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Dates of the Annual Meeting

A Reminder: The annual meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society (NAPTS) will take place all day Friday and Saturday morning, 22–23 November 2013. The banquet will be held on Friday evening at a local restaurant. This year, the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) is in Baltimore, Maryland, 23-26 November 2013. In addition to the annual meeting and banquet, there will be sessions of the AAR Group, “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion and Culture.” Our President Elect, Dr. Duane Olsen, is the Program Chair of the annual meeting.

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The AAR Group’s co-chairs are:

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Dr. Rittenhouse shows that consumerism functions as a religion. It provides a means of assurance that an individual life is meaningful. Because we need this assurance to live out our everyday lives, consumerism takes precedence over whatever other values a person professes—unless a person can adopt a different way to secure the meaning of his or her life. This interpretation explains how consumers actually behave. From the perspective of Christian theology, consumerism is a wrong answer to a problem of human existence that should be answered by faith in Christ.

RAYMOND F. BULMAN (1933 — 2013)

Raymond Francis Bulman, professor of systematic theology and the philosophy of religion at St. John’s University in Jamaica, Queens since 1963, died at age 79 on March 23, 2013. It was just a week before he was scheduled to be honored for his 50 years of service to the school. His induction into the American Theological Society at Princeton University was also scheduled for March, but that event, too, had to be postponed after he suffered the stroke that eventually took his life.

A long time member of NAPTS, Ray’s contributions to the Society and to his field were significant. In 1993 became chairman of the Seminars on Studies in Religion at Columbia. His 1981 book, A Blueprint for Humanity: Paul Tillich’s Theology of Culture, was named an outstanding academic book by Choice, a library journal. Mr. Bulman also wrote The Lure of the Millennium: The Year 2000 and Beyond,” published by Orbis Books in 1999, and co-edited three other volumes with his friend and colleague, Frederick Parrella. These books include: Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Perspective (1994), Religion for the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of Paul Tillich (2001), and From Trent to Vatican II: Historical and Theological Investigations (2006). He spoke fluent Latin, Italian, and French, and could read ancient Greek, Hebrew, and German.

Born on April 13, 1933, in the Bronx, the son of William Bulman and the former Anne Doherty, Mr. Bulman grew up in that borough and in Fort Greene, Brooklyn. He attended Gregorian University in Rome from 1957 to 1960, and was a special research student at Oxford University in England in 1970 and 1971. He earned a doctorate in the philosophy of religion at Columbia University from 1964 through 1973.

East Hampton played a special part in his life. His parents had “a remarkable love affair,” Raymond said, and East Hampton “was their paradise.” It was there, in 1974, that he met his wife, the former Carole Kasbar. They married in 1978. Although they lived in Fort Lee, New Jersey for the school year, they continued to spend their summers in East Hampton until 2002, when they built a home in Wainscott, Long Island.

They had one child, also named Raymond, who says of his dad “[He was] incredibly loving, wise, and good-spirited person, and an exemplary husband and an incomparable father whose depth of experience and insight enriched the lives of those around him.”

He was a great contributor to the scholarship, spirit, and good will of the NAPTS, and will be greatly missed by all of us who had the privilege to work with and know him.

ROGER SHINN (1917 — 2013)

Roger Shinn was one of the scholars who studied with such theological giants of the 20th century, as Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. He was a great admirer and wise interpreter of Tillich’s thought, and provided lucid interpretations of both Tillich and Niebuhr. It was Niebuhr’s ideas that profoundly influenced Shinn’s own ideas about Christian Ethics, a field in which he wrote a number of books. Colleagues and friends Robert McAfee Brown and John C. Bennett were also influential dialogue partners to Shinn’s contribution to 20th Century thought. A signal moment in his career occurred when he wrote the statement of faith still used today by the newly established United Church of
Professor Wesley

Christ.

A truly gentle man, Shinn was always generous to his colleagues and students in sharing his ideas and supporting their work. He was balanced and fair in his judgments and not without a sense of humor. About the “God is Dead” movement he wrote, “Theology has always had a vested interest in foolishness.” We shall miss his gentle and wise presence.

Marion Hausner Pauck

EDMON (EDD) LEWIN ROWELL JR. (1937 – 2013)

Mr. Rowell was a graduate of Howard College (Samford University) and Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary. Edd served in the U.S. Army (1954-1957) in Korea. He was pastor of churches in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Alabama before coming to Mercer University where he was a founder and Senior Editor of Mercer University Press. While at Mercer, he continued to serve widely as interim pastor of area churches. Edd Rowell was editor at Mercer University Press for more than 30 years. He was a dedicated Tillich editor and scholar and he supported many scholars, including many in the NAPTS, in their Tillich books. Marc Jolley of Mercer University Press says that Edd “loved every minute of his work.”

Fred,

I have said things like this before to others and to you but I want to underline how remarkable it is that the Bulletin exists. I belong to many scholarly groups and each one has to figure out its basic glue—the bond that holds people together. Often enough it is a journal or a conference, but there are set ways of making those things happen and the leadership rotates by design. The NAPTS Bulletin exists, it seems to me, virtually solely because of your love of it and your dedication to the group. It is serious glue for this particular group and constitutes a remarkable record of scholarly contribution by you. I want you to know that this is how I feel every time the Bulletin arrives—astonished and grateful! So my hat is off to you once again.

Wesley

Wesley J. Wildman

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**Book Review**

**POLITICS AND FAITH: REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND PAUL TILLICH AT UNION SEMINARY IN NEW YORK, by RONALD H. STONE (MACON, GEORGIA: MERCER UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012), 486P.**

Reviewed by Guy B. Hammond

Everyone interested in the lives and careers of the two greatest American philosopher/theologians of the 20th century—Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich—will rejoice at the publication of Ronald Stone’s magnum opus, *Politics and Faith: Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Seminary*. Stone’s personal connections with the two great figures, and his previous publications dealing with their lives and thought, place him in an unrivaled position to review their activities and interactions in the crucial period of 1933 to 1955, when they were colleagues at Union Seminary. This work is a monumental effort that sheds new light on their perspectives, and indeed provides new insights into that whole period of American history.

Central to both men’s experience in this time period, especially given Stone’s focus on issues of politics and faith, was the inescapable impact of world wars, in prospect, reality, or retrospect. In his early pages Stone gives a prefatory glimpse of the two on different sides of the conflict in World War One, both falling into, and discovering the limitations of, sanctified nationalism. Then, after Tillich had fled Germany with the advent of Nazism, they found themselves together at Union Seminary, confronting the renewal of European conflict, and the need to find meaning in the midst of another worldwide cataclysm.

To what extent did they come to share a common perspective? Stone weighs the evidence judiciously, acknowledging differences where they existed, but in the end portraying a remarkable overall agreement on issues of greatest moment. Despite...
tensions at various points, this agreement provided a firm basis for a broadly neo-liberal (not neo-orthodox) theology in the post-war period.

No review can do justice to Stone’s richly detailed accounts of how Niebuhr and Tillich—jointly or separately—responded to the countless issues that arose during the period in question. A few selected topics may be taken as representative.

Stone provides an interesting assessment of the socialism of Niebuhr and Tillich in the early thirties, noting that their most socialist books, Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society and Tillich’s The Socialist Decision, appeared at the same time (1932-1933). Niebuhr subsequently abandoned socialism and embraced Roosevelt’s New Deal, while Tillich continued to identify himself with his version of religious socialism, but came to understand that it was not “politically relevant” (74) in the United States; both could be said to have adopted a pragmatic, rather than a doctrinaire approach to economic and political issues. Stone shows how both sought to move beyond Marxism while preserving the benefits of a Marxist critique of society in Christian social ethics (85).

Although it was Tillich who used the phrase, “On the Boundary” to describe his own circumstances in life and thought, Stone finds it useful to describe ways in which both Tillich and Niebuhr saw themselves in “boundary” situations. For example, both stood on the borderline between theology and philosophy. Tillich was more overt in acknowledging his vocation as at once philosopher and theologian. Niebuhr was more critical of philosophy, and “turned more quickly to the biblical symbols” (79); but American pragmatism became more and more crucial to his perspective, not always overtly. Though German idealism was alien to Niebuhr, and pragmatism was deficient as an overarching philosophy in Tillich’s view, both made use of existentialism (363).

Before and during World War II, Stone sees Niebuhr and Tillich arriving at a remarkable unanimity of political perspectives. Niebuhr had abandoned his earlier pacifist leanings, and both were highly critical of Christian liberalism’s utopian idealism. Together they constructed a “Christian realism” that was relevant to the times. (Regrettably, Stone does not give extended treatment of Tillich on estrangement to parallel his masterful summation of Niebuhr on sin and salvation (120-132).) One of Stone’s narrations captures the flavor of the debates: Both Niebuhr and Tillich were asked, in 1943, to contribute to the work of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches. The Commission was chaired by John Foster Dulles, who was “a hardened proponent of the capitalist spirit.” Niebuhr must have smiled, says Stone, at the thought of Tillich writing for the Commission; Tillich’s perspective reflected his “sense of a world in revolt against the capitalist spirit” (154). Antagonism between the two and Dulles—who later became Secretary of State—only deepened in following years. Ultimately both sought to defend a middle way between “totalitarian absolutism” and “liberal individualism” (185). Though they were close politically, Niebuhr “offered a more thorough defense of democracy,” while Tillich maintained that Western political forms were not necessarily transferable in totality to other parts of the world (185-186).

In the post-war years, Stone discerns a certain degree of divergence between Niebuhr and Tillich. While Niebuhr continued to address issues of national and international politics, Tillich—with a few exceptions—pulled back from active political involvement. His one major scholarly publication of the time that dealt with historical and political issues, The Protestant Era (1948), pointed back to themes he had developed prior to World War II (263). Secondly, in other important works of the period—in the sermons of The Shaking of the Foundations (1948) as well as in the Systematic Theology, vol. I (1951)—Tillich’s doctrine of the Spirit became “very prominent,” while, says Stone, this theme was “almost absent in Niebuhr’s preaching and in his formal theological writing” (266). And lastly, of course, Tillich turned his primary attention toward the writing of his systematic theology, rather than being preoccupied with the Cold War and other issues in the realm of social ethics.

These divergences were real, but Stone is convinced that they were relatively superficial, counteracted by continuing underlying common commitments. In part to demonstrate this, Stone engages in a “social analysis of Tillich’s Systematic Theology” in a chapter entitled “Tillich’s Later Social Ethics” (289ff). Noting Tillich’s statement (in Volume I) that “it is not the task of the systematic theologian to set forth a political program or a social philosophy,” and that the system does not include a specific section on social ethics (290-291), Stone observes that the whole of Tillich’s theology is written in dialogue with contemporary thinkers, not least with political philosophers of the time. For example, in the epis-
temology of Part One, Stone mentions Tillich’s important citation of political philosopher Max Horkheimer’s analysis of “technical reason” (292). Though Part Two of Volume One (Tillich’s doctrine of God) is “relatively empty of social analysis” (293), it remains clear that Tillich’s ontological concept of God is designed to provide a firm basis for a social ethics (293). Stone grants that Systematic Theology, Vol. II, is “except for a few references—apolitical” (294). (Tillich did not engage in the more recently prominent debates about Jesus’ relation to issues of politics and empire). Regarding Volume III, the dominance of the Spirit (along with mysticism and ontology) evoked Niebuhrian criticism (tradition has it that Niebuhr said regarding Volume III: “he’s even more heretical than I thought he was” (295)). On the other hand, however, the concluding section of Volume III “contributed to the revival of the symbol of the Kingdom of God as a central symbol for social theology,” a tendency not matched in Niebuhr, but seemingly a compatible supplement to his work; Niebuhr used the Kingdom of God symbol primarily as a “principle of critique” of other utopias (422).

In summary, both Niebuhr and Tillich eschewed simplistic solutions to the problem of relating politics and faith. Stone writes: “Some interpretations of Christian faith are relatively apolitical, others almost totally political. These two lived and taught a vigorous commitment to politics for the common good or justice, but with a Christian reservation about politics, and Christian resources for life beyond politics” (416-417). They both generally refrained from applying Christian doctrine directly to political issues. “For both Niebuhr and Tillich it is a more complicated process moving through social ethical judgments, political philosophy and then policy and party strategies” (419).

Stone sums up his depiction of the two great thinkers’ complementary relationship in terms of love, power, and justice: “Niebuhr wrestled for years with the dialectic of love and justice. At last, he talked about it as Christian love inspiring the struggle for justice utilizing power. Tillich provided a philosophy of love, justice, and power for Niebuhr’s more pragmatic synthesis. Niebuhr’s dialectic gives the push for the never-ending struggle for justice, and Tillich provides a rationale for their necessary relationship with each other and with power” (444).

Stone’s Politics and Faith will stand alongside Richard Fox’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography and Wilhelm and Marion Pauck’s Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought as an indispensable source for knowledge regarding the lives and thought of these two towering figures in 20th century philosophical theology.

### Visiting the Paul Tillich-Archives at Harvard in April, 2013

**Cees Huisman**

Among the Tillich-experts and the adepts of the first hour, I often feel how the apostle Paul must have felt within the circle of the first disciples around Jesus. Paul called himself “one born out of due time,” a man to whom the Lord had appeared only belatedly. Something similar applies to me, because, confessedly, I myself have only been a student of Paul Tillich for no longer than one year now. Of course, I knew his name and some titles of his works from the student-handbooks at University, but I had never seriously studied his theology before.

The opportunity to delve deeper into his thinking provided itself during the two months of my study-sabbatical in the Spring of the year 2012—a privilege allowed to me as a minister of the PKN (Dutch Protestant Church). Although during these two months my reading of Tillich’s work could not be more than a first orientation, it was sufficient to digest an impression of his special way of practicing theology. What struck me was the fact that he was confronted with the same questions as we are in our day, viz., how can the message of the Gospel be communicated, so that it is appropriately understood and can be relevant to people in their idiosyncratic situation in life, to their place in society, and, at the same time, can be meaningful to them in their individual predicament.

In an epoch when our Church (PKN) is going through a process of anxiously trying to present itself as a “missionary Church” in a modern society, we are confronted not only by the issue of trying to sustain the congregations as they are, but also with the challenge of planting new communities and seeding new “plantations.” While that objective is surely commendable, of first importance, it seems to me, however, is to find out the precise questions and prejudices people are wrestling with these days, before the Church may provide any possible answers and solutions. So, I discovered for myself that the “Correlative Method” of Paul Tillich’s theology is still a valid approach for an accurate understanding
of the current topical situation in which people find themselves. Before anything else, this method of correlation deserves to be brought forward with the aim to clarifying the contemporary situation.

After studying a handful of sermons and articles by Paul Tillich during the aforementioned two months under my Church sabbatical, I put my findings in a report, entitled “Adieu, God!” My booklet makes an inquiry into the background and the reasons for the contemporary phenomenon of the so-called Apostasy and the Farewell-to-God attitudes shown by many people—subsequently followed by their conversion into Agnosticism and Atheism. “Adieu God!” also investigates the (missionary) response to this phenomenon by the theologian and Philosopher Paul Tillich (1886-1965).

My growing enthusiasm with regard to his way of thinking, his interpretation of the Scriptures, and his ability to point out and to overcome different sorts of stumbling blocks, have led to my becoming a member of the Dutch “Paul Tillich Genootschap” (Society). Together with a few other Tillich supporters, we read and discuss some parts of his works. Once every six or seven weeks in the 2012-2013 semester, we dealt with Tillich’s Systematic Theology III. For myself, I am very impressed by his sermons in particular. In order to show the importance of them, and for the benefit of others, I have also translated some of the sermons into Dutch, which can now be more widely read on my website.

At some point, I discovered the Internet publication of the complete Inventory of the Paul Tillich-Archives (b MS 49). This widely comprehensive and extensive collection of papers, notes, lectures, personal documents, etc., produced by Paul Tillich spans the period 1894 until 1974. It is archived in the Andover-Harvard Theological Library in Cambridge, and it seemed to me an extraordinary occasion to get acquainted with its contents, if possible at all. That possibility indeed manifested itself, because, quite unexpectedly, I received a generous offer to stay in Boston/Cambridge for a few days to do my much wished for hands-on research.

Long before my departure, I had been browsing the complete Inventory and so I had formed an idea for myself of what those 242 grey boxes were treasuring. Of course, I had to make choices and thus I confined myself to asking for “only” 20 boxes. As I have said before, I am particularly interested in Tillich’s homiletic work, but his reflections with regard to questions related to communicating the Gospel in a secular era have my interest and attention, too. I had made my wishes known in advance of my arrival to the archivist, Fran O’Donnell, and no sooner had I arrived than the requested boxes were present to be opened by me: I could immediately make a start with the viewing and browsing of all the selected materials.

