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**Annual Meeting**

Please mark your calendars for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society. The meeting will be held on Friday, October 29, and Saturday, October 30, 2010 in Atlanta, Georgia. The American Academy of Religion and the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group” meets October 30 to November 2.

The annual banquet of the NAPTS will take place on Friday, October 29, at Pittypat’s Porch Restaurant, 25 Andrew Young International Boulevard. 404.525.8228. The restaurant is located on Andrew Young International Blvd. between Peachtree Street and Spring Street, within easy walking distance from the convention hotels. It is also a block from the Peachtree Center Station of MARTA, the Atlanta subway line.

The distinguished speaker this year will be A. Durwood Foster. More information and reservations will be available in the fall issue of the Bulletin.

For registration, please contact the AAR website:
http://www.aarweb.org/Meetings/Annual_Meeting/Current_Meeting/default.asp

Housing information is available after registering for the meeting.

**Letters to the Editor**

Dear Fred,

Thanks so much again for the current bulletin. The mellow reminiscences of Ray Bulman are particularly enjoyable. Your service in editing our organ of mutuality continues, I am sure, to be greatly appreciated by the readership. May I voice additionally a concern triggered by Carl-Eric Gentes’s valuable comparison of Tillich and Michel de Certeau. I had just been reading Martin Leiner’s chapter (“Tillich on God”) in the noteworthy Cambridge Companion to Tillich edited last year by Russell Manning.
Both Leiner and Gentes assert unqualifiedly that Tillich holds the only non-symbolic statement we can make about God is that God is being-itself (Cf. Leiner, op. cit., p. 50). They both are apparently oblivious to the argument in ST II that the only such statement is “everything we say about God is symbolic” (ST II, 9). After stressing this very deliberately, Tillich goes on to say explicitly (p. 10) that being-itself is not a completely non-symbolic statement about God. I have the impression a rather grave misrepresentation of Paulus may have been spawned—I run into it frequently in the oral tradition—and it needs rigorous correcting.

Most of us know of Tillich’s encounter in the 1930s with W. M. Urban, from whom our mentor accepted the critique that his tendency to represent all God-talk as symbolic crucially lacked a linchpin with the universal human quest for truth. After the exchange with Urban, Tillich settled upon being-itself as offering the requisite conceptual link. He held to this, under fire from John Herman Randall, Jr. and others, for a long time. But then, mirabile dictu, in 1957, in the “new introduction” he crafted for the second volume of his magnum opus, Paulus came forth with what I have cited above. To be sure, it was controversial, especially to those who could not imagine Paulus ever changing his mind about structural pilings of the system. But Tillich did sometimes change his mind, and this matter of the sole non-symbolic utterance was very important to him. I feel strongly we need to protect here the purity of the master’s voice.

Durwood Foster
Ashland, Oregon

Therefore, I propose to attempt the following in this article: I will reference Mark C. Taylor’s typology of religion in relation to Paul Tillich’s theology. Taylor, who draws upon Tillich to develop two polar opposite types of religion, ends up classifying Tillich as one of those two, namely, as a monist. While granting that Tillich at some points does adopt positions consistent with monism, I will argue that overall he falls into another category. That category would be Taylor’s tertium quid, his favored type of religion, namely, that of complexity. I will claim that panentheism, with which Tillich is rightly identified but which Taylor ignores, represents an ideal model for complexity. Furthermore, I will argue that Taylor, in his dialectical model of complexity, wrongly favors the “de-stabilizing” element over the “structuring” element, or in Tillich’s terminology, the element of dynamics over that of form. By contrast, Tillich finds a better mix, as he gives the element of structure or form its proper due.

As suggested just above, Taylor offers an interesting three-pronged typology of religions, referencing a Tillichian typology from “Two Types of Philosophy of Religion.” These two types proffer contrasting schemas of the divine in relation to human-kind and the world. The “cosmological” type pictures God as a being distinct and separate from the world, known only through God’s effects on the world. Tillich would agree with Taylor that this model is dualistic, or at least tends towards dualism. On the other hand, the “ontological” type posits some identity or unity between humans and the divine, despite estrangement, and some human awareness of this identity, though not necessarily or even usually a self-conscious awareness capable of verbalization. Associating this ontological approach with the “monistic type of religion,” Taylor judges that Tillich’s own theology falls under such a type (2007:35-37). This monistic scheme includes a prismatic unity whereby difference is unreal, the unfolding of time is pre-programmed, and redemption is already actual (2007:37-39).

Prior to implicating Tillich, Taylor invokes from The Varieties of Religious Experience William James’ typology of the “once-born,” healthy-minded religious individual, versus the “sick soul,” who hopefully overcomes this sickness by becoming “twice-born” (2007:33-34). Taylor in general associates the once-born with the monistic type of religion and the sick soul with the dualistic (2007:37). I will mark that I believe Taylor here misses the nuanced complexity of a very fecund thinker, even as

**Tillich’s “God above God” after Mark Taylor’s After God**

**David Nikkel**

In his book *After God*, Mark C. Taylor has continued to move beyond his deconstructive phase with a creative theological and metaphysical effort centering on complex systems. While judging that traditional concepts of God no longer speak to our age, Taylor does find a central place for divinity or the divine in our complex world. While greatly appreciating Taylor’s contribution, I believe that a more traditional understanding of God or the divine is quite compatible with the emerging picture of our universe as constituted by the interactions of dynamic, complex systems.

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he will with Tillich. To be sure, Taylor can claim support for his interpretation in that James describes healthy-minded religion as entailing a sense of “union with the divine” (2007:33; James, 1902:79) and then cites Romantic-influenced thought emphasizing such union—liberal Protestantism, Emersonian transcendentalism, and Walt Whitman (2007:34; James, 1902:81-91). Taylor could also have cited—though he does not—the movement that occupies the bulk of James’ chapter on healthy-mindedness—the “mind-cure” or positive thought movement (1902:94-126), insofar as mind-cure’s notion of our kinship with divine Spirit represents a “decidedly pantheistic” element (1902:100-101). However, James’ assertion that all religion involves belief in the affinity, “continuity,” or “coterminousness” of our better human natures with the divine complicates things (1902:508). Further complications arise from James’ contrast of philosophical theism, which tends towards pantheism and monism, with popular theism, which is “pluralistic”—and from James’ placement of healthy-minded religion on the “pluralistic” rather than monistic side (1902:131-135). James indicates that healthy-mindedness does not brook the notion of evil as finally rational, to be justified and preserved, but rather minimizes it as something to negate, to defeat (1902:132-133). For James, the practical impulse to ignore, conquer, or overcome evil constitutes a key component of (most) healthy-minded religion; mind-cure in particular accomplishes this through the power of positive thinking (1902:88ff). Monism, by contrast, James avers, “maximize(es) evil,” “based on the persuasion that the evil aspects of our life are of its very essence” (1902:130-131). James then elaborates upon the sick soul in terms of psychological and existential grappling with the evils of life (1902:134-162). This suggests to me that James’ distinction between healthy-minded and sick souls hinges upon the extent and depth of perceived evil in the world; it does not map neatly onto the categories of monism and dualism and their opposing models of the divine in relation to the world.

Indeed, dualistic religion in Taylor’s sense of a “transcendent” and (largely) “absent” God coupled with an essentially evil world barely makes an appearance in Varieties.1 Instead the God of popular religion provides the foil for the monistic God, whom James regards as ultimately causing, and being responsible for, all that transpires in the universe. Yet this “popular” or “practical” God is quite immanent in its own way. This God, the “supreme” (1902:131) but not sole power, takes particular actions that make a positive difference in the world (1902:520-524). Though James refers to his own understanding of God as “crass” or “piecemeal supernaturalism” (1902:520), he actually rejects the notion that the divine acts on or from a truly supernatural plane. Rather James invokes the subliminal or subconscious as the site where the divine impacts our world, as he essays to render divine causality and providence consonant with modern science (1902:523-524).

Moreover, James blurs the distinction between pluralistic, popular religion and monism by allowing a strong “pantheistic” element in popular theism. In Varieties, James judges that the world “may be so complex as to consist of many interpenetrating spheres of reality” (1902:122), may consist of a “collection” of realities “of different degrees of inclusiveness” (1902:525). A Pluralistic Universe admits of organic envelopment or encompassment of realities by ever more-inclusive realities. Indeed, “God….may conceivably have almost nothing outside of himself” (1909:125, emphasis James’; see also 312). Yet James insists that something must remain external to God—if only “metaphysical necessity” (1909:294), lest God be responsible for evil (1909:124, 310-311). In fact, James evinces his preference for such an inclusive God—thus not allowing his “pluralism” to get out of hand (1909:152ff, 292-295). The monism James could not brook was a “thoroughgoing” one (1909:110) that made evil essential, necessary, rational—a view of evil James finds paradoxical and irrational (1902:131-132, 1909:294, 310-312). Finally, James claims that among thoughtful religious believers, a transcendent, “external” God, who designs the world from outside à la the traditional teleological argument, is not even a live option (1902:73-74, 1909:24-30). Here we see a parallel between James and Tillich’s take on how a separated God, à la the ontological approach (which for Tillich includes teleological arguments), once dominated Western theology. That James ultimately opts for a model of God neither dualistic nor monistic suggests that Taylor’s tertium quid of complexity may have found some expression in previous thinkers—including, as we shall see, Tillich.

