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NEW OFFICERS

The annual meeting of the Society took place on November 6–10, 2009, in Montreal, Québec, Canada. New officers of the Society were elected:

President
David Nikkel, University of North Carolina, Pembroke

President Elect
Russell Manning, University of Cambridge

Vice President
Courtney Wilder, Midland Lutheran College

Secretary Treasurer
Frederick J. Parrella, Santa Clara University

Past President
Sharon P Peebles Burch, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley
New Members of the Board (Term expires 2012)
— Robison James, University of Richmond
— Matthew Tennant, Oxford University
— Gregory Walter, St. Olaf College

The Society wishes to extend its most sincere thanks to Terry Cooper, Saint Louis Community College, Ron MacLennan, Bethany College, and Russell Manning, Cambridge University, for their service on the board for the last three years.

The annual banquet was held this year at the Holiday Inn Select, Montréal Centre Ville. The speaker was Raymond F. Bulman, Professor, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Saint John’s University, New York City. The title of Prof. Bulman’s outstanding address was “The Power of Tillich’s Thought: A Nostalgic Retrospect.” It is printed in this Bulletin.

Please Mark Your Calendars

The 2010 Annual Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society takes place on Friday, October 29, and Saturday, October 30, 2010 in Atlanta, Georgia. The American Academy of Religion and the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group” will meet October 30 to November 2. (See Call for Papers below.)

NAPTS: Call for Papers

The North American Paul Tillich Society (NAPTS) welcomes proposals for its annual meeting which will take place on October 29-30 2010 in connection with the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR) in Atlanta, Georgia, October 30-November 1 2010.

We welcome proposals for individual papers and panels on the following issues: (1) Tillich’s theology and philosophy of history; (2) Tillich and Barth; (3) Tillich and Bonhoeffer; (4) Tillich and sexuality; (5) Tillich and class; (6) Tillich and black theology (especially after Martin Luther King); (7) Tillich, empire, and post-colonialism; (8) Tillich and Eastern religious thought; (9) Tillich and American transcendentalsim; (10) Tillich and the experience of German expatriates in the US; (11) Tillich and theological reflections on death; (12) Tillich and the politics and ethics of war and peace.

Other Tillich-related proposals will be seriously considered. A winning student paper receives the $300 Annual Tillich Prize.

The North American Paul Tillich Society is dedicated to the study of the thought of Paul Tillich (1886-1965) and the application of his works to other areas of human knowledge. The Society fosters scholarship and scholarly exchanges that analyze, criticize, and interpret the impact of Paul Tillich’s ideas. It seeks to employ and adapt his thought to deal with contemporary issues in theology, religion, ethics, and the political, social, psychological, scientific, and artistic spheres of culture.

The North American Paul Tillich Society is linked to the German and French-speaking societies as well as Tillich societies in other nations. It publishes a quarterly bulletin that contains papers delivered at its annual meeting and at the “Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture” sessions at the American Academy of Religion.

Proposals should be sent by email (preferably as attachments) to the President-Elect of the NAPTS, Dr. Russell Re Manning, University of Cambridge (rrm24@cam.ac.uk). Proposals should be of no more than 1000 words and be accompanied by a 150-word abstract. Please indicate if eligible for the student prize.

Proposals must be received by 30 April 2010. For further details, please see: http://www.napts.org/

Please circulate this Call for Papers to other potentially interested parties.

AAR Group: Call for Papers


We welcome proposals for individual papers and panels on the following issues in theology, religion, and culture that engage with Tillich or post-Tillichian thought: (1) Cognitive science approaches to religion; (2) New trends in theological anthropology; (3) The turn to (Neo) Platonism in recent theology; (4) Emergence, Pan(en)theism and Theologies of Nature; (5) Globalization, migration and theologies of the boundary; (6) War and peace; (7) Theologies of culture as resources for inter-religious encounters; (8) Tillich as a resource for feminist theology.

Other Tillich-related proposals will be seriously considered. Unless otherwise requested, proposals not scheduled are automatically passed onto the North American Paul Tillich Society for possible inclusion in their Annual Meeting. A winning student paper receives the $300 Annual Tillich Prize.
The AAR Group fosters scholarship and scholarly exchanges that analyze, criticize, and interpret the thought or impact of Paul Tillich (1886-1965), and that use his thought—or use revisions of, or reactions against his thought—to deal with contemporary issues in theology, religion, ethics, or the political, social, psychotherapeutic, scientific, or artistic spheres of human culture. The group cooperates with the North American Paul Tillich Society (a Related Scholarly Organization of the AAR), which is linked with the German, French-speaking, and other Tillich societies. Papers at Group sessions are published in the Society’s quarterly Bulletin without prejudice to their also appearing elsewhere.

Proposals should be sent by email (preferably as attachments) to the group’s co-chairs, Dr. Russell Re Manning, Program Director of the AAR Group, University of Cambridge (rrm24@cam.ac.uk) and Dr Sharon Peebles Burch, Interfaith Counseling Centre (spburch@att.net). Proposals should be of no more than 1000 words and be accompanied by a 150-word abstract. Please indicate if eligible for the student prize.

Proposals must be received by March 8, 2010. For further details, please see: http://www.aarweb.org/Meetings/Annual_Meeting/Current_Meeting

Please circulate this Call for Papers to other potentially interested parties.

**DPTG: CALL FOR PAPERS**

**Paul Tillich’s Theology of Culture**  
Aspects – Problems – Perspectives  
Second International Congress  
of the DPTG in Vienna  
Vienna, October 7-10, 2010

The German Paul Tillich Society (DPTG, Deutsche Paul-Tillich-Gesellschaft e.V.) is conducting an international congress in Vienna, Austria from October 7 through 10 on the theme of “Paul Tillich’s Theology of Culture: Aspects – Problems – Perspectives.” In addition to plenary addresses, sections on Tillich’s theology of culture are planned. The DPTG invites all who would like to make a presentation on this subject in one of the sections to send a proposed topic, together with a summary of a page or less, to one of the following no later than 1 June 2010:

- Prof. Dr. Christian Danz  
  President of the DPTG

Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät der Universität Wien, Schenkenstr. 8-10, A-1010 Wien  
Email: christian.danz@univie.ac.at

- Prof. Dr. Dr. Werner Schüßler  
  Vice-President of the DPTG  
  Lehrstuhl für Philosophie II, Theologische Fakultät Trier, Universitätsgen 19, D-54296 Trier  
  Email: schuessw@uni-trier.de

Notice of the acceptance of proposals will be sent no later than 30 June 2010. The languages of the congress are English and German.