On the other hand, our stay in the U.S.A. featured dramatic circumstances. We landed at Boston Airport one day after Patriots’ Day (April 15th)—the very day after the marathon bombing assault. And we left Cambridge on the day when the manhunt for the suspect was on the full alert (Friday, April 19th). Everybody had to stay in their homes—doors and windows locked. Boston and Cambridge were like ghost towns, with soldiers in full army gear and special police forces thick on the ground and no public traffic at all. Fortunately, in the course of the day, we were allowed to leave for New York City to complete our stay in the United States.

It was fascinating and exciting moment for me when I opened the first grey box, containing exegetical notes and sermons from the days when Tillich was a graduate student and an assistant preacher in Berlin. Tillich’s handwriting from that period is almost illegible to me, so I was glad to see typed transcriptions as well (boxes 16, 17). Further, I found in Box 19 “Das Neue Sein als Zentralbegriff einer Christlichen Theologie,” and the same box stored fascinating reflections on the authority of the Bible. The box revealed more interesting reflections on the essence and changes of the Christian Faith, as well as on novel ways to preach the Gospel. On examining Box 20, I was struck by a very interesting Easter sermon and two lectures on Christian Hope, whereas that same topic was also discussed in Box 25, where I found “Eschatologie und Geschichte” and in another box “Eschatology and Personal Destiny: Immortality, Resurrection and Judgment.”

Another special topic in Tillich’s theology is the meaning of the Kairos-moment and his thinking about the relationship between time and eternity (Box 52). A remarkable document—in my eyes—is the report of a discussion between Paul Tillich and a few people about a sermon he had held on Psalm 90 (Box 28). Very interesting too are the lectures by Tillich regarding the biblical sources of his theology as well as the address on the absurdity of the question regarding the existence of God. Other documents profiling Paul Tillich as a man of faith and sincerity are the handwritten “A Revelatory Mo-
Political Theory and Theory of Religion: Beyond Sui Generis

John Robichaux

Editor’s Note: This paper was presented at the annual meeting in 2011 in San Francisco.

Abstract

The liberal democratic theories of John Rawls, John Courtney Murray, and the theonomous ethics of Tillich can be read as offering three different proposals by which each seeks to bring the religious into closer relationship with the secular realms, typically described as distinct by classic liberal secular views of religious exclusion. However, recent work in religious studies (in theory and history) has also demonstrated the need to recognize the secularity of the religious—specifically, in the criticisms of a sui generis definition of religion and the numerous examples of the influence of the political in defining religious boundaries and practices. In this way, then, the paper takes up the “interpenetration” (in Tillich’s sense) of the classic, but inadequate concepts of the religious and the secular, and suggests the ground in the field is fertile for a further explication of this relationship between theory of religion and political theory, in particular.

Key Terms: Religion; Democracy; Theology; Secular; Tillich; Murray; Rawls; Religion and Culture; Liberalism; Theory of Religion; Political Theory;

pressed by the scope and the order of his work. In my opinion, it shows clearly that Paul Tillich was not only thinking “systematically,” but also that he worked and lived in the same way.

With gratitude to the staff of the Andover-Harvard Library for their help, I will conclude my account now with my intention to carefully examine the relevant materials that I have brought home with me, in the hope that it will also benefit the church(es) in the Netherlands.

April 2013
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Religion in Public Life

Paper

This paper seeks to bring together two disparate conversations concerning the relationship between religion and (secular) politics, each occurring simultaneously at the levels of history and theory in the literature, and both of which are challenging the sui generis understanding of religion, on the one hand, and secular politics, on the other. I argue that these two lines of inquiry have laid the groundwork for an improved theory about the relationship between religion and secular politics, and that Tillich’s theory of religion and culture may offer a useful model for developing an improved re-description of both religion and politics individually and significant dimensions of their relationship to each other, even if some divergences and adaptations remain necessary.

Historical projects are perhaps the most helpful in illustrating the fact that religious influence within the (supposed secular) political sphere persists throughout the eras and political communities commonly seen as marked by the various manifestations of secularism. In the U.S. context, for example, despite constitutional, Jeffersonian, and Madisonian interests in, and assertions concerning, separation and non-majority domination, few historians deny that Protestant Christian mores and preferences have dominated much of U.S. political history, even despite the objections of certain individuals and groups who would prefer that this influence had been, or in the future would soon become, even greater. For those who advance a normative position of secular
politics free from religious influence, this is vari-
ously seen as regretful, a lack of enforcement of the
stated principles, even a noxious expression of ma-
ajoritarian schools of thought trumping liberal de-
ocratic ones, or some other form of deviation fall-
ing short of the secular ideal. Nonetheless, the clear
historical influence of religion on so-called secular
politics is undeniable.

Meanwhile, the religious-secular debates con-
cerning religion and liberal democracy have by and
large resulted in two camps, between inclusivists on
the one hand, advocating (for various reasons) for
the inclusion of religion in politics, and the exclusiv-
ists on the other hand, advocating (for similarly di-
verse reasons) for the exclusion of religion from (a
presumptively) secular politics. Inclusivists often
use historical examples, such as Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Abraham Lincoln’s religious arguments
(though not all of their arguments are religious, of
course), to argue that religion can be beneficial to
liberal democracy, and in some cases actually be
more liberal and more democratic than secular lib-
eral democracy had itself been prior to these relig-
ious arguments affecting the public political debates.
Meanwhile, exclusivists often rely on their own his-
torical examples, such as the religious arguments
given by the Ku Klux Klan and Taliban (though not
all of their arguments are religious, either), to argue
for the necessary exclusion of religious arguments
from the (rightly, in their view) secular political
arena. I have elsewhere examined in detail two lib-
eral democratic proposals that may be helpful for
getting liberal democratic theory beyond these two
options of inclusion or exclusion, and instead offer a
principled stance that can adjudicate the difference
between the two types of religious arguments, be-
tween, so to speak, King and the KKK—that of the
later work of John Courtney Murray and John
Rawls.1  xxx

Setting aside the hotly debated role that Murray
ultimately carves out for natural law within the lib-
eral democratic legal realm, given his changing
views on this topic at various stages in his career,
Murray’s clearest means of incorporating the reli-
gious into the secular is through the well-known
realm of civil society (not unlike Habermas’s early
position concerning religion). Here, Murray stresses
the role of religion in the non-political public dimen-
sions of civic life. This is the realm for religious
authority and not legal authority. But it is also the
realm where citizens’ moral and political pathos are
formed, and the underlying philosophies that guide
political principles are tested, debated and fully fash-
ioned. In this way, Murray proposes the religious
can—and on his view, has the important role of—
afflicting the (pragmatically secular) realm of the
political, including law. Murray’s proposal is em-
blematic of a classic approach to religion being able
to penetrate the secular through so-called civil soci-
ety (that is, the public non-political rather than “pri-

tate” arena), without tearing down the full distinc-
tion between religion and secular politics, as we in-
stead see with certain communitarian and wholesale
anti-secular arguments. He seeks to preserve a dis-
tinct but not wholly separate role for each realm of
public (and not merely private) life.

Rawls, similarly, if very late in his career, also
offers a path beyond classic separation models of
liberal secular politics and religion. In his famous
proviso, finally proposed in his 1996 introduction to
the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls
revises the classic liberal position on religious argu-
ments in the public political sphere. In the proviso,
Rawls offers a fully permissive public debate, in-
cluding any religious argument, so long as the
speaker is willing later to make the same arguments
in terms of public reason, for purposes of public po-

titical justification. If this latter requirement is cor-
rected—using my modification that such reasons
need not come from the speaker him/herself and/or
Habermas’s observation that translation is always
part of public deliberation and so is constantly nec-

essary, in any case, between various comprehensive
worldviews, including religious to religious, relig-
ious to non-religious, non-religious to religious, and
non-religious to non-religious ones—then Rawls
offers an intriguing means of bringing the religious
into the (previously presumed) secular public politi-
cal deliberation. He finally offers a widely permis-
sive deliberative phase and a restrictive justificatory
stage, with justification (rightly, in Rawlsian liberal
viewpoint) remaining on the grounds of the basic
political principles. On Rawls’ proposal, then, the
religious may very well indeed affect and influence
the (secular/non-religious) realm of political justice.

Both the historical example of Protestant Chris-
tian influence in U.S. political history and the theo-
retical work of Murray and Rawls are representa-
tive of many other available historical descriptions and
theoretical projects which represent one well-known
theory concerning the relationship between religion
and secular politics—namely, that religion can de-
define and shape (previously-assumed-to-be secular)
politics. Here, the influence is described in the direction from religion to politics.

There are innumerable examples from history, in the eras and political communities not touched by the various forms of secularism, in which the political shapes and defines the religious. Imperial Roman civic religion is one well-known example, where the political realm informed and defined the religious for various political purposes. In the ages of secular politics, however, there are also examples of the political (re-)defining the religious. There are myriad examples of previously-understood-to-be religious practices (and often central religious practices) that, for reasons precipitated by political action (most often law), were either altered or abandoned. Hallucinogenic sacraments, certain forms of ritual blood-letting and sacrifices, polygamous marriage, and wearing of headscarves are just some of the most well-known ones. In my previous work on liberal democracy, I describe such effects of liberal democratic political influence on religious practice, where the religious practitioner(s) do not revolt or reject the political arrangements outright, as liberal democracy’s restrictive moment on religion.

In addition to these examples of restriction of religious practice, I would also add the fact that the specific political context is able to positively (and not just negatively) define religious interests and even so-called litmus tests. This is particularly clear in the case of global religions, which are comprised of substantially different interests, emphases and even (presumptive) orthodox litmus tests across various political contexts—as with the various differences between what constitutes Roman Catholicism in La Paz, Beijing, or San Cristóbal de las Casas, just to take three locations I know from my own work. Here, I take for granted that religious practice is integral to defining religion for the scholar of religion, and specifically reject definitions of religion relying on Weberian ideal types, religious essences, or “official” teachings/positions, even when they are preferred by the religious practitioners (or centurions of orthodoxy) themselves. What it means to be Catholic, for example, in these three places differs tremendously, thanks to a large degree (though not solely) to the political context in question. This is something we saw in this country with President Obama’s 2009 visit with the Pope, when certain U.S. Catholics complained that the European leadership in Rome did not do enough to challenge the President on his stance on abortion. As one senior Vatican journalist explained, this is because abortion is not a central Catholic issue in European politics like it is in U.S. politics. The (secular) political context matters to the actual practice of religion on the ground, this line of description explains. On the one hand, this observation is pedestrian (certainly for any sociologist or historian of religion); but for theory of religion, these differences, generated as they are by the greater social, cultural, and political contexts, are foundational. And they are particularly important for theorizing religion and secular politics, as they concern the very identity of a particular religious expression and practice being negotiated with the (secular) political. In the extreme, if Sarah Thal’s argument withholds scrutiny, for example, we may even see forces such as political nativism create entire religions for political purposes. Thus, the influence here is described as moving in the direction from the political to the religious.

At the level of theory, I have in mind the now-classic work of Talal Asad and Russell McCutcheon. Asad and McCutcheon, whose arguments are no doubt well known to most people in this room, go a long way toward describing the techniques through which secular politics define religion. Asad famously describes the redefining of religion necessary for the coming into existence of the modern (secular) state. McCutcheon, having in mind as much the politics of the discipline as the politics of secular modernity, puts it this way: “The discourse on sui generis religion, then, can be understood as...a political program for constructing a modern social reality on the basis of a presumed difference between tradition...and modernity....” For his part, McCutcheon wants to normalize religion as a cultural phenomenon, not distinct from the other such phenomena, returning it to, as he puts it “a branch of culture.” This, in fact, dovetails nicely with the thesis I am advancing here today.

This thesis begins with this: in the two lines of thought sketched above, representing broader segments of historical and theoretical work in the field, we see that on the one hand, there is a line which describes religion’s influence on defining the (presumed) secular political realm, and there is also a line which describes politics’ influence on defining the (presumed sui generis) religious, on the other. What a comprehensive and coherent theory of religion and politics must recognize, I propose, is the fundamental insights of both these bodies of literature. If McCutcheon wants to place the religious within the realm of culture, then what I want to do is
(re-)place both religion and politics individually, and the dynamics of their relationship, in the realm of the cultural. And like many other areas within the realm of the cultural, they have substantial and essential effects on each other’s very definitions, and not just tangential elements. Religion and politics are, I propose, properly understood as often mutually defining. The relationship may not be circular, and the particulars of their interplay may unfold over generations, but religion and politics are not mutually exclusive or sui generis. The impact of one on the other does not run in one direction (for example, religion influencing politics or politics influencing religion), and, of course, they are not synonymous either, as the categories of each are regularly contested. This is certainly not to say that politics and religion each do not also concern other matters beyond the other, but it is to say that their relationship is dynamic and, again, often mutually defining.

What bringing these two lines of thought together will mean for political theory and theory of religion has yet to be filled out fully and needs more complete description in the field, but the ground is prepared for this constructive undertaking. This is where Tillich’s work offers an interesting study, if one that still needs much further development for a contemporary theory of religion and political theory.

While Tillich’s own theonomic ethics represent another type of attempt to describe the religious and secular in a more integrated relationship, and his method of correlation proposes a particular mutually-questioning between religion and culture, it is the model that he proposes for religion and culture, which is of highest interest to me here as one model for theorizing the mutual negotiation of religion and politics. On the one hand, it is clear that the scholar of religion cannot import the theological dimensions of Tillich’s proposal, and Tillich himself helps in this regard, through his distinction between religion and the churches from his “Spiritual Presence.” Nonetheless, on the other hand, the sociological description of Tillich’s may indeed provide a useful model for a contemporary re-description of the relationship between religion and (previously-presumed secular) politics, an essential component of a re-envisioned intersection between political theory and theory of religion. In this regard, Tillich is clear: “The churches [religions] are sociological realities, showing all the ambiguities of the social self-creation of life. Therefore, they have continuous encounters with other sociological groups [such as (secular) politics], acting upon them and receiving from them...the influence is mutual.” He offers a typology wherein the mutual influence is in the form of “the way of silent interpenetration” and “the way of critical judgment.” The first concerns the constant “mutual exchange” between religion and society and the second the mutual criticism of each by the other—particularly important in liberal democratic societies, where the boundaries between religion and the legal-political realm, and the religious and the secular, are constantly being negotiated.

To these two, Tillich adds what he calls “the way of political establishment.” Here, Tillich argues that religion has political import and that the churches are themselves subject to political compromise. “They must be ready not only to direct but also to be directed,” he concludes. I go a step further and note that, for a theory of religion and politics that takes practice seriously (among all the other elements it may also include), this compromise is a genuine re-defining of the religious and (secular) political, not a simple concession, or a “directing” of one over the other—indeed, it is one of the cardinal mechanisms of identity formation-negotiation.

Tillich’s caveat to such “compromise” (in his words, “identity negotiation,” in mine) is also of import here, as he places a noteworthy limit on this “interpenetration” of the religious and the political, namely that “the character of the church as expression of the Spiritual Community must remain manifest.” The scholar of religion, however, cannot endorse the claim of “the Spiritual Community” in the fullest Tillichian meaning, and indeed this is another important area where Tillich and I part ways. In one sense, this, of course, is a theological difference—Tillich’s caveat is given in the context of his Systematic Theology, while I want to think through a theory of religion and politics for use in theory of religion and political theory. In another sense, however, it is one place where Tillich’s theology succumbs to the temptation (some might say theological necessity) of holding onto some essential element(s), something too problematic to insist on for a descriptive theory of religion, and especially for a family resemblance theorist such as myself. Nonetheless, this difference does have a significant analogy in theorizing religion and secular politics, namely, that every political and religious individual or community may have elements that are to them non-negotiable. However, resisting any temptation toward “essence,” these non-negotiable elements may not be the same for all individuals or communities, and must be discerned in history as the lines are
variously drawn. In Tillich’s case, it is the persistence of “the Spiritual Community”—for others, it may (and does of course) differ, and this can certainly have serious political (and wider social) consequences, as when the remaining non-negotiable/essentialized feature is the use of violence, circumcision of minors, honor killings, and so on. These can become the moments when religion may revolt or withdraw from the social contract and/or when the political arena will attempt to exclude or dominate the religious.

Where this does not happen, and when the religious and the political are mutually defining, Tillich has laid some initial, though not unproblematic, groundwork for the scholar of religion. His work may serve as one useful conversation partner for the broader and necessary task of re-describing the relationship between religion and secular politics—and the intersection of theory of religion and political theory—as going beyond reading either realm as sui generis, but instead as frequently circumscribed by their ample mutually defining negotiations.

1 John Robichaux, “Beyond Inclusion or Exclusion: Rethinking the Boundaries between Religion and Democracy,” On Second Thought: The Judge Davies Issue (Summer 2011).
5 Ibid., 159.
8 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 3 (The University of Chicago Press, 1963), §IV.III.A.2.b.5 (pp.212, 213).
9 Ibid., 212.
10 Ibid., 215.
11 Ibid.
I regularly teach undergraduates about two of Paul Tillich’s most accessible works: The Courage to Be and Theology of Culture. The former serves as one of three primary source texts in the course, “Modern Religious Thought,” while the latter is one of two assigned books for “Religion, Art, and Culture,” this latter course a creation of mine.