I do grant that some partial aspects of Tillich’s understanding of God, humanity, the world, and their interrelationships meet some of Taylor’s monistic criteria. Yet I will argue that Taylor’s categorization of Tillich’s theology misses the complexity
of Tillich’s views on the divine-world interrelationship. Again, for Taylor monism entails a primordial unity whereby difference is unreal, the unfolding of time is pre-programmed, and redemption is already actual.

Tillich’s ontological elements—of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny—are premised on a distinction (as well as correlation) between self and world/other and on temporal change of the self in relation to its world. Taylor correctly notes that Tillich posits an (element of) identity of the human person with the divine that transcends the subject-object distinction—Tillich sometimes referred to this as “the mystical a priori.” For Tillich an inalienable participation of the human in the divine does obtain despite human alienation from God. Granted, even this element of identity is problematic on postmodern grounds. However, what Taylor misses is that this identity never constitutes the whole of a person’s experience—the experience of self in correlation with the world always remains for Tillich, even in the “purest” possible mystical experience. For Tillich then there is no undifferentiated mystical experience. Even meditative mystical states involve particular mediating traditions and ways of being in the world; thus “the world,” the object side of things, is not left wholly behind, but becomes the vehicle or occasion for mystical awareness (1959:28). Indeed, Tillich criticizes the extreme mystic, who ventures to reach pure, abysmal divinity, for not “tak(ing) the concrete seriously” (1952a: 186), “impl(ying) an ultimate negation of (human) existence in space and time” (1951:140; compare Systematic Theology II, 1957:69). Likewise, “the self,” the subject side, does not lose itself in pure divinity; individualization still pertains. The human being as a whole maintains some distinction from the divine; there is never identity without remainder.

Furthermore, when it comes to eschatology, Tillich is quite clear that participation in eternal fulfillment or “redemption,” to use Taylor’s term, is hardly fully realizable or actual in this life—such fulfillment is ever fragmentary and provisional. For example, in summing up the section on “The Divine Spirit and the Ambiguities of Life” in Volume 3 of the Systematic Theology, Tillich pens the following: “In so far as it is created by the Spiritual Presence, the health of unambiguous life is reached; and although unambiguous, it is not total but fragmentary, and it is open to relapse into the ambiguities of life in all its dimensions” (280). What of the Kingdom of God “above history,” where all the positive created in history is elevated to eternity and all the negative is exposed as negative (1963:396ff), in which there is “universal fulfillment” and participation (1963:406-409)? Is the individual, after he or she has died, lost in a dazzling light where all is white? Not according to Tillich. He affirms that “there is no participation if there are no individual centers to participate,” and “therefore the centered, self-conscious self cannot be excluded from Eternal Life.” Recognizing the difficulty of speaking of that which transcends time, he adds that “the self-conscious self is not what it is in temporal life” (1963:414). Tillich also issues the caveat, “Everything said which exceeds these two negative statements is not theological conceptualization but poetic imagination” (1963:414). Though Tillich thus demurs from positive description of life beyond death, he clearly rejects the loss of individuality in an undifferentiated divine unity.

Focusing on the divine nature, Taylor on two points has more plausible grounds for accusing Tillich of monism: (1) time as the unfolding of a pre-set program, and (2) whether the otherness of the world is taken seriously—seriously enough for the world to make any difference to God. Much of Tillich’s corpus, at least at first glance, seems quite ambiguous as to whether temporality, and whether the world in its otherness and difference, mean anything to God. To borrow Charles Hartshorne’s terminology, Tillich has a hard time letting go of the divine attributes from “classical theism” of immutability, impassibility, and eternity as timelessness. Tillich was wont to write about God’s transcendence of the distinction between potentiality and actuality (1951:252, 254, 271, 273; 1964:376), about dynamics/form and freedom/destiny always in perfect balance in the divine life (1951:181, 244-247; 1963:405), about the “not yet” in God always being balanced by an “already” (1951:236) (paradoxical language not unlike Taylor’s during his deconstructive phase). What did Tillich mean by such language? While Tillich strives to be faithful to the Protestant Reformers in crediting our salvation all to God (1948:91, 1952b:175, 1955:67, 80, Systematic, 1957:79), he consistently rejects determinism whenever he directly confronts the issue (1951:184, 186; 1954:41, 43, 47; 1955:30). Indeed, twice Tillich gainsays any divine plan in which all is predetermined (1948:106-107, 1951:266). Moreover, his strongest assertion about newness in the divine life would seem to rule out foreknowledge of what humans will create, even as
Tillich wants to rule out any total surprise for God (see 1951:246-247 on the latter point):

For the divine ground of being we must say both that the created is not new, for it is potentially rooted in the ground, and that it is new, for its actuality is based on freedom in unity with destiny, and freedom is the precondition of all newness in existence. The necessarily consequent is not new; it is merely transformation of the old (1963:398).

So Tillich apparently has granted some openness in the divine life to the freedom and spontaneity of the creation. However, when Tillich addresses the classical notion of impassibility, one may wonder whether creation in its freedom has any effect on God after all. Indeed, one may wonder whether the world means anything to God. To my awareness, Tillich directly writes of God’s suffering on only two occasions (1963:51), one of which professes agnosticism as to “what divine suffering may mean” (1964:379). In addition he qualified such suffering, according to Charles Hartshorne, apparently from conversations with Tillich: “God is suffering not in his infinity, but as ground of the finite” (1952:191). He more frequently refers to divine participation in creaturely suffering or in the negativities of creaturely existence. Even here, however, he feels some need for qualification. He labeled Albert Outler’s phrase that God “participates in the agony and tragedy of human life,” as not just symbolic—as are almost all statements about God for Tillich—but as “highly symbolic” (1964:379). Finally, Tillich specifically endorses “the fundamental theological doctrine of God’s impassibility” (1963:404) and the early church’s rejection of Patripassianism, that God the Father” suffers (1951:270; 1963:404).

Is Tillich just engaging in blatant contradiction, or simply wallowing in paradox? I think not. While I cannot grant a final coherence to Tillich’s position on God’s relationship to what transpires in the world, I will claim that Tillich consistently held throughout his career a subtle, complex viewpoint. His position does assert that God’s going out from God’s self and returning to the divine self through creation of the world mean something to God, is of value for the divine life. While Tillich adopted this outlook from the time he became acquainted with Schelling’s work, it receives its clearest rendition in Volume III of his Systematic Theology:

In this view the world process means something to God. He is not a separated self-sufficient entity who, driven by a whim, creates what he wants and saves whom he wants. Rather, the eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has the freedom to reject and to accept love (422).

Apropos to this view, Tillich affirms that God takes a risk in creating the world and humankind (1954:55, 1964:378). But here is where we need to watch out for Tillich engaging in what my theological mentor warned theologians are wont to do: taking away with the left hand what they have just given you with the right. Remember that all the positive of existence is lifted up into eternal life, while the negative is purged. Let me add that the positive is synthesized with a being’s essential nature (which includes positive essential potentialities we do not realize in time) (1963:400-401, 405-406). Indeed, even as he concesses, “that God may fail in what he intends to do through men and mankind,” Tillich concludes with “the transcending certainty that in spite of every individual and group failure, an ultimate fulfillment can be expected” (1964:378). Tillich confirms that Eternal Life always entails a maximal fulfillment of world history: (1) “there is no ought-to-be in it which, at the same time, is not” (1963:402). (2) “There is no truth which is not also ‘done,’ in the sense of the Fourth Gospel, and there is no aesthetic expression which is not also a reality” (1963:403). (3) “The only unconditional prospect is the promise and expectation of the supra-historical fulfillment of history, of the Kingdom of God, in which that which has not been decided in history will be decided and that which has not been fulfilled will be fulfilled” (1938:141). So the risk God takes is not as great as it might first appear: an ultimate insurance policy guarantees maximal divine blessedness.

How then should we characterize Tillich’s rendering of God’s relationship to the world? For Tillich, creating the world is indispensable to divine fulfillment and blessedness. However, the particulars that happen or do not happen, the particulars we decide or fail to decide, do not add to or subtract from that maximal divine blessedness. I do not claim that Tillich’s solution is tenable. Indeed, elsewhere I have argued its untenability. My purposes here relate to Taylor’s attachment of the monistic label to Tillich’s theology. Taylor does have some basis to so categorize Tillich. A certain pre-programmed unfolding of history does apply. However, this applies to the value of history for divine fulfillment, not to historical particularities, which defy determinism.
and do create the new. Taylor could also charge that Tillich at least blurs the distinction between divinity and the world, in that in eternal life an essentially perfect version of each one of us contributes to divine blessedness. However, in our earthly lives we experience the reality of falling short of our essential being, as well as differences among individuals in the degree by which each falls short. Moreover, Tillich does indicate that the quality of an individual’s participation in eternal life bears some correlation to “the amount of fulfillment or non-fulfillment which goes into an individual’s essentialization” (1963:418), that is, it bears some correlation to what we actually do with our lives.

