Christian social ethics and his prolific writing in the area. The book includes unique insights into some of the renowned scholars Stone worked with closely, including Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, and it discusses Stone’s scholarship on the relationship between religion and politics.

Ronald H. Stone taught for years at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary and the University of Pittsburgh. After retiring, he continues to teach in Carnegie Mellon University’s Osher Life Long Learning Program. He studied at Union Seminary and Columbia University in New York City, where he served as Reinhold Niebuhr’s last teaching assistant and met Paul Tillich. He has published more than twenty books on religion, politics, and philosophy, and served as the president of the North American Paul Tillich Society and founding board member of the Niebuhr Society.

—About Between Two Rivers:
Between Two Rivers chronicles the life of noted scholar of religion, politics, and philosophy, Ronald H. Stone. From childhood through re-
Tillich’s Unsteady Affair
with Being-Itself

Durwood Foster

At Union Seminary when I was there (1946-53), it was counter-intuitive to think of Tillich ever being mistaken historically in the sense of what actually happened. Some would shrink from Paulus’s system; and many confessed he was over their heads. But no one I knew dared question his authority remains impressive, I have become convinced Tillich sometimes seriously misrepresented history. Systematically, as distinct from historically, the most glaring mistake Paulus made was arguably to equate God as he did for a short but critical time with “being-itself.” The crucial instance occurs in Volume One of Systematic Theology, the flagship of Tillich’s career-filled publishing. The following passage saliently espouses “being-itself” as the conceptual spine of Paulus’s doctrine of God, averring blatantly what became unacceptable to him in ST II six years later, viz., that God is literally being-itself. At the same time the passage harbors emphatically the further problematic of identifying God and being whether symbolically or not. This latter stance was never explicitly surrendered by Tillich, not only as such or in itself—which was, of course, his own business as systematician—but also as the allegedly historical position of the Augustinian-Franciscan “ontological”—as contrasted with the Thomistic “cosmological”—way of thinking, Paulus used this historical claim to buttress his systematic stance, which is the nub of the issue I want to raise here. My plaint is that in so doing our revered master egregiously misrepresented the Augustinian-Franciscan position. He writes:

The statement that God is being-itself is a non-symbolic statement. It does not point beyond itself. It means what it says directly and properly; if we speak of the actuality of God, we first assert that he is not God if he is not being-itself. Other assertions about God can be made theologically only on this basis. [ST I, 138-9]

It is crucial to realize that despite this unwavering assertion Tillich himself, with ST II in 1957, did correct and abandon—in all he thence wrote afresh—the position that God is literally being-itself. In doing this he resumed what had been his own earlier position through the 1920s and 1930s—the pan-symbolism about God that notably W. M. Urban had critiqued. Tillich’s corrected position was as follows:

[T]he question arises…whether there is a point in which a non-symbolic assertion about God must be made. There is such a
point, namely the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic. Such a statement is an assertion about God which itself is non-symbolic...This is the point at which we must speak non-symbolically about God, but in terms of a quest for him. In the moment, however, in which we describe the character of this point...a combination of symbolic with non-symbolic elements occurs. If we say that God is the infinite, or the unconditional, or being itself, we speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time...The point is both non-symbolic and symbolic. [ST II, 9-10]

Some erudite Tillichians, such as Rob James with whom I debated the issue at the San Francisco meeting in 2011, may continue to think there was no change in Paulus’s espousal of being-itself as literally the meaning of God. This would appear to show the awed credence I shared at Union. It was, and is, undeniably sheltered by Tillich’s failure to be as clear about the change as he should have been. He did not explicate that ST I was in error, nor attempt to alter subsequent publications of the volume. Nor did he repudiate his espousal of “being-itself” as (along with “unconditional,” “absolute,” and “infinite”) one of three or four partly non-symbolic while also partly symbolic designations of God. In San Francisco three years ago, I did not quarrel with this retaining by Tillich of being-itself as a cardinal Christian ascription to God. Now I am convinced I must. To reiterate: whereas before I attacked only its literal equivalence to God—in this echoing the second thoughts of Paulus himself—I now am compelled to question being-itself in its common sense meaning as an acceptable designation for God as understood biblically and in the mainline Christian tradition.