We do close reading of Courage for a four-week period near the beginning of the semester. I provide the students with a printout of 73 numbered questions (most of which have multiple sub-questions), generally with relevant page numbers of Courage included, to guide their reading and provide questions for class discussion. I also furnish students with a one-page overview of the book, which outlines the meaning of “ontological” and the main points of each of the six chapters, along with a few appropriate graphics. While the University of North Carolina—Pembroke is not particularly selective, students generally succeed in understanding Tillich’s meaning. Enrollees are majors, minors, and other upper-level students.

Besides offering students significant insights of Tillich in theology, philosophy, and cultural analysis, Courage serves the purposes of tracing the lineage of modern Western religious thought, as students can place Tillich in the trajectory of Liberal Protestantism and German Romantic Idealism, which then are challenged by Neo-Orthodoxy (though, of course, in the case of Tillich, not overtaken by it!). One aspect of Tillich’s theology that rejects the dominant Neo-Orthodox approach in favor of the Liberal/Idealistic model is the immediate connection human beings have with the divine. Harkening back to Schleiermacher’s feeling of absolute dependence, in the context of Courage to Be, this a priori awareness of the divine and its power of being is what enables the person who has lost all particular bearers of meaning to summon the courage to forge on. Grasping the significance of this rendering of the mystical a priori enables students to grapple with Courage’s “God above God”—but more on that shortly. Other crucial points of theological cultural analysis include: (1) Tillich’s three types of threats to being from nonbeing—fate with its ultimate threat of death, guilt with condemnation, and meaninglessness with emptiness—and the respective periods of Western history where each threat dominates; (2) the various movements that exemplify the courage “to be as a part” of a group versus the courage to be as an individual—“to be as oneself.” Regarding the three types of threats, students discuss how the threats manifest themselves personally, insofar as they are aware and comfortable doing so, as well as in terms of contemporary culture.

Tillich’s Courage additionally presents similarities and differences in relation to the next primary text, one by the principal expositor of process theology, Charles Hartshorne. Interestingly, process theology, like Tillich’s, posits a direct connection with the divine, not surprising given the liberal British idealistic background for Alfred North Whitehead’s work. For process thought, though, our connection with the divine comes with concrete content via the creature’s prehension of God’s initial aim, or preferred option, for each unit’s occasion of experience. On the other hand, this initial aim is not available for our conscious articulation.

Tillich’s God above God offers rich resources to students for considering divine transcendence and immanence—and their interrelationship. Related to that pair are Courage’s two poles for the human relationship with God: (1) the personal, the “person-to-person” or “divine-human encounter,” and (2) the “transpersonal” or “mystical” side. Tillich grants a clear priority to the second. The first can only be affirmed symbolically. If taken literally as in “theological theism,” “it tries to establish a doctrine of God which transforms the person-to-person encounter into a doctrine about two persons who may or may not meet but who have a reality independent of each other” (184). Furthermore, the God of this doctrine becomes a God of “absolute knowledge and control,” which constitutes “the deepest root of the Existentialist despair and the widespread anxiety of meaninglessness in our period” (185). With respect to the second pole, the divine “is nearer to the I than the I is to itself.” The transpersonal “God above the God of theism unites and transcends the courage to be as a part and the courage to be as oneself” (187). Tillich continues with a clearly panentheistic statement: “The acceptance of the God above the God of theism makes us a part of that which is not also a part but is the ground of the whole” (187). Moreover, this participation does not result in our submergence “in the life of a limited group,” for “[i]f the self participates in the power of being-itself it receives itself back” (188).
While students realize that the God above God involves a radical immanence, at the same time a radical transcendence comes forth. In transcending all formulations of the divine, the God above God emphasizes that God is not reducible to anything in the created world—or any interpolations from anything in the created world. This is especially relevant to Courage when all particular formulations of meaning become subject to doubt leading to despair. Faith in the God above God—“absolute faith”—has no “special content” (182; emphasis Tillich’s). Yet absolute faith “says Yes to being without seeing anything concrete which could conquer” nonbeing (189). While process theology’s version of panentheism maintains that God is not reducible to the world, it does not draw divine transcendence as radically as the God above God. For process, whatever meaning and value God derives comes from God’s consequent nature taking in the world’s actualizations. Not being identified with any particular creations of the world, including human culture, the God above God sets the conditions for and includes all worldly creativity. As Tillich puts it given the context of doubt and despair, “the God above the God of theism is not the devaluation of the meanings which doubt has thrown into the abyss of meaninglessness; he is their potential restitution” (186), as the power that enables and takes in all the meanings we create. By contrast, process philosophy and theology does not identify God as the empowering “ground of the whole” (for possibility, creativity itself, and finite unit occasions of experience have some ultimate ontological independence from the divine ground).

Theology of Culture supplies the theoretical foundation for Religion, Art, and Culture. Students receive questions for discussion for the weekly assigned readings, with just one question or cluster of questions per week. Given that most students take this course as a General Education course (and now also as a Writing-Enriched course), lecture on each covered chapter, including dialectical and other graphics, and discussion prove necessary for the class to comprehend Tillich’s purposes. In terms of concrete cultural analysis, the course focuses on films with explicit or implicit religious significance (the relevant textbook: Miles’ Seeing and Believing) and on important works in the history of Western visual art. The class also listens to music related to particular artistic periods during gathering time. It is interesting to note, as I do for the class, that though Tillich frequently analyzed visual art in his theology of culture, he did not do the same for the type of art that he most indulged in personally as he came home from work each day, namely, classical music.

From the beginning of the semester, students consider Tillich’s claim that all cultural and artistic creations manifest an ultimate concern. Many students do suspect that some art is merely concerned with preliminary matters, whether utilitarian and/or aesthetic, as I myself do. But whether or not they judge that claim to be too far-reaching, they do resonate with Tillich’s assumption that art and artistic movements express the values of a cultural era, as we analyze the meanings of the various paintings and films. Generally, one chapter of Theology of Culture is assigned each week (though the long Chapter VII on Existentialism is divided into three parts). Additionally, the following chapters are especially important for the purposes of this course: Chapter II: “The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,” which builds on Chapter I in giving students’ the sense of the immanence of the divine depth dimension in all cultural and artistic life for Tillich; Chapter IV for formulating Tillich’s classic expression of the relationship between religion and culture; and Chapter VI specifically on visual artistic styles.

The fourth chapter introduces students to Tillich’s famous couplet: “Religion as ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself.” Or in abbreviated fashion: “religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form of religion” (42). As just suggested, this nicely builds on the first two chapters. In Chapter I, Tillich insists that religion cannot be reduced to any one cultural function—be it moral, mythological, aesthetic, or emotive, that religion does not constitute one cultural form among others, but rather serves as the depth dimension within all the others. In making this argument, God’s ontological status parallels that of religion: God is not a being among others, even the highest being, which would wrongly separate God from everything else and thus deny divine immanence. For Tillich, the divine depth dimension can only work, or at least can only work in full measure, when we posit that all human beings have a direct connection to it, to the immanent divine; religion must involve both human creativity and divine power. In Chapter II, Tillich diagnoses where Western philosophy and theology took a fateful and drastic wrong turn: in the 13th century of the High Middle Ages, when the so-called Augustinian ontological approach—where our being has an immediate connection of identity with being-itself—
became superseded by the Thomistic so-called cosmological approach, where our connection to God is only an inference of reason.

Concerning the famous couplet, students receive the final exam, consisting of one broad yet I think well-defined question early in the semester: React to (explain, analyze, critique/evaluate, and apply) Tillich’s claim: “Religion is the substance of culture; culture is the form of religion.” Make reference to (1) Tillich’s Theology of Culture, (2) films studied in the course, (3) art and architecture. Be sure to distinguish between explicit religion and supposedly more subtle, even secular, cultural expressions with religious implications or dimensions.

Chapter VI represents one of many lectures or articles where Tillich categorizes artistic styles. In this piece, entitled “Protestantism and Artistic Style,” which also appears in the Dillenberger’s edited Tillich On Art and Architecture, he specifies four artistic styles while bouncing off of Dilthey’s philosophical styles: idealistic, realistic, subjective, and objective. Elsewhere I have maintained that, despite the manifest variety in Tillichian organizational schemes for artistic styles, the various permutations reduce to three primary styles, namely, idealism, naturalism, and expressionism. As we analyze the manifold stylistic periods in the history of Western art, we keep returning to these three primary styles, looking for how the artists idealize or romanticize their subject matter, depict objects in a natural or realistic way, or “bend” the normal appearances of the subject matter in a way that expresses something beyond or below the surface. Tillich in a number of his pieces on artistic styles divides expressionism in the broad sense into a negative and a positive mode. This distinction also becomes relevant to the class as we view the examples of visual art through the centuries. The artwork is projected on screens, with most of the examples coming from ArtStor, an electronic database to which our library subscribes. Period styles covered include early Christian Roman, Byzantine, Romanesque, Gothic, early and later Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, Classical, Baroque, Rococo, Realist, Romantic, Impressionist, Post-Impressionist, Expressionist, Surrealist, Abstractionism, Abstract Expressionism, and Pop-art. Relative to Chapter VI, the objective style more or less corresponds to a naturalistic style, while the subjective corresponds to a positive expressionism and the realistic to a negative expressionism.

To give a sample of the kind of analysis of art that occurs in the class, I will refer to two oil paint-

ings by Cezanne: Montagne Sainte-Victoire from the Bibemus Quarry (1897, 64.8 x 81.3 cm, Baltimore Museum of Art) and The (Great) Bathers (1894-1905, 127.2 x 196.1 cm, National Gallery, Great Britain). Tillich lionized Cezanne, once penning that “an apple of Cezanne has more presence of ultimate reality than a picture of Jesus by Hofmann” (On Art and Architecture: 144). We note with Tillich a “getting back to basics,” as Cezanne draws (upon) elemental forms, with space being created through basic shapes, a few basic colors, and simple directional lines. One might see a measure of a naturalistic style in this, as well as in the choice of subject matter—nature. Yet, a Romantic expressionism dominates in various ways. Nature is the object of Romantic fascination; in this regard, the Romantic primitivism of The Bathers stands out. Cezanne’s color palette is expressive, with a few bright, dark, and/or deep colors. Finally, the indistinctness of Cezanne’s renderings constitutes an expressionism that departs from defined “objective” reality. Drawing upon an insight of my mentor in Religion and Culture, William Po-
teat, students come to see an important implication of Cezanne’s fuzziness: deeply rooted and grounded through our embodiment in the world, it is our human eyes, body, and interactions that bring reality into focus. We partially create our world, even as we partially create when we interact with the beauty of Cezanne’s creations.

A nice parallel becomes manifest between Til-
lich’s evaluation of art (and culture more widely) and Miles’s evaluation of film: even as explicitly religious art may not be very successful in expressing the divine depth dimension, while secular art may profoundly express that dimension; so explicitly religious films may fail in conveying religious values in an effective, compelling manner, while non-religious films might succeed in conveying the deepest values of a culture in a powerful way (whatever one makes on Tillich’s claim that all cultural creations express some ultimate concern).

**Anyone who has presented a paper at the 2012 NAPTS or AAR Group Meetings in Chicago and has not sent a copy to the editor, please do so as soon as possible:**

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In pedagogy and in didactics we find three main questions: What is the subject or content of teaching and learning? How is it to be mediated in the pedagogical situation? Why is the teaching done in the given way or, rather, what are the goals of teaching and learning? What, how, and why make up the key questions of learning and education. In the Scandinavian context, the emphasis has moved from pedagogy to didactics: religious education is didactics of religion. Didactics is the design of the learning situation, including classroom design, ethical dimensions, curriculum, and the objectives of the course: didactics, in the American context, is curriculum studies. Recent pedagogy studies emotions in the classroom, the impact of cultural patterns in the learning situation, and the life-politics of pedagogy. Usually the relationship between the two is interpreted in the sense that didactics is subordinated to pedagogy: pedagogical philosophy contains a didactic dimension. To describe Tillichian pedagogy I use in the widest sense of the word, which includes philosophical, political, pedagogical, and didactic aspects. With Tillichian pedagogy, I refer to Tillich’s philosophy of education. It is said that Tillich did not have a philosophy of education and pedagogical questions were explicit during the German period only. This is true; he did not have an explicit philosophy of education, but his interest in pedagogy is integrated with his thought in profound way. Questions how to teach and how learning takes place were a part of Tillich’s thinking both during the German period and during his time in the United States. I think that there is a latent philosophy of education in Tillich; the leading motifs of that philosophy are discernible already during the 1920s. If it is so that pedagogy is integrated with various aspects of Tillich’s thought, an approach that emphasizes wholeness is needed in order to catch sight of it. Recent critical education asks for “a holistic engagement with the world that is existentially challenging in cognitive, affective and practical terms.” Such an engagement is to be found in Tillich.

Today’s learning situation is different from the learning situation just few years back in time. Technical tools of communication from learning platforms to twitter have pervaded the learning situation. Students are not met in real time, but they are spread all over the world and the communication is through email and learning platforms. Internationally, there is an outspoken concurrence between private and public universities considering the financial resources, that is, the students. Multinational corporations have their own universities, educating their own highly skilled staff and fostering international elite, which has the whole globe as its workplace. Society, locally and globally, is split in two: one the one hand, the educated privileged class and on the other hand, those who are outside the educational system, due to their lack of a relevant education. Even as the divide is getting wider and wider between the two classes, and will probably continue to do so in the near future, sustainable strategies in education are seen as a way of reducing the cleft. Tillich fought the divisive tendencies during the 1920s; the cultural trends are backed up by thousands of years of mental history. Education is an active force in the society, “conditioning” the society and its future in one-way or another; education is, and always has been, future-oriented. Today it is necessary to think through the role of education locally, globally, culturally, and religiously. It is necessary to discuss the educational tradition and what education does to us and for us individually, socially, and globally, and last but not least, it is necessary to discuss the constructive potentials of education. I will discuss Tillich’s philosophy of education in relation to the recent learning situation; I will try to lift up his constructive educational alternatives. Traditional teaching, if we are to talk in those terms, has emphasized the “what” side of pedagogy: teaching is to communicate formulated knowledge or information; education is informative learning. The “how” side—how we relate to knowledge, how we construe knowledge, how we are in relation to each other, how we orient ourselves in the light of meaning—has been the “hidden” side of education. In Tillich’s thought, and in his pedagogy, the last-mentioned questions have a central place. To tackle the recent political, economical, and cultural/educational situation it is necessary to integrate the “what” side with the “how” side! The “how” side emphasizes connectedness, identity, meaning, and ethical/political issues; the “how” is essential to participative learning.
Religion is the subject matter in religious education, in scientific studies of religion and in theology, but do we learn about religion or from religion? This last question is widely discussed in the Anglo-Saxon religious education, influencing the Scandinavian context.7 The scientific study of religion since Schleiermacher has examined the outer, historical forms and functions of religion. It studies those forms of expression to which an objective attitude is appropriate: we learn about religion, what it is and how it functions. In confessional schools we learn from religion, and the only way to understand religion, it is said, is through participation in a particular religion. In non-confessional schools, in the state-funded schools, the emphasis is on learning about religion. The secular state gives room for both ways, as it admits the right to religion; it admits the confessional schools. Today it is asked if the “old” ideal of scientific study of religion—religion as the object of scientific studies—is possible at all.8 Post-modernity is adhering to relativism in epistemology, morality, and religion, and in the study of religion. Essentialism is denied and with it both the essential human nature and the essential, substantial definition of religion. Is all, then, relative? On the other hand, we have fundamentalists in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity who claim that the only way to understand religion is to study and to live from religion. There is a considerable pressure coming both from relativists and from fundamentalists against the scientific study of religion. The questions considering the possibility of religious studies and of studying theology in schools and universities are important questions, touching the very foundations of the modern state and the way democratic institutions are construed in democratic states. If we cannot study religion with scientific means, why should it be a subject in schools and universities at all? If the scientific study of religion is not possible, why should we then study theology, as theology is a superstructure to religion? Many things are wrong in this logic of exclusion, but the argumentation catches a trend in the recent debate. How would Tillich have tackled these issues? His is not an extremist position: he gives room for the autonomous culture (it is possible to study religion with scientific means) and he gives room for religion in its various, non-extremist forms. Tillich had an integrated view of the relationship between the modern autonomous culture and religion.

