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The 2013 Annual Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society and the Election of New Officers

The annual meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society was held in Baltimore, Maryland on Friday, November 22, and Saturday, November 23, 2013, in conjunction with the meeting of the American Academy of Religion. The AAR Group, “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture” also met on Sunday and Monday, November 24 and 25. The meeting on Monday was a joint meeting with the AAR’s Kierkegaard Society.

The annual banquet of the Society was held on Friday night, November 22, 2013 at the Baltimore Convention Center. The guest speaker at the banquet was Marion Hausner Pauck. Her address is published in this Bulletin. At the banquet, it was read by the Society’s president, Echol Nix, since Mrs. Pauck was unable to be present in person.

Unfortunately, the attendance at this year’s banquet was very low, and the Society suffered a serious financial loss. If you have not paid your 2013 dues, or if you attended the banquet and did not pay the secretary treasurer, please send a check made out to the NAPTS at your earliest convenience. Thank you.

New officers were elected to serve the Society:

**President**
Duane Olsen, McKendree University

**President Elect**
Charles Fox, SUNY/ Empire State College Emeritus

**Vice President**
Bryan Wagoner, Davis and Elkins College

**Secretary-Treasurer**
Frederick Parrella, Santa Clara University

**Past President and Chair, Nominating Committee**
Echol Nix, Furman University
Three new members of the Board of Directors were also appointed for a three-year term, expiring in 2016:

- Christopher Rodkey
- Zachary Royal
- M. Lon Weaver

The Officers and the Board of the Society extend their most sincere gratitude to those members of the Society who have served on the Board for a three-year term expiring in 2013:

- Nathaniel Holmes, Florida Memorial University
- Bryan Wagoner, Davis and Elkins College
- Wesley Wildman, Boston University

Congratulations to the new officers!

NAPTS Call for Papers 2014 Meeting
San Diego, California

The North American Paul Tillich Society (NAPTS) welcomes proposals for its Annual Meeting that will take place Friday and Saturday, November 21–22, 2014, during the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in San Diego, California, 22-25 November, 2014. We welcome proposals for individual papers to become part of panel discussions on the following issues:

1. Open session exploring the relation of Tillich’s thought to the particular research interests of individual Tillich scholars.
2. Critical discussion of Ron Stone’s recent book, “Politics and Faith: Niebuhr and Tillich at Union Seminary in New York” (Friday, early afternoon) (three best papers submitted, with response by Stone)
3. Tillich’s *Systematic Theology* fifty years later. We invite papers on each volume of the Systematic, exploring the systematic connection of that volume with the whole, and/ or on the system as a whole and the roots of Tillich’s notion of “system.”
4. The Philosophical Roots of Tillich’s Thought. We invite papers devoted to the influence on Tillich of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Papers addressing more than one of these figures will also be considered.

Proposals should be sent to the President Elect and Program Chair of this year’s meeting (electronic submissions preferred):

- Dr. Charles W. Fox
  chaswfox@hotmail.com
  (Please put NAPTS Call in the subject line)
  37 Belden St.
  Williamstown, MA 01267
  413-458-8571 (land)
  413-884-5333 (cell)

**Deadline:** 15 April 2014

Please send your 2014 papers to the editor (fparrella@scu.edu) for publication.
Statement of Purpose

This Group fosters scholarship and scholarly exchanges that analyze, criticize, and interpret the thought or impact of Paul Tillich (1886–1965) and that use his thought — or use revisions of or reactions against his thought — to deal with contemporary issues in theology, religion, ethics, or the political, social, psychotherapeutic, scientific, or artistic spheres of human culture. We cooperate with the North American Paul Tillich Society (a Related Scholarly Organization of the AAR), which is linked with the German, French, and other Tillich societies. Papers at our sessions are published in the Society’s quarterly Bulletin without prejudice to their also appearing elsewhere.

Call for Papers

Paul Tillich’s theology contribution was distinctive in the twentieth century in the extent to which he recognized that theology must respond to its contemporary situation. In his Systematic Theology as well as his writings in theology of culture (and his sermons), Tillich sought to correlate the substance of the Christian message to the questions of his context.

In 2014 the AAR Tillich Group invites proposals for papers and/or panels that take up Tillich’s legacy and reassess correlational theology for the twenty-first century. As new situations pose new questions, what are the theological resources available to a contemporary Tillichian? Is the method of correlation still viable at all, given the rise of liberation and contextual theologies? We welcome proposals that engage any aspect of Tillich’s thought and/or that address contemporary concerns.

We also welcome proposals that explore how Paul Tillich’s thought may be used in constructive and creative ways to engage a theology of the arts that sees the arts not merely as a medium for theological reflection but rather a generative source for theological thinking about, and engagement with, the natural and cultural worlds.

In addition, we seek papers addressing love, eros, desire, sexuality and pornography in relation to the work of Paul Tillich (for a cosponsored session with the Queer Studies in Religion Group).

Method

PAPERS: Please go to aarweb.org. There you will find PAPERS, the AAR Call for Papers Submission System that provides complete instructions about submitting a proposal. A 150 word abstract and a 1,000 word proposal are evaluated by the Program Unit Leadership and due by March 3, 2014.

Process:

Proposer names are visible to chairs but anonymous to steering committee members

Leadership:

Chairs
1 Sharon Peebles Burch, sburch@att.net
2 Stephen G. Ray, stephen.ray@garrett.edu

Steering Committee
1 Adam Pryor, pryoraw@bethanylb.edu
2 Courtney Wilder, wilder@midlandu.edu
3 Loye Ashton, lashton@tougaloo.edu
4 Stephen Butler Murray, revdrmurray@yahoo.com

Please find below the Call for Papers for a small conference dedicated to the thought of Paul Tillich to be held in Oxford, 14-15 July 2014

The meeting will take place at Ertegun House, St Giles and is sponsored by Ertegun House, St Benet’s Hall and the Oxford Centre for Theology and Modern European Thought. Keynote speakers include Marc Boss (Montpellier), Douglas Hedley (Cambridge), Anne-Marie Reijnen (Paris) and Christoph Schwébel (Tübingen). The conference is co-convened by Werner Jeanrond (St Benet’s Hall), Russell Re Manning (Aberdeen) and Samuel Shearn (Ertegun House).

We welcome proposals for 20-minute papers on any aspect of Tillich’s thought and/or his legacy.

Paul Tillich features on anyone’s list of most significant and influential 20th Century theologians. In an age where it is tempting to retreat into intra-theological discussion or dismiss the secular world, Tillich’s vision for a theology which engages with culture and connects religious language with philosophical reflection continues to influence and provoke contemporary theological reflection.

This conference aims to stimulate and provide a platform for current work on Paul Tillich in anticipation of the commencement of the publication of the Collected Works in English from 2015, as well as providing space and time for scholars with an inter-
est in Tillich’s work to meet, get to know each other, and discuss their work.

We welcome the submission of abstracts for 20 minute papers which will provoke engagement with and discussion of Paul Tillich’s theology. For example:

- Explorations of aspects of Tillich’s theology
- Tillich’s intellectual development
- Tillich’s influence on other thinkers
- Applications of Tillich’s approach

Please send abstracts of between 300 – 500 words to samuel.shearn@theology.ox.ac.uk by Friday 14th February 2014, with a short biographical note.

It would be wonderful to see any of you there, but also please do spread the word widely.

Best wishes,
Russell Re Manning

New Publications


A Tribute to Professor Robert P. Scharlemann

This tribute to Professor Scharlemann includes excerpts from a tribute I published in the Newsletter of the North American Paul Tillich Society, Vol.
25/1 (Winter 1999), pp. 6-7. Prof. Scharlemann was my doctoral mentor at the University of Iowa, 1970-1977, and we worked together over many decades in the North American Paul Tillich Society (NAPTS).

Although I had gone to the University of Iowa for graduate school to study religion in India, Prof. Scharlemann’s well-organized and well-argued lectures on 19th-century theology in the Spring of 1970 convinced me that I wanted to work with him. He agreed to take me as his mentee with a focus on Paul Tillich’s theology. Bob was a wonderful advisor and teacher who empowered his students rather than trying to clone his own theology and methodology. Semester after semester, he designed seminars for his students that creatively integrated the next steps we needed to take in our work while allowing each of us to pursue our individual interests. Never did he set a seminar to further his own research but always ours. Really, he was doing double research—preparing for our seminars and working on quite different thinkers and topics in his own writing. He challenged us and set high standards for us, treating us all equitably.

On Tuesday nights, Professor Scharlemann took time away from his scholarship to join a group of the School of Religion faculty and students at a local pub where we gathered to drink beer, talk, and laugh together. It was in that setting that I experienced Bob’s political acumen, his broad cultural knowledge, and his delightful sense of humor.

One of the co-founders of the NAPTS, Scharlemann served as Vice-President (1977), President (1978), and Secretary-Treasurer and Editor of the Newsletters (1979-1982, 1988-1997). As the NAPTS informal liaison, he regularly attended the conferences of the Deutsche Paul Tillich Gesellschaft, the Tillich Symposia in Frankfurt sponsored by Prof. Dr. Gert Hummel, and the colloquia of the Association Paul Tillich d’Expression française. His two major books on Tillich are Reflection and Doubt in the Thought of Paul Tillich (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) and Religion and Reflection: Essays in Paul Tillich’s Theology (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005). His critical contributions to the study of Tillich included not only his own papers but also those of several doctoral students, and he regularly raised questions that stimulated our thinking and clarified our understanding.


In all of his academic work, Prof. Scharlemann was quietly effective, committed to high quality research, and willing to give of his time and financial resources, and yet he never expected recognition for his work. With his many other students, both at the University of Iowa and the University of Virginia, I express deep gratitude for the privilege of having worked with Professor Robert Scharlemann.

Mary Ann Stenger
Professor Emerita, Humanities
University of Louisville

**Publication Opportunity—God in Popular Culture**

Are you interested in contributing a chapter to a book on God in Popular Culture? I am co-editor for a two-volume book that will be published later this year with ABC-CLIO on this topic, looking at how God is represented in popular culture, interpreted widely across television, film, music, visual and performance media, and sports. As we come down to the deadline of submitting our volumes to the publisher, we find that we need a few more chapters, although we need them in a rather quick turnover time: No later than March 15, 2014.

If you would be interested in contributing a chapter (5,000-8,000 words typically), please get back in touch with me (revdmurray@yahoo.com) RIGHT AWAY and let me know 1-3 ideas you have about what sort of contribution you would like to make to the volume. This can be a 1-4 sentence proposal, and does not need to be an AAR-style formal proposal. In turn, I’ll get back to you within 24 hours to let you know whether or not we could use the chapter that you have proposed.

So, if you have an otherwise unpublished essay or a conference paper that you would like to see published and were looking for a good avenue for that: here it is. We’d love to have you be part of the project, and I look forward to hear back from you soon. Also, if you want to send this on to any of your friends, colleagues, or graduate students, please feel free to do so.

*God appears throughout television and film, on FOX News and the New York Times, on Twitter and*
belieftnet.com. In nearly every aspect of popular culture, God plays an unparalleled role in determining the importance of storylines and moral reflection. Why do authors and directors use God as a vehicle to examine the human condition? What about God sparks such strong concern in news reports and political commentary? Who is the God depicted in comic books and music videos? Contemporary popular culture is fascinated by God at a time when mainstream churches are failing. Do we rely on culture to feed our imagination of the divine and discuss matters of ultimate meaning, rather than depend on doctrine and theology to determine the course of cultural expression? This set of volumes explores why popular culture needs God, and why, in fact, God might need popular culture.

Thank you so much for your consideration, and I hope to hear from you in the remarkably near future!

Best wishes,
Stephen Murray
The Rev. Dr. Stephen Butler Murray
Dean of the College and Associate Professor of Theology, Barrytown College
Senior Pastor, The First Baptist Church of Boston, Massachusetts
American Baptist Chaplain to Harvard University
Denominational Counselor and Lecturer in Ministry, Harvard Divinity School

Looking Back While Looking Forward

MARION HAUSNER PAUCK

Today we mark (rather than celebrate) the 50th anniversary of the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Those of us who were alive on that terrible day remember precisely where and with whom we were when the news was announced. I was eating lunch in a noisy bar on Madison Avenue, New York in the company of a friend, a Harper book editor; we were discussing the Tillich biography on which I had begun to work. Suddenly there was total silence. We heard Walter Cronkite’s trembling voice announce that President Kennedy had been shot and killed. Later as I walked north on Madison Avenue, I entered an Episcopal church where many had already gathered in silent prayer.

As you all know, the events of that day in Dallas, Texas are being telecast and written about and widely discussed, and Kennedy’s achievements, his personality, and character are being reassessed. Paul Tillich who attended Kennedy’s inauguration on a bitter cold winter day in 1961 and Reinhold Niebuhr who had also been invited but was unable, by reason of his frailty, to attend the ceremony, lived to experience this event. Kennedy had in fact already decided to present the Medal of Freedom (this nation’s highest honor) to Reinhold Niebuhr but it fell to President Johnson, JFK’s successor, to bestow it upon him. Niebuhr was prouder of this award than any other he had received, and rightly so.

On the afternoon of November 22, 1963, Wilhelm Pauck was expected at tea time by the Niebuhrs in their apartment on Riverside Drive. He had not yet heard the announcement of Kennedy’s death, and was therefore puzzled when the elevator man bringing him up to the Niebuhr’s floor wondered out loud how Vice President Johnson was feeling. A few moments later in the Niebuhr apartment, he caught up with the tragic news. Niebuhr turned on the television and wondered in his characteristic way, “Can we compare him to Lincoln?”