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**2009-2010**  
**PAUL TILLICH LECTURE**

Monday, 26 April 2010, 5:30 p.m.  
Harvard University  
The Memorial Church  
One Harvard Yard  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

**Roger Haight, S.J.**  
Scholar in Residence  
Former Visiting Professor of Theology  
Union Theological Seminary  
New York

“Religious Self-Understanding in the 21st Century:  
Paul Tillich and Ignatius Loyola”

The new century extends an era of evolving pluralism and declining influence of mainline Protestant and Euro-American Catholic churches in North America. Professor Haight will address how correlating Paul Tillich’s theology and Ignatius Loyola’s spirituality offers insight into ways Christian and, more broadly, religious self-understanding might promote spiritual nurture and practical engagement in society.

Professor Haight received his doctorate in theology at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago (1972) and subsequently taught at Jesuit graduate schools of theology in Manila, Chicago, Toronto, and Cambridge. He has been a visiting professor in Pune (India), Nairobi (Kenya), Lima (Peru), and Paris. Among his published works are the Catholic Press Association award-winning books *Dynamics of Theology* (1990), *Jesus Symbol of God* (1999), and *The Future of Christology* (2005). Volume III of his notable trilogy, *Christian Community in History*, was published in 2008, and a previous award-winning book, *An Alternative Vision: An Interpretation of Liberation Theology*, in 1985. A prolific writer, in addition to liberation theology Professor
Haight’s numerous articles have addressed themes of secularism, modernity, spirituality, and religious pluralism. He is a past president of the Catholic Theological Society of America, and Alumnus of the Year of the Divinity School, University of Chicago, for the year 2005.

A dinner in Professor Haight’s honor, by reservation, will follow at 7:30 p.m. in the Library of the Harvard Faculty Club.

**In Memoriam**

**F. Forrester Church**

F. Forrester Church was the editor of *The Essential Tillich. An Anthology of Writings of Paul Tillich* (New York: Macmillan, 1987). He died Sept. 24, 2009. Dr. Church, son of the late Sen. Frank Church III of Idaho and senior minister of All Souls Unitarian Church in Manhattan, helped to define Unitarian Universalism and relate its beliefs to the larger culture.

**John E. Smith**

John Edwin Smith was Clark Professor of Philosophy Emeritus and former Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Yale. He was born in Brooklyn on May 27, 1921, received his B.A. from Columbia (1942), his B.D. from Union Theological Seminary (1945), and his Ph.D. from Columbia (1948). Prof. Smith, who taught at Vassar and Barnard before his appointment at Yale, died December 7, 2009, in Arlington, Virginia.

**Joan Ryerson Brewster, 1916 – 2009**

**A Reflection**

**William R. Crout**

A first image of Joan Ryerson Brewster forms a lasting memory. In September 1955, as I was hastening down Harvard’s Divinity Avenue, late for Tillich’s Wednesday class in his theology, a forest green Mercedes coupe suddenly pulled up on the curb across from me. The door quickly opened, an elegant woman stepped out, and in silk dress, fur jacket, and high heels, she rushed down the walk and up granite steps to the classroom. Many months later at a reception in Paul and Hannah Tillich’s Cambridge apartment, I met this stunning woman and her patrician husband. George and Joan Brewster had become and remained thereafter the Tillichs’ closest Boston friends, and from that evening we, too, soon became close friends.

Joan was from a Chicago steel family, and George, an architect, traced his lineage to the Mayflower. They were prominent in Boston’s cultural life, instrumental in founding Boston’s Institute of Contemporary Art, and influential in historic preservation. Joan had been prevented by bulbar polio from attending Bennington College, but on recovery, with a leg weakened by minor paralysis, she studied at the Sorbonne in Paris, becoming fluent in French. After marriage she combined raising three sons with a life of serious scholarship, poetry (a book of her poems was published), volunteer charitable work and, with George, traveling and sailing.

A devout Episcopalian of rare grace, astute theological sensitivity, and ecumenical, questing spirit, she had enrolled in courses at the Divinity School in the year before Tillich arrived, but from his arrival in 1955 through the next seven years she attended most of his courses, carefully typing her notes and securing them in a binder. She and George frequently hosted the Tillichs at dinner in their spacious art-filled home in suburban Brookline and were in turn the Tillichs’ guests in Cambridge. Son Donald recalls an Easter egg hunt on their spreading lawn in which Tillich “ruthlessly” insisted upon finding and gathering all the eggs, leaving few for the children!

When Harper & Row in 1964 secured rights to publish a one-volume edition of Tillich’s *Systematic Theology*, Joan and I were engaged to “re-English” Part IV and Charles Fox Part V. During the academic year 1964-1965, Joan and I met twice weekly in the Brewster residence collaborating intensely on Part IV, sending our typed suggestions to Tillich who with comments and approval returned them to us, a project that regrettably came to end with Tillich’s death in 1965. Through Robert Kimball, Tillich’s literary executor, Joan contributed the preparatory editorial work for publication of *My Search for Absolutes* (1967), a posthumous volume dedicated to her. The manuscript would have been Tillich’s Noble Lectures at Harvard in 1966.

Joan once confided Tillich’s last words spoken to her and George. Having been the Tillichs’ guests in East Hampton in summer 1965, they were about to drive away when Tillich, alluding to their conversation in parting words at her car window, said, “Remember, man is the question of being.” Joan, misunderstanding, replied, “Paules, do you mean man asks the question of being?” “No,” Tillich responded, “man is the question of being.”

In 1968, the Brewsters bought property on the near-pristine Maine coast south of Cushing and
moved there. George, having given up architecture to become a painter, with shows in Boston, New York and Maine, died in 1981. For 29 years Joan lived alone on this cherished shore, devoted to her family, to conservation, and to Harvard’s Paul Tillich Lectures, being driven from Maine as often as possible to attend them, the last in 2004. She died peacefully in her Maine home on 22 July 2009, “full of grace and courage, generous and kind, loving and being loved.”

CHRISTMAS EVE, 1961: Paul Tillich, 1886-1965

We sat
That night
With you and Hannah
Under Luther’s tree,
Its fat white candles
You insisted on
Flamed
Dangerously close
To the apartment
Ceiling

Champagne,
Exchange of gifts:
Shahn lithograph,
*Sonnets to Orpheus.*
You said,
“My color is yellow,
The color of faith,
Wrote Rilke’s
Lines on being
In the book.