I make a distinction between two levels of learning: the informative level and the level of participative learning. The two build up an integral or integrative model; both kinds of learning are needed, if we want to have a holistic view on education and learning. We are able to highlight Tillich’s philosophy of education with this model. The model helps us to discuss Tillich’s pedagogical views, deeply embedded in his philosophy and in his cultural theology, helping us to discuss these in relation to recent discussions in pedagogy, didactics, and philosophy. Further, the model proposes a view on religion and theology, which builds on integration between religion as a lived reality, religion as a studied object, and theology as a faith-perspective in life. Life, thinking, and faith are integrated with each other in the learning situation. In an integrative model, it is possible to point out the different levels or dimensions as such, at the same time as a certain wholeness is presupposed. We do not only orientate ourselves through bits, fragments, and atomistic claims (clear statements), but we orient in terms of constellations, patterns, “wholes” including values, which are mostly rooted in the unconscious. There are conscious and non-conscious learning-processes, as Damasio puts it: the conscious mind gives only a window-view to things and much of learning happens outside that window-view.9 The interesting question of how to educate the unconscious comes in view.10 Perhaps learning is about value-differentiation at the meta-narrative level: that we learn about that what is truly important and valuable in life, despite the dominating evaluations of our commercialized times? When it comes to religion, we might make a distinction between what is truly valuable and what is only an expression of the “ultimate value.” It seems to be the case that both relativists and fundamentalists place an absolute value-judgment on that what is not valuable as such, but only a representation of the absolute. Derek R. Nelson has observed, while using Dynamics of Faith in education, that the book “functions primarily as a relativizing antidote to absolutizing tendencies.”11 I would like to add that Tillich’s philosophical theology and its pedagogical application functions as a relativizing antidote to absolutizing tendencies in understanding culture, politics, morality, and science, not only in understanding religion. It relativizes things on the informative level, but it also points to something absolute on the relational level. In Tillich’s view, the different levels of reality “demand different approaches and different languages”.12
Informative learning

When Tillich came to the United States he saw that students knew historical facts but he could discern no emotional, identity-bearing connection with the past was discernible. Considering his first meetings with American students, Tillich wrote:

I found that an immediate emotional identification with the reality of the past was lacking. Many of the students here had an excellent knowledge of historical facts, but these facts did not seem to concern them profoundly. They remained objects of their intellect and almost never became elements of their existence. Perhaps the schools had emphasized the informative learning rather than the personal dimension of identity and orientation in history and in one’s contextual space. If so, the teaching was more or less determined by the objectifying approach: the fact—or what-orientation, and not with the how and why orientation. The objectifying approach was that which had laid the groundwork for teaching and learning in Scandinavia, and perhaps the same could be said for teaching and learning in the United States. Herbert M. Kliebard points to “the yoke of college domination” burdening the high school preparatory courses for college studies. The yoke is still there because of the one-sided emphases of traditional school subjects. If this is true, universities and schools are still in the hands of the informative learning, even though there are significant changes happening in recent years, according to Kliebard. We might say that the informative learning has been a dominant trend during the 20th century in Scandinavia and perhaps in the United States as well.

One of the strongest arguments against the hegemony of informative learning comes from neurophysiologists in their emphasis on the higher cognitive capacities at the cost of other mind-capacities. If the emphasis is solely on cognitive/informative learning, the emotional capacities become impoverished: the capacity for empathetic identification with others is lessened, because of the one-sided emphasis of the cognitive rationality. In 1920s, Tillich pointed to a trend in modern education, leading to an unbalanced development of personality. He talked about “the one-sided intellectual emphasis in modern education.” Education was linked with the knowledge-needs of the capitalistic industrial society and not with the development of the whole personality. The purpose of education was to supply the labor-market of the industrial society with qualified workers; education gave the means to manage the system. Education marked class and the intellectual/economic needs of the privileged groups: “cultural education becomes the hallmark of a class and an instrument of economic power.” In the prevailing education:

Nature and tradition were regarded not from the point of view of their meaning, as referring to the eternal, but from the point of view of their finite, phenomenal form. Consequently the materials of education were to be received intellectually, through knowledge of the finite and phenomenal form.

In Tillich’s view, education had become a part of the process of dehumanization and depersonalization:

The loss of personality is interdependent with the loss of community. Only personalities can have community. Depersonalized beings have social interrelations…. The monopolistic direction of public communication, of leisure, pleasure, learning, sex relations, sport, etc., does not provide a basis for a real community.

The informative learning seems to have dominated the educational system of the capitalist industrial society in the 19th and the 20th century. Since Freire, the informative learning is called “banking-education”: the purpose of teaching is to deliver well-formulated facts; students collect the facts and store them; the capability to store facts is checked by tests. In banking-education, it is the teacher, as the authoritative representative of the educational system, who has the right knowledge and s/he transports it to pupils and students. The informative learning is teacher-centered learning. The informative learning emphasis is still with us, but now in a more sophisticated form. Today we witness “a gradual yet relentless replacement of the orthodox teacher-student relationship with the supplier-client, or shopping mall-shopper pattern.” In the supplier-client model, it is supposed that learning is a matter of buying and selling, and information that which is being sold. One part of learning is informative learning, but learning should not be reduced to transporting information. Informative learning is partial: it does not touch the whole human person; the unconscious, symbol-creating dimension of personality, as well as any information provided by the senses, is excluded in the informative learning. “All movements against the spirit of capitalist society in education are united in their opposition to the intellectualism of purely formal training,” Tillich wrote while still in Germany.
In America, after 1933, Tillich continues to articulate the alternative to the informative learning: it is symbols that give the sense of identity and meaning; a depersonalized individual is to restore her or his core or centre of personality in interaction with other people; both personality and community are to be restored; that which happens in one individual, affects all others. What is demanded is “a convincing restatement of the meaning of life...the discovery of symbols expressing it, and...the re-establishment of personality and community. But such a demand includes the demand for an equally radical and inseparable social and political construction.”

Given the relation of interdependence, which in Tillich’s view “links” all dimensions and realms of life with each other, there is no restoration of humanity without the corresponding restoration of society and community and vice versa. The alternative should “include the principle of humanist education, ...the opening up of human possibilities and the providing of opportunities where the pupil may develop in freedom.”

The alternative includes self-determination.

Informative learning is supposed to build on abstract universalism. It makes use of the universals of language and of representation (words, images, and signs); universals or common concepts being the results of the process of abstraction. It is presupposed that words stand for that what they say, that there is a one-to-one fit between the representation and the represented, the map and the terrain. It is supposed that words do nothing more but inform about the states of affairs in humans, nature, and society. Words, in informative learning, are not supposed to have constructive capacities; rather, they tell about the world as it is in itself. Realism and informative learning are supposed to be congruent with each other. The one-to-one fit between the representation and the represented is questioned today.

If there is no one-to-one fit between the representation and the represented, the word and the object, if all things are internal to representation, then relativism is the inevitable outcome. Relativism, as a philosophical position, is self-contradictory. The claim that all stories and all truth-claims are equally true, as a relativist claims, is not a relativistic claim: it aims to say something true about the stories and about the relation of the stories to each other. Tillich does not accept the relativist position, but he claims that there is relativity at the informative level. In Tillich’s view, all representations, as propositions, statements, and assertions are relative. Tillich thought that the cognitive relation between the representation and the represented, the I-It relation, gives some knowledge of things and of the universe under certain conditions. The condition-dependence gives the relativity of representation. It is this dependency on the conditions under which the representation takes place that constitutes its relative nature. Empirical truths, for instance, are congruent in Tillich’s view with “controlling knowledge” or controlled knowledge. This knowledge “is verified by the success of controlling actions. The technical use of scientific knowledge is its greatest and most impressive verification.”

Still, empirical truth-claims, built on the controlling knowledge, are relative. The controlling knowledge is there under certain conditions: the subject/object structure between the individual and the world has come to pass; the thing-universe is construed; the object of knowledge is targeted; the experimenting, and controlling procedures are used in testing the hypotheses. If these conditions are fulfilled, the knowledge is there. The informative truth-claims, as we find them in science, in ethics, and in religion are, in Tillich’s view, probabilities, in this sense they are relative. “Every particular assertion is preliminary;” he wrote.

Given the above, absolute literal faith in science, that only scientific truth-claims are true or that only science gives us truth is impossible. In religion, and in religious education, the relativity of assertions leads to the breakdown of logo-centrism: “Verbum is more than oratio. Protestantism has forgotten that to a great degree. Verbum, word of revelation can be in everything in which the spirit expresses itself, even in the silent symbols of art.”

Religious education, then, might use all the means through which the spirit is able to express itself: rites, rituals, images, natural things, art, architecture etc, and not only words. Rites and symbols affect the unconscious of children (and adults), Tillich wrote, and educators should be aware of their affects. “The conquest of literalism without the loss of the symbols is the great task for religious education,” he wrote.

The relativity of assertions is not the last word of truth-claims. All truth-claims must meet the absolutes of knowledge: those absolute cognitive conditions that make the truth-claims possible, like the categories of mind as formal structures of the mind and being, as we presuppose that natural things, even as objects of science, have being. The absolutes are there, but we cannot say what they are; they cannot become objects of knowledge, as knowledge itself presupposes them. Given the underlying absolutes of
the cognitive relation, Tillich’s position is not the relativist philosophical position. Tillich formulated this in the following way: “Each of our statements about the absolutes in knowledge is relative…But the absolutes themselves are not relative.”

In sense impressions, there is something prevailing and absolute, even if we cannot formulate it in clear and definite terms, something that “stands there” despite the changing flux of perception. In human encounters, there is something absolute: the demand to admit the Other as a person on her/his own right, despite the relativity of moral prescriptions and laws. There is, further, “the logical and semantic structure of the mind,” which is absolute and which must be presupposed in all truth-claims. There is the fundamental and “the basic absolute”: being, as we presuppose that all things have being. None of the absolutes is an object, but all empirical and controlling knowledge needs objects. There is no possibility to say what these absolutes are: they must be presupposed as belonging to the mind/world encounter. We should have an open and critical mind while making use of informative learning. Experimental verification must be combined with “experiential verification,” Tillich wrote.

Humans and higher animals are products of evolution; evolution is there as part of the life-process, when we start to claim that humans and animals are nothing but material products of evolution, we make a metaphysical claim. Given the scientific perspective, it is highly probable that humans are products of evolution and that we have a this-worldly life-history, but to claim that we are nothing but products of evolution shuts out the other possibilities and other interpretations. Science gives us a means of understanding nature and of natural processes in terms of cause and effect, but it is not only science that gives us knowledge, and science gives us only one kind of knowledge. When we start to claim that through scientific understanding of nature we control nature and the future direction of life-process, we make a metaphysical claim and place ourselves above life. We become victims of a modern myth: that only the scientific perspective with its controlling knowledge gives true knowledge of the universe and of its future direction. “The world as a universal machine is the myth of the modern man, and his ethos is the elevation of the personality to the mastery of this machine,” Tillich wrote. The elevated personality is still a depersonalized individual, if the elevation is in the power of the machine only. The determination is from the outside.

The question of self-determination actualizes itself. In a depersonalized society, education is not able to reach its goal, which is “to give a personal center which can radiate into all sectors of contemporary life.” Still the individual has “the capacity of becoming personality…Personality is that being which has the power of self-determination, or which is free; for to be free means to have power over one’s self, not to be bound to one’s given nature.”

In a depersonalized situation, the personal center is not reached and the power of self-determination is broken; the bond to one’s humanity is lost. Tillich thought that genuine self-determination is possible only in the power of the humanity of humans, that is, in relation to the essential human nature: “the determining subject can determine only in the power of what it essentially is. But under the conditions of existential estrangement, it is separated from what it essentially is.” What this means is that the bond to common humanity is to be re-established. One goal of Tillichian pedagogy is to create space for the restoration of the humanity of humans. This does not mean that there are not any other forms of self-determination than the restoring act.

Participative learning and self-determination

In the orthodox teacher-student relationship, it is the teacher who stands for knowledge and transports this knowledge in a one-way communication to the students. Tillich saw the alternative to the informative learning in encouraging creativity, participation, and originality on the part of students and pupils. In 1920’s, while referring to the new pedagogy, he wrote:

The authoritative communication of the subject matter is opposed; originality and creative activity on the part of the pupil are encouraged. Vital participation of the pupil in perceptual reality is to take the place of the intellectual communication of the rational and abstract forms of things. Fellowship between the pupils and between them and the teacher is proclaimed as the ideal form of the educational relationship. This is all of great importance for the religious situation of the present and particularly of the future. Love of community and love of things are beginning to prevail.

What this means is that the learning situation is to be constructed in such a way that pupils, students, and teachers participate in this activity or act in which truth, community, meaning, and society are in the
making. Recently Victoria Rue has written: “Classrooms can be arenas for building communities too. When classroom become communities of learning, students and teachers are ‘rehearsing’ the society they would like to see.” This new community-building, at the same time as the processes of community-destruction are accelerating locally and globally, is one of the possibilities of the new pedagogy today. The emphasis is turned from informative to participative learning.

In the participative learning situation, pupils, students, and teachers share the common relationship in collecting information, in construing/creating new knowledge, and in orientating themselves in the light of that which is the goal and meaning of life. To orient oneself in the light of meaning is not to give consent to a represented world or an informed world; it is not to move on the informative level only, but it is both to ask the question of meaning and to act for meaning in the prevailing situation, “from below.” To orient in the light of meaning does not mean that schools and universities are turned into religious congregations, as participative learning gives room for autonomy and autonomous culture (informative learning). It means that there is room for human questioning, a human search for meaning, and for human self-determination. “The humanistic question is radical; it goes to the roots and does not accept anything whatsoever as being beyond questioning… Christianity includes humanism and the radical question of truth which is the first principle of humanism.” Further, participative or integral learning gives room for drama and art, as these are bearers of stories, narratives, rites, and symbols. Narratives, rites, and symbols give the sense of identity and meaning, in Tillich’s terminology: they give the reunion with the center of personality, creating the very core of personality; personality comes into being. If there is the loss of identity, meaning, and community (depersonalized individuals and depersonalized communities fostering non-personal social interrelations), then drama and art, the opening up of the symbolic dimension of things, might be a way to counteract that loss. The symbolic dimension is not only in the individual; it links the individual with being. The participative or integral learning makes use of art, metaphors, and symbols; it points to and participates in the creative dimension of being; it deals with ontological issues. Tillich pointed to the creativity of being: “Reality itself creates structural possibilities within itself. Life, as well as mind, is creative.” Today, hardly any professional educator does not admit the indispensability of art in learning, and with it the creative interaction between mind, being, and society:

“Then we really may believe that mountains are living?” asks one of the young girls in The Ethics of the Dust. “Things are not either wholly alive, or wholly dead. They are more or less alive,” responds Ruskin’s Lecturer, and he has the girls—not unlike Millais’s angels fifteen years before—walk around and grasp each other’s hands, as in a dance, creating “crystals of life,” to empirically teach them the configurational nature of things… The Gothic is an architecture of relationality, of entanglement, an architecture that constantly forges new relationships and expresses them in every possible form and shape.

Map-making

Participative learning is structural and relational: it studies the human ways of relating and map-making. In Keri Facer’s view, “building the map is the basis for all learning and for the mutual encounter.” Informative learning presupposes the subject/object relation between the individual and the world, that is, it presupposes a certain map. The grounding coordinate of that map is the subject/object relation between the individual and the world. The subject/object relation between the self and the world is a product of self-determination: the position of observer is construed in relation to the world out there. The modern autonomous self is born in this act of self-determination: the self posits itself as an autonomous thinking subject in relation to the world. This act grounds the modern autonomous culture. Tillich named the self/world structure: “the basic ontological structure.” The autonomous self is individualistic, punctual, and independent. In Tillich we, however, discover a second phase of self-determination in addition to the initial phase of self-determination. The coming into being of the modern autonomous subjective self is an initial phase of self-determination. It is a necessary step, laying the ground of the autonomous culture and the basic ontological structure of the self/world relation, but human beings not only relate objectively with the world, they also relate to each other, affect each other, and realize themselves in interdependence and in interaction with each other. The marks of the second phase of self-determination are discernible in Tillich. Religion, culture, morality, and education
might be understood in the light of the second phase of self-determination:

Western education builds on the humanistic ideal: the individual is to develop her/his intellectual, emotional, moral, and volitional capacities and potentials. The humanistic educational ideal has its root in Renaissance, even if the modern education has disregarded the affective levels of interdependence and interaction, which were still a part of the Renaissance humanism. Education, humanistic education, helps us to go from darkness and ignorance to the clarity of rational reason. Only the individual with reason is free and autonomous. Freedom is the freedom of speech, of opinion, of religion; freedom is to choose one’s way as a reflecting person. The humanistic educational ideal builds on strong self-determination: the individual as such is capable of reaching the goal of learning, which is the balanced development of personality. According to humanism, the individual as such is in touch with the essential human nature and human nature comes to expression in the activity of thinking, feeling, and willing, in the species activity. The goal is to think independently, to differentiate between the self-feeling and mere reactions, and to act independently in the power of the reflecting reason. A humanist works for the benefit of others; s/he serves humanity; s/he is a uomo universale. In Tillich’s view, the opportunity of the development of personality is given only to a few privileged individuals; large groups of people are left outside of the humanistic educational ideal:

Because of human finitude, no one can fulfill the humanist ideal, since decisive human potentialities will always remain unrealized. But even worse, the human condition always excludes ...the vast majority of human beings from the higher grades of cultural form and educational depth... Therefore, the question “Educating into what?” must be answered in a way which includes everyone who is a person. But culture cannot do that by itself—just because of the ambiguities of humanism. Only a self-transcending humanism can answer the question of the meaning of culture and the aim of education. In Tillich’s view, the humanistic educational ideal is correct, but given the conditions of existence, it is unattainable in its entirety: an individual is not capable of realizing the whole human potential. Tillichian pedagogy admits of the humanistic educational ideal; the ideal is partly reachable for certain individuals under certain conditions, but given the factual conditions of human life this ideal is not reachable for all. Because of the factual conditions, the goal of educational ideal should be such that it includes all persons and not only those who have the privilege of education. Tillich wrote: “Humanity is attained by self-determination and other-determination in mutual dependence. The individual strives for her/his own humanity and tries to help others reach humanity, an attempt which expresses her/his humanity.”