In the mainline Christian tradition, überhaupt, the unconditional being of God, is categorically prior to and distinct from “finite” being, which is construed as the creation by this God “out of nothing” (ex nihilo). About this, I believe there is broad scholarly consensus, irrespective of what position one may take on the question of an “analog of being” (analogia entis) between God and creation. Of course, this assertion requires in its own right to be established and defended in depth and detail, but I do not propose in this short notice to undertake that. My point here is simply that if the statement is true, God for the Christian tradition cannot be being-itself because that tradition holds there are two kinds of being—uncreated and created—and God is essentially the first of these but not essentially or in general the second. [I have added “essentially” and “in general” here to allow for the Christological paradox, which otherwise need not encumber the issue before us.] Tillich opportunely inflates the meaning of being-itself to encompass “ground of being,” the aboriginal mystery preceding being and non-being, thus gaining accord with traditional Christian utterance. But he does not always do so, thus inviting now and again the charge of pantheism or atheism. In any event, his personal holding of God to be being-itself, whether inflated or not, is his own systematic viewpoint to which he has every right. Though shared with some others—notably, I find, with Meister Eckhart—such at bottom is not an issue of history and tradition but rather “ob es stimmt oder nicht” [“whether it’s right or not”]. On that issue, I am not presently confronting Tillich. Whatever is systematic about the issue I here leave open, wishing to concentrate instead on the historical aspect. Granted, the two aspects—systematic and historical—are intimately mingled. But surely, that is the more reason to get them clearly disentangled. Once again, what I here wish to question and deny is whether Tillich was right to assert “being-itself” is conceptually equivalent to God for the mainline Christian tradition as that took form in Augustine and the Franciscans, was dismantled by Aquinas, and must or might be rehabilitated to make Christian theology relevant today.

II

For Paulus, producing his magnum opus was a creative strain through decades of anxious preparation. Anticipated in his earliest reflections, it congealed preliminarily as the lectures on dogmatics at Marburg, 1924-5. It does not mention being-itself. Tillich at Union in the late 1930s and 1940s was brimming with new impulses, but if we focus specifically on being-itself, there is no reference to that notion, which would become for years his cardinal category, until the mid ’40s. Then, in a pair of articles, “The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,” 1946, and “The Problem of Theological Method,” 1947, Paulus articulated the core thrust he was preparing for his awaited masterwork. Its method, expounded in the latter article, would be the correlation of existential
questions and theological answers, and its inmost theological substance, ringingly enunciated in the first article and assumed in the second, would be the identity of God and being. That first article, I have come to feel, could well be the most problematic piece Paulus ever wrote.

God identical with being? Wouldn’t that be pantheism? Indeed, how else could one adequately define pantheism? But throughout the 1946 article, Tillich declaims it was the “ontological” position of Augustine and the Franciscans, exemplified as the Middle Ages crested in Bonaventura. The article proposes this as the first of two basic types of philosophy of religion, the second type being the “cosmological” approach of St. Thomas which is said to reject God’s identity with being, undertaking instead to prove God as cause of the world. All other philosophies of religion are held to be mixtures of the two basic types. According to Tillich, the ontological type anchors the meaning of God in our human reality, so that estrangement from and reunion with God are ipso facto estrangement from and reunion with our own self and world. By definition, religion is our ultimate concern. The second or cosmological approach undermines this intrinsic mutuality, making God a stranger whom we may or may not accidentally meet. Accentuation of this approach in Scotus and Ockham—so Tillich continues—leads unavoidably to the religious distempers of modernity. To grapple therewith, to answer modern meaninglessness with a viable theology, he insists we must reestablish God’s identity with being.

This was in 1946. Five gruelingly creative years later, Systematic Theology I was launched amid such cheering as H. Richard Niebuhr’s that it is “great theology because the sense of God in it is great.” Union Seminary President, Henry Van Dusen, presciently averred that, “by century’s end if any work of current theology is still discussed, it will be this volume.” Counter fire too began to erupt, from fundamentalists and liberals, from Barthians and Catholics, from linguistic analysts and Whiteheadians. Tillichian theological insight processively entered combat worldwide and does not now seem to be losing or clearly winning, especially where God’s relation to being is concerned.