How holy were
Those moments
Of silence!
I remember
Your gentle lion face
In contemplation,
The myriad searching bees
Of your deep mind
Hived now
And resting
As that silence
Brimmed
With Spirit’s presence,
Being’s mystery.
— By Joan R. Brewster, 1990; read at the Inaugural Paul Tillich Lecture at Harvard, commemorating the 25th anniversary of his death.

NEW PUBLICATIONS: TILLICH IN ESTONIAN


THE POWER OF TILLICH’S THOUGHT: A NOSTALGIC RETROSPECT

The 2009 Banquet Address

RAYMOND F. BULMAN

Now that we have enjoyed our very pleasant banquet, I would ask everyone to relax a bit while I take many of you down memory lane—or for those of you who are too young (fortunate for you) to have experienced the time period about which I am musing—hopefully this somewhat nostalgic journey might give you some better insight into an important time in the history of Tillich’s influence and popularity. It might also give you a further clue as to the enthusiasm and passion that motivated an earlier generation of Tillich scholars. The timeframe I am referring to covers generally the last half of the Sixties and the decade of the Seventies of the last century—approximately the fifteen years following the death of Paul Tillich in 1965.

Let me confess upfront, that I did not personally have the privilege of knowing Paul Tillich. At a NAPTS meeting in St. Louis (I believe it was 1976), I was waiting to make a presentation, while listening to a series of papers by top notch Tillich scholars. Each one began with a personal recollection of Paul Tillich. Since I had no such fond memories, I thought I should be upfront and admit that unlike the previous speakers I did not personally know the Master. Since I was now in confessional mode, I further admitted that I had actually blown the one opportunity I had had to hear him speak. In the summer of 1965, I shared a tennis house in the Hamptons with a group of young professors from my University. One of the more dedicated of the group—I suppose—announced one evening that a famous theologian, Paul Tillich was speaking at Southampton College. This created a conflict that evening with a big party that many of us had planned to attend. In my defense, in the summer of 1965, I knew very little about the work of Paul Tillich and I did enjoy parties. The net result was that I almost met Paul Tillich, but in fact, preferred to go to a party.
Hannah Tillich, who was sitting with Mutie, in the front row at the St. Louis Conference, was delighted by my penitent introduction to my paper and after I left the podium, she put a signed copy of her latest book—*From Place to Place*—in my hands. Together with her signature, she included a very complimentary and personal inscription, suggesting in the process that in similar circumstances Paul Tillich would likely have made a similar choice. I will always cherish that inscription which also marked the beginning of a long, close friendship with Hannah—a friendship that lasted throughout her life.

My actual introduction to Paul Tillich’s thought came one or two years later while taking a course with Prof. John Macquarrie at Union Theological Seminary in New York. I was at the time a doctoral student in Philosophy of Religion at Columbia University—it was a Joint Program with Union. Macquarrie had recently published his book on *Twentieth Century Religious Thought* and students from Union and Columbia flocked to his classes to hear his interpretations of Bultmann, Whitehead, Dewey, Barth, Jaspers, Jung, Troeltsch, and many others, including Tillich. On reading Tillich’s *Dynamics of Faith*, I was immediately enamored with the existential dimension of Tillich’s thought—his insistence, for example, that all theological statements, as opposed to philosophical ones, express a personal engagement as well as an ontic description. When one says, for example, that Jesus is the Christ, this statement expresses not only a descriptive view of Jesus’ identity but also a statement about one’s personal commitment. In Tillich’s terms, the whole “centered self” is involved in doing theology. Several years prior to entering the Columbia University program, I had been a graduate student at the Gregorian University in Rome, where the Spanish Jesuit, Juan Alfaro, had a strong impact on my understanding of theology. He had brought a good dose of personalist philosophy into an otherwise traditional scholastic theological scheme. Personalism, made popular by the French philosopher Maurice Nédoncelle, was essentially the Catholic version of existentialism. At the time, it was far more prudent for Alfaro to use the term “personalism” rather than “existentialism,” the latter term being quite suspect in Church hierarchical circles of the day. It should be noted in this respect that the Gregorian University is in close proximity to the Vatican.

In that course, I wrote a term paper for Macquarrie, in which I compared Tillich’s and Alfaro’s notion of faith. Macquarrie—ecumenical as he was—delighted in the comparison, and later encouraged me to continue to work on Tillich. Macquarrie, as many of you know, was a Scotsman, who, while he was in New York had converted to High Church Anglicanism. This conversion to the English Church did not change his Scottish accent one bit. When Macquarrie had become my mentor, I suggested working on Rosmini, rather than Tillich, since the Italian theologian wrote in Latin and Italian—two languages that I knew well. I argued that, while I liked Tillich, my knowledge of German was not strong enough to handle his early German works. His answer was typically direct and to the point: “WELL, RAY, LEARN IT.” He really wanted me to stay with Tillich, so I did my best with German, taking an additional reading course in Theological German with Walter Mosse, whom Tillich had known from his German years. I learned enough German to pass my reading exam and subsequently to plow through some of Tillich’s German texts that helped support the claims of my dissertation. Years later, access to Tillich’s German texts would be made much easier for me by the work of Jean Richard and his team from Laval, who produced an excellent translation into French with critical references to the German text of the *Gesammelte Werke*.

My personal indebtedness to John Macquarrie, who died just two years ago at Headley outside Oxford, is not the subject of this talk, but I cannot but point out how important for me was his unflagging encouragement (more like insistence) for me to stay with Tillich. Shortly after I had begun work on my Tillich dissertation, however, I heard the news that my mentor, John Macquarrie, had been named the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Christ Church in Oxford. I called him to congratulate him, but at the same time asked him where that would now leave me. His answer (once again short and pithy) was: RAY, COME ON OVER WITH ME. Which I did.

Having managed to get a small grant and a year off from St. John’s University, where I now served as an assistant professor of Theology, I made my way to Oxford by a circuitous route through Cambridge, Massachusetts (the Divinity School, as we know, was the home of the Tillich Archives). When I finally arrived in Oxford—and after a lengthy stay at Harvard Divinity School, my mentor was not at all convinced that the delay was totally due to the rich resources available at the Harvard archives. I well remember his response to my explanation: WELL, RAY, YOU WERE HAVING A GOOD
TIME! I think perhaps that my mentor knew me too well.