Under the condition of existence the relationship to the human essential nature is broken and fragmented; it is ambiguous, and “therefore, self-determination into fulfilled humanity is impossible; nevertheless, it is necessary.” Human life, at the stage of autonomous culture, is a mixture of existential and essential elements. If humans lived in the best of the worlds, the ideal of fulfilled humanity would be reached by all. In real life, this is not the case because of the social, economic, and political conditions, and not least, because of the estrangement cutting through all life and all levels of encounter and understanding, leaving large groups of people outside the humanistic educational ideal. Therefore, the complete self-determination into fulfilled humanity (the uninhibited species activity) is practically impossible. Still humans are to strive for development on their own and the humanistic ideal should be a part of education; partly it is reachable for individuals as individuals.

Thus far, the autonomous culture and humanistic education are such: the informative learning gives some knowledge of the world; autonomous cultural forms in education, science, and morality are there on their own; an individual is a mixture of existential and essential elements; the moments of the species activity are there, but the species activity is mixed with self-seeking and inhibited by estrangement; there is the cleft between the individual and the essential human nature. An individual cannot elevate her/himself to a constant uninhibited species activity; it is available only momentarily. The species activity is in the individual; at the same time, it is above the individual, determining her or him in the activity of thinking, feeling, and willing. If the species activity is there, the center of personality is restored in relation to the human essential nature. False forms of self-elevation and self-sufficiency break down as the species activity is for all individuals as individuals. The species activity is expressing the human nature or the humanity of humans. One central goal of Tillichian pedagogy is, then, the restoration of the humanity of humans; the question
“Education into what?” might be answered in terms of the humanity of humans: the society is to be construed in such a way that the humanity of humans is reached by all. Education or learning is to create the space in which the center of personality is restored.

The Givenness of Being and of Human Nature

In Tillich’s view, education or learning should go “deeper into reality” than the humanistic ideal seems to allow for. The goal of learning is initiation into the basic structures and relations of being, not only into those possibilities and potentials that are included in human nature in the autonomous culture. Being and human nature are congruent with each other according to Tillich: both are “givens” and they, so to say, “come together.” Tillich links the question of the goal of human development with being, much in the same way as Heidegger did in his *Letter on Humanism*. In Tillich’s view, the essential human nature is congruent with being; the species activity and being are congruent with each other. In this view, “the idea of humanism is transcended without being denied.” The idea of humanism is that each and every individual as such, through self-determination, is capable of the uninhibited activity of thinking, feeling, and willing; that the essential human nature is expressed in and through the individual. In Tillich’s view, education is “initiation,” pointing “to the terminus ad quem, the “where to.” Secular culture has lost an ultimate and commanding terminus ad quem, because it has lost an ultimate and unconditional concern.” In 1946, Tillich thought that the content of religious education, the where-to, is the sacred void. Later he seemed to have thought that the seriousness in questioning the direction, goal, and meaning of life, disregarding culture or particular religion, points to the presence of the holy in all life. This gives a non-religious interpretation of religion. The holy or the eternal, or as Tillich preferred to call it, the Spiritual Presence, is in all life, not only in the religious life. There is the spiritual dimension in life itself, the spiritual dimension comes to expression in religion, in morality, but it also comes to expression outside religion. It is at this point that map-making becomes crucial as it helps us to point out the presence of the holy in the human life-encounter. The experience of the holy comes from the dimension preceding the subject/object split. The question of education and initiation, the question of “where to,” might be answered in terms of the givenness of the preceding dimension. Self-determination is in relation to the preceding dimension:

The moral act, the act of personal self-constitution in the encounter with other persons, is based on participation in the transcendent union. This participation makes the moral act possible. By its Spiritual impact, the preceding transcendent union creates the actual union of the centered person with itself, the encountered world, and the ground of self and world. It is not only the development of personality that is the goal of education, but also a creative relationship with the creative source of all life prior to the subject/object split. In morality and in religion, “the preceding absolute” comes to expression. The Other, through her/his very existence demands to be accepted as a person. In Tillich’s view there is:

The permanent resistance of every personality against any attempt to make it into a thing, to appropriate it and deprive it of its self-determination, is the presupposition for the rise of personality as such. Without this resistance of the “thou” to the “ego,” without the unconditional demand embodied in every person to be acknowledged as a person in theory and in practice, no personal life would be possible. A person becomes aware of her/his own character as a person only when s/he is confronted by another person. Only in the community of the I and the thou can personality arise.

The unconditional demand is the absolute in the human-to-human encounter. It is only in relation to the Other that we learn about ourselves. In meeting the Other we also become aware of that which in that very meeting transcends both the self and the Other: that we have a common humanity and that we are connected with the universe; we partake of something bigger than our selves. Being and the humanity of humans are interconnected. The absolute at the relational level is the demand to accept the Other as a person on her or his own (the moral act). This acceptance we cannot do, if we have not felt and experienced the acceptance on our own part. If the acceptance is there, the core of personality is there and the Other is allowed to stand her/his own ground and to develop in freedom. Our self-determination happens only in relation to the Other: self-determination is mutual enterprise at the relational level. As we learn to see beyond ourselves, we see that the Other comes with a world to us, that s/he is a bearer of a world, a true mask of God, God in disguise, whatever culture or religion s/he represents. S/he is a gift.
The relationship to the preceding dimension is in all life. Religious education, then, is not to teach a religious way of living, but it is to learn both about religion and from religion what in religion transscends religion: the infinite is in religion, but it is not from religion. The Spiritual Presence or God is in the givenness of the encountered life. Religious education in ethics is not only to learn about the moral prescriptions throughout human history and in different cultures, it is also to learn about that which in moral life transscends morality: the demand coming from each and every person to be accepted as person, whatever culture or whatever nation, whatever religion this particular person belongs to. The acceptance is there in the power of that which transcends the individual selves and particular cultures. The Other is accepted as such: s/he is allowed to stand his or her own ground; s/he is allowed to express her/his meaning and identity through symbols suitable for her or him; the species activity is encouraged. Learning is about the restoration of the humanity of humans.

4 “Many of the major multinational corporations already have corporate ‘universities’ with Deans, faculties and programmes of courses and training ranging from personal development to recognized qualifications critical for career progression, with some granting degrees in their own right. (…) Corporate universities numbered over 2400 in 2002, and were forecast to overtake the number of private universities in the US by 2010.” Kerri Facer, 2011. *Learning Futures. Education, Technology, and Social Change*. London: Routledge, p. 26.
5 Andrew Wright, 2004.
6 Sustainable strategies in education in countering “the highly polarized future” are discussed in Facer, 2011.
7 Wright, 2004.
9 “Our cognitive unconscious is capable of reasoning and has a larger “space” for operations than the conscious counterpart… In all likelihood, there is an important reasoning process going on unconsciously, in the subterranean mind, and the reasoning produces results without the intervening steps ever being known.” Antonio Damasio, 2012. *Self Come to Mind. Constructing the Conscious Brain*. London: Vintage Books, 275f.
10 See Ibid., pp. 280ff.
14 “Colleges have served to perpetuate a curriculum organized around traditional disciplines of knowledge, and thereby the colleges have had fatally inhibiting effect on curriculum experimentation. (…) Over the course of roughly a century, many high school reformers have exhibited an only half-concealed tendency to demean the kind of academic knowledge that colleges have come to represent.” Herbert M. Kliebard, 2002. *Changing Course. American Curriculum Reform in the 20th Century*. New York: Teachers College Press, 50.
15 Matti Bergström, 1984. *The Green Theory*. Helsinoki: WSOY. “Increased cognitive demands have made the interplay between the cortex (where consciousness is born) and brain stem a bit rough and brutal, or, to put it in kinder words, they have made access to the wellspring of feeling more difficult….) In the wars of consciousness the cerebral cortex tends to get the upper hand”. Damasio, 2012:251.
17 Ibid, p. 16.
18 Ibid, p. 111.
22 Tillich, 1932:112.
23 Tillich, 1948:266.
But if everything is based on the Word, then the consciousness is overburdened. Therefore today we have a reaction against intellectualization of the Word in Protestantism.” Paul Tillich, ‘The New Community’, in Faith and Thought. Vol. II, nr 1, 1984. New jersey: First Baptist Church of Montclair, p. 34

Nobody can say exactly how much or how little a young child takes from a ritual act into her/his unconsciousness, even if s/he understands almost nothing of it.” Ibid.

“Receiving knowledge is verified by the creative union of two natures, that of knowing and that of the known. (…) Experiential verification must go on continually.” Tillich, 1978:103.

Tillich, 1976:159.

The self without a world is empty; the world without a self is dead.” Tillich, 1978:171, ST I.

John Milbank has famously asserted that the “pathos of modern theology” has been “its false humility” (Milbank 2006, 1) with regard to “secular reason.” The source of this false humility, present in both neo-orthodox and liberal forms, has been modern theology’s captivity to modern dualisms, evidenced by the fact that they allowed for the possibility of “worldly knowledge” as separable from revelation and therefore valid in its own sphere (Milbank et al., 2). Graham Ward and Milbank find theology faced with a stark choice: either theology will again become a “meta-discourse,” positioning all other discourses, or it will be “positioned by secular reason” and “turn[ed] into the oracular voice of some finite idol, such as historical scholarship, humanist psychology, or transcendental philosophy” (Milbank 2006, 1). Theology must frame all other disciplines, “otherwise these disciplines will define a zone apart from God, grounded literally in nothing” (Milbank et al., 3). It should be clear, given considerations such as these, that overcoming dualisms is not a concern of secondary importance for “Radical Orthodoxy” (hereafter “RO”) (I should note here that in this paper I use “Radical Orthodoxy” interchangeably with “Ward” and “Milbank,” whose theological agendas I take to be essentially the same). Indeed, Milbank affirms James Smith’s sympathetic description of Radical Orthodoxy as embodying a mood of “refusal of dualisms” (Milbank 2004, 12).

Ward and Milbank’s means of insuring that there is no such “extra-divine” zone lies in their robustly metaphysical, neo-Platonic theological schema (which is no doubt already familiar to many). On this model, the created order “is” or has being only because it participates in the Being of God. Thus, all good things in the world “analogically concur,” as Milbank puts it (Milbank 2006, xvi) with each other insofar as they share in common participation in the Good (with a capital “G”), which is God. On this schema, there can be no extra-divine ontology or realm of being, so that dualism is in principle ruled out in advance. What, then, of the obvious fact that the entirety of the created order seems not to be “good,” but “fallen,” and even relatively resistant to the goodness of God? Ward and Milbank do not deny this aspect of created existence, but explain it via appeal to an Augustinian notion of the privation of being. The fallen world does not represent another ontological order opposed to God, but a failure to fully participate in God. These aspects of the created order therefore “are” not anything, but are in fact a failure to be. Rather than representing a realm of being opposed to God, they represent a lack of being. Within this schema, the Church plays a central role (in my view RO is first and foremost an ecclesiology). The Church is that community that most fully participates in the Being of God, prophetically anticipating the full and proper participation of the full created order in God. As such, Church is tasked with, in Ward’s words, performing the “march of God in the world” (Ward 2004, 56) and bringing “the world...to an understanding of itself” (96), which to say of its true nature as “participated being.” RO’s claim to overcome dualism, then, is grounded in the assurance that there is no zone of being “apart from God.”

RO, based in this metaphysical schema, therefore stands apart from “modern theology,” which is defined by its acceptance that philosophy “has its own legitimacy, its own autonomy, apart from faith” (Milbank et al., 21). This capitulation on the part of modern theology means that the “knowledge of God” can be articulated only “in terms of philosophically derived categories of being and knowing, the legitimacy of which liberal theology has forfeited the right to adjudicate” (Milbank 1999, 21). It is at this point that we can introduce Paul Tillich. Though he does not always appear by name, Tillich is the paradigmatic figure of this capitulation on the part of liberal theology. Ward, to give a single example, finds in Tillich’s concern for “the ultimate” (a phrase Tillich in fact takes measures to avoid [cf. Tillich 1951, 12]) an appeal to a supposed universality exceeding the specifically theological that ultimately leads to the “liquidation of religion” (Ward 2003, 115, 119). As Smith sums up the RO reading of Tillich, “for Tillich, the claims of Christian revelation simply confirm the more universal disclosure of our dependence on the ‘ground of being’” (Smith 36). Tillich’s theology is, for RO, hopelessly mired in, and defined by, the structuring dualisms of modern theology.

I want to suggest not only that RO’s narrative is simplistic as it pertains to Tillich’s thought, but that the situation is, in fact, reversed: RO, as formulated
by Ward and Milbank, is constitutively dualistic, while Tillich’s theology provides more promising resources for advancing a non-dualistic theological program. This section and the next will consider the constitutive duality of RO and the non-dualistic promise of Tillich’s thought. In the final section of the paper, I will suggest, however, that Tillich’s theological model, as it stands, does not fully deliver on its promise, and outline the contours of my own critical appropriation of Tillich’s thought.

Concerning the constitutive dualism of RO, I begin by endorsing (and expanding) Virginia Burrus’s suggestion that RO represents a striking contemporary example of a heresiology. As Burrus notes, “orthodoxy enters the stage of history hand in hand with heresiology,” the former being impossible or unnecessary without the latter (Burrus 36). While orthodoxy presents itself as a (re)articulation of Christian truth undertaken in response to, and so subsequent to, heresiological error, “in practice orthodoxy and heresy must always be spoken in the same breath, at the same time…there is no orthodoxy without heresy…no original without mimicry” (37). My contention is that what holds for orthodoxy holds equally well for “Radical Orthodoxy.” Despite their insistence on the ultimate ontological un-reality of that which opposes God and the Christian community, Ward and Milbank are ultimately able to advance their theological program only in opposition to “secular reason” (to use Milbank’s phrase again). Both the “radicality” and the “orthodoxy” of their program are dependent on their opposition to the stark alternatives of nihilism, secularism, violence, and so forth. We have already seen this in Milbank’s insistence that either theology will position all other discourses or be positioned by them (cf. Hyman, 70). While theology’s “other” might be unreal in principle, in practice RO does not advance a single step without constituting itself on the basis of that to which it stands opposed. Its own non-oppositional, positive identity is at least as unreal as that it attributed to the objects of its critique. As a result, Ward and Milbank in fact fail to overturn a single one of the fundamental dualisms of which they are so critical (cf. Hyman, 70).

What, then, of Tillich’s theology? What draws me to Tillich’s thought is its promise for articulating a more thoroughly non-dualistic theology than that advanced by RO. What I specifically have in mind are Tillich’s related notions of correlation and religious symbols. I want to make two points before turning to a consideration of Tillich. First, it is obviously not possible to develop these ideas adequately in the brief time available here, so what follows remains preliminary and thematic. Second, my appropriation of Tillich is critical and constructive. While I find great promise in some of Tillich’s central insights, I think they also stand in need of significant revision if they are to fully deliver on that promise. I will outline the points of such a revision in the final section of the paper.

It is a mistake, in my view, to understand Tillich’s method of correlation in the dualistic terms we have seen RO ascribe to it. The key to getting at this point, for me, lies in Tillich’s insistence on the “mutual interdependence” of “existential questions” and “theological answers” that defines the method of correlation (Tillich 1951, 60). There is, then, a mutual interdependence between “God for us” and “we for God”—though Tillich does still differentiate the self-manifestation of God from “God in his abyssal nature,” a distinction I would contest on phenomenological grounds (61). Thus, “ultimate concern,” the properly theological object is irreducible to “preliminary concern,” but nevertheless is only given insofar as preliminary concern becomes the “vehicle” of ultimate concern (13). It is only in and through the finite that the infinite becomes real (13). Putting the issue in terms that reflect Tillich’s own Heideggerian influences, the infinite (ultimate concern) “is” only insofar as it is given through the finite (preliminary concern). This interdependence means that, “the ‘divine-human-encounter’ means something real for both sides” (61).