We first looked at the God-world relationship from the perspective of human experience, then primarily from the divine side in terms of time, eternity, and divine (im)passibility. But Tillich’s more basic and more “spatial” “doctrine of God” vis-à-vis the world also bears crucially upon the validity of Taylor’s monistic appellation. In his characterization of monism, Taylor rightly indicates that the real or divine is fully present and immanent—absence and transcendence finally do not apply. Moreover, difference is effaced by identity: despite their apparent differences, self, world, and the divine are one and the same (2007:37-38). Despite the obvious unipolarity implied in the very term, Taylor curiously identifies monism as a “both-and” schema (perhaps because the Real is both the world and the divine, which are nevertheless ultimately the same?). Using Taylor’s polar categories, I would avow that in a genuine “both-and” schema, the Real is both immanent and transcendent, is both present and absent, and incorporates both identity and difference. Such a dipolar schema in fact fits well the profile of the model for the divine-world relationship known as panentheism.

In fact most Tillich scholars hold that Tillich is best understood as a panentheist, not as a monist/pantheist. As suggested just above, panentheism attempts to do justice to both divine immanence and transcendence, in contrast to the emphasis on the immanence of monism and the emphasis on the transcendence of dualism, to use Taylor’s polar types. Growing out of German Romantic idealism, panentheism primarily reacted against what it perceived as an over-emphasis on transcendence, as a tendency towards dualism, in Western theology. Forms of pantheism, from German Romantic idealism and earlier, also countered that tendency. Thus, it should not surprise us that some have accused Tillich of panentheism or that, according to Nels Ferre, Tillich once confessed that the total “feel” of the presuppositions of Spinoza resonate with him more than those of any other thinker (127); nor that Charles Hartshorne, the foremost contemporary expositor of panentheism, originally called his model “the new panentheism.” As we shall see shortly, decisive differences exist between pantheism and panentheism.

Let me summarize the concept of panentheism before returning to Tillich as a panentheist. Literally meaning, “all is [in] God,” panentheism maintains that the world and its creatures constitute a part of God. To expand on that, panentheism holds that the world exists in God, included in the divine life, but that the reality of the individuals or the structures of the universe or of the universe as a whole do not exhaust the divine reality—and crucially that the reality of these individuals entails an integral indeterminacy of freedom and spontaneity. This means that all divine relations are internal relations, that is, relations between God as integrated whole and the creatures as included parts. Yet these relations are complex; contrary to the whole as undifferentiated, distinctions do pertain between including whole and included parts. Besides mutual freedom between the divine and the world, certain ontological properties of divinity, such as necessary existence and all-encompassing attributes such as omnipresence and supreme power, apply to the including whole but not to the creaturely parts nor to the universe itself. Thus, a part of the divine is identical to the universe and its components, but difference remains.

To return to Tillich, he significantly identifies the “mutual freedom” of God and world (Systematic Theology II, 1957:7) as what distinguishes his model from “panentheism” (Systematic, 1957:8, 1951:237), “emanationism,” or Spinoza’s mechanical necessity (1951:158). In the same vein, he cites finite freedom as separating his doctrine of God from Spinozistic monism, where the creatures are “mere ‘modes’ of the eternal substance” (1964:384). Several distinctive Tillichian phrases highlight divine inclusiveness and immediacy: (1) God is not a being, but being-itself. Rendered in manifold variations, this formula works against the dualistic, transcendental tendencies of Western theism. Significantly Tillich identifies the “God above God” with being itself and the power of being in everything. As such, this God is above the “God of theism” who is a being, identified with something concrete (1952:182, 186-190). (2) Divine participation in everything that exists. (3) God transcends the subject-object/self-world correla-
tion insofar as this correlation also involves some separation—here “transcendence” means the immediate presence of all reality to the divine. In connection with this motif, Tillich indicates that the God above God “is neither object nor subject” (1952:187). Note that no separation is not the same as without distinction—in which case, a world with its own integrity would not exist as present to a divine reality. As Tillich frames it, “The acceptance of the God above the God of theism makes us a part of that which is not also a part but the ground of the whole” (1952:187). Given Tillich’s insistence on creaturely freedom, his model of the divine as inclusive of all reality is best understood as panentheistic rather than monistic.

This brings us to the third religious schema in Taylor’s typology, that of “complexity.” Complexity involves “identity-in-difference” and “difference-in-identity,” “spontaneous self-organization,” and “emergent creativity.” Thus when it comes specifically to the “relation of identity and difference,” Taylor in fact does opt for “both-and” in his preferred model, as entities interconnect in complex ways (2007:38, 40). However, overall and officially Taylor characterizes his model of complexity as that of “neither-nor.” Self-organization serves as ultimate principle for Taylor. Indeed, for Taylor the physical laws of the universe themselves self-organizationally evolve (2007:322-323), while “Logos—whatever structures or principles pertain to self-organization—is itself self-organized” (2007:346). Yet for Taylor, self-organized wholes do not constitute the “locus of the real” or divine. Such a locating of the real in self-organized wholes would allow for a both-and with respect to transcendence/immanence and absence/presence à la panentheism, as each entity includes various parts, but only the divine as most real includes everything. Moreover, it would provide for a “both-and” relationship of identity and difference: Self-organized wholes have an integrity distinguishing them from other wholes, while at the same time connections and similarities pertain among those wholes; parts of wholes contribute to, without being identical with, the whole that is more than the parts or their sum; and finally the world constitutes part of the identity of the God who also transcends it. Thus, I maintain that a “both-and” relationship best fits with complexity, rather than Taylor’s yoking of “neither-nor” and complexity.

Instead of self-organized wholes as loci of the real, Taylor identifies “the virtual” as “the elusive real in and through which everything that exists comes into being and passes away” (2007:40-41). As the elusive reality that allows for self-organized wholes, it is neither transcendent nor immanent, neither absent nor present (2007:38, 41). Taylor does posit a “both-and” dipoarity within complex systems of a structuring/stabilizing element versus a deconstructing/destabilizing element. However, he admits his favoritism for the destabilizing element (Columbia News). Indeed, it appears to be tantamount to this elusive virtual. Finding some words for this elusive real, he likens it to “an immanent transcendence, which is inside as an outside that cannot be incorporated.” He further describes the virtual as “the source of the endless disruption that keeps complex systems open” (2007:41). Taylor associates the deconstructing, undifferentiating element with the experience of the sublime, which he further associates with the experience of unlimited possibility (2007:119-124). Taylor has moved well beyond his deconstructive phase through his embrace of the importance of holistic meaning making. Nevertheless, his preference for the destabilizing element and for “neither-nor” over both presence and absence of the divine in the world probably reflects continuing Derridean deconstructive influence.

Indeed, I will make the case that Taylor re-inscribes a type of dualism over-emphasizing transcendence. Deconstruction, while having its immanentist tendencies (insofar as we are trapped in our representations), also manifests interesting tendencies towards transcendence: (1) difference, the unresentable, which transcends, which refuses capture by, any form or structure; (2) the later Derrida’s messianic ideal. This messianism—endorsed and expounded upon by John Caputo—constitutes a messianism “without content and without identifiable messiah” (28). While Derrida grants that this messianic ideal perforce comes from the particularities of tradition(s), it is intentionally a formal concept, a wholly other that challenges in the name of justice the privileged claims of any and all historical social structures or meaning. One could regard this as a post-structuralist version of divine transcendence. In any case Taylor does identify the virtual with the divine, the virtual that refuses capture in any form—that indeed works to de-form all forms. Taylor associates dualistic religion with “either-or”: things exist either in the inferior or evil realm or in the divine, perfect realm. Yet for the human who for now is stuck in the lower realm, “neither-nor” pertains: one can identify oneself as neither fully within this world nor fully within the world to come. One
cannot and should feel at home in this world. Similarly for Taylor, one cannot wholeheartedly identify oneself with the meaningful forms of one’s life in this world, because that is not the locus of the most real. Yet the elusive virtual, the most real, is not anything we can grasp nor is it any place in which we can make our home.

In an obvious sense this transcendent divine ever eludes us. Yet in another sense, it entails an immediacy and an absolutism with respect to our connection with the divine. Clearly we do not incorporate the divine as structured particularity in Taylor’s schema (nor with Tillich’s mystical a priori). Nevertheless, insofar as we imaginatively participate in the unfigurable sublimity of the virtual, we may ironically still end up with a “having of the divine” more in keeping with the absolutistic modern spirit than with the postmodern spirit. Here Taylor may well be closer to Tillich than he realizes, by maintaining some identity of the human with the divine.