A second far more personal 50th anniversary will occur a year from now when longtime friends will remember and celebrate Wilhelm Pauck’s and my wedding day. We were married in Christ Chapel, Riverside Church, New York on November 21, 1964. Reinhold Niebuhr was best man, and Paul Tillich the officiating minister. The congregation was composed of a small company of distinguished theologians, historians and their wives, as well as friends and family of the bride and groom. John Bennett, president of Union Theological Seminary, and his wife Anne, Samuel Terrien, biblical scholar and his wife Sara, Tom Driver, theologian and his historian wife Anne Barstow were present.

Of course, both Ursula Niebuhr and Hannah Tillich were in the congregation. I had known Ursula Niebuhr since my first year at Barnard College, and we were friends at first sight; I had met Hannah Tillich at the post Tillich sermon parties at Union Theological Seminary, and in Cambridge, Massachusetts at special lunches that Tillich hosted during my visits, but I did not yet know her well.

During the wedding, everyone present stood in rapt and joyful attention while Tillich read one of his most heartfelt and fatherly wedding prayers but then pronounced an unexpectedly unorthodox and somewhat hilarious blessing as follows: “In the name of God the Father, and God the Son, and God the Ghost.” He had been up late the night before and was excited and tired. Immediately after the service,
Paul Lehmann claimed that we had not been properly married since Tillich had flubbed such a crucial line.

A graduate student at Union hearing about the wedding later in the day quipped, “That was not a wedding. It was a Protestant summit meeting.” The 50th anniversary that concerns this/our society most deeply will take place in two years, on October 22, 1965, marking Paul Tillich’s death. Many of us here and all over the world, friends, family, and scholars will mark the day celebrating his life and work rather than mourning his death. We will in this way express our continuing gratitude for one of the most dazzling and creative minds of the 20th century. He was for some of us not only a teacher but also a pastor and close friend. These celebrations will of course be precious to us all, but I suspect they will be especially poignant for those of us who knew Tillich personally and even more so for members of his family.

By way of preparation for the 50th anniversary of Tillich’s death, I am proud to have been invited to deliver this after dinner speech. And I hope to provide additional materials about Tillich in response to many requests to publish my memoir. The question has become not so much whether I will remember everything, but rather how I will be able to contain and convey a veritable flood of memories: how to separate the important fact from over-abundance; what to say and what not. Indeed, our biography of Tillich will be republished in the near future in a new design and with minor changes. This is especially gratifying.

I am still taken into the past filled with a “thousand” names and faces especially those from whom I learned so much about Tillich before I was privileged to know him very well. More than anyone else, John Dillenberger, Mary Heilner, John and Grace Smith, come to mind. They were ten years my senior and enthusiastic purveyors of wonderful stories about their hero whom they had come to know intimately. Also in this context, Jim Adams and Wilhelm Pauck were inexhaustibly filled with anecdotes and history, not with fable; and finally, Tillich himself was extraordinarily open with a superb memory for the telling story.

I anticipate these celebrations with great joy. Perhaps my eagerness may strike some of you as unduly optimistic; I have, after all, just celebrated my 85th birthday. But my physicians assure me that I will be around for another 20 years and if that turns out to be the case I had better start working on my third banquet address. But at this moment, I am taken back to the beginning.

I first heard the names Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr when I was 16. My Lutheran pastor, Paul Scherer, one of half a dozen great preachers in New York, quoted Niebuhr and Tillich and other notable thinkers in his sermons. He was especially fond of Niebuhr and called him a great genius. He admired Tillich and was somewhat in awe of him but he felt his thought was too deeply influenced by Greek philosophy to be genuinely Christian. By then I had fallen in love with Greek literature and philosophy and was therefore not disturbed by this characterization. The Greek gods seemed, and I trust this will not sound blasphemous, far more intriguing and fascinating than did the Christian triune God. For like humans they too succumbed to temptation of all kinds, and although some of their escapades were destructive others were quite enchanting. I truly hope this does not sound heretical or simple. For every Sunday morning, when I recite the Nicene Creed in my Lutheran church, I understand the meaning of the words in a special way, a way in which our bishop might consider heretical. But my private interpretation makes it possible for any skepticism in my mind I to live side by side with my faith.

I am therefore in the precarious position of the person on the high wire (thus did Reinhold Niebuhr describe Tillich’s thought). I am able to accept the teachings of the Enlightenment on the one hand and accept the reinterpreted articles of the Christian faith on the other. Tillich’s definition of faith as ultimate concern but even more his phrase, “the God beyond God,” are keys that helped me unlock the most difficult paradox. My private certainty lies in this: the words of the creed and the words of Tillich are both signs and symbols of a reality beyond my comprehension. And Tillich’s definitions make it possible for me to do this without feelings of guilt and denial and without the sacrifice of my intellect. My pastor to whom I referred earlier was not alone in his admiring criticism of Tillich. When I was a student at Union I heard this description of Tillich again and again, “Tillich is a great thinker but he is too Greek to be Christian,” spoken by Henry Sloane Coffin, and Henry P. Van Dusen, by Reinhold Niebuhr, Frederick Grant, and James Muilenberg. But such words were not used by David E. Roberts. Roberts was a brilliant young theologian who was expected to succeed Tillich; his premature death devastated us all. I recall Tillich’s telling me that David was the
only member of the Union faculty at that time who really understood his thought, and that he would be his ideal successor. We had several conversations about this tragic loss. Tillich was as shaken and benefitted by Robert’s death as by any other except for that of his closest friend Hermann Schafft. I remember seeing tears in his eyes when he told us of Schafft’s death. David Roberts and Richard Kroner gave a fascinating seminar on Greek Philosophy and Christian theology, in which each one took different sides and debated one another. Kroner had been a colleague of Tillich’s in Dresden; he was a skilled writer and a fine scholar, but he did not receive the public recognition in America that Tillich achieved. He admired Tillich greatly but was a bit puzzled by his success. Roberts and Kroner were not the only scholars who did not accuse Tillich of being a non-Christian. At the University of Chicago, Wilhelm Pauck compared Tillich’s thought to Schelling whose published work he knew very well. Schelling was not yet available in English translation and not therefore known to younger colleagues. Far from being a criticism of Tillich, Pauck was telling the truth as Tillich himself had recognized in his published work and his unpublished conversations. Tillich had swallowed Schelling whole and had recreated his thought in own way. This is not as simple as it sounds. James Luther Adams, who by the way wrote his doctoral dissertation under the guidance of Wilhelm Pauck, also knew what he was talking about since he too was one of the few on the American scene who had read Schelling.

These two interpreters of Tillich’s thought stand out as giants of their time in their own fields. Both and each bring me closer to Tillich himself than any other interpreter. They were the first, and I believe the most reliable, American interpreters of Tillich’s work. This is not to say that those who have followed are less intelligent or less creative. But it means that they are inevitably further away from the original. The flesh and blood Tillich has disappeared into an iconic figure. This is to be sure inevitable and perhaps necessary in order to introduce Tillich’s thought to generation after generation. And it is worth pointing out that Tillich would not have minded this transformation at all since he was keenly interested in two things as he moved closer to death: first, he hoped that his thought would not die with him, for he realized that his personal charisma attracted large audiences and the printed page might not. Second, he hoped that his work would not be diminished in importance when the stories about his relationships to women were made public; he felt it was inevitable that the truth would out and he therefore took great pains to discuss this side of his personality with us. In some few cases of which I know directly, the latter did happen. A brilliant woman, having read about Tillich’s dalliances with women, immediately threw out every book of his that she had in her library. This was the most extreme and ill-considered reaction of which we heard. Most admirers, scholars and non-scholars alike, however were momentarily surprised but not alienated; they continued to study his books and honor his ideas. Who among us is without fault?

The recent lamentable death of Robert Scharlemann reminds me that he was one of the most important interpreters of Tillich in the generation that followed Wilhelm Pauck and Jim Adams. Indeed, he took courses with each of them. His unique interpretations, however, were not reflections of his teachers’ ideas but rather represented his own extraordinary and original understanding as a radical theologian with a highly individualistic style. His students add their own interpretations influenced by him but growing beyond him. And so we are a third step away from the original Tillich.

Indeed, when we look to the generation following Adams and Pauck, we must salute many industrious scholars, e.g., John Smith, John Dillenberger, and Roger Shinn, all three teachers and colleagues of mine and now sadly deceased. Tom Driver in his early years wrote with verve and imagination but after decades of admiration for his teacher, Driver moved in another theological direction. Durwood Foster and Rob James have each written a great deal about Tillich. Each of these gentlemen were/are exceedingly sovereign over Tillich’s architectonic thought and bring new forms to old ideas in their lively conversations as well as in their written work. The spice that the Foster/James encounters elicit would please Tillich. On more than one occasion he said that every friendship needed a bit of pepper as well as salt to make it more lively. He also said this about love affairs but that is another matter!

Frederick Parrella and the late Ray Bulman, representing the continuing Roman Catholic understanding and interest in Tillich’s thought, provide solid scholarship in their book on Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Assessment that rings true. Guy Hammond in his book on homosexuality was one step ahead of the Supreme Court in its decision to allow homosexuals to marry. Each in his own way gives us new insights into the ideas behind the icon.
Ron Stone’s encyclopedic book about Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich is valuable and intriguing, and I am reading it now and am preparing a long review. In the younger group Lon Weaver and Bryan Wagoner, and many others, are opening up new ways of understanding Tillich—each generation has different points of view and each scholar finds new points of emphasis in their many-sided subject. Finally, Bill Crout continues to invite scholars from various fields to Cambridge to give lectures about Tillich and/or Tillich related subjects in the “Paul Tillich Lectures at Harvard.”

In Germany, special attention should be paid to the painstakingly scholarly work of Werner Schüessler, Edward Sturm, and Christian Danz. With the exception of the prolific historian, Friedrich W. Graff, who courageously reveals the flaws as well as the virtues of the thinkers he studies, these German scholars reveal an emotional distance from the Tillich about whom they write. Their careful detail is always impressive but sometimes fails to come to terms with his complex and fascinating personality. Thought and life cannot and should not be separated. In this realm, Tillich seems to have become a statue, not a person. And Graf tries to remedy this although his views sometimes run to the extreme. Tillich’s special attachment to women does not cancel out the value of his thought and I am hopeful that Graf agrees.

The French Tillich Society has also contributed lively and valuable ideas to the Tillich corpus. Jean Richard, Theo Junker, Anne Marie Reijnen, and Marc Boss stand out as especially valuable and interesting scholars.

I apologize for the inevitable omission of names of those who have done creative work here and in the British Isles, in Ireland, and in other parts of the world. So many scholars everywhere have written and lectured about Tillich’s thought. He would be both pleased and amazed. I believe strongly that Tillich would be content that, albeit we do not all have the same views nor do we each speak/write from the same perspective, we can always learn from one another. This openness to respecting one another even when we do disagree has been a characteristic of this society that I have long admired.

But to return to the beginning, one of the particularly alluring qualities about two scholars who were contemporaries of Tillich namely Adams and Pauck is the fact that they helped to put Tillich into print in America. They were the first even before Tillich’s students at Union Theological Seminary, to transform his Germanic English into American English. Moreover, they found publishers for his work at a time when Tillich was virtually unknown in this country. And they recommended him to colleges, universities, and seminaries for speaking and preaching engagements. Not everyone who came to this country had as much immediate support. And not everyone had the richness of intellect and the ability to adjust with which Tillich was blessed.

Adams and Pauck were there at the beginning and Tillich remained grateful for their help and their special friendship until the end. He was faithful to Adams, the greatly admiring American scholar, and to Pauck, his younger German American close friend one whom Reinhold Niebuhr named, “Tillich’s guide to America.” Their common language and their membership in the Wingolf Society, a non dueling fraternity created a special closeness from the time of their first meeting. Whenever they attended meetings at the cathedral in Washington, D.C. they bought several bottles of the best Beaujolais that they drank as they talked until late in the night. Once when a young priest opened the door for them (they had forgotten their keys) Tillich blurted out, “Oh thank you very much. We are the bad boys...”

When the time came for me to begin work on the biography Tillich and also Pauck and Adams were most generous with their time, their knowledge, and their support. I was the recipient of countless letters, phone calls, interviews, lunches and dinners with these gentlemen. At the time, incidentally, I was an assistant editor of Religious Books at the Oxford University Press in New York. Endless conversations of the most fascinating variety enchanted me. Pauck lived in New York where I did, so our conversations about Tillich were frequent and I took copious notes. Adams was of course in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and he wrote voluminous letters throughout the years—they are still in my possession and will become part of the Wilhelm and Marion Pauck Manuscript Collection in Princeton. It was an enormous gift to me that these two gave me so much support and information generously and voluntarily. I had Tillich’s support and theirs as well. (The voluminous notes I took in several long interviews with Tillich himself will also soon be in print.) Indeed the vast majority of American and German scholars and friends of Tillich, with only two exceptions on both sides of the Atlantic were enthusiastic and cooperative.

But to return to my struggle with the Nicene Creed—and this is of course an example of many
struggles that we are all prone to if we are honest about the problem of faith and reason—here is one way in which such a dilemma can be addressed. As a Lutheran in the 20th and the 21st centuries, I found that like Tillich I was driven to live on the boundary between the secular and the sacred, the material and the spiritual worlds. The Enlightenment and the devastating events of the 20th century have clearly made their impact on all serious believers. We have been forced to look again at the basic statements of our faith. Some of the most able theologians and members of the Christian church have left the church and have become open agnostics or even atheists. As one who wished to remain in the church despite this conflict between faith and reason, I find that whenever I speak the words of the Apostles’ but especially the Nicene Creeds, I reinterpret them in a Tillichian manner.