I admit that I was having a good time in Cambridge, but at the same time it is true that not only the resources, but also the whole atmosphere at Cambridge was far more conducive to Tillich research than Oxford was. These were heady days for theology in the U.S. and especially in intellectual centers such as Harvard. Exciting hours of theological jam sessions were regular fare at the Divinity School. Harvard theologian, Harvey Cox, had recently published the immensely influential The Secular City, touching off the “Secular City Debate.” As I locked up my bike outside the Divinity School Library in the morning, I often found myself next to Prof. Harvey Cox, who had biked over in his Ivy tweeds. I felt I was at the theological epicenter. Protagonists on all sides of the Secular City debate regularly appealed to Tillich in support of their position. Who, after all, asked John Macquarrie (in God and Secularity), “had written more eloquently and thoughtfully about the presence of God in the secular world than Paul Tillich—the theologian ever on the Boundary”? Even the Death of God controversy, spurred by the writings of Altizer, Hamilton, and Van Buren, which was soon to grab the spotlight in both the national media and in Harvard’s theological circles, was regularly embellished with references to Tillich’s writings. While some looked to him as the forerunner of their rejection of the God of theism, others such as Langdon Gilkey saw his concept of theonomy as the Christian answer to the questions about God’s apparent absence in our secular culture. Already in 1967, Macquarrie had concurred that “Tillich’s way of seeking to relate Christian faith in God to secular life and thought had not been surpassed” (God and Secularity, p. 60).

Cambridge and the Divinity School, by providing both theological ambiance and the intellectual enthusiasm, made my Harvard interlude into a truly exciting adventure. An important part of the enthusiasm was provided by regular visits to the home of James Luther Adams on Francis Avenue (usually over a gourmet signature lunch of toast, honey and tea). Adams was a gracious and dedicated guide to budding Tillich scholars like myself and would later write an illuminating preface to my book on Tillich’s Theology of Culture (A Blueprint for Humanity, 1981). Of course, it was no disappointment for me that the Divinity School was not far from Harvard Square, which boasted excellent watering holes, such as the Wurtzhaus, ideal for late night theological disputations.

My Harvard story would not be complete without telling you about Ted, who would become a lifelong friend, and a psychologist (not to be confused with our own Ted Peters whom I also consider to be a dear friend). Reading Tillich for the first time, the other Ted was at once fascinated and disturbed (sounds like something from Rudolf Otto). What disturbed him was Tillich’s insistence that faith was an “ecstatic centered act of the personality” (DF, 7)—faith was “reason in ecstasy.” The impressionable young Ted was a serious and committed Christian, but was also quite layback by disposition—he could not easily relate to Tillich’s language of ecstasy. If Tillich should be correct, did this mean that Ted was not really a man of faith? This was for him a very upsetting prospect. At the Wurtzhaus on Harvard Square, we discussed the issue for several nights with both ardor and angst (the angst, I admit, was mainly Ted’s).

It was crucial for Ted to discover that Tillich’s understanding of ecstasy was not to be reduced to an “outburst of emotion.” Faith, Tillich had insisted, was an act of the centered self, which by “standing outside of itself” (ecstasy) is able to transcend both its rational and non-rational elements. When, at my suggestion, Ted read Tillich’s sermon on the Spiritual Presence, he was happily surprised to find that some of Tillich’s examples of a faith experience of the Spirit were almost mundane: e.g., (1) realization that one’s life is empty, but that there is a chance for new life; (2) an awakened desire for the sublime amidst the dullness and the profanity of the average day; (3) the ability to love, with the divine love, someone you profoundly dislike (Eternal Now, 85), etc.—nothing too ecstatic!

Even in ecstasy, Tillich argued, the Spirit works “with a soft but insistent voice”—much I would think like the prophet Elijah’s experience of the Lord, who came to him on Mt. Horeb, not in a strong wind, earthquake, or fire, but in “a still small voice” (1 Kings, 19:12). Around the time of our late night powwows on Tillich and ecstasy, Abraham Maslow was arguing as a psychologist that not all transcendent experiences are ecstatic (peak experiences); some might better be described as plateau experiences—the high plateau where one can stay calmly drawn to the divine transcendent in a quiet, consistent, enduring experience, like that of the new mother adoringly contemplating her infant child—an experience that was profound, without being ec-
static. Ted was clearly more comfortable on the plateau than at the peak. Tillich himself, on the other hand, was undoubtedly what Maslow termed a “peaker”—no stranger to ecstatic religious experience.

In case you are wondering, I did finally get to Oxford, (and I am happy that I did); I soon found that Great Britain was also in the midst of mild social upheaval and unusual theological excitement—overseas lecturers in Theology such as Karl Rahner, for example, drew large crowds during my year at Oxford. (I feel obliged to say MILD social upheaval, however, because unlike their protesting counterparts in Harvard, who had blown up the CIA offices clandestinely housed in the Asian Center, Oxford student rebels had scrawled their social grievances in chalk on the walls of Magdalene college, so that the signs and graffiti could later be safely erased. In England, Tillich was often discussed, but had nowhere near the clout that he was having in the United States. In my own experience, many English people had a hard time relating to notions such as angst or Ground of Being, viewing them as foreign philosophical categories. I remember especially a former RAF tail gunner, Bill M.—at this time, a manager of a large cigarette plant in Nottingham, who, upon overhearing his Oxbridge-bound son and companions hotly disputing the significance of angst, asked me for a brief rundown on the term. After hearing my explanation, he remarked that when he felt that way as a child, his grandmother would simply administer Castor Oil. For the English, was angst a kind of intellectual constipation?

This general English cultural resistance to some of Tillich’s Germanic and existential starting points was paralleled in Oxford’s theology faculty, which apart from the Scottish newcomer, John Macquarrie, and the innovator Maurice Wiles, typically understood theology as ending in the fifth century. When a contemporary systematic theology was attempted in England, as in the case of the theologian Bishop Ian Ramsay, the all-pervasive framework of analytic philosophy dominated the discussion. The closest we come in Ramsay to Tillich’s notion of an ecstatic faith is the sudden experience of “the penny dropping.” Tillich, you might recall, had once remarked that this analytic philosophy was good for sharpening the tools, but that it failed to address the most serious human questions.

But whether in the United States or in Great Britain, there were a number of ways in which Tillich’s thought either anticipated or at least resonated with some of the main cultural concerns and trends that emerged in these years. As early as 1952, in his classic work, The Courage to Be, Tillich had provided a powerful theoretical framework for understanding self-affirmation against the all-controlling authority of institutions. Tillich even found praise for Spinoza’s claim that human self-affirmation is a participation in the divine self-affirmation (22c). What about that for motivation?