The mutual interdependence of ultimate and preliminary, finite and infinite, human and divine is the point at which Tillich’s correlational method conceptually displaces dualism. Tillich is explicit that any aspect of finite reality (i.e., any preliminary concern) has the potential to manifest the infinite (i.e., ultimate concern) (cf. Tillich 1951, 13, 118) This gives a central role to “culture,” defined by Tillich as “the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion [i.e., ultimate concern] expresses itself” (Tillich 1964, 42). As he famously states the issue, then, “religion is the substance of culture” and “culture is the form of religion,” this “definitely prevents the establishment of a dualism of religion and culture” (42). The mutual interdependence of finite and infinite therefore announces for Tillich “the disappearance of the gap between the sacred and secular realm” (41).

Tillich’s theology, then, conceptually displaces dualism (and he addresses other forms of dualism
Beyond that of sacred and secular, theology and culture. But so does RO’s Neo-Platonic metaphysical schema. Given this point, why do I think that Tillich’s theology actually displaces dualism in a way that RO’s does not? The answer lies in Tillich’s notion of religious symbols and, more specifically, in his conception of the “birth” and “death” of religious symbols. Tillich refers to those aspects of finite culture that becomes the vehicles of ultimate concern as “symbols,” which he differentiates from mere “signs.” Like signs, symbols point beyond themselves, but in such a way that they participate in the reality to which they point (Tillich 1964, 54). The notion of religious symbols is obviously related to that of correlation. When finite, conditioned realities become vehicles of the unconditioned, their mundane reality enters into a “revelatory correlation” (Tillich 1951, 118), thereby opening up the “depth dimension” of reality which otherwise remains inaccessible (Tillich 1964, 59).

To this point, of course, Tillich and RO actually sound quite a bit alike (a point which would be worth exploring, given more time). What sets them apart is Tillich’s further formulation of religious symbols and their “birth” and “death.” Religious symbols are not, for Tillich, arbitrarily created. On the contrary, they either “open up” reality or they do not (Tillich 1964, 58). A religious symbols is therefore “true” if it “adequately expresses the correlation of some person with final revelation,” if it no longer does so it becomes obsolete or “dies” (Tillich 1951, 240). Or, on the other hand, a symbol is “born” when some aspect of finite reality opens reality up to the unconditioned that had previously remained inaccessible.

It is with the notion of the birth and death of religious symbols that Tillich’s thought shows far more promise for overcoming dualism than does RO, for at least two reasons. First, I think Tillich’s concept of religious symbols harbors an irreducibly aleatory dimension of a kind lacking in RO. Tillich is explicit that anything can become a religious symbol (cf. Tillich 1951, 118) and that the locus of revelation cannot be foreseen (120), the significance of which is heightened by the recognition that a symbol can cease to be revelatory. Not only can the locus of revelation not be determined in advance, but also it is impossible to determine when and if media might fail to serve a revelatory function any longer. Accepting these points, the social simply cannot be determinatively divided into the realms of the religious/theological, on the one side, and the secular/cultural, on the other. On the contrary, the relation between religion/theology and the secular/cultural becomes undecidable (in specifically Derridean terms), calling into question the fixed identity of each side of the dualism as such.

The second reason I find such promise in Tillich’s thought lies in the intensification of these implications of his thought when combined with his recognition of the mutually interdependent character of correlational relations. If, to repeat, “God for us” and “we for God” are both conditioned by the correlational relationship, and if the effectiveness of the “vehicle” mediating that relationship (i.e., the symbol) is not itself insured, then neither are “God for us” or “we for God” (I am reserving discussion of “God in his abyssal nature” for later). Tillich’s theology, on this reading, cannot consistently subsume theological reason to secular reason because the very identities of the theological and the secular are in constant flux.

Perhaps it will help to illustrate these points, and their contrast with the overall thrust of RO, by considering Tillich’s complex formulations of the relation of the church to culture (ecclesiology also provides a fitting illustration in light of RO’s significant ecclesiological concerns). In the third volume of the Systematic Theology, Tillich insists that the “Spiritual Community” of “New Being” inaugurated in the Christ event cannot simply be equated with the Christian churches (cf. Tillich 1963, 152) because the latter remain irreducibly caught up in the ambiguities of cultural life (cf. 246). As he puts it, the churches are “distortions as well as representations of the Spiritual Community,” with the result that “their relation to culture is itself culture and not the answer to the question implied in culture” (246, emphasis added). This point operates in opposition to dualism, either in the form of a theocratic subsumption of the secular or a secular subsumption of the Christian churches (246). Further, the “freedom of the Spirit,” which I take as a reference to the aleatory nature of the birth of religious symbols, is such that “the secular” is “open to the impact of the Spirit without the mediation of a church” (247, emphasis added). Thus, Tillich insists that “the Spirit can and often has become manifest” in “movements, groups, and individuals who are not only on the secular pole of the ambiguities of religion but who are openly hostile to the churches and beyond this to religion itself in all its forms, including Christianity” (247). In my terms, the boundaries between church and non-church become ultimately undecidable.
This stands in marked contrast to the dominant ecclesiological themes in Ward and Milbank. Now, it is true that Ward at times sounds positively Tillichian, writing that all human lived experience is irreducibly hermeneutical (cf. Ward 2004, 114) and that “I am a Christian’ is not an identity statement. For my intellectual grasp upon what it is to be a Christian is weak, hermeneutical” (Ward 2000, 259). He even allows that God may be at work in extra-ecclesial culture in such a way that the church may have to learn from its “cultural other” (Ward 2004, 54). Yet, these are rare exceptions in Ward’s writing (with no clear parallels in Milbank’s own) which stand in stark contrast to the dominant and dogmatic assurances which structure the work of RO. It is Ward who insists that the church’s role is to bring “the world…to an understanding of itself” (96), that the church performs the “march of God in the world” (56), and that theology proceeds from a position which is “transcultural and transhistorical” (56). This dominant voice can be heard even more clearly in Milbank, who makes no such occasional concessions to the realm of “secular reason.” On the contrary, as I have said, Ward and Milbank’s theological program is, in fact, constituted by numerous dualisms, not the least of which is that of “church” over against “culture.”

Let me summarize what I hope to have achieved in the admittedly brief considerations to this point. First, I have attempted to highlight the fact that Ward and Milbank’s theological program is constitutively dualistic, despite its claims to overcome the dualisms plaguing modern thought and theology. Second, I have highlighted how Tillich’s theology emerges from his desire to disrupt reigning dualisms, and does not represent a dualistic capitulation of theology to “secular reason.” Third, I have contrasted the respective shapes these theological proposals take with regard to the relation of “church” to “culture,” attempting to show that Tillich’s ecclesiology calls this dualism into question while Ward and Milbank’s theological program reinforces it.

Having said all of this, however, it will be clear to the learned scholars of Tillich gathered here that in my reading of Tillich I have pressed past his own formulations at various points, and this brings us to the brief outline of my own revisions of Tillich’s thought that I promised earlier. While I obviously find tremendous promise for a more thoroughly nondualistic theology in Tillich’s thought, I also have some deep-seated reservations about the adequacy of his theological model as it stands. Stated most directly, what I propose is a more deconstructive-phenomenological appropriation of Tillich’s theology. In line with this, I would contest Tillich’s assurance that the one non-symbolic statement concerning God is that God is being-itself, which, as he notes, is the basis of his distinctive development of the *analogia entis* and the notion of religious symbolism (cf. Tillich 1951, 238-239). While space does not permit to outline my reasons for being uncomfortable with the notion of “being-itself,” I can at least hint at a broad array of reasons by stating that I am uncomfortable with this formulation for essentially the same reasons Derrida ultimately critiques Heidegger’s notion of the “gathering” of Being.

What I would contest, then, are Tillich’s own theological assurances and a host of concepts that I think highlight them, which I think too readily lend themselves to renewed dualistic constructions. Among these are revelation as manifestation, the emphasis on “unambiguous life,” a certain understanding of idolatry, and the notion of “God in his abyssal nature” in contradistinction to God as given in the correlational relation. What I propose, in other words, is a more phenomenological, and therefore less ontological, appropriation of Tillich’s thought. Such an approach, as I understand it, would content itself with the givenness of phenomenal life without falling back upon the assurances provided by an appeal to “being-itself.” If there is a sense in which Tillich’s theology remains, to borrow John Caputo’s term (cf. Caputo), a “strong theology,” what I envision is a significantly “weaker” theology.

What remains, then, if we call into question the ontology accompanying and structuring Tillich’s theology? I would suggest that we can give a distinctively deconstructive-phenomenological reading to the notion of the “unconditional” in Tillich’s thought. Along these lines, what is experienced as “unconditional” is not the giving of “being-itself,” but the very non-ultimate character of our reality as it is normally constituted. The unconditional, on such a formulation, is not an ontological positivity, but the experience of the non-ultimate and ultimate contingency of our ordinary structures and forms of life. This phenomenological negativity would necessarily be given as something, this “something” being that which brings about the disruption (i.e., the unconditioned is still mediated only via the conditioned). This phenomenological disruption, and its being figured in something which is a phenomenal-logical positivity, is, following Tillich, a form of our constituted reality’s “opening up” beyond itself.
But, even more than I think Tillich allows, such opening up is ultimately aleatory and unforeseeable. For example, Tillich has a tendency to accord a privilege to particular past Christian symbols which I think ultimately stands in marked tension to his emphasis on the possibility of symbols’ dying away (e.g. Tillich 1963, 123). I think that the aspects of Tillich’s thought I have highlighted in this paper press against the assurance that “historical and doctrinal symbols” that once meaningfully communicated Christian revelation can be counted upon to continue to play that role, and so can ultimately determine the present shape of symbolic mediation (to put this in his terms). The undecidability opened up by the contingent nature of symbols, upon which I think Tillich insists, pushes us past his own attempts to limit this effect.

Finally, I would reserve a place for a modified Tillichian conception of idolatry. On this formulation, idolatry would indeed have to do—as it does for Tillich—with the elevation of the conditional to the status of the unconditional. However, it would not have to do with failure to recognize being-itself as the only unconditional. Rather, on the deconstructive-phenomenological model I am proposing, “idolatry” would consist in elevating any aspect of our social and communal life to “unconditional” status, thereby insulating it from all destabilization, contestation, or critique. To avoid idolatry is to maintain a firm insistence on the contingency of social forms as such, thereby seeking to maintain the openness of the social to its own creative reformulations.

Works Cited


Referenced aspect of his thought (including both critical and affirmative references). With this in mind, I will only say a brief word or two about this concept, reserving the greater part of what follows for a consideration of two divergent “postmodern” theological legacies of this concept.

We can begin with a brief consideration of the notion of ultimate concern as Tillich formulates it,
speically highlighting some points to which we will return as we proceed. Most succinctly, Tillich writes that “the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object insofar as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us” (Tillich 1951, 12). Crucially, the “object” of ultimate concern is not an “objectivity” (12). Rather, Tillich insists that that which correlates to ultimate concern is “not a ‘highest thing’ called ‘the absolute’ or ‘the unconditioned,’ about which we could argue in detached objectivity” and goes on to write that “for this reason we have avoided terms like ‘the ultimate,’ ‘the unconditioned,’ ‘the universal,’ ‘the infinite,’ and have spoken of ultimate, unconditional, total, infinite concern” (12). Concerning the total nature of this concern, Tillich writes that “no part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it; there is no ‘place’ to flee from it.” Concerning its infinity, he writes that “no moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite” (12).

Contrary to a popular (academic) perception, Tillich does not claim anything so banal as that “religion” has simply to do with whatever we happen to invest with ultimate value. On the contrary, the “existential” and ontological aspects of ultimate concern are coordinated in his thought. Thus, while it is true that the existential state of being “ultimately concerned” is “universally human,” with the result that humans may elevate any number of things to the position of ultimate concern (Tillich 1957, 9), he nevertheless maintains that only God, understood as “being-itself,” is the proper correlate of ultimate concern (Tillich 1951, 235). God, understood as “being-itself,” is a not a being (235) (and therefore cannot properly be said to “exist” (236)) but is the “creative and abysmal ground of being” (238). God is the infinite source of being in which everything that is, participates, in a merely finite way, for its being (237). While humans may therefore elevate something other than “being-itself” to the position of ultimate concern, such elevation replaces ultimate concern with one which is in reality only “preliminary” (11-12), and is therefore idolatrous (13).

Two Postmodern Legacies of “Ultimate Concern”

Questions have arisen, for some time, about the relevance of Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern for so-called postmodern theology. What I want to suggest today is that two significant, and in most respects opposed, postmodern theological legacies of Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern are represented in the “Radical Orthodoxy” of Graham Ward and John Milbank, on the one hand, and in the “theology of the event” outlined by John Caputo, on the other. At first glance, both of these might seem like unlikely examples, given that neither Radical Orthodoxy nor Caputo provide any detailed treatment of Tillich’s thought in their published corpus. As I hope to demonstrate, however briefly, it nevertheless remains the case that Tillich’s thought has had a significant influence on both Radical Orthodoxy and Caputo.

Radical Orthodoxy and Ultimate Concern

To say that Tillich does not often appear as a subject of explicit thematization in the work of Milbank and Ward is not to say that Tillich does not loom large in their thought. On the contrary, Tillich is the image par excellence of all that is wrong with modern theology from their perspective. On the first page of his Theology and Social Theory, Milbank famously lays out the dilemma facing Christian theology in the postmodern context as he sees it: either theology will again become a “metadiscourse” positioning all other discourses, or it will be “positioned by secular reason” and “turn[ed] into the oracular voice of some finite idol, such as historical scholarship, humanist psychology, or transcendental philosophy” (Milbank 2006, 1). The danger to which modern theology has succumbed is nothing less than “its false humility” (1) in the face of the onslaught of “secular reason.” As metadiscourse, by way of contrast, theology must (once again) frame all other disciplines, or, as Milbank writes with Ward and Catherine Pickstock, “these disciplines will define a zone apart from God, grounded literally in nothing” (Milbank et. al., 3). The now-famous opposition of Radical Orthodoxy is clear: either a “radically orthodox” Christian theology, by which Ward and Milbank mean their own neo-Platonic, neo-Aristotelian, Anglo-Catholic metaphysical theology, or nihilism.

I will return to the significance of Ward and Milbank’s stark “either/or” logic shortly. For the moment, I want to point out that readers uninitiated with Ward and Milbank’s thought could be forgiven if it might seem as if Tillich would prove a useful ally for Radical Orthodoxy. Indeed, a number of themes in his own theological proposal would seem to form natural points of productive contact with those found in Radical Orthodoxy. His insistence on
what can only be viewed, from our contemporary perspective, as a robustly ontological and metaphysical understanding of God as “being-itself” marks an immediately evident point of similarity with Radical Orthodoxy, as does his insistence that all authentic being is such only through participation in the divine (the respective theologies of Tillich and Radical Orthodoxy, in other words, are both articulated around an analogy of being). Tillich’s attempt to provide a theology of culture would also seem to have obvious resonances with Ward, insofar as the latter is concerned to articulate Radical Orthodoxy as a broader theology of culture (an interest far less pronounced in Milbank). Again, from a contemporary perspective, one of the criticisms of Tillich’s theology of culture might be precisely that it remains too Christian in an exclusive sense, despite his own efforts to open Christian theology beyond itself. Stated differently, Tillich shares with Radical Orthodoxy an abiding concern to remain on guard against idolatry. In summary, then, we can read Tillich (though I don’t think we have to) as seeking to elevate theology to the level of “metadiscourse” of the kind advocated by Radical Orthodoxy, situating and positioning all other forms of knowledge, even if it must also be informed by them—a concern which echoes Ward in his most charitable moments.

Given such inviting points of rapprochement, the actual response of radically-orthodox thinkers to Tillich is striking. Succinctly stated, Radical Orthodoxy finds in Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern a capitulation to “secular reason” and philosophy understood as a “zone apart from God,” and so as emblematic of the nihilism believed to infect modern theology. James K. A. Smith nicely summarizes the radically-orthodox reading of Tillich when he writes that “for Tillich, the claims of Christian revelation simply confirm the more universal disclosure of our dependence on the ‘ground of being’” (Smith 36). Tillich is, for Radical Orthodoxy, the paradigm of what Milbank describes as the surrender of modern theology to philosophy, according the latter, in his words, “its own legitimacy, its own autonomy, apart from faith” (Milbank 1990, 21), with the result that the “knowledge of God” can only be articulated “in terms of philosophically derived categories of being and knowing, the legitimacy of which liberal theology has forfeited the right to adjudicate” (21). Tillich’s theology represents, as Ward writes in a critical review of Caputo’s Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, a “faith without content” (Ward 1999, 506). He finds in Tillich’s concern for “the ultimate” an appeal to a supposed universality which abstracts from all theological specificity, ultimately leading to the “liquidation of religion” (Ward 2003; 115, 119), definitive of late-capitalist society.