There is a reason of course why Tillich, Niebuhr, and Pauck became members of the United Church of Christ: the UCC lacked the dogmatism that they could not accept in the Lutheran church in this country.

In my college years, I majored in philosophy and minored in foreign languages and history. I was fortunate beyond my dreams to study under John E. Smith who himself had studied with Tillich and Krone. John’s reading list included the most recently published books by Tillich and introduced us to his philosophy. John himself was so clear in his interpretations of intricate thought that we were easily persuaded that we really understood philosophers like Hegel and Schelling. Some years later while listening to a private conversation between Pauck and Tillich I realized they were communicating on an entirely different level. It was not the German language that came between them and me (I have always been bilingual) but something else: they were walking skillfully on a high wire called total recall and wide and deep reading and quoting verbatim from scholarly sources in several languages. Their performance was breathtaking and like the greatest high wire artists they did not fall off. Moreover, as John Dillenberger often pointed out, they were in a special intellectual realm of their own. Others could listen but not participate and like me they remained in awe.

John Dillenberger, who was my Master’s thesis advisor and a close friend, used to say during our many luncheon/dinner conversations, “Someone should have taped Pauck as he delivered his fabulous lectures and especially during his long conversations with Paulus. Tillich wrote and published so much, Pauck much less. It’s a shame that no one followed him around with a tape recorder.” And I said, “They should be taping us too although we would not be speaking so openly about our great friend and teacher, Paulus, and about ourselves, if someone were listening to us right now.” Nevertheless, these conversations between Pauck and Tillich at which I was present, will be woven into the memoir, which I have been writing for some time. Indeed, I hope to include the heart of many conversations between John and myself, not to mention conversations with Jaroslav Pelikan, Albert Outler, Reinhold and Ursula Niebuhr. They will be woven into a long memoir which I have been writing on and off for some time. When recently an American publisher expressed interest in republishing our biography of Tillich I mentioned my memoir. The publisher immediately expressed interest also in it.

I regret very much that I cannot be present at this year’s North American Paul Tillich Society meetings. I wish to thank Professor Echol Nix for his kind and enthusiastic invitation. And I wish to thank him also for his willingness to read my paper in my absence; not an easy thing to do. I salute you all: members, friends, and especially Mutie Tillich Farris. I send you warmest greetings from the great state of California. I look forward to seeing you all next year in San Diego.

**Beyond Kantian Criticism: Paul Tillich’s First Philosophy of Religion**

**by Claude Perrottet**

A REVIEW BY JEN RICHARD

Claude Perrottet teaches philosophy of religion at the University of Bridgeport (Bridgeport, CT). He also specializes in Kantian studies. After discovering Paul Tillich’s first course on the philosophy of religion (Berlin, 1920), a document that had only recently been published by Erdmann Sturm, he decided to make it the topic of a doctoral dissertation. The fact that Kant’s thought was—rather unexpectedly—central to Tillich’s considerations was a major source of interest. In this newly discovered course, Kant is indeed Tillich’s main discussion partner, which immediately clarifies the meaning of what Tillich calls his “critical-intuitive” method—the intuitive element being in turn borrowed from Husserl. Tillich’s inspiring combination of the critical and intuitive elements offered something that went be-
Beyond the inevitably austere nature of Kant studies, Tillich’s reflections are not purely theoretical—they are grounded in his concern for the deep religious crisis that affected those whom he addressed. Well aware of the contemporary situation, Tillich sought to offer new elements towards a response.

1. In this context, the epistemological status of religion and philosophy of religion is particularly important. Tillich makes this issue the topic of his first chapter. First comes the transition from the immediate nature of religious experience to the stage of religious reflection. Religion as an immediate reality corresponds to what Troeltsch calls “naïve religion”—religion as it appears before it is subjected to rational critique. Similarly, Tillich speaks of “strongly religious” periods, or periods of intense religious awareness.

Tillich’s own time was quite different, and so is ours. These are times of religious crisis due to the phenomenon of secularization, a process Tillich sees as defined by the autonomy of the different functions of our mind. Thus, religion ends up being marginalized as a residual function that is gradually forgotten. Hence, the urgent need for a reflection on religion. Historically, this reflection has developed into two different directions. Upstream, one finds reflection as a dogmatic and apologetic tool meant to justify religion based on rational proofs of God. Downstream, on the other hand, religious studies intend to explain religion as a psychological and sociological phenomenon. These two approaches are still based on the common notion of religion. Perrottet defines them by using the terms of “objectifying dogmatism” and “reductionist empiricism” respectively. As for Tillich, his goal is to revolutionize the notion of religion by applying the method of philosophy of religion. He will seek to transcend these two opposing views by applying the critical approach, which is that of consciousness reflecting upon itself. This indeed is Kant’s approach to the problem, which explains why Tillich will focus on his thought.

2. The next two chapters (chapters 2 and 3) of Perrottet’s book focus on the way Tillich interprets Kant’s approach to religion, i.e., the role Kant attributes to the religious element among the functions of our mind. Kant’s importance in philosophy of religion becomes obvious, even if Kant himself does not use that terminology. The revolutionary aspect of his thought is well summarized in a formula we owe to Husserl: “transcendence in immanence.” This allows Kant to move beyond dogmatism and positivism. Over against supernaturalistic dogmatism, Kant insists on the immanence of the religious element. And contrary to reductionist positivism, he demonstrates how transcendence is key to our relationship to the world. In Perrottet’s words: “For Tillich, Kant’s considerable merit is...to have preserved the absolute by protecting it against attacks by both relativistic empiricism and dogmatism; the latter did uphold the absolute, but as an object, though a supreme one, and thus exposed it precisely to the deadly attacks of the other side—which made it even more dangerous” (86).

In terms of religion, the Kantian revolution thus consists of acknowledging the absolute (or the unconditioned) within consciousness itself, rather than as a Supreme Being external to it. This means that the question of the objective truth of religion becomes identical with that of its subjective validity: “The proof of religion’s truthfulness,” says Tillich, “lies in the proof of its necessity for the functioning of consciousness, which is its validity as understood by [Kantian] criticism” (89). Kant’s real aim here is to confirm the unity of our consciousness, hence the unity of the phenomenal world. To this end, he proceeds with the deduction of the categories, which are nothing but the forms that allow consciousness to assemble all objects in the unity of the self (the “I”). But there is more to this. Perrotett reminds us of Kant’s words in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where the notion of the unconditioned is first introduced: “It is the unconditioned that necessarily pushes us to go beyond the confines of experience and of all phenomena. Reason inevitably requires its presence in the things in themselves, in addition to the conditioned, and it is fully entitled to do so, because the series of conditions needs to be complete” (120). This is where Tillich sees that Kant offers an opening towards a new way of doing philosophy of religion. But this new way is barely suggested and religion is not even explicitly mentioned. Additionally, the cumbersome presence of the “thing in itself” maintains the threat of a return to an objectified view of the unconditioned.

3. The next chapter thus offers a precise analysis of what Kant means when he speaks of the thing in itself (Ding an sich)—a sort of residual byproduct of the critical approach, which shows that laws and forms of reality are given by consciousness in order to grasp things. These formal laws presuppose a content, or substance, to which they refer. But how can this content be reached and known? Here lies the
whole problem of the “thing in itself” as opposed to a “thing for us.” As Perrottet observes: “Tillich does not really criticize Kant for believing in “something” beyond the phenomenal world that is apprehended by the formal laws of our consciousness. He challenges him for trying to grasp this something through the critical, hence rational, approach alone” (154). This being the case, falling back into an objectifying perspective is inevitable. The “thing in itself” then becomes a thing like all other things; it is fully part of the phenomenal world.

There is, however, more than this to Kant’s approach. Tillich has tried to show “how both the critical and the intuitive approaches have a common origin in Kant’s thought, even though the intuitive element is only present in embryonic form” (171). In his effort to clarify his own notion of intuition, Tillich states the problem in somewhat different terms. He no longer makes the difference between phenomena and noumena, or between the forms of consciousness and the substance of reality; rather, he makes the distinction between thought and being. This opens the way to a twofold approach of being: an original, intuitive approach, as well as that of rational reflection. Here is how Perrottet summarizes the process: “One of the main characteristics of the critical-intuitive method is that, from its perspective, it is impossible to think apart from an intuitive apprehension of what is given to us, but it is equally impossible to hold or to express such an intuition without giving it form through reflection” (180).

4. The fourth chapter of the book is devoted to the study of relevant sources and to the elaboration of that intuitive element. Here, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is the main reference. “Contrary to Kant, Husserl believed in intellectual intuition, which essentially is our ability to grasp certain ultimate principles in the function of our mind before discursive language comes into play” (205-206). This is corroborated by a quote from Logical Investigations where a distinction is made between immediate and mediated knowledge: “It is thus obvious that asking for a fundamental justification of all mediate knowledge can only make sense if we are able to cognize certain ultimate principles through immediate intuition, since all justification ultimately rests on such principles” (206). Tillich concurs. In the seventh lecture of his course, he comments: “…This requirement is of the highest importance. The phenomenological method demands that there be an intuition and intent of thought prior to any explanation or valuation” (208).

Tillich’s other reference in that context is Rudolf Otto. In his famous Das Heilige (The Idea of the Holy), Otto highlights the importance of the non-rational element and its relationship to the rational element in the experience of the sacred. According to Perrottet, “Otto concludes that religious phenomena contain an element that is irreducible to rational analysis. To describe it, Otto coined the well-known term the numinous, which consists of the equally well-known mysterium tremendum et fascinans (219). Tillich greatly admires Otto’s phenomenological description of the sacred, but he considers at the same time that Otto fails to sufficiently consider or discuss the rational and critical element.

5. Perrottet’s book ends with a chapter in which he offers an overview of the evolution of the critical-intuitive method in Tillich’s thought. Two dates will serve as an easy reference: 1922 and 1962. In 1922, Tillich has just discovered Karl Barth’s Römerbrief, for which he has considerable praise. Tillich’s article on The Conquest of the Concept of Religion in the Philosophy of Religion (1922) is without a doubt the most Barthian of his writings. Tillich himself feels that he and Barth share a same position of principle, which he applies to philosophy of religion, while Barth (and Gogarten) apply it in the realm of theology. But this does not prevent Tillich from pursuing his own quest in philosophy of religion. He ends his 1922 article by reaffirming his choice of the critical-intuitive method. The critical or rational method is insufficient, because it is unable by itself to reach reality itself beyond its given forms.

In his 1962 Harvard course on philosophy of religion, Tillich not only applies the same overall idea as in his earlier writings—he even uses the same terminology, that of the critical-intuitive method. As Perrottet notes, there is, however, a small but significant difference in the way Tillich formulates the name he gives to his method: “critical-intuitive” has become “intuitive-critical.” The inverse order of the elements making up the name does not make any essential difference, but the emphasis is now made on the precedence of intuition over rational critical reflection. Additionally, within the intuitive element, an ontological dimension is added to the phenomenological one. The intuitive-critical method will thus consist of the following three elements: first, the intuition of human finitude; second, the intuition of the phenomena of religious life; and third, the critical consideration of our human spiritual structure.

The following sentence, taken from Tillich and quoted by Perrottet, perhaps best encapsulates his
contribution made by the 1920 course: “The way towards God goes through religion. The way towards religion goes through the Absolute” (215). To which one could add that the way to the Absolute itself passes through the critical analysis of human consciousness. In the same passage of lecture 8 of Tillich’s 1920 course (EGW XII, 385), we further find the following statement: “God can only be grasped through religion—not the opposite.” And also: “It is consciousness that so to speak creates God as God.”

The full implication of the notion of method in philosophy of religion is now clear. It represents the approach of the religious phenomenon, the starting point and the process of thinking. This is where Tillich’s revolutionary contribution becomes really obvious. Commonly speaking, religion is defined by God: religion is thinking about God and worshipping God. If God does exist, religion is thereby grounded. If God does not exist, religion is annihilated by that very fact. Thus, philosophy of religion will have to directly address the issue of God and prove his existence in order to justify the validity of religion. Tillich, for his part, suggests a method that takes the exact opposite direction: grasp God based on religion, and grasp religion by starting with our consciousness.

What is at stake in this reordering of precedence is immediately obvious. First of all, it represents a protest against supernaturalism that sees God and the divine as being outside our human reality, and hence is a source of religious heteronomy. Tillich supports the perspective of autonomy, over against that of heteronomy. For him, we must start our considerations with human reality. It is in the very immanence of human consciousness that the transcendence of the unconditioned emerges, as Kant has shown. This approach of transcendence through critical analysis of consciousness will also allow us to avoid objectifying God as a Supreme Being, i.e., as a being, a First Cause in addition to others. This explains how Tillich can affirm that, “it is consciousness that, so to speak, creates God!”—with God, thus conceived, as the symbolic expression of the unconditioned perceived at the heart of human consciousness.

These are the key points that strike me in Claude Perrottet’s publication, a must-read for anyone who wishes to seriously tackle Tillich’s extensive course on philosophy of religion given in Berlin in 1920.

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which the Bible speaks; for this drama requires freedom both for God and for man, and is negated by ontologies which subject either God or man to an ontological necessity.” Tillich disagrees, saying that a full discussion must include ontology: “There is no ontological thought in biblical religion; but there is no symbol or no theological concept in it which does not have ontological implications.” Since both men have valid points—Niebuhr, to uphold the Biblical truth expressed in the story of the Fall, and Tillich, to attempt to explain it ontologically (and thereby expand its meaning to a non-Biblical audience), a way beyond their impasse must be found.