In terms of the Tillichian ontological elements, Taylor over-emphasizes the element of dynamics over form. Contrary to Taylor and in the spirit of Tillich, I will now argue for a certain priority of form over dynamics in complex, dynamic systems. Let me begin with a fairly long quotation from Tillich:

But dynamics is held in a polar interdependence with form. Self-creation of life is always of form. Nothing that grows is without form. The form makes a thing what it is, and the form makes a creation of man’s culture into what it is: a poem or a building or a law, and so on. However, a continuous series of forms alone is not growth. Another element, coming from the pole of dynamics, makes itself felt. Every new form is made possible only by breaking through the limits of an old form. In other words, there is a moment of “chaos” between the old and the new form, a moment of no-longer-form and not-yet-form. This chaos is never absolute; it cannot be absolute because, according to the structure of the ontological polarities, being implies form. Even relative chaos has a relative form. But relative chaos with relative form is transitional, and as such it is a danger to the self-creative function of life. At this crisis life may fall back to its starting point and resist creation, or it may destroy itself in the attempt to reach a new form (1963:50-51).

Clearly Tillich envisions an interdependent relationship where dynamics is indispensable. Yet in marking that “being implies form” and that chaos itself always involves some form, I see a certain priority of form vis-à-vis dynamics. By contrast, Taylor regards the destabilizing element and the virtual as transcending all form.

Let us apply this first to natural complex, dynamic systems. When a physical or biological system far from equilibrium self-organizes into a more complex system, the basic form of that system then normally needs to be maintained—or, at least in the case of individual organisms, death ensues. Of course, the homeostasis of humans and other biological organisms represents a dynamic equilibrium. Bridging nature and culture, Tillich wrote of the need for humans to preserve their form, in terms of the “biological structure” that make us human, that allows for “intentionality and historicity” (1951:181-182).

At the same time, the element of dynamics enables humans to transcend the “non-human” “biological realm” through technological and cultural creativity, through which they create the genuinely new (1951:181-182). Let me add a word about the stability and instability of biological species over time. While most species over the long haul do become extinct or evolve into other species, stasis has occurred in many ancient species extant today. Moreover, the phenomena of “punctuated equilibrium” means that periods of disequilibrium, where a large proportion of species die or speciate into new ones, are the exception rather than the rule for the span of biological time.

What about natural “laws” or structures? The character of basic forces of the universe and their potential interactions may well have been up for grabs in the first fractions of a second of the Big Bang. However, my sense of the scientific consensus is that at least most of the basic structures that allow for various types of self-organization have remained stable for the past 13.7 billion years. What about the divine? While both Tillich and Taylor value the abysmal element of the divine, from which finite actualities arise and pass away, key differences emerge. With Tillich, God as reservoir of possibility goes out of the divine self and, we might say, self-organizes certain possibilities in accordance with basic structures for the universe—structures that allow for dynamic self-organization. For Taylor by contrast, as suggested above, it is “self-organization all the way down,” so to speak. The abyss is “nothing” but “not nothing,” for “it is the anticipatory wake of the unfigurable that disfigures every figure,”
which is “the condition of the possibility of creative emergence”—again manifesting his preference for the destabilizing pole. The structures relevant to self-organization themselves arise out of “an-archy” (2007:164). Favorably referring to Hegel, Taylor 
pens that “(j)ust as God creates freely ex nihilo, so the productive imagination creates freely out of nothing” (2007:117).

In contradistinction to Taylor as I have interpreted him, I maintain that we and our world in no sense have experiential contact with that aspect of divinity that serves as the reservoir of all possibility, of that which is prior to embodiment. All the activity and creativity of emergent complex realities happen within structures, structures that are open, but never infinitely so. Here Tillich’s God above God has an important word to say: While we may find a kind of meaning in the God above all particularities, precisely when all particular structures have lost their meaningfulness, this meaning is “not a place where one can live” (1952a:189), but rather points to the “potential restitution” of particular meanings (1952a:186), as the divine source becomes partially present and immanent.

Taylor offers much of value on how today’s competing religious systems have lost coherence—and about how their disorder provides opportunity for the creative emergence of new, more complex forms of religion. Noteworthy here, I sense some connection between Tillich’s kairos moment and Taylor’s moment of “self-criticality.” Yet, according to Tillich as I read him, more due must be given to form than Taylor admits. Even where older forms of religious traditions meet mostly rejection or die, new forms still radically depend upon the old. Selected components of the old are not added linearly, which as Tillich noted would be “merely transformation of the old” (1963:398) or “a continuous series of forms” (1963:50); rather a new complex whole exceeds any sum of its parts. Yet the old traditions form crucial components, they constitute “relative form” (1963:51)—without these, as well as that which partially disfigures and rejects the old, the new would be impossible.

To conclude, I have argued in this article that Tillich’s understanding of the God-world relationship—when lingering attachments to impassibility and timelessness are jettisoned—cohere rather nicely with what we are learning about our universe as constituted by interactions among self-organizing, complex wholes. Indeed, I have argued that Tillich, insofar as he can account for structures that enable self-organized complexity, offers a more complex understanding of the divine-world relationship than Taylor’s. When it comes to complex interconnections, Tillich panentheistically allows for both identity and difference of God and the world in “both-and” fashion, while for Taylor the relationship of divinity to the world is as an otherness within. The divine finally appears to have little to no connection to forms or structures within the world, but rather has its connection with infinite disruption and restlessness (2007:345, 358). Consistent with his special association of de-stabilization and restlessness with the divine, Taylor valorizes unending restlessness as the highest good for humans (2007:38, 41, 345). While Taylor does affirm the importance of form/structure making, his preference for defiguring means that there are no forms or structures in or through which we can feel at home. Tillich recognizes that dynamics and form exist in interdependent correlation, indeed normally in some kind of balance (1951:181)—though given human estrangement from its ground of being, some imbalance inevitably occurs. I would reiterate that the homeostasis of humans and other biological organisms represents a dynamic equilibrium, as well as note that our embodied lives are thoroughly temporal and that newness and creativity constitute a key value in our orientation, knowing, and action with respect to our natural and social worlds. And I will grant Taylor that his vaunted “disequilibrium” (2007:345) is sometimes both unavoidable and quite productive. Yet I claim that we can navigate through the ever-changing flow of life with a deep sense of at-home-ness, of groundedness, through our bodily being in the world, avoiding both complacency as well as consignment to Taylor’s unending “dissatisfaction” and “restlessness” (Taylor, 2007:345).

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1 In *A Pluralistic Universe* James associates “dualism” with the atemporally complete, impassible God of “scholastic” theism, which is a form of “philosophical” rather than popular theism.

2 Here Derrida comes to sense the absolutistic dangers of immanentism, as Taylor explicitly did earlier as he reflected on the immanentism of facism’s blood, soil, and final consummation (1991).

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**Tillich’s Ethical Nature as Drawn from Nietzsche and Luther**

**Gretchen M. Freese**

Good Christians Friends, rejoice, With heart and soul and voice;
Now ye hear of endless bliss; Jesus Christ was born for this!
He has opened heaven’s door, And we are blest forevermore.
Christ was born for this! Christ was born for this!

**Introduction**

When the Christmas season approaches, the carols of Christmas are in the air. The Medieval Latin carol, “Good Christian Friends, Rejoice,” provides a glimpse into the concept of *kairos* moment born out of love giving hope in a time that seems so troubled. We live in a world that at times seems to be disintegrating with economic crisis, war, global warming, and a noticeable lack of family values. Into this time, the question of morality comes into the limelight in politics, the churches, and on the street. With so much political rhetoric around family values and various ideas of morals and morality, one must ask what we can learn as people of faith and as individuals from those who have struggled with these issues before us.

Morality defines the laws of nations, religions, and life. The issue of morality, its definition, and how its laws are used come to light in the writings of many philosophers and theologians. Surprisingly, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who started as a Christian from the Lutheran tradition and ended up turning his back on God through atheism, and Paul Tillich, a great twentieth century theologian, intersect with their thoughts on morality. Paul Tillich found a way of talking about morality that moves beyond Nietzsche’s good and evil (morality) and into a time (*kairos*) where agape love rules.

Although it confused me at times as to who was saying what, I was drawn to this topic while simultaneously reading Nietzsche and Tillich. This
thought provoking confusion led me to the realization that a theologian could use and change a self-proclaiming atheist philosopher’s perspective to reclaim life and the importance of religion. In this paper I will first look at Nietzsche’s concepts of good, bad, evil, and morality, followed by Tillich’s definitions of moralism, moralisms, morality, and the moral imperative. After exploring the meaning of morality and the moral imperative, I will delve into one place where both Nietzsche and Tillich agree that love transcends morality. After exploring love, I will address the issue of time by paying close attention to Tillich’s use of the Greek *kairos*. In my reflections, I will interweave Martin Luther and Lutheran tradition, which show the connections between Luther’s writings and their influence on both Nietzsche and Tillich. I will argue that both Tillich and Nietzsche built on their Lutheran foundation to come to a point where Tillich reclaims morality from Nietzsche’s deconstruction through Tillich’s understanding of agape transcending *kairos*, creating a new being in a new moment.