It would be easy to demonstrate that such readings represent “straw-man” Tillichs (we have already seen, for example, that Tillich explicitly rejects any formulation of ultimate concern in the objectivist terms of “the ultimate” attributed to him by Ward). What I want to highlight here, however, is the function of such obviously caricatured presentations of Tillich in radically-orthodox thought. Simply stated, Radical Orthodoxy needs the caricatured Tillich. I fully endorse Virginia Burrus’s suggestion that Radical Orthodoxy represents a striking contemporary example of a heresiology. As she notes, “orthodoxy enters the stage of history hand in hand with heresiology,” the former being impossible or unnecessary without the latter (Burrus 36). While orthodoxy presents itself as a (re)articulation of Christian truth undertaken in response to, and so subsequent to, heresiological error, Burrus draws our attention to the fact that “in practice orthodoxy and heresy must always be spoken in the same breath, at the same time…” that “there is no orthodoxy without heresy…no original without mimicry” (37). My contention is that what holds for orthodoxy holds equally well for “Radical Orthodoxy.” Ward and Milbank’s entire theological program is structured around the notion that late-medieval nominalism initiated a death spiral for Western theology and philosophy, culminating in the nihilism and capitalist depravity of contemporary culture.

This narrative (which takes a strikingly teleological form in Ward and Milbank’s thought, despite their criticism that it renders all historical development merely “arbitrary”) legitimates the stark “either/or” structuring their theological proposal. Without this sharp “either/or” alternative, they have no positive theological proposal of their own. It is not surprising, then, that Ward and Milbank have a vested interest in positioning Tillich as they do, precisely in an effort to occlude the obvious points of correlation (I term I use intentionally) between their own theological proposal and that of Tillich. In other words, were someone to successfully demonstrate that the “radical” points Ward and Milbank claim to introduce into contemporary theology were already there in Tillich, their theological program would be
specifically called into question. Modern theology would no longer represent the nihilistic, vacuous “other” against which Radical Orthodoxy defines itself. Insofar as Radical Orthodoxy positively depends on the very “Tillich” it rejects, I am suggesting that it, in fact, represents one, albeit negative, postmodern legacy of Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern.

Caputo and Ultimate Concern

If Radical Orthodoxy represents a negative legacy coming out of Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern, John Caputo’s recent work represents a much more positive and affirmative, though still critical, legacy of Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern. Responding to a series of papers on Tillich presented in the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture” Group at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Caputo notes that, though it has gone “largely unexpressed” in his written work, he has always had a love of Tillich (Caputo 2005, 1). He goes on to suggest that his then-recently-published Weakness of God and the “theology of the event” it outlines (that is the subtitle of the book) bears the stamp of Tillich. Caputo’s professed “affection” for Tillich has become more pronounced in some of his most recent work (1).

One of Caputo’s recent concerns has been to outline and contrast what he sees as two forms of postmodern (Continental) philosophy of religion. In his view, the first, broadly Kantian, model takes “postmodernism” to be, as he puts it, “a way to delimit knowledge in order to make room for a more [or] less classical orthodox faith” (Caputo 2011c, 1). Caputo contrasts this first, “mostly apologetic,” approach with what he describes as his own “theopoetic” approach (1). Tillich enters into the picture at this point: Caputo suggests in numerous instances that this alternative model of postmodern philosophy (which he also terms a “radical theology” (3; cf. 2011a 24; 2011b)) has Hegel for its grandfather and Tillich as its father (2011b, 22; 2011c, 5). Despite a lack of sustained treatment of Tillich, then, Caputo acknowledges Tillich as an essential precursor (though certainly not the only or, I would suggest, the primary one) of his current project in radical theology, theopoetics, or philosophy of religion, all descriptors of his work.

Caputo is explicit in tracing the “fatherhood” of Tillich to the notion of ultimate concern, which he seeks to rearticulate in a number of critical ways. Specifically, he seeks to articulate in Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern not in terms of being-itself, but in terms of what he describes as “a phenomenology, albeit of a post-Husserlian, radical, or deconstructive variety” (2011c, 1), a “heretical and hauntological quasi-phenomenology” (7). Caputo’s is a deconstructive phenomenology that aims to “make room for the open-ended unpredictability [of] something deeply aleatory and non-programmable that keeps the future open” (2005, 4).

Caputo’s emphasis on the aleatory nature of this phenomenological structure marks the point where he is both nearest and farthest from Tillich. Caputo aims at the aleatory and non-programmable futurity described in his phenomenological approach with the notion of “the event,” which he develops from the thought of both Derrida and Deleuze. He writes that “the event is an event of desire, not the determinate and determinable desires that I can pick out and identify...but what is going on in that desire, which I designate by speaking of a desire beyond desire” (2011c, 9). The echoes of Tillich in this formulation are both clearly discernible and explicit on his thought. Caputo tells us in The Weakness of God that it is the event which “concerns us ultimately” (2006, 294). His aleatory “desire beyond desire” is the correlate of ultimate concern, rendering all determinate desires merely “preliminary” in Tillich’s sense of the term. The event is that which is unconditioned insofar as it is “undeconstructible” (340n24).

But if Caputo is explicit in acknowledging his proximity to Tillich, he is equally clear concerning his distance. Tillich’s overall thought ultimately remains, in Caputo’s estimation, “too centered on an underlying logos” which preserves a “profound equilibrium” (2005, 4) only at the cost of the aleatory futurity of the event. He therefore seeks to de-couple the “existential” aspect of Tillich’s thought from the ontological anchoring Tillich provides for it, joining with other “postmodern” thinkers (e.g., Winquist) in registering a suspicion of Tillich’s appeal to being, non-being, and his insistence on the non-symbolic nature of the definition of God as “being-itself” (1). While he applauds Tillich’s incorporation of a Schellingian notion of Ungrund into his theological proposal, Caputo remains critical of what he sees as Tillich’s refusal to give this notion of Ungrund a freer reign in his thought (4). As he puts it, “for the Ungrund to have any teeth in it, it would mean an indeterminacy, unregulability, unpredictability, unprogrammability inscribed in the [‘]things themselves[’]” (the latter
phrase bringing us back to the phenomenological dimension of Caputo’s theopoetic proposal) (4). He finds in Tillich’s insistence on the non-symbolic nature of the proposition that God is being-itself an attempt to regulate the Ungrund that inhabits his formulation (cf. 1). Or, stating the issue in terms of Caputo’s proposal, Tillich ultimate seeks to regulate, and so to foreclose upon, the aleatory futurity of the event.

If Ward and Milbank hold Tillich in contempt for evacuating faith of identifiable Christian content (a charge which I think is unfair), Caputo is critical of Tillich for settling for faith in an ultimate concern that remains all too determinate. As he sums up the issue: “I am spicing up Tillich with a little dash of deconstruction: in the desire for God, for the unconditional event, there is no identifiable ultimate concern, for that identification would immediately turn the gold of ultimacy into the lead of something proximate, thereby locking the even inside a name and confining the unconditional to something conditioned” (2006, 340n24).

**Evaluating the Legacies**

I conclude by suggesting, very briefly, that Caputo’s legacy ultimately holds more promise than that of Radical Orthodoxy. Simply stated, Radical Orthodoxy is, despite all of its protestations to the contrary, reactive, nostalgic, and dualistic. Indeed, there is something positively Shakespearean about the repeated radically-orthodox insistence that it does not represent a form of premodern or medieval nostalgia (Radical Orthodoxy doth protest too much...). In my view, the deal is sealed by the heresiological structure of radically-orthodox thought, outlined above. As I have already noted, the entire radically-orthodox theological edifice (and I have in mind both Ward and Milbank) is structured around the argument that acids of heresy have slowly been eating away at the church and its theology since the late medieval period, and that now, in the present, nihilistic moment, this has come clearly into view. While there are certainly some novel, constructive, and even positive elements of radically-orthodox thought, I remain unconvinced by arguments that the overall narrative advance in Radical Orthodoxy represents more than a call for a return to an earlier time, a call to “reset the clock” on Western culture. I don’t know how else to read Milbank’s insistence, to give one example, that his positively utopian account of life in medieval Christendom is, in his words, “presented as a debatable account of actual real history” (2006, XXI) or Ward’s insistence that the relation between God and society is irredudibly “theocratic” or “aristocratic” (2009, 299).

By way of contrast, Caputo’s theopoetics, his “weak theology,” holds greater promise. He contrasts his position with more apologetic approaches to postmodern theology, suggesting that determinate religious traditions are the “multiple horizons” (2011c, 2) which “nominate and actualize” (3) the phenomenological structure. For him, each such tradition has its own vitality, and therefore its own “truth,” but no tradition can be final, ultimate, or claim to be the “Truth” (with a capital “T”) insofar as each tradition represents a conditioned response to the unconditioned aleatory future that, while sustaining it, also threatens it, opening its own contingency. Caputo therefore advocates what he calls a “hermeneutics of universality” (4) attending to that aleatory phenomenological structure that exceeds (but does not simply abstract from, as his critics suppose) the limits imposed by any concrete historical form.

The promise—and the threat—of Caputo’s approach, then, is that it resolutely looks forward into an open future, whereas Ward and Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy looks back nostalgically to a past that never was. Or stated in what I think are more phenomenological terms, while Caputo’s thought opens onto a true future, the eschatological future to which Ward and Milbank gesture is merely a repetition (albeit intensified to “infinity”) of an idealized past.

**References**


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death of God theologians—Paul Tillich has the most enduring and significant impact on Daly.¹ As a “Pirate” and “Alchemist,” Daly gives these figures some credit but acknowledges that she often appropriates and mis-appropriates their ideas for her own playful usage. A “Call to Piracy” for Daly is to poach and “accumulate” such intellectual “treasures of knowledge that had been hidden from my Tribe.” Although Daly simultaneously exhibits a disdain and respect for Tillich, she engages no other thinker so directly throughout her writing. She refers to Tillich in both Outercourse and Quintessence as a thinker “used” as a “spring-board.”² In doing so, Laurel Schneider suggests, Daly has initiated “a profound and invaluable critique of the limitations and distor-

¹ While I realize that a term like “postmodern theology” is deserving of further elaboration, space simply does not permit us to address the issue here. For the time being, we might define delimit “postmodern” theology as including those forms of theology which articulate their theological proposals in opposition to “ontotheology.” This working definition is particularly appropriate for discussing Tillich in relation to postmodern theology, insofar as the concern of “postmodern” theological has been whether or not, or the degree to which, Tillich’s thought remains beholden to ontotheology. As examples of this concern at work, compare Charles Winquist’s statement that “Tillich is not a postmodern theologian. He clearly works within the ontotheological tradition” (Winquist 62) with John Thatamanil’s defense of a non-ontotheological interpretation of Tillich’s notion of “being-itself” (Thatamanil 293ff.)


Mary Daly and the Patriarch with Good Ideas

Christopher D. Rodkey

Feminist philosopher and theologian Mary Daly describes her overarching theological methodology—despite her disdain for methodologies as “methdologicide”—as “Piracy.” Among all of those influential on her thought—Aquinas, Jacques Maritain, Simone de Beauvoir, Nelle Morton, Susan Griffin, Matilda Joslyn Gage, Nietzsche, and the
tions embedded in his thinking.” While teaching at the now-defunct Cardinal Cushing College in Brookline, Massachusetts, Daly audited courses with Paul Tillich at Harvard Divinity School. She writes of this experience: “I sat at the back of the Sperry Room where Tillich lectured. He had a powerful charisma but there was something about it that I did not like…. But it was important that I saw and heard Tillich in person—that my knowledge was not confined to his books.” Daly would write further that she felt Tillich’s “ghost” later when she herself would return to Harvard to lecture in the same room. Even though, as Daly admits in *Pure Lust* years later, Tillich’s “vast scope and vigor of his thought….[i]s worth studying and criticizing by those who would embark upon the adventure of discovering Elemental philosophy,” Tillich is not to be altogether trusted; instead, his ideas should only be used “as springboards for our own original analysis.” She adds in a 1972 article that “Tillich’s insights…are very helpful” for the cause of women’s liberation, and thus “[h]is work provides a theoretical groundwork “which can be extended and applied.”

Daly’s most important and central criticism of Tillich is that his systematic understanding of the power of being for self-transcendence is not radical enough. Once one transcends oneself in Tillich’s theology, Daly suggests in *Gyn/Ecology*, “[t]here is no reason to change and no possibility of changing, only of wallowing.” Self-transcendence must be perpetually unfolding and truly radical for it to be “self-affirming” in the way that Tillich believes that it is. While this is not necessarily how Tillich presents the nature of the power of being in his theology, Daly sees the centrality of Christology and Tillich’s own personal life as examples of a life erroneously self-affirmed. Regarding Tillich’s sexual addictions, Daly suggests Paul Tillich exhibited the kind of “religious doublethink” of “mythic/ theological self-deception” that manifests itself, reverses itself, as “self-acceptance.” She adds, such “sado-masochistic” reversals “are the juice/sap of his impressive theologizing.”

While Daly writes in *Gyn/Ecology* that Tillich “deceives us with statements that are both true and untrue at the same time,” she refers to him in her earlier writing, in *The Church and the Second Sex*, as a “prophetic figure.” In Daly’s later work, Tillich’s influence has—intriguingly—become even more apparent, though he is discussed and credited far less. Wanda Berry suggests that Tillich’s influence is not only a formal influence upon Daly’s writing, but that Tillich’s influence “was both conscious and unconscious.”

**Tillichian Symbology**

The two scholars who have written the most about the intellectual relationships between Tillich and Daly are Laurel Schneider and Mary Ann Stenger. I will summarize their arguments, but they both point primarily toward the same salient notion: Tillich’s notion of the religious symbol undergirds the whole of Daly’s work in the same way that the idea operates within Tillich’s theological system. To review, for Tillich the religious symbol is rooted in the ultimate and points toward being-itself inasmuch as it participates in *esse-ipsaum*.

Mary Ann Stenger was the first to investigate Tillich’s influence upon Daly, writing the first such article in *Encounter* in 1982, well before Daly’s ideas become more developed in *Pure Lust* and later writings. According to Stenger, Daly pirates Tillich’s theology of culture. The correlative function of a Tillichian theology of culture shifts away from Tillich’s choice of culture—art, architecture, politics—and directly shifts toward women’s experience of patriarchy. As such, Stenger suggests, Daly’s theology is formally Tillichian, complete with nearly-matching concepts. Instead of kairos as “a fulfilled and creative movement of time and time of decision,” for Daly a kairos is collapsed into her appropriated notion of an Eternal Now. For Daly, “Now is a kairos,” despite the fact that Daly would never use such blatantly Christian terminology.

Laurel Schneider rejects Stenger’s argument that Daly has merely appropriated or, to use Stenger’s term, simply “reinterpreted,” Tillich’s method of correlation. In fact, Schneider suggests that Daly’s apprehension of methodology as “methodolatry” or “methodicide” is closely connected to Tillich’s own obsession with theological method. Instead, for Daly the methodology is a “movement” from one New Creation or Spiraling Galaxy to another. Schneider points toward a short phrase found early in *Beyond God the Father* that calls this movement methodology as a “method of liberation.” Recalling that Daly’s charge that Tillich’s notion of self-transcendence as self-affirmation is not radical enough, or that a correlative methodology must be radical, Schneider suggests that the two do have some methodological solidarity. She writes:
Tillich sees an anthropocentric ‘New Being,’ Daly a biophilic cosmic one, but both see of a culture a source and resource for revelation. What is revealed turns out to be rather different, depending on whether the presupposition is christocentric or biophilic-feminist….I suggest that neither truly starts with analysis of culture and ends with theological answers. Both have answers in mind when they ask the question, and both presuppose a path of hope for those who perceive the anxieties/oppressors of contemporary life, namely systematic New being/elemental Metab-ing.”

Even though Daly is by most definitions a theologian, she usually refers to herself as a philosopher. Her autobiographical Outercourse constantly refers to her Journey as one closed off to a formal education in Western philosophy, so that she inevitably sees herself as a philosopher. 

According to Daly, Tillich’s insight is precisely the point that he missed, namely, that philosophy and theology, as the “handmaiden,” in its traditional conception, resembles many of the same qualities of a “typical patriarchal marriage, in which the unruly wife/subordinate has a disconcerting ability to disobey and run away.”

For Tillich, “religious symbols are double-edged,” and are always inadequate, but are nonetheless sometimes helpful, and more often are rooted in non-being than in being. Daly writes in Pure Lust, referring to Tillich’s discussion of symbols in the first volume of the Systematic Theology: “Symbols…participate in that to which they point. They open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and they unlock dimensions and elements of our souls that correspond to these hidden dimensions and elements of reality. As Tillich pointed out, they cannot be artificially produced, but rather grow out of the unconscious.”

The problem with Tillich, from Daly’s perspective, is that while Tillich would acknowledge that patriarchal symbols are not literal expressions of God and are in fact part of the symbols’ inadequacies, he “stops short of offering a critique of the appropriateness of kinghood as a symbol for God,” even if his line of thinking directly points toward identifying the tremendous problems which supersede out of such symbols. As Susann Pangerl states, “Tillich’s ontological analysis falls short” in connecting “sexism, and its concrete manifestations...
for interpersonal relationships and for the individual psyche,” as well as long-term effects of gendered religious symbols; these issues “remained outside his scope of inquiry.”