But the youth of the Sixties struggled not only for individual self-affirmation. They also felt the urgent need for community. A very popular song of the day insisted that, “we all need someone to lean on.” But if Tillich supported the “courage to be as oneself,” he argued with equal vigor that the courage of self-affirmation “is an integral element of the courage to be as a part”—it also requires courage to be a part of the world and the community to which we belong. Despite some of their evident excesses (irrational exuberances), I believe that the hippie communes, protest songs, and landmark events such as Woodstock were intended to make an urgent plea for community. Last summer, in re-reading The Courage to Be, it struck me very clearly that Tillich had actually anticipated some of these major cultural developments and upheavals of the Sixties. I believe that this accounted to a great extent for his amazing popularity and his astonishing appeal to both young and old alike.

The powerful yearning for community among the young people of this era, which I had witnessed first hand in my younger neighbors on Harvard Avenue in Cambridge, was very much driven, it seemed to me, by a fear of the isolation and loneliness: something that seemed to go hand in hand with the advance of industrial society. Now Tillich had certainly warned of this danger both in his academic writings and in his sermons. It was the constant refrain in his cultural critique (as, e.g., in The Religious Situation) that the spirit of capitalism with its self-sufficient finitude coupled with the dominance of technological reason had created a deep alienation for modern men and women. This alienation was experienced as a widespread anxiety and loss of meaning in contemporary culture. The dominance of a technological society leads to a sense of isolation and loneliness. In the collection of Tillich’s sermons called The Eternal Now, he courageously addresses the question of loneliness head on in the sermon entitled “Loneliness and Solitude.”

A brief personal story might best convey the power of Tillich’s ideas on this subject. When I re-
reflect back on this sermon, I think of an old friend of mine, Bruno—an engineer, who was inclined to read neither sermons nor theology. We were in ski country in Vermont in the early 1970’s. Despite his reputation for gregariousness and partying, Bruno suddenly and unexpectedly succumbed to a deep sense of brooding and aloneness—declining to participate in any of the usual après-ski merriment of the lodge. He asked me if I had possibly brought along a book he could read. All I had with me was Tillich’s *Eternal Now* (good thing I hadn’t brought *The Courage to Be or Love, Power and Justice*). His attention quickly focused on the sermon, “Loneliness and Solitude.” After reflecting a long time on this sermon in front of the lodge fireplace, his whole demeanor began to change: his anxiety and discouragement began to dissipate. He had found both wisdom and comfort in Tillich’s message that aloneness is unavoidable as an integral part of human freedom; that loneliness is often our lot, even when surrounded by loved ones, friends, co-workers, or loads of people; that solitude, however, is not loneliness—that in solitude our inner self can be so transformed that our restlessness and loneliness are taken up in a deep, abiding peace.

In this masterful sermon, Tillich not only disclosed the universal and ontological source of human loneliness, but also claimed that the deep pain of this experience was a special pathology of contemporary culture—which, he wrote, “does everything possible to deprive us of the external conditions for solitude” (p. 22). I believe that Tillich’s insight would prove even more relevant today, in our world of the internet, cell phones, I-phones, blackberries, text messaging, e-mail, Facebook, wikis, blogging and tweeting. Are these not new devices to deprive us of our much-needed moments of solitude?

The Sixties and the Seventies were also a time when people longed for *freedom*: freedom from discrimination; freedom from war; freedom from the corporate mindset; freedom from oppressive institutions; freedom from conventional expectations, and freedom from bourgeois moralism. But for many of us with a religious background and concern, Tillich understood that we were longing before all else to be free from the burden of religion itself. You might well recall his sermon entitled “The Yoke of Religion” in the collection, *The Shaking of the Foundations*. He takes as his text for the sermon a famous quote from Matt. 11, in which Jesus invites his disciples: “Come unto me all you that labor and are heavily burdened, and I will give you rest” (v. 28). This passage, Tillich confides, was the text he had chosen for his confirmation ceremony in the church of his youth and friends and family were surprised that this text was his choice, since they felt that at his age and in his circumstances, he was far from “heavily burdened.” Tillich, however, was always convinced that the yoke of which Jesus was speaking is neither the labors of everyday existence nor the burden of sin or guilt. The context of the passage, he claimed, shows rather that the burden of which Jesus speaks is the burden of religion and that the yoke is the yoke of the law. Tillich, even at a young age, obviously felt this burden. Many of us who passed through the period of which I am speaking also felt very keenly the heavy yoke of religion. We tried to free ourselves from this yoke, rebelling in many ways against the authoritarian pronouncements of the church and the absolute demands of biblical texts. But Tillich knew that such rejection would be an impossible and unsustainable solution. For while, on the one hand, we cannot sustain the emptiness of skepticism, neither can we return to the Yoke of Religion with the kind of fanatical and irrational zeal that such a return would require. What Jesus had in mind was not a return to a set of laws, dogmas, or moral injunctions. It is rather to accept the sweet and easy yoke of the New Being, for which we need only be open and accepting: the New Being that is the being of love and justice and truth. The law of the New Being is not imposed from without; rather we experience it in the creative depths of our own being. Elsewhere Tillich refers to this experience of the Law from within as Theonomy.

I believe that the popular Jesuit poet and political activist of the Sixties, Fr. Daniel Berrigan, also had a deep understanding of the implications of Tillich’s exhortation to throw off the yoke of religion. Berrigan’s advice to young people on matters of sexual morality (remember this is also the time of the Vietnam War and protests at home) was simply this: “Ask yourself three questions—whose flesh am I touching and why? Whose flesh am I recoiling from and why? Whose flesh am I burning”? Here was a case of Theonomy in action: an appeal to what Bernard Häring, the German moral theologian, was describing at this time as the Law of Christ as opposed to Canon Law and religious authoritarianism.

From another perspective, Tillich’s notion of faith as reason in ecstasy was never meant to be un-
derstood as a purely mystical or transcendent event. Nor was faith to be equated with an exclusively inner-personal experience. For Tillich, faith necessarily entails a call to duty and an appropriate ethical response. Love without justice is vague and ineffective. As Tillich’s thought became more and more influential during these years, all of us owed a great deal to leaders, such as James Luther Adams, Ron Stone, Mary Ann Stenger, Tom Driver, and Jean Richard, to mention a few, for a continual reminder of the political and social demands of Tillich’s thought. It would have been misguided and even tragic to neglect the early Tillich in favor of a one-sided inner psychological theology that dominated the American period.