Simply stated, criticism focuses on the important distinction between ontological necessity and historical inevitability in the Fall. The demands of classical theodicy require that creation cannot be fall. To counter Niebuhr’s criticism, that if God creates man to fall, then man cannot be held responsible for the fall, Tillich’s ontological analysis must be interpreted to show that the Fall is inevitable, yet not

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**Inevitable, but not Necessary: Using Tillich’s Ontology to Formulate a 21st Century Interpretation of the Fall and Original Sin**

*Annette Neblett Evans*

Preliminary Remarks: The Criticisms Aimed at Tillich’s Interpretation of the Fall

Xxx Two of the greatest theological minds of the 20th century—Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr—disagree on a fundamental point of theology: how to explicate the myth of the Fall into sin found in Genesis 3. Niebuhr and others¹ argue that the Biblical perspective prohibits ontological clarification. He says: “A part of the function of a systematic theology is to refute ontological speculation about God and man which falsify or negate the drama about
necessary, Tillich’s clearest statement of the relationship between creation and fall is that “…the fulfillment of creation and the beginning of the fall are, though logically different, ontologically the same.” Tillich’s words are clear, but his concepts are not, and his supporting arguments are not easy to clarify. The preceding comments leave this question: can Tillich’s use of ontology explain the Fall in such a way that his stated distinction makes sense, that creation and fall are distinguishable, yet distinct? In addition, can this information then be used to make the Fall not simply an ancient myth, but an interpretation, which makes the process of sin in the 21st century understandable?

The answer is yes to both questions. Niebuhr’s criticism can be met by showing that, in Tillich’s thought, the Fall is an inevitable result of creation, but not an ontologically necessary one. The task of clarifying Tillich’s thought is not an easy one. Many interpreters have tried, but they do not succeed because they stay mired in Tillich’s unclear terminology. Therefore, to make the argument, several sources of confusion in Tillich’s thought must be identified and resolved, since one cannot argue for or against his interpretation without making it more intelligible. To this end, three clarifications must be made.

Clarification #1: Distinguish between the Immanent and Transcendent Falls

Langdon Gilkey begins his analysis of Tillich’s fall with a footnote that is open to debate; he says that “Tillich is very careful, in fact precise, about the language he uses in this connection: about how and when he wishes to employ the symbols of ‘Fall,’ sin, evil and so on.” In fact, confusion abounds in his terminology, which is why so many have pointed it out. At first reading, it is easy to cite numerous passages from Systematic Theology II that support the ontological necessity of the fall into existence: “Existence is a fact, not a derived dialectical step,” and “The transition from essence to existence is the original fact.” Other statements support the fall’s inevitable or unavoidable nature: “The fall is the work of finite freedom, but it happened universally in everything finite, and therefore unavoidably…”

A careful reading of ST II reveals a series of contradictions so evident that an alternate way to make Tillich’s thought coherent must be sought.

The simplest way to resolve the confusion is to distinguish at the outset between two Falls: the transcendent and the immanent. Early in the course of the controversy, Niebuhr cites this passage from Tillich’s Propositions: “The myth of the ‘transcendent fall’ describes the transition from essence to existence as a universal event in ontological terms. The myth of the ‘immanent fall’ describes the transition as an individual event in psychological terms.” It would seem that, in the first citations (above), Tillich is referring to the transcendent fall, or the state of existence in which human beings find themselves. It is a given that humans are in existence, and they are neither free to choose this condition, nor are they responsible for this type of fall. By contrast, references to “finite freedom” refer to the immanent fall, or the fall for which human beings are responsible, because, to Tillich, finite freedom is another word for human being.

Tillich commits the fallacy of equivocation throughout ST II in pages 29 to 42, by discussing, simultaneously, the characteristics of these two very different falls. It seems strange that the distinction between them does not carry over from the Propositions to the cited section of ST II (in which there is no use of the word “immanent” to describe the individual fall). Rather, the characteristics of the two are so mixed up, and used so interchangeably, that Niebuhr, et al. are correct to say that Tillich seems to make the fall necessary. The transcendent fall, by setting up the conditions of existence, is correctly referred to as necessary. Because the transcendent fall is a given, there is no way to argue that humans are in any way responsible for the situation in which they find themselves.

Surprisingly, however, even after citing the needed distinction, Niebuhr argues that, “It is in the actualization of the potentiality that reality becomes ambiguous, that is, evil as well as good. The sinfulness of man is thus an ‘ontological fate.’” Niebuhr needs to clarify his language as well. Simply because a concept is explained ontologically does not make it a fate. Rather, ontology is simply descriptive, and the idea that fate is connected to ontology as if the two are one is incorrect. In any case, the description of the human situation of “being here” is a situation that requires both speculation and clarification.

Clarification #2: Use the Biblical story of Adam and Eve to clarify the immanent, not the transcendent, fall
As Niebuhr states: “There is no myth of the ‘transcendent fall’ in the Bible, but only the myth of the historical fall.”15 The immanent fall is the historical fall, the fall that happens in each individual life, and it is not problematic to say that humans are responsible for this fall. The Biblical story of the fall attempts to explain why humans are sinful, and so must be understood in the context of the rise of ethics that took place during the Axial Age, a time period described by Karl Jaspers as a world-wide awakening to the problems of meaning and ethics.16

Understood in the context of morality, the story of Adam and Eve describes the process by which sin enters the world. It is a series of steps that are both eternal and universal because the mental process has always happened in every individual human life immediately preceding the commission of sin. Individual sins affirm our (prior, universal, given, necessary, and transcendently) fallen nature. Tillich’s word for this type of interpretation is “transhistorical,” which signifies that it both transcends the historical (has universality) while also maintaining the temporal element (in the individual life).17

Distinguishing between two falls helps to explain another unclear Tillichian phrase, half way de-mythologization. Tillich tends to use it as a way of saying he accepts some elements of the myth, while rejecting others. However, it more clearly means that the pre-historical element of the myth is rejected, but the other ‘half’ of the myth contains key symbols that explain the advent of sinfulness into each personal life. In simple terms, each man and woman is his/her own Adam/Eve. This assertion contradicts Gilkey’s observation, that “In some strange way the Fall is, therefore, an event, a non-necessary moment....”18 It is not strange at all, since it is an event in every personal life. Equally questionable is Gilkey’s statement that “Human evil is, therefore, bafflingly both situation and act, and neither one can be construed ‘literally’ (ST II: 55-58”).19 The immanent fall can be construed literally, albeit with the use of analogical/symbolic language. Saying that the myth in Genesis is used as a guide helps to clarify the path to sinfulness, but certainly does not clarify Tillich’s retelling altogether.

To summarize, clarification of terms is a necessary step in approaching the problems related to Tillich’s discussion of the fall. The disagreement that Tillich has with Niebuhr and others is founded on Tillich’s tendency towards equivocation in his use of almost every important concept he uses in his explanation. He is right to say that the transcendent fall is ontologically necessary because it is. It is both necessary and universal, as a precondition for existing at all, so that humans have every excuse for being in this situation. Since human fault for the transcendent fall is not open for debate, the transcendent fall can be left out of the debate from this point. It is the situation, and must be accepted literally. It establishes estrangement, which is not itself sin, but is the condition of the possibility of sin. And, by saying the fall represents a ‘transhistorical fact’, Tillich gives us permission to analyze the process that leads to each individual’s sin, a state which Gilkey sums up in the assertion that “…we are not only the conditioned victims of estrangement; we are also participants in it and so perpetuators of it.”20 Therefore, meaningful discussion about man’s fault or innocence must center on whether Tillich’s analysis of the immanent (personal) fall makes fallen-ness inevitable or necessary.

Clarification #3: Use ontological concepts consistently

Agreeing that Tillich is describing an immanent, not a transcendent fall in ST II leads to the possibility of interpretive clarity. However, confusion arises again when Tillich says that the immanent fall must be described in psychological terms, and the transcendent in ontological terms.21 To be useful, description must be consistent both linguistically (by making the distinction) and methodologically (by using ontology). So, in order to make his explanation consistent, both falls must be understood in ontological terms.

It would be helpful if one term or concept could be used as an ontological standard. Fortunately, one of his fundamental concepts—faith—is a concept whose ontological explanation makes the psychological understandable. Simply stated, faith as polar balance is such a structure. For instance, dreaming innocence is Tillich’s term for the ontological structure of moral perfection, which is self-centeredness or balance. In this paper, the term ontological faith will be used to designate this structure. As such, ontological faith is an idea in our mind of what we ought to be, or how we ought to act. Thus, both psychology and morality in this context presuppose ontology, which takes priority.

These three clarifications must be accepted before the attempt to interpret Tillich’s explanation of the fall: (1) the acceptance that there are two falls, and that humans are only responsible for the imma-
nent one; (2) the fact that the immanent fall is told in the myth of Adam and Eve, which is the story of the individual’s fall into sin; and (3) the fact that the immanent fall must, like the transcendent fall, be analyzed ontologically through the central term of faith.

The Method

An analysis of both the transcendent and the immanent falls requires beginning with Tillich’s ontological description of creation. One strength of his thought is his ability to establish a definitional consistency based on ontology between four different, yet related, types of being: being-itself (God), essential finite being (Adam), existential finite being (the existing human), and essential finite being under the conditions of existence (the Christ).

This clarification allows for four states of being in which the ontological structure finds expression: God; the essential human being, Adam; the existing human; and the essential human under the conditions of existence, the Christ. The explanation will also require us to go beyond Tillich’s stated analysis to another part of his system that will provide us with the support for and clarification of Tillich’s statement that the immanent fall is inevitable, though not ontologically necessary. This concept will be found in the ontological analysis of the role of the Other in the immanent Fall.

With these terminological and methodological clarifications in place, we can now proceed to the first question addressed by the paper, the fundamental question Niebuhr poses: Does Tillich’s ontological analysis of the concepts found in the Biblical account of the Fall of human being into sin make sin inevitable or ontologically necessary? The answer—that the immanent Fall, and subsequent sinfulness, is inevitable, but not necessary—will be found in an exposition of the role of Otherness in the immanent Fall.

The Argument: God as the Original Manifestation of the Balance of all Opposites

As a philosophical concept, Tillich defines the concept of being-itself as containing within itself all possible contradictions. To name but a few, these are freedom and destiny, individuality and participation, and dynamics and form.22 In each set of polarities, one side is a limiting principle—such as form, destiny, and participation—and on the other side of the polarity is a more unlimited principle that gives life and power to the other side—freedom, the individual, and dynamics. Both sides of the polar structure are needed to create a whole. Wholeness for being-itself is a given, since being—itself lies beyond all distinctions, while at the same time containing them. Within being itself, the ground of all that is, the polarities create a whole that is never actually threatened with breakage, or non-being. Being—itself contains non-being, but continually overcomes (or transcends) the threat it poses. Theoretically, the tension of breakage may be present, but it is continually overcome. According to Tillich, God is being-itself.23

There is a direct ontological relationship between being-itself and three other concepts: essential finite being; existential finite being; and essential finite being under the conditions of existence. These three types of being—in Biblical terms, Adam in the garden, Adam outside the garden, and Jesus who is the Christ—are logically derived from the analysis of being-itself, but are ontologically distinguishable by two characteristics: (1) the actual degree to which the polarities are held in tension or are threatened by breaking; and (2) the degree to which each state is chosen.

Essential Finitude, or Adam in the Garden

First, there is essential finite being. The word ‘finite’ has many meanings in Tillich’s thought. In agreement with most definitions of finite, Tillich defines it as “being threatened by non-being.”24 However, going beyond other thinkers, Tillich also implies that finite as an adjective in conjunction with freedom, finite freedom, means human being; it is a way to differentiate human being from the ground of being, to make it a recognizable entity. The polar tension in essential finite freedom is threatened by breakage but remains unbroken due to its proximity to the ground of being. This is the presumed state of human being at the time of creation. In Genesis, human being is created in God’s image: “Then God said, Let us make in our image, after our likeness…” (Genesis 1:26).25 Although Tillich asserts that this image is found in man’s “finite freedom,” it can also be argued that man is in God’s “image” by sharing this polar structure.

The state of dreaming innocence is the mythical state of Adam and Eve before the Fall, the state of essential finitude. In it, the ontological balance is found, but it is not real, given that is unchallenged.
The state of dreaming innocence is important, even if mythical, for it describes the ontological goal of human life: to maintain the self’s ontological balance (faith) when it is actually threatened under the conditions of existence in which humans find themselves as a result of the transcendent Fall. Apart from the abstract definition that Tillich provides of dreaming innocence, it seems that the function of the concept is to provide the ontological goal of human being under the conditions of existence: a finite structure in which the ontological structure is balanced.

**Existential finitude, aroused freedom, faith and bad faith**

The conditions of existence give rise to existential finite being, which is the state that humans find themselves in as the original fact. In this state, the polar structure is present, and tension is created by the very real threat of nonbeing (the source of which is the focus of this paper). When the predominance of one side of the polar structure occurs, the polarity acts as the center of the self, and causes the entire self to be off-center. Without the other polarity to balance it, the unified self loses its centeredness or wholeness. Centeredness is faith, and, because that which is not faith is sin, the self becomes, in ontological terms, sinful. Whether this state is inevitable or ontologically necessary has yet to be determined.

Freedom is the power that the individual has to achieve faith. The balance is possible for humans, though not likely, since the conditions of existence exert a very powerful force on the self’s polarities that lead, eventually, to their breakage. When the self loses its center, or the power that it had to hold its polarities in balance, human beings fall into sin. Given that, for the self, faith is balance among the polarities, it can be implied that the loss of balance is bad faith.