But wait! Was there ever adequate critique—was there ever any critique?—of the 1946 “Two Types” article? The eerie scantiness, if not absence of such critique, exacerbates my present concern to take a hard fresh look at this launch pad of Tillich’s affair with being-itself. Contrary to our revered master, I dispute that Augustine and the Franciscans identified God and being. Augustine did famously say “esse qua esse bonum est,” but where did he ever say “esse est deus”? It seems patently a misconstruction to assert God as being-itself was the mainline Christian stance till Thomas undermined it. There was indeed a prominent theological figure who equated God and being in the early 14th Century. This was Meister Eckhart, and he was indicted for heresy by Franciscan Pope John XXII! The Augustinian emphasis on creation ex nihilo compellingly requires the contrary.

Nor is it true, I further submit, that St. Thomas disjoined God from being. For the angelic doctor, God categorically is “He who is” (qui est). That being, in the unconditionality of which we do not ipso facto participate, is God’s alone. But only if you implicitly repudiate or ignore the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, which Thomas robustly affirms and articulates, could you hold our being and the world’s is ontologically disjoined from God. Please, comrades, examine carefully this 1946 article!

Paulus respected and loved bold critique. He would never approve timid submission to himself as an authority figure.

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Please remit your dues to the Secretary Treasurer as soon as possible!

The Annual Meeting of the NAPTS and the AAR Tillich Group is in Atlanta this November. Please plan to join us.
The Demonry of Christianity: 
Tillich’s Concept of the Demonic 
and the Deconstruction of Religious Racism

ERIC A. WEED

[Editor’s Note: Two photos accompany this paper, but they could not be produced in this printed version. They will be sent to those who receive the Bulletin electronically, and will be posted with the Bulletin on the website, NAPTS.org]

“The people in this country will have quite enough to do in learning how to accept and love themselves and each other, and when they have achieved this—which will not be tomorrow and may very well be never—the Negro problem will no longer exist, for it will no longer be needed.”
—James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time

The last sixty years in the field of theology have brought about many changes that have increasingly specialized the field. The formalization of contextual and liberation theologies have created more experiential and existential theologies that take seriously the particularities of all persons and creation. Through this approach, theology has taken on a more individual character as opposed to the theological systems of previous centuries. As we move farther into the 21st century, this trend will seemingly continue, but in what ways can this new theological reality be enhanced?

An aspect of contextual and liberation theologies that cannot be denied is the influence of the 20th century theologian Paul Tillich. The work of Tillich is often understood primarily through his discourse on ontology after his exile from Germany and his new life in the United States, but, it can be argued, that in his early career Tillich was constructing a theology heavily based on the existential experience of life that has come to be a centerpiece of contextual and liberation theology.

In this paper, I seek to recapture the theological connection between the early Tillich and contemporary elements in the field of theology. I will do this by applying Tillich’s method of correlation and his concept of the demonic to white supremacy in the United States. To be clear, this does not mean I will be demonstrating the obvious demonic nature within groups like the Ku Klux Klan or the Aryan Nation; rather, I will demonstrate how the mundane in the life of the U.S. is in fact created and maintained through the demonry of a white supremacist Christianity. In doing this work, I am continuing the use of Tillich’s theology to investigate creative and human realities in the same vein that James Cone, Gustavo Gutierrez, and Valerie Saiving used Tillich’s method to construct theological systems that take seriously their experiential context and history.