Let me end my reminiscences with a return trip to Harvard and the Tillich Archives. Things were very alive at the archives during this period, especially with the publication of Hannah’s controversial book, From Time to Time. The archivist at the time, a very conscientious, fine young Methodist minister, named Ken, was devastated by the new kind of notoriety Tillich was receiving. He took me down to the archives one day, showed me the vast collection of writings and proclaimed with deep conviction: “Ray, no one could have written all this material and still have time for all that philandering—it’s just impossible.” I was not totally convinced of his argument, but I did think he had made a salient point.

While still at the archives I also came across a reference to a symposium Tillich had held with Columbia philosopher, John Herman Randall, Jr. Randall was not only a highly influential philosopher and historian of philosophy, he was a recognized leader of the Humanist movement in the U.S. It would be a real research find for me, if I could locate a transcript or tape of this encounter, since my doctoral dissertation was on Tillich’s critique of the Secular Humanists. Somewhere I uncovered in the archive stacks a hand written list of Tillich tapes and their location. The Tillich/Randall Symposium (held at Amherst in 1958) was listed among the tapes preserved in the private archives of the “Reverend Peter John.” Peter John, who had been a legendary devoted follower and fan of Tillich from the latter’s days at Union Theological Seminary seemed to me to have taped almost every word Tillich had spoken during his American career. He was currently serving as a Methodist pastor for a very small farm community on the Massachusetts-Vermont border. When I called, he was delighted to have contact with an academic visitor who wanted to talk about Tillich. And so it happened that on a beautiful October day, I drove up for a visit to Peter’s country church. Peter John was excited to talk about Tillich and led me to a large room where he had a whole collection of Tillich writings, tapes, letters, and notes. While I failed to discern any order in the collection, the pastor had no trouble in immediately locating my tapes. I taped the Amherst Symposium right on the spot and when I replay it, I can hear the whistle from the train that passed by at regular intervals, as well as the occasional lowing of cows.

The exchanges that took place between Tillich and Randall did not offer a head-on collision between humanist and theologian. It was not until the end of the debate (if it could be called that) that the differences between the two thinkers became clearer and more significant. It seems, for one thing, that Randall was not happy with Tillich’s term “ultimate concern” to describe what Randall simply referred to as “the religious transaction.” Without expanding too much on his objection, he nevertheless suggested that the term “ultimate concern” lends itself too easily to religious fanaticism. He far preferred the less dramatic term “an organizing concern.”

In a post 9/11 world, still faced with the dangers of religiously inspired terrorism and violence, many might be inclined to agree with Christopher Hitchens that “God is not Good” and that “Religion Poisons Everything.” Is it possible in retrospect that Randall was right after all in resisting the idea of religion as ultimate concern?

Tillich, for his part, certainly recognized the ambiguous character of religion and of the Holy on which it is based. The Holy, Tillich argued, was not only creative and constructive, but could also be demonic and ultimately destructive. In The Dynamics of Faith, he wrote that, “our ultimate concern can destroy us as it can heal us” (18). To Christopher Hitchens, I believe that Tillich might have responded, “Religion does not poison everything—but it certainly does poison an awful lot.” Provided our faith is genuinely directed toward the truly Ultimate, i.e., “the God above the God of theism,” we can still say with conviction that GOD IS GOOD!

Those of us who were inspired by Tillich and wrestled with his thought during this spirited decade and a half following his death found in him a Path, a Source, and a Guide: a PATH to spiritual freedom from the yoke of heteronomous religion; a creative
SOURCE for connecting our religious and secular selves, and a GUIDE to a courageous acceptance of our own human finitude—“the acceptance of being accepted” (Courage to Be, 177).

Since all of us from that generation have entered our so-called “golden years,” I suspect that we might also have today an even deeper and more personal grasp of the significance of Tillich’s “Absolute Faith,” which courageously “says Yes to being” in the face of doubt and the ever looming threat of nonbeing.

To the younger group of Tillich scholars, I can only offer my esteem and words of congratulations and encouragement for what seems to me (thanks to Fred’s wonderful Bulletin) to be an outpouring of original and significant insights into Tillich’s thought. Are we perhaps entering a new stage in which the power of Tillich’s thought is once again asserting itself with a new energy and restored vitality? Those of us who lived through the wonderful, exhilarating years of the Sixties and Seventies wish you continued excitement and success in relating Tillich to the Twenty-first century. It is with much confidence and hopefulness that we pass the baton to you—a new generation of Tillich scholars.

Tillich, Augustine, and Pauline Hermeneutics

COURTNEY WILDER

I. Introduction

In Paul Tillich’s A History of Christian Thought, compiled from his lectures at Union Theological Seminary and the University of Chicago, he says, “I would say, almost unambiguously, that I myself, and my whole theology, stand much more in the line of the Augustinian than in the Thomistic tradition. We can trace a line of thought from Augustine to the Franciscans in the Middle Ages, to the Reformers, to the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the German classical philosophers, including Hegel to the present-day philosophy of religion…”1 What does Tillich mean by this claim, and in what way is he Augustinian?

Although Tillich describes his relation to Augustine in a genealogical way, Augustine’s and Tillich’s respective readings of I Corinthians reveal three important and more direct influences of Augustinian theology on Tillichian method. First, both regard the philosophical, social, linguistic, and rhetorical tools available to them as appropriate for proper biblical and theological interpretation, a position that is crucial to the method of correlation as Tillich develops it. Second, each grounds this claim explicitly in his reading of Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, thus following the same model of establishing scriptural authority for theological method (although, as I describe below, they do not read Paul in the same way.) Finally, although each identifies a different pitfall of idolatry, their respective accounts of the human relation to God are similar, and for each, biblical interpretation and theological method emerge accordingly.

In his On Christian Teaching (habitually shortened to its Latin initials and thus known as DDC), Augustine provides a nuanced approach to biblical interpretation, including an influential discussion of signs and how they function in the Bible. This discussion presumes the thoughtful and appropriate use of non-biblical interpretive and rhetorical techniques. Similarly, in his three-sermon series entitled “The Theologian,” from The Shaking of The Foundations, Tillich gives a reading of Paul that connects exegesis, the method of correlation, and preaching. For both, issues of Christian identity and of idolatry are always in the foreground.