**Nietzsche on Morality**

When entering Nietzsche’s critique on morality, one must understand not only what he means but also how he transvalues or revalues the meaning of good, bad, evil, morals, and morality. In *Human, All-Too Human*, Nietzsche gives a prehistory of good and evil coming from “ruling tribes and castes.” Good and evil are about the supremacy and subjectivity in power relations. He writes, “The good are a caste, the bad a mass like dust. Good and bad are for a time the same as noble and low, master and slave.” This evil comes into play in the “other,” when the other is “considered hostile, ruthless, exploiting, cruel, cunning, whether they be noble or low.” Thus originally, good and bad are defined by the powerful where as evil comes out of the hostility that the subjugated feel against those that are. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche writes:

The source of the concept ‘good’ has been sought and established in the wrong place; the judgment ‘good’ did not originate with those to whom ‘goodness’ was shown! Rather it was the ‘good’ themselves that is to say the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for values. The powerful, supreme, and noble of birth define what good means and is; therefore, the other becomes bad. Once this judgment of values occurs, evil enters the picture as the lower classes judge the values of the powerful. The concept that the powerful are the ones who make the first definition should not come as a shock in today’s world, especially when one considers today’s society. One only needs to look to the rich and the powerful to hear what is good, bad, and evil even when they do not live up the conduct that they set before the people. The government, according to the words of the Preamble to the United States Constitution, to be “of the People, by the People and for the People,” seems to have forgotten the people who have become controlled by industry and the corporate world.

For Nietzsche, the good equal the nobility while the bad equal the common people, who are not part of the ruling class. The nobility define good to be what is useful and are not conscious of the bad since they see no necessity for it. Thus the nobility have the ability to shrug off the misdeeds done to them, while the oppressed remember the misdeeds. Out of the oppressed comes the concept of evil since it originates out of the slave morality leading to resentment and hatred. Ressentiment is further fostered by priestly members of the nobility who want to move closer to power. The priestly class, considered the lowest in the noble families, did not have the power to be the master. Rather than becoming slaves, they found another way to reduce the strength of the noble to raise up the weak. This in turn creates a slave revolt causing the transvaluation of values in which the good become bad and their actions become evil. Weakness is turned into strength.

Within the lower class, resentment leads to evil. Evil enters the world when guilt and shame teach humanity to be ashamed. Nietzsche writes, “For it was with the aide of such inventions (gods and genii/idols) that life then knew how to work the trick which it has always known how to work, that of justifying itself, of justifying its ‘evil’.” Evil rises out of hiddenness that creates guilt and the need for revenge. It provides fertile ground for planting and growing resentment. Once the seeds of resentment have been planted they sprout quickly into judging the powerful as evil. Thus, evil becomes anything and everything that elevates one above and beyond the group (herd).
The herd or group mentality is expressed through the Danish Jenta law where people strive to be average; no one wants to do better or worse than anyone else. If someone does his/her best and moves beyond the group, then s/he are thought to be bragging. Even though this law no longer supposedly exists, people still strive to remain only average. Another cultural example of this is the tradition in Japan that if a nail sticks out further than the others one must nail it back in. I experienced the nail concept when one of my students wore the wrong uniform to school. Japanese students wear school uniforms, either a formal one or a sweat suit. If one student forgot what to wear, the student was fairly well shamed into either calling a parent or borrowing from someone else so as not to stand out.

Even in the United States, the idea that people should behave the same occurs. Take the workers in an assembly line, for example. If one person works too fast or does too much, the other workers clamp down on that person, saying that that person makes them look bad. The other workers want to appear to have equal value and are not happy when someone goes above the call of what the group deems as workable.

Nietzsche’s critique was that people want to be the same and someone not fitting the criteria becomes the “other” or the “evil” one. This remains valid even in the Twenty-First Century. Reflecting back to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity is stated in Ecce Homo: “the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of resentment, not, as people believe, out of the ‘spirit’—a countermovement by its very nature, the great rebellion against the dominion of noble values.” Christian morality, born out of resentment, gave perspective to going beyond good and evil and overcoming morality.

Resentment as a creative power comes from defining itself as different. It incubates and matures in the hostile world, often showing itself in the form of creating tension, discord, and eventually rebellion. Slave morality causes rebellion since the lower class does not have the sophistication of the nobility to let go and forget the bad. The lower class sinks into evil where resentment gains complete creative power to turn towards revolt. This destroys the opportunity for communication between the slave and master until the only option of seizing power through force. The values that the nobility claimed as good have been transvalued by slave morality to become bad, and through this value designation of being outside the group to becoming evil.

Once the values are put into place, Nietzsche defines morality as the ranking of values that drive a human as the code of life and knowledge. Morality becomes the phenomenon in which life comes to be. Morality is the Ten Commandments of life; the law changes depending from which perspective morality is viewed. Nietzsche provides two basic views of morality, the master morality, and the slave (herd) morality. The master morality is the morality of the nobility, the powerful, in which the lower classes are not even viewed but used as the masters see fit. Although the lower classes make up the herd or the slave, it is through the slave morality that values are trans-valued where the good of the nobility is seen as bad by the lower classes. The lower classes cause the transvaluation in their quest to gain power. Tillich understands this, taking Nietzsche’s perspective to another level.

**Tillich on Morality**

Tillich builds off of Nietzsche’s perspectives and revalues Nietzsche’s work to enter into a theonomous ethic. He does this using the terms: moralism, moralisms, morality, and the moral imperative. Tillich states, “‘Moralism’ designates an attitude toward life …the distortion of the moral imperative into an oppressive law.” Tillich goes on to say that this type of moralism is negative and has no plural form.

If there is a plural form of moralism, then “moralisms…points to systems of moral imperatives as they have developed in special cultures and are dependent upon the relativities and limitations of these cultures.” He continues, “The distinction between moralisms as ethical systems and moralism as a negative attitude is identical with the distinction between the creative and the oppressed character of moral imperatives, and each ethical system has both characteristics.” For Tillich, moralisms equal the various types of morality that Nietzsche discusses.

Tillich defines morality as “the experience of the moral imperative” essential to humans being humans. Morality also can equal moral behavior. Thus, if morality can equal human moral behavior, it is dependent upon culture, one of the basic functions that define Tillich’s concept of the human spirit. The three basic functions of the human spirit are morality, culture, and religion. He states, “Morality is the constitution of the bearer of the spirit, the cen-
tered person; culture points to the creativity of the spirit and also to the totality of its creations; and religion is the self-transcendence of the spirit toward what is ultimate and unconditioned in being and meaning.”

Thus, the moral imperative provides the dynamic unity that gives vitality and “ultimate seriousness both to culture and to religion.”

If one truly wants to understand Tillich’s use of morality, one must explore Tillich’s use of the moral imperative. The moral imperative commands a person to be “a person within a community of persons.” Tillich defines a person to be a self-centered person. This relationship allows a person to belong to and yet also confront the world. The moral imperative directs the power of being; it is actualized in time and space. The goal of the moral imperative is to drive people into community and away from self-realized disintegration. Thus Tillich argues, “For the ethical problem this means that the moral act is always a victory over disintegrating forces and that its aim is the actualization of (human) as a centered and therefore free person.”

Nietzsche and Tillich both look for ways in which the human is freed. For Nietzsche, the concept of the übermensch (superman) is freedom from morality. The problem, however, remains that each level of morality is overcome by another system of laws that comes into play. Thus, the übermensch, either as an individual or as a group of nobles, never reaches a point where morality no longer exists.

For Tillich, freedom comes as people live in community where self-centered people overcome the disintegrating forces through morality, culture, and religion that frees them.

**Tillich on the Moral Imperative in Dialogue with Nietzsche**

The moral imperative, as defined by Tillich, "puts our essential being as a demand against us...In the moral imperative we ourselves, in our essential being, are put against ourselves...Morality is the self-affirmation of our essential being.” The moral imperative not only measures individuals, but also participation within the group. The moral imperative, thus, actualizes humanity’s creative potential as it supports the person as a centered self in the community. Humans experience moral imperatives as law when they are estranged from the power of being; the moral imperative brings them back into the community as a centered person. Thus, if morality leads to self-affirmation of our being, then it leads us into community where ethics lead to the creative process of life together.

Tillich answers the question of how religion and morality are related through stating:

The relation of religion and morality is not an external one, but that the religious dimensions, source, and motivation are implicit in all morality, acknowledged or not. Morality does not depend on any concrete religion; it is religious in its very essence. The unconditional character of the moral imperative, love as the ultimate source of the moral commands, and grace as the power of moral motivation, are the concepts through which the question of the relation of religions and morality is fundamentally answered.