**Freedom vs. finite freedom**

The state of finite freedom, which is another term for simply being human, leads to the fall into sin, in part, because the state of essential finite being, in theory, is incomplete. Completion requires the choice to remain centered, or the choice of ontological faith. Freedom is necessary to choice. This choice is revealed when the choice of destiny is affirmed through finite freedom. In moral terms, one can say that it is incomplete because it does not require choice, and all moral actions must be chosen.

Humans must be confronted by choice in order to make moral decisions; and choice creates aroused freedom. Immediately prior to each individual’s moral decision, two possibilities exist: to act in such a way that the self chooses to remain in balance (the balance of freedom/destiny, etc.), or to act in such a way that the self’s balance or center is lost (which results in the self being thrown out of balance, resulting in sin). One can see from this that the state of faith under the conditions of existence is ontologically the same as the state of faith in the ideal world of essential being, but they are logically different in a fundamental way. The latter is a given, and the former is chosen.

**Essential finitude under the conditions of existence: true faith through choice**

This third and final instance of this ‘image’ of being-itself is found in essential finite being under the conditions of existence. This structure is identical to the ontological structure of essential finite being. Being finite, its centeredness is threatened by non-being, even in the theoretical state of essential being. However, it differs in one significant way: the self’s balance is achieved under the conditions of existence, through choice.

Tillich interprets Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, as the New Being, the only human instance of essential ontological balance who is able to maintain his polar balance under the conditions of existence. Of the numerous Biblical titles describing Jesus’ role, the one that best admits of ontological clarification is the idea of the Christ as the ‘second Adam’, given by the apostle Paul (1 Cor 15:45-48) and elaborated by Tillich (as the New Being). As “the Christ”, he is a new type of being, a second Adam, because he lives under the conditions of existence, prone to the sin of ontological imbalance, but, through his choice, maintains both his own balance and his undisrupted unity with God. Adam loses his essential unity with himself and God as the sustaining structure of the self (for reasons we have yet to ascertain); Jesus as the Christ reestablishes the bond with God for all humans. The structural being of Adam and Eve is identical to that of the Christ—the polar tensions are present but are not overcome by non-being, and so remain in perfect balance. The two differences in them are that, in Adam, polar balance is given under the conditions of essence and (assumed
to be) unchallenged and not chosen; whereas in the Christ, the balance remains unbroken under the conditions of existence, through choice. Jesus as the Christ saves mankind from the consequences of the Fall of the first Adam, and restores to Creation what was originally lost. How Jesus accomplishes this is the subject under consideration, and will require that Tillich’s ontological analysis be pushed to describe not only what immanent fallen-ness is, but also why it inevitably comes about.

Summary to this point

There are strengths to be noted in Tillich’s analysis to this point. His thought provides ontological clarification of four fundamental terms necessary to the understanding of fallen-ness: God; Adam before the fall; Adam and Eve after the fall; and the Christ. The ontological consistency in these concepts makes them more coherent. The analysis is theologically sound, since human being, as created, is good, created in God’s image, and God is not involved, to this point of analysis, in the immanent fall of human being.

Unfortunately, however, Tillich’s theory lacks definitional clarity at another fundamental point: why does Adam sin (what is the cause of this first, original sin)? And, if ‘original’ is interpreted as ‘foundational’, what is the cause of sin in each individual? What happens in the moments prior to sinning? If Adam (as the representative of all humans) is created with polar balance, what causes him to lose it? Biblical theology explains the immanent fall as a result of Adam and Eve’s disobedience, without answering the much needed question of why human beings would disobey their Creator. Tillich’s ontological answer is no better than the Biblical one, since he blames finite freedom, which can be seen as simply another term for ‘created human being’. If Adam is created as finite freedom, and if finite freedom is responsible for the fall, the responsibility for the immanent fall goes back (once again) to the creator, God.

The Introduction and Explanation of Key Ontological Concepts in the Biblical Story

It is necessary to look into the details of the Biblical story for key concepts that could be used, symbolically, in Tillich’s interpretation. Three significant concepts arise when three significant changes occur in the Biblical story between Creation (Chapters 1 and 2) and Fall (Chapter 3): God disappears from the story; the serpent appears; and the first other person, a woman named Eve, appears.

Given these three new elements, it can be asked whether Tillich interprets them symbolically and ontologically in such a way that his statement is true, that “‘simultaneously acknowledge the tragic universality of estrangement and man’s personal responsibility for it.”? The answer is yes; it is an answer that will require a more extensive analysis of the role of the Other in the immanent fall. Because he does not have an overt reference to the Other in the fall, and so no clear understanding of the ontological implications presented by the Other, it will be necessary to find a different source in his thought to which he assigns a role to the Other. For this source, one need look no further than Tillich’s Christological formulation.

Essential being, the conditions of existence, and the affirmation by the Other: achieving ontological faith with the implied ‘missing link’

Jesus as the Christ, it will be remembered, is the appearance of the ontological structure of faith under the conditions of existence. To be considered ‘the Christ’ requires three things, two of which we have discussed: First, Jesus must be aware of his God given polar structure, his unique freedom and destiny. Second, he must also affirm his destiny through his finite freedom; his polar balance must be reached through choice. To this point, we have reached the conclusion that the life of the Christ manifests the only conditions necessary for the centering of the self after the fall into existence: self-knowledge—the individual must know what faith is; and freedom—that s/he can freely choose to affirm his/her ontological faith, or self-centeredness. It seems that faith would be simple, if it is only a matter of personal choice. That it is not simple implies that there is a power or force at work within existence that works against the individual, to pull the individual self apart, regardless of the self’s willingness to be centered. There must be some third component that helps to establish centered selfhood, and, if lost, makes centered selfhood difficult to attain.

The third component of his ontological faith is not quite as obvious as the first two because it is not found in the story of fallenness that is under review. But it is a crucial component in both the life of the Christ, and in understanding the immanent fall.
This third component can be found within Tillich’s system: it is the concept of Otherness. As an implied concept, it is often overlooked, but is crucial to the establishment of faith, or self-centering, under the conditions of existence. The importance of the Other in the state of faith is interpolated from Tillich’s well-known explanation of the point at which Christianity begins. Tillich cites the verse in Matthew 16, when Peter, asked by Jesus who he (Jesus) is, responds, ‘Thou art the Christ.’\(^{36}\) This analysis implicitly affirms a third thing that is required for the fulfillment of ontological faith under the conditions of existence: the affirmation of one’s God given self by the Other. To Tillich, Peter’s believing reception in some way transforms Jesus, the faithful man, into the Christ. In terms of faith, Jesus, as essential being, has a polar structure. It is maintained through his consistent use of his finite freedom to affirm his God-given destiny. However, in his case, it seems that the power that is within Jesus’ ‘destiny’ is not released, or completed, until the Other recognizes his destiny and affirms it.

Since the immanent fall (which results in polar imbalance) can be understood as being the contrary to faith (polar balance), the role of the Other in the fall must be considered. This would seem to provide a hidden premise in the discussion of faith: ontological faith requires not only God as the One who establishes it, and the self as the One who chooses it, but the Other as necessary to affirming it. The complete power of the self is only released when one is recognized by the Other as being what the individual (whose destiny is established by God) claims to be.\(^{37}\)

To summarize: humans, as created, are in God’s image. They are created to be centered, but their centeredness must be chosen. For some inexplicable reason that Tillich attributes to finite freedom, man, when first confronted with choice, chooses sin.\(^{38}\) This makes Niebuhr’s assertion that there is a necessary relationship between freedom and sinfulness valid. But is this what Tillich meant?

To answer this question requires transposing this ontological analysis into the myth. Hopefully this will bring about the much needed clarification about how finite freedom leads to the fall.

**Tillich’s Ontological Analysis and Genesis Chapters 1-3**

Since an ontological description of most components has been given, the attempt can be made to relate these components to each other as they occur in the immanent Fall, or the point in time that each individual experiences as the moment before sin occurs. This is the moment that is referred to in the myth of Adam and Eve: it describes the process that occurs in each individual as s/he begins the process that results in the act of sin. Tillich’s ontology, coupled with the myth, results in an explanation of the ‘transhistorical quality’ that Tillich asserts.

In order to follow the myth more exactly, three more ontological clarifications must be added. These ontological clarifications will show how the concepts of finite freedom, faith, and bad faith are derived from ontology.

As has been noted many times, the ontological structure of faith is identical to the ontological description of essential finitude. The goal of existence is to attain this state of centeredness, through free choice. (This explains the statement that, though ontologically the same, the two are logically different).\(^{39}\) However, because Adam’s act of finite freedom is considered to be sinfulness, which results in the uncenteredness of the self, more analysis of why this happens is necessary. Now, with the introduction of the Other, we can take the analysis to another level by analyzing the most important component in the story—the creation of the other, Eve.

**Exploring Sartre’s ontology to clarify Tillich’s definitional shortcomings**

Surprisingly, perhaps, is that one way to clarify Tillich’s theistic existential ontological system can be found in the work of Jean Paul Sartre, a contemporary of Tillich’s, who, like Tillich, uses ontology in elaborating his atheistic existential philosophy. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre discusses in great detail the ontological make-up of human being. In the following paragraphs, the attempt will be made to relate a few of the salient features from his description to Tillich’s explanation to fill an interpretive void in Tillich’s explanation. If the answer of the Role of the Other is to be found in Tillich’s thought, it is not obvious. In fact, Tillich himself claims that irrationality must be evoked at points in the explanation.\(^{40}\) This is certainly true in all areas of speculative theological discourse, but the point at which rational discussion breaks down, and irrationality is accepted, can be argued and debated. It seems that Tillich stops short in his analysis, and not only can but must be pushed further in the direction of rationality. This can be done if Sartre concepts are used to clarify Tillich’s.

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\(^{36}\) Tillich cites the verse in Matthew 16, when Peter, asked by Jesus who he (Jesus) is, responds, ‘Thou art the Christ.’

\(^{37}\) This analysis implicitly affirms a third thing that is required for the fulfillment of ontological faith under the conditions of existence: the affirmation of one’s God given self by the Other.

\(^{38}\) To summarize: humans, as created, are in God’s image. They are created to be centered, but their centeredness must be chosen. For some inexplicable reason that Tillich attributes to finite freedom, man, when first confronted with choice, chooses sin.

\(^{39}\) However, because Adam’s act of finite freedom is considered to be sinfulness, which results in the uncenteredness of the self, more analysis of why this happens is necessary. Now, with the introduction of the Other, we can take the analysis to another level by analyzing the most important component in the story—the creation of the other, Eve.

\(^{40}\) This is certainly true in all areas of speculative theological discourse, but the point at which rational discussion breaks down, and irrationality is accepted, can be argued and debated.
A Sartrean analysis of the Fall is difficult because Sartre does not believe in one crucial component of it: God. To Sartre, the idea of God is a limitation on human possibility. For this reason, Tillich and Sartre must work together with the hope that Tillich’s ontological missing link can be explained through Sartre’s similar ontological thought. Because it may seem unfair to use an atheist’s view to strengthen a theist’s argument, I will say that my use of Sartre is simply to suggest the direction in which an ontological elaboration of Tillich’s thought should proceed. What Sartre lacks, Tillich provides, and vice versa. Such an elaboration will help to broaden the contemporary understanding of sin.

First, in order to make the comparison with Tillich’s polar structure, it is necessary to begin with Sartre’s ontology in terms of polarities. Two fundamental terms are necessary for the discussion. The two opposites would be the being-for-itself, the being of the human self. Defined as the being of consciousness, it is transcendent, and always beyond itself. On the other side of the self is the polarity of the in-itself, which is the being of objective reality, or things. Being-in-itself is determinate, non-free and non-transcendent. First and foremost, in Sartre’s thought, the ontological structure of human being is defined as being-for-itself. As such, the structure of the self lacks self-identity, because being-for-itself is always projecting itself beyond itself. Humans have the ability to transcend the here and now, to project themselves into the future, and to work towards the future. Two things result from this: being-for-itself is never stagnant or at rest, but is dynamic, always pushing the self forward. The second consideration is that being-for-itself is consciousness, consciousness again that is beyond itself. When consciousness turns itself upon itself, it sees the nothingness at the core. Thus, within the core of man is nothing, literally. So, instead of being a good thing, Sartre sees human being as a ‘futile passion’, an entity that, by the lack of self identity, has an inferior ontological status.

For Sartre, the world of the ‘thing’ constitutes another aspect of being. The thing, ontologically defined as being-in-itself, is the other principle way of being in the world. It is ontologically distinct from the for-itself. Sartre reserves the term for the world of things; since they are what they are, they have an ontological completeness as well as a priority over the for-itself world of conscious beings. Ironically, Sartre tends to give things an ontological priority over humans, because things are ontologically complete and self-contained: they are not what they are not, and they are what they are. Sartre does express a goal for human being: being-in-itself, or, to be to others what one is to oneself. The difference, and a point that must be disputed, is that Sartre believes this goal to be unattainable, a futile passion, whereas in Tillich it is seen as a very real possibility manifest in the Christ as the New Being.