II. Augustine’s Reading of Paul

For Augustine, what is at stake in the problem of proper biblical interpretation is no less than the continuation of Christianity itself. He opens the DDC with this observation: “There are two things on which all interpretation of scripture depends: the process of discovering what we need to learn, and the process of presenting what we have learnt.” One reads the Bible not only for one’s own spiritual growth, but also to prepare one to edify others. Augustine recognizes that the Bible is difficult to read, particularly for those Christians who do not have the benefit of his extensive education. He observes, “[C]asual readers are misled by problems and ambiguities of many kinds, mistaking one thing for another. In some passages they find no meaning at all that they can grasp at, even falsely, so thick is the fog created by some obscure phrases.”3 This is a problem not only because a reader might be con-
fused or frustrated, but also because misunderstanding scripture impedes one’s relationship to God.

Ever mindful of God’s sovereignty, he holds that God must have ordained the difficult situation in which human beings find themselves with respect to the Bible. He writes that God, like human doctors, can heal through a contrary: “Because human beings fell through pride, [God’s wisdom] used humility in healing them. We were deceived by the wisdom of the serpent; we are freed by the foolishness of God.”

However, God did not leave us without instructions.

Before turning directly to scripture, Augustine embarks on a lengthy discussion of language. For Augustine the study of scripture must begin with an understanding of the basic function of language: it is to communicate. Augustine writes, “All teaching is teaching of either things or signs, but things are learnt through signs.” He argues that “things” are objects, whose name when spoken or written is intended to simply denote the thing. Sometimes a rock is a rock. Signs, however, are “those things which are employed to signify something.” Sometimes, a rock means something else, as in Genesis 28:11, when Jacob, traveling away from his hometown, settles in for the night and selects a stone for a pillow. There are two kinds of signs, according to Augustine, natural signs and given ones. A natural sign is one that signifies something else incidentally, without intending to do so: a footprint reveals that an animal has passed by; smoke is a sign of fire.

Given signs, intentional communications, are much more relevant to Augustine’s larger discussion of language and of biblical interpretation. He writes, “Given signs are those which living things give to each other, in order to show...the emotions of their minds or anything that they have felt or learnt.” The purpose of signification is communication. Moreover, “…even the divinely given signs contained in the holy scriptures have been communicated to us by the human beings who wrote them.”

Language is modeled after the natural world, in that words, like natural signs, are used to signify things. Scripture, as communication from God recorded by human beings, takes the form of language, and God uses words to signify things. We must read scripture with all this in mind. “The aim of [readers of scripture] is simply to find out the thoughts and wishes of those by whom it was written down and, through them, the will of God, which we believe these men followed as they spoke.”

God is also, on Augustine’s reading, thoughtful about the whole process, providing human beings with vivid imagery and compelling narratives. Augustine compares a summary statement of important theological principles with a passage from the Song of Songs, and muses,

Surely, one learns the same lesson as when one hears it in plain words without the support of the imagery? And yet somehow it gives me more pleasure to contemplate holy men when I see them as the teeth of the church tearing men away from their errors and transferring them into its body, breaking down their rawness with biting and chewing. And it is with the greatest of pleasure that I envision the shorn ewes, their worldly burdens set aside like fleeces, ascending from the pool (baptism) and all giving birth to twins (the two commandments to love), with none of them failing to produce this holy fruit. Augustine concludes that it is the wonderful work of the Holy Spirit visible here, meeting human beings’ needs for both entertainment and for spiritual nourishment.

Having established that biblical language functions in much the same way that ordinary language does, and that God employs language in his communication with human beings, Augustine takes up the problem of understanding these communications. In an exegetical move that Tillich will also make, Augustine turns to Paul for help, relying heavily on I Corinthians in formulating his hermeneutical method. He refers briefly to I Corinthians 9:9-10, which reads in full, “For it is written in the law of Moses, ‘You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing out the grain.’ Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Or does he not speak entirely for our sake? It was indeed written for our sake, for whoever plows should plow in hope and whoever threshes should thresh in hope of a share in the crop.” Augustine points out that Paul’s position here is that while sometimes when Scripture refers to oxen, it is indeed for oxen that God is concerned, but that in this instance—here Paul is citing Deuteronomy 25:4—God has other concerns.

Augustine writes, “Signs are either literal or metaphorical. They are called literal when used to signify the things for which they were invented: as, for example, when we say bovum, meaning the animal that we and all speakers of Latin call by that name. They are metaphorical when the actual things which we signify by the particular words are used to signify something else: when, for example, we say bovum and...understand ‘worker in the gospel,’
which is what scripture, as interpreted by the apostle Paul, means...”\textsuperscript{12} So, on Paul’s reading of this passage of Deuteronomy, God intends to refer to human beings, and the oxen are merely part of a figure of speech. Sometimes the word “oxen” might simply be a sign for oxen. Sometimes, as in this passage of Deuteronomy, “oxen” might mean something else entirely. Thus, says Augustine, Paul demonstrates for us a hermeneutical method that relies on symbol.

Augustine goes on to develop an elaborate schema of interpretation wherein scripture has four senses and must be read accordingly; he takes this approach up from Origen and it holds sway through the medieval period. Although this is a fascinating aspect of Augustine, and of scriptural interpretation in general, a closer investigation of this method is well outside the scope of this paper, except to note that Tillich does not adopt this paradigm in his own interpretation.

III. Augustine and Non-Biblical Resources

Much more relevant to Tillich’s description of the method of correlation and to Tillich’s reading of Paul in his sermons discussed below, is what Augustine is doing but not explicitly discussing in this section of DDC. As Francis Young points out, Augustine develops his approach to exegesis, and simultaneously his approach to Christian pedagogy, in a social context that placed high value on rhetoric. Young argues, “Despite his introduction of novelties, the most obvious being his substitution of the biblical literature for classical texts, his discussion of the language and interpretation of scripture draws upon the conventional methods of literary analysis practiced in the grammatical and rhetorical schools.”\textsuperscript{13} Augustine’s own education provided him with the interpretive and rhetorical skills he needed to read and proclaim the Bible.