With love as the ultimate source and grace as the ultimate power, Tillich believes that religion and morality are interrelated, illustrating that morality in its very nature is religious. Nietzsche shows that since morality is religious in its nature, morality must be overcome to a point of amorality.

In his *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche deconstructs morality, showing the path into being that morality has taken over time. He gives at least two genealogies and perspectives for the development of morals. One stems from an economic base. It moves from buying and selling (unpaid debts) to a master and slave situation. Once the master and slave relationships have formed, the veneration of ancestor worship begins. This creates a god or idol that is the precursor to the God of Abraham leading to the Christian God where Jesus is self-sacrificing. This self-sacrificing God leads to a Christian morality that is a morality of the weak.

Another genealogy is based on memory and conscience. It occurs when one looks at morality as beginning with memory and then moving to promise. Once the promise has been made, the chance that the promise may be broken enters into a cycle leading to guilt. A sense of guilt leads to a sense of duty and conscience. From the sense of duty and conscience, punishment and cruelty come into play. Once a promise has been broken and the conscience realizes it, resentment enters the picture. Then it progresses into a festival mode, finally leading to the concepts of good conscience, bad conscience, and ethics. These two genealogies join together in the sense that they both create concepts of guilt, concepts of what is good and bad, concepts of what is right and wrong, and the concept of what is the proper societal response and punishment for going against it.
Nietzsche’s genealogies of morals provide ways of looking into how cultures think. Often a culture’s concept of what is moral comes from its genealogical line. Since Nietzsche strongly critiques Christianity, his conception of Christian morals, though at times valid, provides a negative view of what many consider to be “good” and “just” morals. The whole idea of Jesus dying on the cross, the self-sacrifice of one man who is God, negates the good for Nietzsche, since no one could truly live up to that example as humans never do anything out of complete altruist love.

Whereas Nietzsche deconstructs morals and morality, Tillich believes taking the morality risk as true morality is based on the “courage to be.” The risk is that in “the dynamic self-affirmation of man as man,” one “must take the threat of non-being, death, guilt, and meaningfulness into itself.” This illustrates moralisms in contrast to morality, as moralisms provide safety and morality entails the risk of non-being. Morality needs courage to face the existential question of looking into the abyss and perhaps facing estrangement and nonbeing. Grace provides the bridge to overcome guilt and estrangement, connecting the courage to be with the safety of moralisms.

Tillich recaptures the grace lost in Nietzsche’s deconstruction of good, bad, evil, morals, and morality, and brings morality back into a strong ethic of love for one’s neighbor. Since Tillich and Nietzsche were both raised as German Lutherans, they were influenced by their Lutheran heritage, upbringing, and similar circumstances within the German church as well as having both served in wars. Tillich claims his Christian Lutheran heritage, while Nietzsche rejects his.

Although the academic world has often overlooked the powerful connection of Tillich and Nietzsche with Luther and Lutheranism, the connection exists. James Luther Adams writes of Tillich’s connection stating, “he was a Lutheran, a particular kind of Lutheran, and he brought to bear upon Luther’s mind and piety his own unique scholarly and theological perceptiveness... for him Luther’s ideas were often a point of departure, in the sense that he developed or expanded these ideas in new direction.” Let us look at one of these connections.

**Love Transcends Morality**

Love seems to connect Luther, Nietzsche, and Tillich, as through love it is possible for all three to go beyond the boundaries of morality. Although Luther sees love for one’s neighbor as what provides the grounds for morality, he also understand that love transcends morality as it is in living out the life of faith that God has given. Nietzsche writes, “Whatever is done from love always occurs beyond good and evil.” Let us compare Nietzsche’s quote with Tillich’s statement, “Love, realizing itself from kairos to kairos, creates an ethics that is beyond the alternatives of absolute and relative ethics.” In this comparison, love moves people from the realm of just doing good works to the realm of going beyond the laws of morality. According to Tillich, “Love, agape, offers a principle of ethics that maintains an eternal, unchangeable element, but makes its realization dependent on continuous acts of a creative intuition. Love is above the law.” This juxtaposition allows us a connective lens of Tillich, Nietzsche, and Luther.

The question concerning love is what kind of love does each of the writers use as their understanding of love. In his various writings, Luther often talks about love for one’s neighbor, *philia*, or the love of God, *agape*. Nietzsche, with his support of Dionysian aspects, would lean towards the lusty love of *eros*. For Tillich, *agape* love includes all the qualities of love—*philia*, *eros*, and *epithymia* (libido). *Agape* is the love that transcends the moral imperative, which “transcends the finite possibilities of (humanity),” and that is the “highest work of the divine Spirit” going “beyond faith and hope.” The connection for Tillich between moralisms and love is that “moralisms of justice drive toward the morality of love. Love, in the sense of this statement, is not an emotion but a principle of life... Love...is the ground, the power, and the aim of justice.”

Tillich believes that love has more than just emotion since emotions cannot be commanded. He continues, “it may well be that the ethical nature of love is dependent on its ontological nature, and that the ontological nature of love gets its qualifications by its ethical character.” Tillich compares his ideas of love and power with that of Nietzsche when he states:

Love and power are often contrasted in such a way that love is identified with a resignation of power and power with a denial of love. Powerless love and loveless power are contrasted. This, of course, is unavoidable if love is understood from its emotional side and power from its compulsory side. But such an understanding is error and confusion. It was this misinterpretation
which induced the philosopher of the ‘will-to-power’ (i.e. Nietzsche) to reject radically the Christian idea of love. And it is the same misinterpretation which induces Christian theologians to reject Nietzsche’s philosophy of the ‘will-to-power’ in the name of the Christian idea of love. In both cases an ontology of love is missing and in the second case power is identified with social compulsion.53

When Nietzsche viewed “the will to power” as being the will of life, his issue with love was that it was self-sacrificing and denied power.56 As the will of life, power takes on a formative role where it cannot be separated from life. Love denies power and therefore denies life. One of Nietzsche’s main critiques of the Christian church is that it denies power in self-sacrifice as exemplified in Christ’s dying on the cross.57 The weakness of the event is that Christ as God (a part of the Trinity) gave up his power and life in love for the world. The powerful thing to do would be to choose life; choosing death is weakness and thus love leads to weakness. Nietzsche needs love to be filled with passion flowing from the powerful, the nobility.58

Tillich argues that Nietzsche misunderstands the relationship between power and love. Since many scholars and theologians followed Nietzsche’s thought, Tillich identifies the problem that if “God as the power of being was discarded as a pagan invasion,” then the Trinity would be dissolved.59 So love must surpass the ethical, the social, the moral, and the distrust and rejection of power overcome in the ontological question. Love must transcend ethics, morals, and power in order to unite the individual and the community in the process of the new being. Tillich describes love as being “the answer to the problem of moralisms and morality.”60 Love reconnects and reunites the individual with the ground of being and the individual with the community, thus changing the old being into new being. Love, the source of grace, “includes justice to others and to oneself.”61 This love that accepts the unacceptable and achieves transcendence must be the agape love. Tillich states “Agape is love cutting into love, just as revelation is reason cutting into reason and the Word of God is the Word cutting into all words.”62 Agape cuts into the earthly chorological (chronos) time through the heavenly kairos time.

Kairos Arriving in Love

Tillich contrasts classical Greek words of time where “the term kairos, the right time, fulfilled time, time in which something decisive happens, is not the same as chronos, chronological time, which is watch time, but it means the qualitative time in which ‘something happens.’”63 To reach his concept of ethics, Tillich shifts the focus from a linear chronological approach to a primarily kairos one.

An example of kairos comes from the Jesus event when the Apostle Paul described the atmosphere as being heavy and ripe for the coming of the Christos.64 The Christ event happens in a linear timeframe but also in a qualitative timeframe. As the medieval carol goes, “He has opened heaven’s door, And, we are blest forevermore. Christ is born for this!”65 The qualitative happens when the impossible is possible, when the time has come and the moment is right for the action or event to take place. God opens heaven’s door at the right moment of Christ’s birth entering into the world as God incarnate, the impossible becoming the possible, God becoming human. The event breaks into history.

According to Tillich, kairos is not only a one time event but, “we all experience moments in our lives when we feel that now is the right time to do something, now we are mature enough, now we can make the decision.”66 That moment of knowing this is the time to do something is the qualitative moment of kairos. The Holy Spirit provides peace and the person realizes that God’s voice is something to be cherished and not ignored. God’s love breaks through the fear and into the moment.