Sartre, like Tillich, believes that centered selfhood is the goal of the self, and that a self that goes too far in the direction of any one polarity is damaged. Sartre calls the tendency to go too far in the direction of the in-itself, or to make the self into a thing, ‘bad faith’. It works like this: conscious beings, disturbed by the negation that is at the center of the self, as well as the lack of identity caused by transcendence, want to sacrifice their unique being-for-itself to attain the ontological fullness of some thing. It is worth noting that Sartre’s ontology sets man up for what appears to be a no-win situation: on the one hand, man is doomed to be free. Freedom is, as it is in Tillich, human being’s greatness and weakness. Yet in Sartre, freedom is the source of anxiety that humans want to give away. By being determinate, by giving up one’s for-itself, one achieves the completeness, that is, the identity and security, of the in-itself. However, one then loses the essence of what human being is—freedom as it is revealed through transcendence. The cost of security is high. One lives in bad faith when one attempts to play a role of some sort, chosen by someone else, not authentically one’s own. This role limits one’s being-for-itself; one’s being in the world, and hence one’s possibility. Humans become what other people see them to be. A person is in ‘bad faith’ when his/her polar structure collapses on the side of being-in-itself. Human being becomes nothing more than an object, with all its limits, by giving up the subjective side of the self.

Does bad faith change the way that people exist in the world? Resoundingly, it does. Sartre asserts that man is constantly trying to give to others the freedom that he finds too overwhelming to harness. It is by limitation that we gain control over this aspect of being human. We literally play at life, by playing at the roles we create for ourselves. We are ‘the good wife’; ‘the good daughter’; ‘the excellent student’. Not thinking for ourselves, we only have to look to society, the unthinking herd, to tell us what is involved in playing each of these roles. We seek wholeness, ironically, through objectivity.
But, to be fair, on the other side of Sartre’s descriptive ontology, too much emphasis on the for-itself leads to a transcendence that is literally “negation, or nothingness.” Tillich agrees with Sartre that too much emphasis on either side of the polar structure leads to problems, including the predominance of the polarity of freedom that results in chaos. Since Sartre’s emphasis on man’s absolute freedom leads him to despair of man being anything but a futile passion, freedom must be limited by something. Sartre clearly does away with God as this limitation, but leaves open in his ontology the goal of the blending of the two sides in his being-in-itself-for-itself. To have ontological completion, both sides of the polar tension must be brought into one in a being-in-itself-for-itself. 47

To this point, we have seen that the structure of human selfhood is expressed by polarities that are held in balance in essential being through the power of being. We have also added Sartre’s basic ontological distinction to this list of polar tensions. As well, choice is key to the analysis since freedom is not actualized unless choice is presented. 48 With this overview, we can now relate Tillich’s and Sartre’s concepts to the fundamental question, which has now been modified to read: why did Adam and Eve sin?

A Synthesis of Tillich’s and Sartre’s Thought

It is now time to attempt to intertwine the Biblical story of the fall with the ontological analysis provided by Tillich and Sartre.

First, God creates human being in his image, constituted by polarities, defined by freedom, confronted by choice. Tillich’s pre-lapserian Adam has perfection through his (unchallenged and unchosen) polar balance. The power of being-itself, mythically expressed as man’s dwelling in the garden with God, keeps Adam in polar balance, or in the state of dreaming innocence, before the fall, since the power of being-itself continuously overcomes the threat of non-being which could upset the balance. Adam lives within God’s watchful vision. Sartre’s Adam, had he postulated such a person, would have been the perfect blend of the in-itself-for-itself. Human being is, in one important sense, almost perfect. That which keeps it from being perfect is that the state of man before the fall is given, not chosen.

The immanent fall occurs in Genesis 3, after three important things happen: God’s presence is replaced by the presence of the serpent in Genesis 3:1; Eve, who was created in Genesis 2, now appears as a dynamic presence in the story at Genesis 3:2 and following; and human beings subsequently fall into sin (Genesis 3:7).

Following the line of reasoning that has been established, it would make sense to ask, what happens ontologically when the Other arrives in the garden? Biblical tradition asserts that it is Eve’s power of seduction that makes Adam sin. 49 However, it seems more plausible that it is not what Eve does that creates the state of sin; rather, it is that Eve, by her very presence in the garden, and particularly her ability to see, changes everything in the garden, ontologically speaking. The force of Eve’s gaze puts Adam into a state of “bad faith,” and ontologically changes his structure. He needs her to complete himself. 50 Theoretically, she would affirm him by affirming what he is created to be (a creature with freedom balanced by limitation), an understanding that he has received from God in the prohibition given in Genesis 2:15-17. Instead of affirming his understanding, she challenges it by preferring the understanding of human being—ness given to her by the Serpent in Genesis 3:4: “But the serpent said to the woman, ‘You will not die.’” It is the gaze of the Other that creates limitation and provides the ontological force that transforms Adam and causes him to fall from faith (polar balance) to bad faith (polar imbalance which emphasizes the objective side) through his own choice. His freedom, which had been in perfect balance with his destiny, becomes limited, or finite, when he is seen by Eve. It is this finite freedom that is responsible for the “transition from essence to existence.” It works in exactly the opposite way that Peter’s affirmation of Jesus as the Christ starts the movement of Christianity. In this case, it is Eve’s non-affirmation of Adam’s being that leads to the sin of bad faith. Because it is chosen, and because of the human need for others for completion, the immanent fall is inevitable, though not ontologically necessary (or given).

Is it possible that the power of the Other’s look, then, ontologically changes subject into object? The answer is yes. Through an ontological interpretation, the immanent fall has nothing to do with Eve’s sexuality, but rather with her gaze. The fact that Adam and Eve choose to do something that God told them not to do was not sin; it was a manifestation of the prior sin of objectification. As an example of the change in perspective, their nudity (a manifestation of their objectification of each other) becomes problematic only after their fall not before it: “Then the
eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked” (Gen 3:7). The possibility of sin and the actuality of disobedience do not enter the Garden until a second person is created.

Of course, the existence of the other is not only a negative; it is also a necessity. Sartre says, and Tillich affirms, “There is no person without an encounter with other persons.” This would lead to the acceptance of the theory that full personhood is only attained when the person discovers his/her purpose, that is given to him/her by God, and that this purpose is affirmed by the Other. The Gospel account also supports Tillich’s view. In Matthew 13:55, Jesus, in his hometown, becomes the object of ‘bad faith’ and corresponding ontological imitation, shown by the words of the crowd: “Is not this the carpenter’s son?” Later in the chapter, their ‘offense’ at him renders him unable or unwilling to do “mighty works” there, “because of their unbelief.” (Matthew 13:58) Bad faith negates the power of being.

The contemporary relevance of this understanding of the Fall and Original Sin

Is objectification through the Other the original sin? The answer is a resounding Yes. The essence of fallenness, or the sin which underlies all other sins, is objectification. The Biblical story tells us what happens when humans strip each other of their unique combination of subjectivity-objectivity, their original fullness, the ontological goodness and completion that were given in a polar balance or self-centering: the world and everything good that dwells in it stands over against us as an Object. If original can be understood as foundational, it can be shown that the sin that underlies all other manifestations of sin is objectification. If this analysis is correct, it strongly suggests that bad faith—the act of objectification and subsequent limitation of one person by another—is the original sin.

Given the force of the ontological analysis presented herein, is there other Biblical evidence for this conclusion? Again, yes. What is seen in the first two chapters of Genesis affirms this hypothesis. God creates through his word, and then He pronounces his creation good when he sees it. In the current analysis, it is not that God sees that his creation is good after creating it; it is, rather, it is the seeing itself that establishes the goodness in creation. God, by the act of looking on all that he creates, renders creation good. He also sustains the goodness of creation through his look, and allows Adam to use his (Adam’s) gaze to name His creatures: “…and brought them to the man to see what he would call them;” (Genesis 2:19).

Hopefully it has been shown, through ontological clarification, that Tillich’s interpretations of the Biblical story of creation and fall has enduring merit for understanding the human situation. Human beings, created by God in his image, are fundamentally good. This goodness is related to their original constitution, given to them through God’s gaze, which empowers them to be what He creates them to be—creatures who live in harmony with Him.

The Biblical story tells us how this original creation is transformed: Eve (representing the real world of the Other) creates the possibility of the polar break through her gaze. In a perfect human creation, freedom and destiny, as well as the other polarities, are balanced through an individual’s faith that is affirmed by the Other. In the garden narrative, Eve’s “look” introduces the threat of non-being into essential being. The threatened break of the polar structure can then occur; specifically, Eve’s gaze, by not affirming Adam’s destiny, to be at once both himself and at one with God, de-centers him. Any action that occurs from a self that is not centered is sin. The power to lose one’s center is exacerbated through the conditions of existence (of which the Other is a primary component). Gilkey’s summary is correct: “The centering, shaping and directing of the self—the self-constitution of the self—depend on real relations to others, participation inwardly through commitment in those relations, and real but limited projects on the world.” Without this, the world loses its subjectivity: “It is filled only with flat, empty objects, objects there ‘for me’ and for my use.” As Tillich asks, “…then what does the term ‘fallen world’ mean?” It can be suggested that human perspective, the way that humans look at the world, is fundamentally changed through the tendency to objectify.

Though often dismissed as ‘only a myth’, the story of original sin expresses the more fundamental truth of what happens, in every life and at every time, to make sin happen. It is the condition that underlies every manifestation of sin. Gilkey agrees: “In speaking of both estrangement and sinew are pointing below the surface of events, choices, acts and consequences to a ‘deeper level’, a level below consciousness and so below the manifold of experience, a level which for Tillich in large part affects, in fact almost determines, the events, choices, and acts on
the ordinary historical surfaces of life.”

“What makes Tillich so helpful, therefore, is not only his clear interest in method, but also the fact that his ontological approach to theology helps bring to consciousness, even prominence, the universality and the ‘already there’ character of the experience of human evil.”

The explanation based herein is both ontological and existential; it answers Niebuhr’s criticism, that sin must be understood in such a way that it is inevitable, though not ontologically necessary. Finally, as well, this interpretation shows the ontological distinction between creation and fall, through what Gilkey calls “Some combination of ontology and myth.”

Questions concerning why we are created the way we are will always be asked, so that there are still points of mystery in the story. Humans would be arrogant to assume that they can know the mind of God.

The story of the immanent fall explains why human beings have such a strong inclination towards wanting to objectify those things which never should be objectified: objectifying people leads to stereotyping; even stronger cases lead, as Kant says, to treating others as a means to an end; and the most extreme cases of objectifying others lead to crimes, such as rape and murder, in which the subjective humanity of the Other is totally negated. Objectification in the realm of ideas transforms the spirit into the letter of the law. The list of examples of how humans transform the essential goodness of creation into something that goes against the original intent is endless.

Humans are created to be free, ontologically, and can achieve polar balance (faith) with God’s help, with individual effort, and with the affirmation of the Other. Unfortunately, humans are so uncomfortable with this God-given freedom, that they take the easy way out, making themselves and others objects. It is a matter of free choice; it is not out of ontological necessity. Before every encounter with the Other, there is always the choice to affirm his/her subjectivity. Frequently and inevitably, however, we choose to live in the concrete, limited world of bad faith, which reduces others to objects.

Hopefully, this paper has suggested a way of understanding original sin that is relevant to the 21st century. Original sin is not an inherited flaw that makes us sinful without our consent. Rather, the concept of original sin, derived from the Biblical story and interpreted ontologically, explains the universal and eternal tendency, found within each individual, awake at every moment and before every action, to freely choose to objectify Self and Others. This tendency leads to sin.

1 Langdon Gilkey Gilkey on Tillich (New York: The Crossroads Publishing Co., 1990), 114: “To his many ‘biblical’ theological colleagues—notably Reinhold Niebuhr—he was, especially on this issue, too ‘ontological’.”


4 Niebuhr, “Biblical Thought”, 218: “But if the structure of his existence, defined as finite freedom, is inevitably self seeking, man has every excuse.”

5 Paul Tillich, “Reply to Interpretation and Criticism”, Theology of Paul Tillich, 342.

6 Gilkey, 114 (footnote)

7 ST II, 29.

8 ST II, 36.

9 “Reply,” 343.

10 “Biblical Thought”, 220.

11ST II, 31: “One can say that nature is finite necessity, God is infinite freedom, man is finite freedom.”

12 Gilkey, 115: “Hence sin cannot be conceived as an ordinary personal act for whose consequences we are in the ordinary way responsible. When did any of us decide against God, or determine to rebel? Even if we did, how would such a particular, historical act infect everyone?”

13 “Biblical Thought”, 220.

14 Gilkey, 116: “…his ontological approach to theology helps bring to consciousness, even prominence, the universality and the ‘already there’ character of the experience of human evil.”

15 “Biblical Thought”, 220.

16 Newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/axial age (online)

17 ST II, 40: “…the transition from essence to existence is not an event in time and space but the transhistorical quality of all events in time and space.”

18 Gilkey, 118.

19 Gilkey, 115.

20 Gilkey, 115.

21 “Biblical Thought”, 220, quoting Tillich’s Propositions

22 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 165: “Three basic pairs of elements constitute the basic ontological structure: individuality and universality, dynamics and
form, freedom and destiny. In these three polarities the first element expresses the self relatedness of being, its power of being something for itself, while the second element expresses the belongingness of being, its character of being a part of a universe of being.”

23 ST I, 235.

24 Ibid, 188: “Being, limited by nonbeing, is finitude.”


26 Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York, Harper and Row, 1957), 5-6: “For faith is a matter of freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility of centered personal acts.” Sin becomes the opposite: when centering of the self is not present. For more elaboration, see pp. 49-52.

27 See note 11.

28 ST II, 31: “...God is infinite freedom, man is finite freedom.”

29 Ibid, 34: “Temptation is unavoidable because the state of dreaming innocence is uncontested and undecided. It is not perfection.”