While Daly might agree with Tillich’s assessment of how symbols work, again, Daly charges that Tillich does not go far enough with his own thinking or even follow his ideas to their conclusions. Tillich’s understanding of symbols is that when they point toward what he believes to be being-itself, esse-ipseum, symbols cannot be all bad, even if they are dangerous, such as a regal symbol for God. He assumes that there is an undergirding telos of symbols aligned with esse-ipseum, a group of “fixed and limited” that appears as a “set” to Tillich. These symbols “are understood to represent eternal truths; the truth value of the theological symbols looks backward toward history and tradition” rather than “an evolving sense of truth as something not yet having been.” For Daly, esse-ipseum is “detached” and “abstract”: a static symbology that points toward a necrophilial reality. Daly instead suggests a shift toward a Verbal esse, rather than a nominative esse-ipseum, which is “the Verb”: The Verb of Verbs in her classic book, Beyond God the Father.

**Courage, Quintessence, and Ontological Intuition**

Perhaps the most obvious act of Piracy enacted by Daly on Tillich’s thought is her poaching/Pirating of his notion of existential courage. Just as Daly criticized Tillich on other elements of his theology, she charges once again that Tillich did not go far enough in his understanding of courage. More specifically, the patriarchal impulse unconsciously at work in Tillich’s thought as a Christian theologian prevented him from taking his good ideas to their logical ends. Daly writes in *Outercourse*: “The idea of existential courage was initially inspired by Paul Tillich’s book, *The Courage to Be*. However...I took it into another context, that is, the context of the omnipresent sexual caste system of patriarchy, and applied it to the struggle to see through the basic/base assumptions of sexual hierarchy in theology and in popular culture. So the concept of existential courage was radically transformed. Tillich became the target of my criticism for encouraging detachment from the reality of the struggle against oppression in concrete manifestations.”

In *Pure Lust*, Daly calls this detached courage “potted courage,” as static and ultimately hegemonic, as not perpetually becoming. This potted courage can be present in Christian, non-Christian, or atheistic philosophical or theological settings. She explains, using Tillich as an example:

Theologian Paul Tillich...maintains that ‘the courage to be’ transcends the fortitude that is concerned only with specific fears, and that it confronts existential anxiety of nonbeing. However, patriarchal theological/philosophical analysis of anxiety has no way to Name adequately the specific structures of ‘nonbeing’—mythic, ideological, or societal. It therefore cannot fully Name the way past these, which is the Elemental Realizing of participation in Metambeing. In other words, patriarchally named existential courage is described as ‘affirming being over against nonbeing,’ and this is all it can do. It can only affirm one reified opposite over against another, but it cannot re-member the metapatriarchal Elemental intuition of be-ing. Thus, the nebulous nothingness called “nonbeing” looms larger than life.

For Daly, then, Tillichian courage is an authentic ontological courage, but it does not open the means for a truly dynamic self-transcending reality; instead it points toward a more singular self-transcendence. As such, Tillich’s conception of courage rejects the dynamism that is potent in the local “I.” To have the “Courage to See,” she writes, is a situation where the self recognizes “the unseeing—indeed eyeless—existential courage of Tillich [to be] I-less for women.”

Daly’s Elemental Courage is ontological and Elemental; it requires subversive transgression and the ability to accept and love oneself. It requires an acknowledgement of différance by virtue of the rootedness of Courage in Metambeing. It is also connected to the *vita-ipseum*, the life-itslf that is Elemental, because we have an “intuition of be-ing.”

Daly names several different kinds of ontological, Elemental courage, and defines them in the *Wickedary*: Ontological Courage, Outrageous Courage, the Courage to Leave, Courage to Live, Courage to See, and the Courage to Sin. The Courage to Sin is later called “The Courage to Sin Originally,” “The Courage to Sin/Spin,” and finally the “Courage to Sin Big.” She elsewhere also mentions the Courage to Be, to Grieve, to Rage, to Laugh out Loud, and to Create. In all of these different kinds of ontological/Elemental Courage, the courageousness is always subversive as “Outrageous Courage,” which risks the charge of “tastelessness” but moves toward “reversing the reigning reversals” of patriar-
The false empowerment offered by patriarchal sado-spirituality is called *dis-couraging*.

The emotion (“E-motion”) of Rage is often essential for the *Motion* required for Elemental Courage. Rage is not negative but it is the *praxis* of Courage. Rage is “not something to be gotten over,” Daly writes, “[i]t is a transformative, focusing Force.” Rage is creative: “As the ocean roars its rhythms into every creature, giving birth to sensations of our common Sources/Courses, Rage too, makes senses come alive again, thrive again….The sounds of its pounding awaken transcendent Force.”

Debra Campbell writes that for Daly “[e]ven if Ontological Courage sounds like an abstraction, there is nothing abstract about *living a life* grounded in Ontological Courage.” It is an acknowledgement that we live life as a life among other Elements, including others, animals, plants, and the earth.

To this end, Daly’s notion of the Courage to Sin is of some particular significance as the courage to live life. Early in *Pure Lust* the Courage to Sin is directly connected to the process of self-transcendence, of “Realizing be-ing.” Later, she explains that women throughout history have been emphatically “WRONG according to prevailing assumptions” of the patriarchy “may be said to Sin.” Since the word *sin* is probably etymologically akin to the Latin *est*, meaning *(s)he is*, and that it is derived from the Indo-European root *es-, meaning to be,* then Courage, that is, “our courage to be,” must imply “the courage to be WRONG.” In other words, “Elemental be-ing is Sinning; it requires the Courage to Sin.” She explains further:

To Sin against the society of sado-sublimation is to be intellectual in the most direct and daring way, claiming and trusting the deep correspondence between the structures/processes of one’s own mind and the structures/processes of reality. To Sin is to trust intuitions and the reasoning rooted in them. To Sin is to come into the fullness of our powers, confronting now newly understood dimensions of the Battles of Principalities and Powers.

The Courage to Sin is to revolt and reverse patriarchal pseudo-realities and to construct new ones. It “trusts the deep correspondence between the structures” and “processes of one’s own mind and the structures” and “processes of reality”: understanding the *différance* between *vitae-ipsum* and my own constructions and creations of reality. Ultimately, to Sin is to Re-member to Live and love Life. It is to find meaning and value in life-itself; and to do this will always be a *subversive* activity, especially in a death-loving patriarchal society.

While Daly would probably see herself on this point at her furthest distance from Tillich, while still using his Pirated ideas, the connection to sin and Sin reflects a very Tillichian anthropology. If we recall Tillich’s sermon, “The Good I Will, I Do Not,” Tillich memorably speaks of Sin—Sin in the singular with a capital “S”—Sin as a power controlling world and mind, persons and nations.” First, it is interesting that Tillich shifts to a capitalized use of the word *Sin* here, Spelling perhaps without realizing the gravity with which a future interpreter such as Daly might methodologically associate such a shift. Secondly, ironically, staying true to Protestant theological anthropology, to accept one’s own life as perpetually full of sin and grappling with Sin is a liberated, Christian life for Tillich. It is the means by which one “finds the courage to believe in a total acceptance of themselves,” to love themselves.

A Dalyan reading of Tillich here suggests that Tillich in his sermon is partially unaware of just how his words expose deeper truths than he already intended. Clearly, for Tillich, we live in a sinful state. Daly would suggest that we do not live in a sinful (or “sin-fool”) state, but rather that we *should* live in a Sinful (Sin-full) state, that being Sinful is not a passive way of being-in-the-word. The small-letter-s sinful state is one imposed by a patriarchal religious system that defines sin with what its typically necrophilial agendas and is not biophilic. Small-s sin is something to be avoided, in as much as it is unavoidable; it apprehends self-transcendence unless, according to Tillich, it is simply recognized and accepted. For Daly, to acknowledge is not enough, and to genuinely Name sin would be to reverse it. “Sinful Courage,” she writes, “is furthered by the Pyrogenetic Power of Naming, which itself is an expression of the Volcanic Virtue of Courage.”

Sinful Courage, then, as an *active* activity (rather than *passive*) *requires* one to have the Courage to Create. The phrase “Courage to Create” is taken
from Tillich’s friend, Rollo May, who, in a book titled *The Courage to Create* poses human creativity as something that “provokes the jealously of the gods.” Calling such thinking laughable, Daly suggests that Godly jealousy has its origins in men’s deficiency to give birth themselves. The “Leaping/Expanding” of self-transcendence, Daly writes, “requires Ontological Courage, which manifests itself as the Courage to Create—to summon out of the apparent void New Be-ing,” to “push back the foreground, the nonbeing pompously parading as Be-ing.” This Spinning and Weaving subversively against the *nothing* of patriarchy sees this nothingness as a new *creatio ex nihilo*—Courageously Creating out of the *nothing*.

In an earlier work, she calls this Courageous Creativity “ontological becoming,” which has “itself an alchemistic power” as “revolutionary and revelatory, revealing our participation in an ultimate reality as Verb, as intransitive Verb.” In her middle work, she calls the practice of living Courageously “Elemental Ontology” or even “Pyro-ontology.” In her later writings, the state of living Courageousness is called “Quintessence,” which is living with “specific emphasis” on manifesting oneself as “a source of integrity, harmony, and luminous splendor of form.” It is to render oneself a “Goddess,” Courageously Creating and Spinning new realities and in the process being in touch with one’s own spirit, becoming “more than ever like trees and angels,” that is to say, “[e]xtending our roots deeper, we are free to expand and participate in the universe.”

*Quintessence* is active, Raging, be-ing, but it is rooted in the *ontological intuition* potently intuitive in women. It is natural and self-affirming. Latent ontological intuition is at once the courage to love oneself and the courage to self-transcend, the courage for a woman to “Discover Faith in herSelf” and Act by “Seeing and Breaking Out of bondage.” This is a “Spiraling process,” with both of these elements connected and always leading to a new awareness. Ontological intuition transgresses against any notion of a “Supreme Being” that “just hangs ‘up there.’” The *Shock of be-ing*, then, is a genuine shock of the ultimacy in the Now, in the clover just saying “I am.” Ontological intuition “Unblocks/Shocks” the “Blocks” of patriarchy, opening oneself to “the way for infinite possibilities.”

It is to this end that there are various expressions of this Quintessence punning on the Verb and the actions often associated with the Verb: Be-Dazzling, Be-Falling, Be-Friending, Be-Laughing, Be-Longing, Be-Monstering, Be-Musing, Be-Shrewing, Be-Speaking, Be-Spelling, Be-Thinking, Be-Tiding, Be-Wildering, Be-Wishing, and Be-Witching. Daly defines Be-Speaking as “Naming our interconnectedness.” Be-Laughing, for example, is defined by Daly as a “Primal Act of Power.” Furthermore: It is breaking the Taboo against Elemental humor, which splits/cracks man-made “reality,” unveiling man’s mysteries. Be-Laughing is not mere reacting to patriarchy’s horrors. It is an activity that carries laughter in the Background.

As Self-conscious Seers, Be-Laughing women are engaged in the Metamysterious work of Metafooling… In short, Metafooling is Outrageous Contagious Departure from phallic fixations. It consists of riotous transformations. Clearly, Be-Laughing is to have and act with a Courageous, subversive, humor about life.

These words, prefixed by *Be-* are for ontological/Elemental Spells. They “Name the interconnectedness which involves Transtemporal/Trans-spatial Consciousness, Communication, Sisterhood, Synchronicities, [and] Travels,” Daly writes, “[i]n other words, they signify active participation in the Harmony of the Universe.” They describe the complexity and simplicity (the is-ing, the be-ing) of living in Quintessence. Sometimes this is lived in solitude but more often and preferably “in community with others.”

In shifting away from God-language to Verb-talk, Daly has also shifted the tensions between transcendence and immanence latent in Tillichian thought to be less about the nature of the universe but toward the nature of our perceptions about the universe. Daly criticizes Marilyn Frye and Sarah Hoagland who write that this shift no longer defines “‘transcendent’ in the old sense of ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the world of our lives, but transcendent in a new sense—a way of be-ing that we participate in that is completely transformative.” After the Death of Daddytom, living in the time after the death of God, where the patriarchy has begun to be silenced, a Copernican shift is emerging toward the authentic, ontological/Elemental Creation and Naming latent in the Selves of the oppressed. The shift is onto what she called in an 1969 essay to live in “[t]he faith…of ultimate concern,” a *religion of the concrete spirit* where women may *live* more genuinely. To do so requires radical feminism to have the Courage to Leave, and to Courageously Live, in some respects, as an “exodus community.”
A truly biophilic spirituality truly loves life as the highest value, subversively “living the process of transvaluing values” as a “revolutionary” being-in-the-world. In doing so, Daly, as Anne-Marie Korte writes, “sings and associates, speaks in different voices, places herself outside any system, shows anger, pleasure, and analytical depth, draws on and cites Western theology, philosophy, and mythology as well as contemporary culture; in so doing, she spins and weaves new tapestries of meaning.”

Shifting away from Tillich’s method of correlation to Spinning a Piracy of voices, sources, and ideas, Daly has Alchemically Conjured a new philosophy through her linguistic Spellings. This radical shift, however, subversively begins in Tillich’s thought. Instead of rearranging and realigning Christian theology, as Tillich did with his method of correlation, Daly’s Piracy not only “recalibrates” a new theology or philosophy but also offers an apocalyptic vision of “a new configuration of society itself.” Although Daly ultimately rejects Tillich as a “phallocratic…springboard,” clearly, for Daly, as Laurel Schneider puts it, “Tillich opens the door” for a radical feminist spirituality, and “Daly takes the lead.”

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4 Daly, Outercourse, 54, 148.

5 Ibid., Pure Lust, 29n.


7 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time (New York: Stein, 1973) 241; Daly, Gyn/Ecology, 378.

8 Daly, Gyn/Ecology, 1991 ed. (Aylesburg, England: Women’s, 1991), 94-95. It is also worth mentioning that Daly has a clear respect for Hannah Tillich and her cour-

age to write about her own experiences after Paul Tillich’s death—Daly quotes Hannah Tillich several times and uses Rollo May’s smear campaign to prevent her from publishing her books as crucial examples of patriarchal power attempting to silence women (Daly, Outercourse, 101; Gyn/Ecology, 435-436 n. 40, 442 n. 1; Mary Daly and Jane Caputi, Webster’s First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language [Boston, Beacon, 1987], 189-190; cf. Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology [London: Routledge, 2000] 88; Rachel Baard, “Original Grace, Not Destructive Grace,” Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society 30.4 [2004] 8).

9 Daly, Gyn/Ecology, 46; ibid., Church and the Second Sex, 185.


13 Stenger, 223, 224.

14 Ibid., 179.

15 Schneider (2000), 59; Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father (Boston: Beacon, 1973), 8.

16 Schneider (2000), 59-60.


18 Daly and Caputi, Wickedary, 67.

19 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1951), 173, quoted in Daly, Pure Lust, 156, emphasis Daly.

20 Daly, Pure Lust, 156 n., 157.


22 Daly, Pure Lust, 25. It is worth noting that in this discussion that Daly references from the first Systematic Theology, where Tillich writes that “[i]f a segment of reality is used as a symbol for God, the realm of reality from which it is taken is, so to speak, elevated into the realm of the holy. It no longer is secular. It is theonomous. If God is called the “king,” something is said not only about God but also about the holy character of kingship…. Therefore, it is not surprising that in a secular culture both the symbols for God and the theonomous character of the material from which the symbols are taken disappear” (Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1.241).
25 Daly, *Beyond God the Father*, 7.
26 Pangerl, 193.
27 Schneider (2000), 60.
29 Ibid., *Pure Lust*, 223.
30 Schneider (2000), 64.
31 Daly, *Pure Lust*, 223.
33 Daly and Caputi, *Wickedary*, 69–70.
34 Daly, *Outercourse*, 198; ibid., *Pure Lust*, 223.
35 Daly and Caputi, *Wickedary*, 284; Daly, *Quintessence*, 88.
36 Daly, *Pure Lust*, 280.
42 Daly, *Pure Lust*, 31, 151, 152, 223.
43 Schneider (2000), 64.
44 See, for example, Christopher Rodkey, *In the Horizon of the Infinite* (Ph.D. diss., Drew U., 2008), 210–215.
45 Daly, *Pure Lust*, 284.
46 Rollo May, quoted in Daly, *Quintessence*, 90.
47 Daly, *Quintessence*, 91, 89, 90.
50 Ibid., *Quintessence*, 230.
53 Daly, *Amazon Grace*, 50.
54 Daly and Caputi, *Wickedary*, 263.
55 Ibid., *Amazon Grace*, 13.
60 Mary Daly, “A Short Essay on Hearing and on the Qualitative Leap of Radical Feminism,” *Horizons* 2 (1975), 121, 123; ibid., “The Spiritual Revolution” (1972), 170.
65 Daly, *Quintessence*, 90; Schneider (2000) 61.
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