Since love adapts to every situation appearing in every kairos, “ethics in a changing world must be understood as ethics of the kairos.”67 The question of what Tillich means by kairos arises and he provides various explanations of kairos in his writings. In The Interpretation of History, Tillich describes how he came to use the New Testament’s concept of the fulfillment of time being kairos as a “border-concept between Lutheranism and Socialism,” illustrating “characteristic of German Religious Socialism.”68 He states:

The term is meant to express the fact that the struggle for a new social order cannot lead to a fulfillment such as is meant by the Kingdom of God, but that at a special time special tasks are demanded, and one special aspect of the Kingdom of God appears as a demand and expectation. The Kingdom of God will always remain as transcendent; but it appears as a judgment to a given form of society and as a norm to a coming
one. Thus, the decision for Socialism during a definite period may be the decision for the Kingdom of God, even though the Socialist ideal remains indefinitely distant from the Kingdom of God.59

Tillich draws on the background of Lutheran mysticism to describe kairos as a creative power that can be possibly also be a destructive power when it goes towards the demonic. Kairos becomes a moment when an aspect of the Kingdom of God appears in a specific moment for a specific reason creating a new being or a new aspect in time. The kairos moment often appears to be judgment as fulfilling the law. Kairos as the fulfillment of time allows for creativity to break into history as it creates an ethic that goes beyond all types of ethics (i.e. absolute and relative ethics).70 Kairos and love work together in the sense where love is eternal. Thus, love “creates something new in each kairos.” 71

Although each kairos is the fullness of time at the moment of an event, it must be seen in relation to the unconditioned.72 The unconditioned plays a role as it is occurring at the same time as the event as “knowledge born in the situation of the Karios then is not knowledge growing out of accidental arbitrary events of a period but out of the period’s basic significance.”73 Psychological and sociological processes make the appearance of the unconditioned possible; however, they do not validate it.74 The unconditioned is validated in its role of occurring in the kairos event.

Conclusion

The unconditional is transcended by love, as love is always capable of breaking in as a new kairos creating new laws and ethical systems.75 Love’s breaking in as kairos defeats Nietzsche’s über-mensch from ever reaching an amoral state. Love as the creative and basic principle of life provides the grounds for creating a just ethic in which we find “the meaning of ethics: The expression of the ways in which love embodies itself, and life is maintained and saved.”76 Love as shown through God’s amazing act of selfless love breaking into the human world through the Christ event continues to express its salvific qualities through the kairos moments it creates. Tillich’s expression of kairos is built on his Lutheran heritage and on his reclaiming morality from the deconstruction of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of morals. This creates an ethic of faith active in love that transcends morality.

Where Nietzsche planted the concept of resentment, Tillich countered with love. Nietzsche viewed resentment as the root of evil, whereas Tillich viewed love, through kairos, conquering all else. Nietzsche believed that morality needed to be overcome since it was caught up in the religious; religion was designed as a constraint to keep the human from being greater. Tillich believed that morality in its essence was intricately connected to religion and culture as they are all grounded in the Spirit.77

Both Tillich and Nietzsche use perspectivism to expose the cultural aspects of morality, moralism, and morals. Tillich utilizes Nietzsche’s perspectivism to create an ethical system where the ground of being centers the individual to participate in a community that is grounded in faith. He transvalues Nietzsche’s concept of going beyond good and evil (morality) to love transcending kairos to create new cultural rules and norms. Tillich’s emphasis on agape love transcending morality as it breaks into chronological time through kairos moves the ethical system into a new moment of fulfillment where the faith given by the ground of being is active in the love for one’s neighbor.

Through Tillich’s understanding of kairos and agape, hope remains for the world despite continuing news reports of the “evil” of war, famine, natural disasters, and street violence. Grace through the justice of love provides a glimpse of the Kingdom of God in a kairos moment creating a new ethical system. The effect of the kairos moment for a specific time and event in history continues to allow creative power and love to guide humanity towards a brighter future. The future may look bleak according to Nietzsche and the press, but Tillich spins God’s love and grace into a new being calling humanity back into relationship with the ground of being as the ultimate concern. Through the gift of the Christ event, we are pulled out of the grasp and power of chronological time, trusting through faith that kairos moments continue to shape our history as we live into the creative self-centered beings participating in the community of Christ. Thus we can rejoice and sing as the carol calls us.

Good Christians Friends, rejoice, With heart and soul and voice;
Now ye hear of endless bliss; Jesus Christ was born for this!
He has opened heaven’s door, And we are blest forevermore.
Christ was born for this! Christ was born for this!78
This song “Good Christian Friends, Rejoice” is a Medieval Latin carol. I took this from the Lutheran Book of Worship (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1978) Hymn 55, verse 2.

Included as an Appendix in Walter Kaufmann’s translation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals/Ecce Homo, HAH 45.
self-overcoming; thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of ‘self-overcoming’ in the nature of life—the lawgiver himself eventually receives the call…” From this I am inferring that if all great things come to an end then the übermensch will also encounter the same problem by overcoming morality.

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32 GOM II 20.
33 Ibid. II 1.
34 Ibid. II 5.
36 Ibid II 16.
38 TC 141
39 Ibid
40 Ibid 142
41 For Martin Luther, ethics was lived in out as one received the free gift God gives of being justified by faith in Christ and the Christian ethic is to live in this world with faith active in love. This is key for Luther that faith is not a work because that leads to works righteousness, but that the love is the fruit of faith lived out for one’s neighbor. This is his basic premise in “Freedom of a Christian” in Luther’s Works Volume 31 eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1957) 327-377.
42 Tillich, On the Boundary (New York: Scribner’s, 1966) 74-75.
44 Tillich himself states that Nietzsche worked in the “spirit of Luther” as quoted in Adams’ article, 318.
47 BGE 153.
48 MB 90
49 Ibid 88
50 Ibid 41
51 Ibid 40
52 TC 144
54 Ibid 4
55 Ibid 11
56 BGE 258
57 Ibid 46 and 269
58 Ibid 260
59 LPJ 12
60 TC 145
61 Ibid
62 LPJ 33
64 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Though (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968). Future references to this book will be HCT.
65 “Good Christian Friends, Rejoice” lines 2 and 3 of verse 2.
66 Ibid
67 MB 89
68 Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936) 57-58. Future references to this book will be IH.
69 Ibid
70 MB 90
71 MB 91-92
72 IH 173-175
73 IH 173ff.
74 MB 27
75 Ibid 94
76 Ibid 95
77 MB 17-18
78 “Good Christian Friends, Rejoice,” verse 2.

An Important Request from the Editor of the Bulletin

Please send to the editor any papers presented at the NAPTS Meeting or the AAR Tillich Section in Montreal in 2009. Attachments should be in Word and emailed to: fparrella@scu.edu

Your papers will be published in the Summer and Fall issues. Thank you.
Tillich’s manuscript, The Courage to Be, which he published in 1952, is not only one of the most beautiful writings of Tillich, but also one of the most influential. Tillich’s thought has taken effect widely beyond the fields of theology with his insistent description of the courage to be and therewith he has summarized very concisely his whole theological thinking. It can be seen that the themes of faith and doubt appear not only in his late work, but also already in his early writings. When reading The Courage to Be, we should also follow up the development of Tillich’s writings. Regardless of the effect of this work, it is not easy to understand. The reason for it lies in Tillich’s use of concepts like courage, absolute faith, or the “God above God,” which are very suggestive—and they complicate a theoretical reconstruction of reasoning. Tillich shifts phenomenological notices and structural reflections into each other. That has an effect on the understanding of his statements. Now the question arises: what is, for Tillich, the “God above God,” which corresponds to absolute faith? What does Tillich understand under absolute faith? In the following, I want to explain some notices for a better understanding of Tillich’s thoughts. Therefore, it is necessary to include the historical development of his theology and philosophy of religion. We have already said: we can find the formula of “God above God” not only in Tillich’s late, but already in his early writings. We locate it for the first time in his habilitation, Der Begriff des Übernatürlichen, sein dialektischer Charakter und das Prinzip der Identität – dargestellt an der supranaturalistischen Theologie vor Schleiermacher. Tillich writes the following in connection to his criticism of supernatural theology: “Der Inbegriff aller Realität und Vollkommenheit müßte sowohl über Gott wie über den anderen Wesen stehen: Ist das Naturgesetz der Gott unter Gott, so das Absolute der Gott über Gott. Das Supra führt einerseits zu weit, anderseits nicht weit genug über die Welt hinaus.”

We are going to show that the formulas of “faith” and the “God above God” really are keywords in Tillich’s whole theology. In his concept of God above God, the originality of his theology expresses itself in a paradigmatic way. I want to explain now in two sections Tillich’s new understanding of the concept of God. Initially I want to comment on the formula “God above God” in its development in Tillich’s statements after the First World War and thus on the context, in which the formula for the first time ever appears. In a second section, and on the background of the observations of the development, I want to analyse Tillich’s absolute faith and his understanding of the God above God in his writing of 1952. My thesis is that the formula God above God represents a reflexive description of the self-understanding of a person in the act of faith. It describes with other words the dialectic of the faith itself and is an expression of the act of faith.