In order to lay a foundation for later parts of this paper, I will begin by critically describing Tillich’s method of correlation and his concept of the demonic. The clearest exposition of Tillich’s correlative method is found in the first volume of his Systematic Theology. Tillich establishes his method in order to seek an appropriate theological foundation for an understanding of the human situation in regards to the duality of being and non-being, and the ways in which this duality is determinative on one’s life. According to Tillich, the existential assault of non-being seeks answers in many different ways and “the method of correlation explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence.” The creation of this method enables the theologian, in Tillich’s opinion, to best correlate the unity of all person’s existential estrangement with being-itself that is revealed in Jesus, who is the Christ. The necessary result of Tillich’s method is the breakdown of normative theological systems for one that understands that time and space are unique factors in the interpretation of one’s situation. I employ Tillich’s method as a form of cultural criticism through the investigation of history to reconstruct popular theologies that are not bound to the pillars of Christian doctrine. In this way, Tillich offers a lens into interpreting the past. By understanding the events of history through Tillich’s method of correlation, the theologian is better equipped to read the present. While others see Tillich’s method as primarily useful in the present situation, his work opens the door to the past. To interpret how the Christian message was used then and how these past interpretations inform the present is key to deconstructing white racism. This is particularly important in understanding the transformation of the theology of Christian supremacy to white supremacy.
Before turning to how Tillich applied the demonic in his own life, it is necessary to briefly describe what is meant by the demonic. The obvious and most insightful answer comes from his essay “The Demonic” in The Interpretation of History. In this essay, Tillich describes the demonic as something that takes over the power of being and therefore divides one’s personality. In this way, the demonic destroys the form of individual being by subjecting it to a new universal power of meaning, but this meaning is found in a finite character that lends itself to creative-destruction.

Tillich recognized two places in which the demonic operated in his own time in the form of economic capitalism and the social meaning of nationalism. Two recent works have also found the concept of the demonic useful in the contemporary setting. Bruce P. Rittenhouse, in Shopping for Meaningful Lives: The Religious Motive of Consumerism, argues that in the age globalization people are finding ultimate meaning in a consumerist culture that function as a religion in contradiction to the ground of being. The other is the article, “An Unintended Conversation Partner: Tillich’s Account of the Demonic and Critical Race Theory,” by Stephen G. Ray. In this article, like myself, he argues that through the lens of the demonic, the category of race can be interpreted as the Holy because of its ability to provide ultimate meaning to persons through the symbols and practices of white supremacy. These recent works demonstrate the relevance and need for theology to continue to embrace Tillich’s concept of the demonic to enhance the awareness of quasi-religious destructive patterns that hold meaning in the world.

In the second part of this paper, I will focus on Tillich’s application of his method and the concept of the demonic to the demonry of Nazism through his radio addresses into Nazi Germany on behalf United States government during the Second World War. Tillich’s radio address, entitled “The Death and Resurrection of Nations,” that aired in April 1942 is particularly important to understanding and applying the demonic to contemporary meanings and symbols. First, to better understand Tillich’s perspective at the time the radio address aired it is important to know that three significant events took place in the preceding months that radically altered the course of the European theater. First, in January 1942, the Nazi government held a meeting in Wansee to finalize what would be called the final solution to the Jewish question. In addition to this, Hitler gave a speech in which he declared the imminent annihilation of the European Jewry. In February, the Soviet military counter assault began to gain momentum and started pushing the German military back on the Eastern front. Finally, in March, allied strategic bombing campaigns started to bomb Germany proper in earnest.

The combination of these three events demonstrated the inevitability of Nazi failure during the war, and Tillich sought to address this inevitability in his broadcast to the German people. Tillich started his radio broadcast by arguing that people seek to hide from the law of death and resurrection. By pointing to people’s desires to evade death and resurrection, the problem of modern western society is unveiled in the drive for progress that makes whole societies within the Christian world believe in their own immortality; and as a result, societal structures constructed themselves in ways that denied the finitude of all created objects, particularly nations. The drive for the immortality of the German people led to the devastation of the First World War that Tillich experienced first hand, and ultimately, the rise of Hitler’s creative destruction.

Tillich continues his broadcast by describing the present situation of Germany as one that witnessed the death of its own nation, and through Nazism, this reality has been twisted, like the Hakenkreuz or the swastika, to a cultural religious expression where ultimate meaning is found in death rather than life. In this way, all of Nazi Germany was shaped to give purpose and meaning only through the service of Germany, and more importantly, Hitler. There is no clearer example of the Nazi belief in death than in Tillich’s reference to Gregor Ziemer’s Education for Death: The Making of the Nazi and later the Walt Disney propaganda film adapted from the book.