30 Ibid, 32-33: “For the freedom of turning away from God is a quality of the structure of freedom as such. The possibility of the Fall is dependent on all the qualities of human freedom taken in their unity. Symbolically speaking, it is the image of God in man which gives the possibility of the Fall. ...His greatness and his weakness are identical.”

31 Ibid, 118: “New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence.”

32 Ibid, 119: “The New Being is new in so far as it is the undistorted manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence.”

33 Tillich’s vagueness about finite freedom is the source of much of the confusion. See discussion, above, ST II, 31ff.

34 See note 4.

35 ST II, 39.

36 Ibid, 97.


38 Reply, 343: “The fall is the work of finite freedom, but it happened universally in everything finite, and therefore unavoidably.”

39 Ibid, 342.

40 ST II, 91: “But the transition from essence to existence, from the potential to the actual, from dreaming innocence to existential guilt and tragedy, is irrational.”

41 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”, from Robert Solomon, ed., Existentialism (New York: Random House, Inc. 1974), 198: “Thus, there is no human nature because there is no God to have a conception of it.”

42 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 629: “Being-for-itself is the being of consciousness.”

43 Ibid, 74: “The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in.”

44 Kurt Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1952), 160-1: “The goal of all human striving is thus an ‘self’, combining the fullness of being with the fullness of consciousness....But such a goal is impossible of attainment....Man is therefore, Sartre concludes, ‘a futile passion’.”

45 See note 29.

46 BN, 628: “Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself.”

47 Ibid, 621: “If we wish to resolve these difficulties, we must take into account what is required of an existent if it is to be considered as a totality: it is necessary that the diversity of its structures be held within a unitary synthesis in such a way that each of them considered apart is only an abstraction.”

48 Gilkey, 120.

49 ST II, 37, discusses the rise of sexual consciousness in the myth.

50 God himself affirms this in Genesis 2: 18, that “it is not good that man should not be alone”.

51 ST I, 177; BN, 222: “But at the same time I need the other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being.”

52 BN, 263. Sartre straightforwardly states this: “My original Fall is the existence of the Other.”

53 The phrase God “saw” that creation ‘was good’ appears seven times in the first chapter of Genesis.

54 Gilkey, 132.

55 Ibid.

56 ST II, 40.

57 Ibid.


59 Ibid, 118.
Introduction

The question is this: Is God ontologically necessary for morality? The answer, I say, is only if God does not, in an important sense, exist. This is a paradoxical statement. It is paradoxical in Paul Tillich’s sense of being contrary to “…opinion which is based on the whole of ordinary human experience, including the empirical and rational.” My claim is that for God to be necessary for morality this paradox must be held intact. If the cognitive objectification of God that occurs in our thought of God is understood as a roughly adequate ontology, then, indeed, God is not necessary for morality. At most God becomes an epistemic prop, or a motivational carrot or stick. Such a God sits comfortably within the structure of ordinary human experience, but morality, with its self-transcending claim, is far from ordinary.

The question and answer that form the heart of this paper contain a question from one tradition, and an answer from another. Because of this, they do not really sit well together. The answer does not make sense within the framework of the question, and the question does not make sense within the framework of the answer. My own commitments have come to lie with the framework of the answer. This paper will be a brief attempt to show one reason for my transition by focusing on a particular bind that the framework of the question gets itself into.

The basic parting of ways between these two ways of thinking lies firstly in their conceptions of how to relate God’s essence to God’s existence, and, secondly, how to relate divine essence to the human essence. In the framework of the question, God’s essence does not include God’s existence, and, as such, God’s essence is conceived of as existing apart from our own human essence. In this way, God’s essence serves as an exemplar of the Good. The framework of the answer, on the other hand, draws upon the idea of divine simplicity. Here God’s essence includes existence. The human essence, therefore, is related to the divine essence by way of participation rather than emulation. These two approaches are well captured by Tillich’s lifelong outworking of the principles of contrast and identity, or, as I will be using the terms in this paper, the prophetic and the mystical. It is the prophetic framework that asks, “Is God necessary for morality?,” and it is the mystical framework that answers, “Only if God does not exist.”

In what follows I intend to show, with reference to a contemporary debate in moral ontology: (1) How the prophetic way of conceiving of God’s ontological necessity fails, and (2) How Paul Tillich’s appropriation of the mystical tradition in conversation with Thomas Aquinas reframes the discussion in such a way as to avoid the troubles of the first way while providing a fruitful structure in which our theological and moral terms might take shape.

1. The Prophetic Question and Its Limits

We can enter into the prophetic attempt to conceive of God as necessary for morality by way of the Euthyphro dilemma. Any theistic moral ontology needs to find some answer to Plato’s classical dilemma. The basic form of this dilemma is this: Is the moral goodness of something constituted by the fact that it is approved of by God (thus making the standard of evaluation internal to God in the form of command or will), or does God approve of something because it is good (and, presumably, this goodness is external to God)? Those who accept some form of the first horn are said to be theological voluntarists. Their task must then be to give a response to the charge that “good” is arbitrary since God, supposedly, could have approved of something different, or even something evil. Those who accept the second horn of this dilemma are said to be theistic Platonists. For them, an impersonal good is the ultimate principle by which the (now finite) God must itself be judged. Are there any other options for the prophetic meta-ethicist? It is difficult to say, but there are those who attempt to articulate a way through.

These theorists are those working since Robert Merrihew Adams’s 1973 essay, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness.” The way they try to get past Euthyphro is to assign divine commands a more limited role. Drawing from social contract theory, they conceive of divine commands as constitutive of moral duty, or obligation, rather than moral goodness. God, they want to say, approves of something because it is good, but this goodness is judged not on the basis of an external standard; rather, it is judged on the basis God’s own essence. Thus the standard for evaluation is internal to God, but goes deeper than God’s mere will or
command—in Robert Adams’ succinct formulation: Goodness is God.⁹

But what is critical to understand is that for Adams, as well as all other representatives of what I am calling “the prophetic meta-ethical project,” God is, as Adams says, “…concrete (though not physical) individual. Indeed [God] is a person, or importantly like a person.”¹⁰ “And therein lies the trouble. If God is a concrete individual, then it seems impossible to avoid the metaphysics of concrete particularity that entails that God is composed of some combination of essence and existence.

According to Michael Loux, metaphysicians conceive of a concrete particular as either substance plus attributes, or perhaps a bundle of attributes, or perhaps even an Aristotelian “kinds” + attributes.¹¹ But whatever way this is sliced, concrete particulars do not have an essence identical with their existence. The existence of a concrete particular entails variations in the exemplification of attributes, thus the exemplification of particular attributes is not necessary in the strict logical sense. If this is admitted the Euthyphro dilemma can make a second appearance, but on a deeper level.

As theistic Platonist Wes Morriston argues, “if we ask what makes it so that love, generosity, justice, faithfulness, and kindness are good, [the] answer [for the view under consideration] would appear to be that these qualities are good because they are united in God’s nature.”¹² But Morriston begins to unravel the prima facie simplicity of this view by asking what a “nature” is. And given that the god-concept in play is a concrete particular, he reaches for an account of “nature” that involves the composition of existence and essence. He says that, “[a] person’s nature is that set of properties which she possesses in every possible world in which she exists.”¹³ That being the case it can reasonably be asked, “Is God good because [God] has these properties? Or are they good because God has them?”¹⁴

From here one need only to imagine how we would respond to the following questions: What would happen to goodness if the exemplification of these properties in God was terminated? What if God ceased to exist or changed? It seems counterintuitive, indeed, to imagine that if someone were to run through these doors with news that God had in fact died due to injuries sustained by local authorities, or perhaps that God had given up on this whole “goodness” thing and was now the embodiment of pure spiteful evil, that such news would alter the metaphysical status of goodness. But this is what the prophetic project must be committed to. Moral goodness remains for them as arbitrary as the existence of the God they seek to tie it to.¹⁵

Of course, these theorists here object that such a scenario is impossible. God, they say, is not a contingent being, as creatures are, but a necessary being in at least the broadly logical sense. That is, God is a metaphysically necessary being.¹⁶ Yet, the reason this assertion never settles the argument is that the existence of the God in play is not logically identical with God’s essence. That being the case, it is impossible not to be able to conceive of this God not existing in at least some possible world. But the trouble with metaphysical necessity is that (quoting proponents of the prophetic project, William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland): “There are no clear criteria which can be applied mechanically to determine whether a proposition is metaphysically necessary or impossible. One chiefly has to rely on intuition or conceivability.”¹⁷ And since it is so easy to conceive of such a God as failing to exist or changing, the assertion of metaphysical necessity just does not stick.¹⁸ Any being we can conceive of whose essence does not include existence, without violence to logic, can be imagined not to exist. This, it seems, is the final limit of the prophetic meta-ethical project. Only by willing the mind to avoid certain logical possibilities can such metaphysical necessity be maintained.

2. The Mystical Answer

This basic failure within the framework of the question “Is God necessary for morality?” leads us now to a different (arguably much older) framework. This is the ontology that Paul Tillich was thinking out of when he said repeatedly that, “God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence…. [T]o argue that God exists is to deny him.”¹⁹ It is from here that the mystical answer to the prophetic question comes.

For many in our day, Tillich’s claim remains a rather shocking thing for a theologian to say. Yet, it is really not so radical as the form he uses might indicate. This fundamental assertion in Tillich’s ontology reaches back to the Augustinian tradition in which God’s essence is thought of as being identical with God’s existence.²⁰ This is what Tillich means when he says that God is beyond essence and existence.

This quasi-concept of divine simplicity is extremely difficult to get across as it does not itself
yield determinate knowledge, but must be seen in contrast with all created things that exist contingently or, as Aquinas says, “by participation.” To have being contingently is to be in such a way that essence and existence are not identical with one another. This is what makes it possible for all things other than God to fail to exist and to change. The existence of creatures stands in no necessary relationship to their essence. Divine simplicity, however, is basically the denial of contingency, by way of uniting God’s way of being with God’s essence. Moreover, created things are, from a common point of view, either concrete things or abstractions, but God, as simple, is neither concrete nor abstract. God is not a being, nor an idea, but Being-itself.

What is critical to grasp at this juncture is that God as simple cannot fail to exist, nor can God change. This is partially due to the pure logic of essence and existence, and partially due to the way the meanings of the terms “exist” and “change” largely slip out of our fingers when predicated of the simple deity. To conceive of God, thusly described, as changing or ceasing to exist is to participate in the very understandable failure of simply not grasping the implications of divine simplicity. Indeed, this is part of the point. But whatever else is said, the tradition Paul Tillich is drawing upon is logically and therefore necessarily immune from troubles that the Euthyphro dilemma brings out in the prophetic attempt to ground the moral good in God.

What we have instead is a conceptual scheme in which, to quote Aquinas, “all beings apart from God...are beings by participation.” Thus, just as all creatures are beings in God’s simple perfection, so all goods, including the moral good, relate to God in the same way. This mirroring of being and goodness operates as it does because, as Aquinas says, “Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea.” From this we can see how little sense it makes to ask “is God necessary for morality?” from within this framework. It would make as much sense as asking if a efficient cause was necessary to explain contingent being.

Yet, for those familiar with Tillich’s thought there may seem to be a difficulty with how I have gone about this. So far, I have been suggesting a fairly seamless union between the thought of Tillich and Aquinas, and yet, it might be remembered that Tillich himself criticized Aquinas on this point. Tillich, himself, emphatic that we must not speak of God as existing, but his substantive critiques of both the scholastics and Aquinas lack a certain nuance that, I think, would otherwise save the term “existence” from the dustbin. In criticizing the scholastics Tillich says,

The scholastics were right when they asserted that in God there is no difference between essence and existence. But they perverted their insight when in spite of this assertion they spoke of the existence of God and tried to argue in favor of it. Actually they did not mean ‘existence.’ They meant the reality, the validity, the truth of the idea of God, an idea which did not carry the connotation of something or someone who might or might not exist.

It was from this idea (before I had read much Aquinas) that I took the title for this paper, which is sort of a problem for me since it is not quite right. Aquinas, at least, really did mean “existence,” but he did not mean it in Tillich’s special sense. Yet, he meant it in a very precise sense that, I think, captures Tillich’s concern without losing the term. For Aquinas, existence is a form of actuality. He says, “…existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.” In this sense both creatures and God have something in common: actuality. But since God does not emerge from potentiality into actuality as creatures do, God’s actuality, and therefore existence, is of a radically different form than creaturely actuality. God’s actuality is the absolute actuality that precedes and gives rise to all contingent actuality. Thus, for Aquinas, we cannot predicate existence of God univocally (and this seems to be Tillich’s real concern), but even so we can still say that God does indeed exist. It’s just that, in the words of Denys Turner, “…we are bound to have lost most of our grip on the meaning of ‘exists’ as thus predicated of God.” This, it seems to me, is Tillich’s basic point, and noting the bind that the prophetic project gets itself into by rejecting this insight, his concern does not seem to be an idle one. So I think—if you do not mind—I will just keep the title of my paper!

3. Conclusion

So, what has been shown here? I have tried to make clear, by way of juggling two incompatible traditions, what we must mean by God if God is to be ontologically necessary for morality. If we let our ontology follow from our ordinary human experience and therefore come to think of God as a con-
crete particular, then, I’m with the atheists; I do not think that such a God is necessary for morality. Morality, if it is anything, is at least the idea that some ways of being are good or bad regardless of what anybody says about them, even a god. This follows from what Tillich called the religious source of morality, “…the self-transcendence of the spirit toward what is ultimate and unconditioned in being and meaning.” What I have called the prophetic meta-ethical project operated by way of a god-concept that remained conditioned by our ordinary human experience. Such a god was, like us, a particular being and therefore not, Being-itself. Calling this being necessary was shown to be an arbitrary assertion.