Certainty and Doubt, or the Dialectic of the True Faith

As already mentioned, we can find Tillich’s formula of God above God in his habilitation from Halle in 1915 for the first time. Here it is associated with Tillich’s criticism of the supernatural theology before Schleiermacher. Tillich’s considerations for reasoning a modern theology how he himself articulates in his letter to Emanuel Hirsch of February 20, 1918, are the immediate context of this writing. During the First World War, Tillich had modified the theoretical foundations and principles of his theology. However, the concept of meaning takes the place now of the concept of absolute truth that has been the basic principle, for instance, in his Systematische Theologie of 1913. Tillich’s formula of God above God, seen in the development, belongs to the context of this conversion of his pre-War theology. That becomes apparent already in the first references to his new foundation of modern theology. December 5, 1917, Tillich wrote to Maria Klein: “Through intensive analysis of the subject of justification, I arrived long ago at the paradox of ‘faith without God,’ and further determination and unfolding of this concept shapes the content of my current religious and philosophical thought.” In this quotation, Tillich does not speak about the God above God, but on the paradox of a faith without God. This paradox includes Tillich in his thought of God above God. For a better understanding of Tillich’s speech on the God above God we should have a more detailed look at his early theology.

Let us begin with Tillich’s early draft Rechtfertigung und Zweifel of 1919, which is—after the habilitation—his second important early writing, in which he speaks on God above God. Also, in Recht-
fertigung und Zweifel, it is a matter of a foundational theological principle, which at the same time could serve as a principle of a theology of culture. What does Tillich then mean with his speech on the God above God? Now it is not possible to analyse Tillich’s argument in detail, but let us turn to the key point of his remarks. These lie in faith as the affirmation of the absolute paradox. This understanding of faith becomes more clear if we look a little bit closer at Tillich’s understanding of the human self. What does the young Tillich understand by the human self? The human self is characterized by three aspects: (1) It is a dynamic dimension, which in the first place arises out of the act of self-determination. The self has its “being” by positing itself (sich selbst setzen). Therein underlies its liberty. (2) The self is characterized by an inner antinomy, which includes that the self is unconditioned as well as conditioned at the same time. Because of its absoluteness it is affirming itself, but it is able to affirm itself only as conditioned and determined. Tillich calls this the *paradox of the spirit*. So we can conclude, because of its antinomy, the self never understands itself as itself, but only as conditioned and determined. (3) In order that is connected, an endless process of positing and negation, which Tillich understands as subjectivity or negativity, takes place. By the antinomy of the self, the conditioned form, in which the self is realizing itself, can never be identical with the self in its absoluteness. Therefore, the self has to negate the concrete forms. This happens by substituting other forms. In his early draft of *Rechtfertigung und Zweifel*, Tillich determined the just drafted structure of the self as doubt or negativity, which is constitutive for the self. In Tillich’s own words the doubt is “der religiös-konkrete Ausdruck für die Subjektivität, die in das religiöse Princip aufzunehmen ist. Der Akt, in dem das Subjekt sich von der substantiellen Einheit mit dem Objekt löst, in dem es sich selbst als unterschieden von dem Objekt und in seiner Freiheit ihm gegenüber erlebt, stellt es zugleich vor die Möglichkeit des Andersseins, der Zwei- und Mehrheit des Zweifels. Im Zweifel,” so Tillich further, “ist die Subjektivität rein aktualisiert, sie hat das Objekt verloren und noch kein neues gefunden; sie ist ganz in sich selbst.”

Tillich’s understanding of faith as an affirmation of the absolute paradox is based on this structure of the self. Faith is for Tillich nothing else than the self-understanding of the self in its inner antinomy. We have already heard that calls Tillich the absolute paradox that exists in the contingent self-understanding of the self in its own structure. By affirmation in its own negativity, the self comes to itself and to its truth. Doubt is for Tillich the wise realization of unconditioned certainty. “Es bleibt nur der paradox Ausweg, im Glauben zu bejahen, daß der Zweifel das Stehen in der Wahrheit nicht aufhebt.” It follows that faith, as an affirmation of the absolute paradox, is the happening, in which the self becomes itself understood in its inner structure. That means further: doubt is the way of realization of the self itself.

Let’s have a look at the concept of God now. Tillich understands the concept of God as a moment in the structure of subjectivity and a self-description of faith as happening of the self-understanding of the self in its inner structure. For this, only reason represents the concept of God the dialectic, which is the faith itself, with Tillich’s own words: “Die Dialektik des Zweifels treibt also zu einem Gott über Gott, zu einem Gott des Zweiflers, ja des Atheisten.” The answer to the question of how we, how can Tillich speak about God above God, we find in this: God above God is nothing else than the self-description of faith and in that the self-understanding of the self in its inner structure of antinomy.

### Absolute Faith

By looking from the early work, *Rechtfertigung und Zweifel*, to Tillich’s late writing, *The Courage to Be*, at first we notice a change terminology. Now Tillich not only uses ontological language, but furthermore his basic understanding of faith as an affirmation of his early writing does not e exist in his later text. Nevertheless *The Courage to Be* may apply as a late comment to his early draft *Rechtfertigung und Zweifel*. The basic subject remains the dialectic of certainty and doubt, and Tillich still believes that sickness unto death, speaking with Kierkegaard, could only be cured by courage to be that does not exclude doubt. “Which courage is able to take non-being into itself in the form of doubt and meaninglessness?” So Tillich formulates the central question. Instead of faith as affirmation of the absolute paradox, Tillich speaks now about absolute faith and relates this absolute faith to the God above God—like in his early draft. Now we have to reply to the question of how Tillich understands absolute faith and the God above God? In *The Courage to Be*, Tillich understands the self as a dynamic dimension. The human is only thus human by positing himself and knowing about this act of positing himself. “On-
tic and spiritual self-affirmation must be distinguished but they cannot be separated. Man’s being includes his relation to meanings. He is human only by understanding and shaping reality, both his world and himself, according to meaning and values. His being is spiritual even in the most primitive expressions of the most primitive human being.\(^\text{10}\) Seen in this context Tillich understands the human self as self-determining and as an intellectual being the human has certain knowledge about himself. However, the human self is positing itself only as concrete and determined. And as self in its self-relatedness, it is never identical with its own positing. From it results the drama of the self-determined human being, that both describes in a similar insistent wise: Tillich in his *The Courage to Be* and likewise Kierkegaard in his *The Sickness unto Death*. Although Tillich refers to Kierkegaard only in few places of his writing, we cannot ignore that Tillich’s determination of faith as he courage to be rests on Kierkegaard’s understanding of sins. Let us now consider more, what does Tillich in his *The Courage to Be* understand under absolute faith? In one of the central places in the chapter 6, “Courage and Transcendence,” he writes the following: “Faith is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself. The courage to be is an expression of faith and what ‘faith’ means must be understood through the courage to be. We have defined courage as the self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being.”\(^\text{11}\) Faith, so we can say with Tillich’s description, is the courage of the self in accepting itself despite of the always current threat of the non-being. We see in this determination of faith that Tillich has included his former understanding of faith as affirmation of the absolute paradox in *The Courage to Be* and has it translated in his abstract concept of his late work. In addition, faith is understood as happening in the self-understanding of the self in the constitutive negation of itself. Tillich relates the act of the self-understanding in its relation of antinomy to itself to absolute faith. Regardless of its absoluteness, faith is self-realizing only by conditioned forms. The self becomes aware of these forms, in which it is positing itself in the act of faith and realizes them as together needful and conflicting mediums of its self-understanding. This is the reason that absolute faith, as the act of becoming self-understood in self-relatedness, is always referred to concrete contents, but so, that it does not have special contents. This absolute faith becomes self-aware “of a faith which has been deprived by doubt of any concrete content, which nevertheless is faith and the source of the most paradoxical manifestation of the courage to be.”\(^\text{12}\)

In the last chapter of *The Courage to Be*, Tillich explains his thought on the God above God in a critical argument with theism. This God above God should be an alternative to the theistic concept of God, from which Tillich differs in three ways. Let us now ask for the keyword, the main thought in *The Courage to Be*. The God above God could only then be an alternative to the theistic concept of God, if it is a part of the structure of subjectivity. Also, Tillich’s determination of being-itself does not aim at an ontological dimension, which anywise exists independent of subjective realizations. In this case, namely it is not to be accepted why and in what way the God above God should be an alternative to the theistic concept of God. But, how could we then understand the God above God whom we cannot describe like “the God of all forms of theism”?\(^\text{13}\)

According to Tillich’s advice, that the courage to be “in its radical form is a key to the idea of God which transcends both mysticism and the person-to-person encounter,”\(^\text{14}\) then God above God can only be understood as a self-description of faith. In the concept of God, faith not only represents and describes itself, but it understands itself. Tillich’s words of the God above God have a functional status, because in them it enlightens faith itself. An expression of the self-understanding of the self in its positing and in its negation of concrete forms, the concept of God in fact is only then, if this dialectic has a place in the concept of God. Since the First World War, Tillich has taken up the tension between ground and abyss into his concept of God. As self-description of the act of faith, the concept of God begins in the first place together with faith. Otherwise it would not be an expression of faith and also no alternative to the theism.

Summarizing briefly our considerations on Tillich’s early draft of *Rechtfertigung und Zweifel* we can observe, that the development of Tillich’s theology has a high degree of continuity.