Tillich’s reference to Education for Death is instructive in understanding how he views the operative power of the demonic at the socio-national level. Ziemer’s work argues that from birth the Nazi party controls every aspect of one’s life until the destiny of death. The Nazi belief of ultimate purpose as found through the sacrifice of one’s life to the propagation of the Führer and Germany redirects the creative energy of the German people that comes to culmination in the true purpose of life which is a sacrificial death for the betterment of Germany. For this redirection of creative
forces to work, the Nazi Party had to create a state conditioned to believe only that Nazism and Germany were central to collective and individual meaning, to the extent that non-Germans were a threat to the life force of Nazi Germany. In this worldview, all actions garnered ultimate meaning by promoting the Nazi way. The visualization of ultimate meaning is succinctly depicted in the last scene of the Disney propaganda film where Nazi soldiers are educated to see, speak, and go only by the orders of the Nazi Party. With muzzles, blinders, and chains connecting the young Nazi men they are marched to the front lines to fulfill their destiny through annihilation.

In the final piece of this paper, I will turn to how the demonic operates in the United States under the guise of white supremacy. While this cannot be an exhaustive analysis of demonry in the U.S. context, it will provide a historical vignette as a way of arguing for further investigation. One can search the history of this country and, from the very beginning of its mythical founding by the Puritans, one will find a sordid history of racial oppression. In this section, I will focus on a more recent event of mob violence in Marion, Indiana. On August 7, 1930, two black men named Thomas Schipp and Abe Smith were lynched in front of the Marion County courthouse for the alleged murder of Claude Deeter, a white man, and the assault of a white woman named Mary Ball. Newspapers in Chicago reported that as many as 5,000 spectators gathered around the courthouse to witness the beating, mutilation, and hanging of both Schipp and Smith.

While this event might not be particularly surprising to a student of U.S. history, the symbolic and sacral meanings of lynching in America are often ignored or misperceived by the observing eye of whites and left to the devices of black scholars to investigate the meaning.

The case of the lynching of Schipp and Smith is forever imprinted in U.S. history through a widely distributed picture of the lynching scene that shows the battered and bruised bodies of Schipp and Smith hanging from the courthouse tree with torn and tattered clothes draped on their lifeless bodies while surrounded by white sightseers and revelers. As one gazes at the horrifying scene, the reality of two Americas takes shape. The first is of a black America where the accused can be humiliated and murdered simply for being black in America. As the New York Amsterdam News said on August 27, 1930, “Every fair-minded person will admit that in the United States a colored man is lynched for the crime of being a Negro.” A reality whites cannot understand, including myself, is the legacy of the continual existential assault against blacks, as well as other non-whites, through the disposable nature of their being in the United States of America. Blacks are used, abused, and killed for the explicit benefits of whites and there is no further proof needed than the picture of the Marion lynching that was sold to whites as souvenirs of the momentous occasion in a town that had never had the honor of lynching a Negro.

As Harvey Young in his article “The Black Body as Souvenir in American Lynching,” states:

On the scheduled day and at the appointed hour, scores of spectators would assemble to witness the public staging of vengeance acted upon the accused by the victim or the victim’s family, the prolonged torture of the accused by the lynching organizers, the lynching (by burning, hanging, or shooting) of the accused, and the dismemberment of the accused’s body into souvenirs. As public performances, lynchings far surpassed all other forms of entertainment in terms of their ability to attract an audience and the complexity of their narratives. A lynching was an event—something not to be missed.

The bodies of Schipp and Smith act as sacred symbols of the mundane character of white Christian supremacy. The physical act of lynching is by no means mundane in any sense, but to it is take a wide view of the lynching scene that does not focus on Schipp and Smith, but rather on the white crowd. This refocusing starts to reveal the real character of whiteness in America. In this picture is the freely exposed and joyous faces of white men and women who do not fear legal recourse because vigilante justice by whites against non-whites does not warrant legal action. The demonic can be found by not looking at the picture for what it presents at the surface level but by digging deeper into the symbolic level of white power for the sake and propagation of white power.