In the wake of this failure, I have held up, by way of Tillich and Aquinas, the classical ontology of divine simplicity as a more adequate alternative. The moral good and God’s essence were in this way related to each other in the same way that all being is related to God’s essence. This was not by way of one particular being an exemplar for another, nor was it by some nebulous relation of a universal to a particular. Rather, the relation of essence to existence is where the crux lies. In the words of Tillich, “Essence empowers and judges that which exists. It gives it its power of being, and, at the same time, it stands against it as commanding law.” God, as this power of being is therefore necessary for morality, but that is a relatively trivial thing to say since God is in this way also necessary for any being whatsoever. What is less trivial is the suggestion that radical questioning in the realm of moral ontology might lead to the doorstep of classical theism, but that is just the suggestion with which I wish to leave you.

Bibliography


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2 Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?”, 129.

3 It’s worth noting that Adams does not seek to tie goodness to God in this way. Rather he argues that God is a suitable candidate to fill the semantic role that our usage of the term “good” picks out. Even so, these considerations render his conclusion questionable since his God needs to deal with the consequences of the metaphysics of concrete particularity.


5 Ibid., 503.

6 For an illustration of this point by way of the truth functionality of counterfactual conditionals, see Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?”, 134-5. The formal logic says one thing, but Morriston’s intuitive conceptualization says another. This is due, I argue, to the non-simple nature of the deity he is conceiving.


12 Wes Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?,” *Philosophia Christi* 3, no. 1 (2001), 128. And indeed, this is just the point that Moreland and Craig make: “God may be said to be good in the sense that he possesses all these moral virtues—and he does so essentially and to the maximal degree!”

25 “The ontological question is: What is being itself? What is that which is not a special being or a group of beings, not something concrete or something abstract, but rather something which is always thought implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, if something is said to be?” Tillich, Systematic Theology: Reason and Revelation, Being and God, 1, 163.

26 Again, Thatamanil has a very good discussion on why predicating “Being-itself” of God is not a straightforward predication, but rather a sort of limit expression between conceptual and religious discourses. Thatamanil, “Tillich and the Postmodern”, 290-8.

27 Denys Turner makes this point beautifully when he argues that “…if we say, as Thomas does, that whatever the answer [to the question, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing’], it is ‘what people refer to when they talk of God, then we know at least one thing about God: we know that we could not know what it means to say ‘God exists’ because the notion of existence has now run off the edge of our intelligible world, even if it was necessities of thought about our world which led us to it: before God, language has, as it were, run itself out of the possibilities available to it.” Denys Turner, “How to Be an Atheist,” New Blackfriars 83, no. 977-978 (2002), 330.

28 Morriston recognizes this point well. He says, “I mention one solution to this problem only to put it to one side. Those who accept the doctrine of divine simplicity can pass unscathed between the horns of this dilemma. If God is God’s nature, the problem disappears. Since God’s nature is not something over and above God, there can be no question of its providing a standard of moral goodness apart from God. But for the rest of us — those of us who cannot see how God could be his nature or how his nature could be simple — things are not so easy. We must choose between the horns of our Euthyphro-like dilemma and make the best of it.” Morriston, “Must There Be a Standard of Moral Goodness Apart from God?”, 129-30.


30 Ibid., ST I, Q 5, A 1.

31 William Rowe pointed to this when he noted that “[Tillich] does use ‘exists’ in such a way that to say that ‘x exists’ is to imply that x is subject to the conditions of finitude. What this means is that ‘existence’ and ‘exists’ are technical terms in Tillich’s system. When people argue about the existence of God they are not arguing about whether God is finite or not. When the classical theologians asserted the existence of God they did not mean to imply, nor were they taken to imply, that God is subject to the conditions of finitude—time, space, [page break] etc. Hence, it would seem that Tillich has not given any convincing reason as yet why it would be a mistake to say that God exists when ‘exists’ is used not in Tillich’s special sense, but either in its ordinary sense or in some sense in which the classical theologians used it.” William L. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study of Tillich’s Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 76-77.

I think Rowe is right about the sense of the scholastics, but in spite of that, I think that sometimes arguments about God’s existence are arguments about whether or not God is finite, as is evidenced by the discussion of the prophetic attempt to ground the moral good in God above.

32 Tillich, Systematic Theology: Reason and Revelation, Being and God, 1, 205.

33 Robert R.N. Ross saw this clearly when he wrote that in light of Tillich’s technical use of “exists” that “…one can see on what basis he is led to make the claim “God does not exist.” Yet the cost of the questionable forcefulness gained in making it comes high. In affirming the reality of God there is a confusion — a confusion Aquinas appreciated but sought to avoid. But because the confusion is a genuine one, it cannot be removed, as Tillich thought, by merely attempting to remove the concept of ‘existence,’ or by somehow making it inoperative. Thus, in the case of Tillich, and perhaps the Pseudo-Dionysius as well, the price paid for (sometimes) disallowing the possibility of asserting God’s existence is that of losing sight of where to focus our confusion.” Robert R. N. Ross, “Non-Existence of God: Tillich, Aquinas, and the Pseudo-Dionysius,” Harvard Theological Review 68, no. 2 (1975), 156.


35 “…the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality.” Ibid, ST I, Q 3, A 1.

36 Paul Ricoeur has a tremendous section in The Rule of Metaphor that analyzes Thomas’ “…desire to encompass in a single doctrine the horizontal relation of the categories of substance and the vertical relation of created things to the Creator.” Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 272-80. He concludes that the result of this monumental effort was a renewed split between the speculative (univocal) and poetic forms of discourse. Poetic discourse is thought to deploy neither univocal, nor equivocal attribution, but instead metaphorical attribution,
and metaphorical attribution contains an irreducible element of *indeterminacy*.

37 Turner, “How to Be an Atheist.”, 321.

38 This might be thought of as a point of contact between the mystical meta-ethical project and atheistic thinking on the topic. As Eric Wielenberg writes, “If there are ethical truths at all, then some of them lie at the bedrock of reality, created by no one, under no one’s control, passing judgment on the actions and character of God and man alike.” Erik J. Wielenberg, *Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 67.


40 Systematic Theology: *Reason and Revelation, Being and God*, 1, 203.

41 It is worth noting that my arrival at the idea of divine simplicity is somewhat similar to the revelation that Alasdair MacIntyre came to after writing “After Virtue.” He says, “…I had now learned form Aquinas that my attempt to provide an account of the human good purely in social terms, in terms of practices, tradition, and the narrative unity of human lives, was bound to be inadequate until I had provided it with a metaphysical grounding. It is only because human beings have an end towards which they are directed by reason of their specific nature, that practices, traditions, and the like are able to function as they do. So I discovered that I had, without realizing it, presupposed the truth of something very close to the account of the concept of good that Aquinas gives in question 5 in the first part of the Summa Theologiae.” Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), x, xi.

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It is well known that Martin Heidegger attributed a basic function to anxiety in the self-apprehension of *Dasein*. As he explains in *Being and Time*, anxiety makes accessible the “being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself” and therein calls it out its fallen-ness in “the They”. With his concept of anxiety, Heidegger draws on Søren Kierkegaard as well as Schelling, about whose *freedom text* he conducted a seminar in the same year in which *Being and Time* was published. Likewise, Heidegger sees his own philosophy as an alternative project to Ernst Troeltsch and Paul Tillich. Since the end of the 1920s Tillich conceived his anthropological reflections in explicit contention with Heidegger.

Tillich’s reflections are also focused on the connection between freedom, finitude and anxiety and stand—as with Heidegger’s reflections—in the reception history of Schelling and Kierkegaard. With that, I have named the theme of my following thoughts, which have to do with how the human person in his concrete, determined self-understanding becomes conscious of his own freedom. Against the backdrop of Schelling’s thought, Tillich and Kierkegaard work out very different answers, which are nevertheless in agreement, that it is in anxiety that the human person gains access to his own freedom. My considerations here are oriented toward their respective elaborations of this connection. Schelling’s philosophy of freedom is the starting point for this.

Schelling’s *Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom* from 1809 is without question one of the central points of reference in the debate about freedom, finitude and anxiety. This text, difficult to interpret and therefore highly controversial, belongs to the context of so called identity philosophy. Here Schelling is working on a natural philosophical groundwork of human freedom, as is evident in the countless references to his identity philosophy texts. Going back as far as his Magister dissertation of 1792, he takes up earlier reflections into the (difficult to illuminate) line of argument of the *Investigations*. Already in his Magister dissertation the young Schelling—referencing Kant and the contemporary exegetical debates—had interpreted the fall of humanity as the transition from the state of nature to the consciousness of freedom, thereby eliminating the traditional doctrine of original sin. Articulated in the biblical myth of the fall is the awakening of human freedom. Connected to this is the loss of the dreaming innocence of the state of nature.

The *Investigations* frames the character of human freedom in terms of absoluteness, freedom, and natural philosophy. In the human, as the result of the
process of nature, the two forces of the universal and of self-will come into union. Thus, the human is simultaneously in nature and “above and outside all nature.” Unlike God and Nature, the unity of both principles is severable. In his life, the human person faces the task of harmonizing these two principles, i.e., the general type and selfhood. The becoming conscious of one’s own state of freedom, and its necessary realization through humanity, is described by Schelling as anxiety.\footnote{8.}

It is well known that, after ending his engagement to Regine Olsen, Søren Kierkegaard went directly to Berlin in the winter semester of 1841/42 and listened to and took notes on—albeit without much patience—Schelling’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation. As Tonny Aagaard Olesen has recently made clear, it is rather unlikely that the Danish thinker had read Schelling’s works, especially the work on freedom from 1809.\footnote{8. Nevertheless, in his treatise from 1844, The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard worked out a theory of a concrete individual subject that stands within the problem-horizon of idealistic debates concerning the Spirit. Following Fichte, the Dane transfers the theory of the absolute and the natural philosophical frame of Schelling’s treatise on freedom to the individual, self-realization of the concrete subject, which is self-understanding and which relates to its self-understanding.\footnote{9.} The self or spirit is a synthesis of freedom and necessity, infinity and finitude, etc., which is only real in the act of self-positioning. For the concrete subject, the derivable disclosedness of this synthetic structure is anxiety. The latter is “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”\footnote{10.} In anxiety, the subject grasps itself as simultaneously finite and infinite, real and possible, while also becoming aware of the task of constructing a concrete self-understanding. Thus, anxiety is ambiguous. A self-disclosed consciousness of freedom is always at the same time a consciousness of guilt, knowledge of the ambivalence of the realization of freedom. If freedom grasps itself in this way, then—as with the young Schelling—the natural state of dreaming innocence is already left behind.\footnote{11.}

During his studies at the theological faculty of the university of Halle, from 1905 to 1907, Paul Tillich took part in a student reading group dedicated to the thinker from Copenhagen.\footnote{12.} This did not fail to leave an impression on his later study of Schelling. On the whole, then, Tillich’s theology and philosophy of religion bespeak an interweaving of Kierkegaardian and Schellingian motifs. Most well-known are the passages about “‘Dreaming Innocence’ and Temptation”\footnote{13.} in the second volume of the Systematic Theology. The recently published early lectures from exile (held by Tillich in the USA in 1934/35), which include lectures on anthropology, cast new light on Tillich’s thoughts on the relation of freedom, finitude, and anxiety.\footnote{14.}

Tillich transforms Kierkegaard’s philosophy of spirit into a historically oriented anthropology. It is concerned with the question as to how the human, in his concrete life, arrives at an understanding of himself. The anthropology, which Tillich—dismissing object-oriented conceptions—calls the doctrine of the man, carries forward the deliberations of the philosophy of mind of the 1920s. The topics to be treated in the doctrine of the human are the freedom and finitude of the human person. The human being is freedom. Freedom is only real in its performance. Therefore, freedom and necessity overlap in self-determination. Tillich examines one’s grasping of the inner structure of his freedom under the central concept of finitude. Like Schelling and Kierkegaard, Tillich determines the coming to awareness of one’s own finite freedom, in the self-realization of the individual, as anxiety. In anxiety, the human person becomes aware of the facticity of his own self-determination, its ambivalent realization, as well as his having to die. Furthermore, for Tillich, the personality is also a task that every individual must realize. It consists in the transparency of finite freedom in its ambivalent structure.

Looking over the thoughts discussed here on the relation of anxiety, freedom, and finitude in Schelling, Kierkegaard and Tillich, it becomes apparent that the self and its self-aware self-determination is increasingly actualized and dynamized. The imagination of a fixed core of the person is dissolved by Kierkegaard, and even more by Tillich, into the symbolic presentation of the self in its own performances. In Tillich, the concept of anxiety becomes a basic anthropological determination. It thereby receives a basic function in a Dasein-hermeneutical theory of the finite human. In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger worked out just such a theory, although he explicitly wanted to think of his program as being distinct from any anthropology.\footnote{15.}
Ein Lebensbild in Aufsätzen, Reden und Stellungnahmen, Stuttgart 1972, GW XIII, p. 27-33, esp. 29.


I express my thanks to Jason Valdez (Vienna) for translating this paper.

A word from the editor:

I encourage you to receive the Bulletin electronically if at all possible. Postage rates have risen on 26 January 2014.

If you have not paid your dues for 2013, please do so at your earliest convenience. The Society sustained a considerable loss on the banquet in Baltimore.

Many thanks.

Please send any new publications to the editor (fparrella@scu.edu).

Book reviews are also appreciated.
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