By the nature of U.S. demographics, all the people in this picture, including the couple on the left who are expecting a child, the older woman looking over her shoulder, or the man with the tattooed arm pointing at Schipp and Smith are
educated in the Christian tradition. This does not mean that everyone who witnessed the lynching in Marion, Indiana on August 7, 1930 was a religiously devout Christian, but they were raised and lived in a society permeated by the symbolism and doctrine of Christianity. What can be seen in this picture is the destructive creativity of a demonic Christianity that is shaped and maintained through the elevation of whiteness to a divine status and a religious fervor that prioritizes white over non-white by providing ultimate meaning to the fortunate few who embody the proper class, faith, gender, and pigment of the demonic divine. In *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept*, W.E.B. Du Bois describes the social commitment to the concept of a race like this,

Practically, this group imprisonment within a group has various effects upon the prisoner. He becomes provincial and centered upon the problems of his group. He tends to neglect the wider aspects of national life and human existence. On the one hand, he is unselfish so far as his inner group is concerned. He thinks of himself not as an individual but as a group man, a ‘race’ man. His loyalty to this group idea tends to be almost unending and balks at almost no sacrifice. On the other hand, his attitude toward the environing race congeals into a matter of unreasoning resentment and even hatred, deep disbelief in them and refusal to conceive honesty and rational thought on their part.

In this rather long quotation from Du Bois, we begin to see the cruze of white supremacist faith systems. Ones natural tendency in looking at the lynching of Schipp and Smith is to see only their dangling bodies in the fashion of Billie Holiday’s *Strange Fruit*, but there is another story to be told in this image. If one looks deeper into the white crowd surrounding their sacrifice to the demonic white Christ, a soul-distorting image of structural whiteness appears that places the white body at the top of the divine food chain. Du Bois eloquently hypothesizes Tillich’s ultimate concern through the sacrifice of one’s self to the ultimate meaning of a white supremacist Christianity and its white Christ, even at the cost of one’s soul. *This* is the second America where white life is valued and superimposed over and against all others.

In closing this paper, I return to the where it began with the quote from James Baldwin. The poignant truth he speaks in those powerful words is also found in the work of James Cone and Paul Tillich. While all three men say it differently, the key here is the need for the breakdown of white Christian supremacy, but this is not easily done, as is evidenced by its ability to reincarnate itself in every generation of white Americans. There is no easy answer, and to think there is belittles the lives of Thomas Schipp and Abe Smith. However, one place I argue a glimmer of an answer can be gleaned is from the concept of courage. Tillich, and later Cone, focused on the courage to be, and Baldwin points to the need for whites to love themselves. This could possibly be a place to begin because the courage to be means being able to love one’s self in spite of the existential assault of finitude.

I know some will expect me to present concrete examples of how to apply this courage to be to the problems of race in the U.S., but this conclusion will disappoint you. I do not know, nor do I desire to feign platitudes, that will only make people feel better. Too many have died at the hands of a demonic white supremacist Christianity. However, this does not mean that Tillich’s concepts are not useful in the search for future answers. There are two instances where Tillich will be invaluable to the academy and society as a whole. First, his method of correlation makes it possible to take seriously experience and location to better recognize the particularities of the existential dilemma—instead of creating a normative experience that discounts the individuality of being. Second, the demonic provides a key to wade through the religious and cultural demands of the world and to recognize where freedom of being is denied and replaced with destructive meaning that leads to further estrangement from one’s self, others, and the ground of being.

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3. Ibid., 120.

vii Ibid., 18.

viii Ibid.


x Ibid., 17.

xi Education for Death: The Making of the Nazi, directed by Clyde Geronimi (1943, Walt Disney Productions), DVD (Walt Disney Productions, 2004).

xii 5,000 See Mob Hang Rapists in Court Yard, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 8, 1930.


xvi Indiana Mob, August 16, 1930.


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