Augustine’s intellectual background prior to his conversion to Christianity was robust; he was trained in philosophy and rhetoric, and schooled in Christian doctrine by Ambrose, Bishop of Milan. When he became Bishop of Hippo, he undertook intensive study of scripture, and, as R.H.P. Green notes, he brought the full force of his education to that study: “...[H]e had spent half his life as a teacher of secular studies. There is a great deal of the ancient schoolmaster and professor in Augustine: a conviction of the importance of detail, a devotion to what he sees as consistency of interpretation, a reverence for canonical texts as authorities.”\textsuperscript{14}

To be sure, Augustine is very clear about his intellectual and spiritual priorities, making a distinction between that which is to be enjoyed and that which is to be used. He writes, in an argument that has drawn much modern commentary, “To enjoy something is to hold fast to it in love for its own sake.... The things that are to be enjoyed...are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the Trinity that consists of them.”\textsuperscript{15} Things that are to be used include other human beings, a position which Augustine nuances later in his thinking. Other things to be used, rather than enjoyed and loved for their own sake, are philosophical positions and secular education. Indeed, even specifically religious education ought always to be directed toward our relation to God. As C. Clifton Black argues, “The ultimate aim of education is the discovery and arousal of our love for God. Though we may think we have begun to search for God through the interpretation of scripture, in Augustinian perspective the truth is actually the reverse. It is we who are interpreted by scripture, which reveals the God who is searching after us.”\textsuperscript{16}

Augustine’s concern here is the possibility of idolatry: that human beings might love something other than God, when they ought properly to be loving God with their whole hearts and souls and minds. However, once this has been made clear, he freely draws from the resources at his disposal when interpreting scripture. As Frederick Van Fleretan notes, “Augustine’s hermeneutic is strikingly interdisciplinary; within one theory, he embraces factors from ancient philosophy, the Bible, the arts and sciences of his day, and Christian writers before him.”\textsuperscript{17}

With that description of Augustine in mind, let us now turn to Tillich, who is similarly interdisciplinary, and who, I argue, grounds his method in Paul with a similar claim to Augustine’s. In his sermons, published in three volumes beginning in 1948, Tillich demonstrates how an existentialist reading of the Bible can be used to proclaim answers that are faithful renderings of God’s revelation and that are expressed using the cultural and philosophical framework of modern people. An understanding of their own predicament permits human beings to ask questions of the God whom Tillich argues is the focus of their ultimate concern; existentialist proclamations of the gospel message, such as those in Tillich’s sermons, answer these questions in terms of that human predicament.
IV. Tillich’s “The Theologian” Sermons

In Tillich’s three sermons entitled “The Theologian I, II and II,” published in The Shaking of the Foundations, he preaches on two passages from I Corinthians and one from Acts, and makes an argument remarkably similar to Augustine’s. Tillich is faced with a theological problem similar to Augustine’s—how ought modern people read the Bible—and offers a solution that is structurally the same as Augustine’s, although it differs significantly in content. In the sermons, as in his discussion of the method of correlation, Tillich argues that the Bible ought to be read in light of the intellectual resources available to Christians, and offers a hermeneutic that, like Augustine’s, is grounded in the writings of Paul. This claim is in keeping with Tillich’s larger theological enterprise, the method of correlation, discussed below.

Like Augustine, Tillich holds that his interpretive method is biblical and argues that in developing and employing his method he is following in the footsteps of Paul. While many of Tillich’s central theological claims, and his method of reading the Bible, differ significantly from Augustine’s, the way in which Tillich locates the theological rationale for his method is in the Bible is similar to Augustine’s own argument. So while Tillich does not, for instance, affirm the bodily resurrection, take up Augustine’s position with respect to the relationship between church and state, or pick up the Augustinian method of reading the Bible according to the four senses of scripture, Tillich does, like Augustine, argue that he is only following in Paul’s footsteps as he reads the Bible.

In the first of the three sermons, preached on I Corinthians 12:1-11, Tillich takes up the question of what theological knowledge is and what it means to have a theological existence. Like Augustine, he affirms the centrality of a Christian’s focus on God, saying, “Theological existence indicates the existence of one who is grasped, within the Church, by the Divine Spirit, and who has received the word of wisdom and knowledge.” God grasps us, such that our pursuit of God reflects God’s initiative. Tillich emphasizes that theologians have an ongoing question of God, and argues that it is the orientation toward God rather than the achievement of particular knowledge that is crucial. Similarly, Augustine writes, “Those who strive to behold the nature of God through their intellect place him above all visible and corporeal things, indeed above all intelligible

and spiritual beings, and above all beings that are subject to change…. All…are agreed that what they value above all other things is God.”

Throughout Tillich’s Systematic Theology, he employs the term “ultimate concern” to describe humankind’s relation to God. In this sermon he describes this experience, arguing that even the person who is “estranged from the Christian Church and its foundations, [who] does not feel the presence and the power of the Spirit, [who] is empty of spiritual knowledge, but…asks again and again the theological question, the question of an ultimate concern and its manifestations in Jesus as the Christ” would be accepted as a theologian. C. Clifton Black argues about Augustine,

Biblical study as an end in itself—or as merely a means to such secondary objectives as fulfilling requirements for a degree of eliciting facile answers to the burning questions of our day—would be, to Augustine’s thinking, nothing more than a practical expression of that idolatry summed up by Paul in Romans 1:25: humanity’s radically confused worship and service of the creature rather than the Creator.

To warn readers away from idolatry, Augustine distinguishes in the DDC between that which is loved for its own sake and that which is properly only used, a distinction Tillich would not have drawn. But Tillich does distinguish between the theologian, properly understood, and the person whose very certainty and self-confidence in his own knowledge demonstrates that “he does not fulfill even the first condition of theological existence, which is that one does not know whether he has experienced the Divine Spirit, or spirits which are not divine.” What is analogous in the two thinkers’ positions is this: in each case, the ongoing experience of pursuit after the genuine absolute, what Tillich has called the quest for New Being, is what distinguishes the Christian (for Augustine) and the theologian (for Tillich) from those who pursue other ends or who, mistakenly thinking they already possess God, fail to pursue anything at all.

For both thinkers, Christian existence is a two-way exchange, mediated through scripture. Tillich argues, “Theology expresses the faith of the Church. It restates the paradoxical statement, Jesus is the Christ, and considers all its presuppositions and implications. Theological existence indicates the existence of one who is grasped, within the Church, by the Divine Spirit, and who has received the word of wisdom and knowledge.” Like Augustine, Tillich
argues that God (here, God the Divine Spirit) guides the process of human biblical interpretation, and that the very event of interpretation is an aspect of God’s intention in giving human beings Scripture in the first place.

In his second sermon in this brief series, Tillich preaches on I Corinthians 9:19-23. Here he makes a claim analogous to Augustine’s de facto position that secular disciplines can inform one’s reading of the Bible, a claim that is central to Tillich’s description of the method of correlation. Taking Paul’s words, “To those under the Law I have become as one of themselves, to win those under the Law, although I am not under the Law myself,” Tillich proposes the following reading: “Let us replace the word ‘Law’ by ‘idealism’ not only because idealists are usually legalistic, but also because idealism is a noble attitude, which elevates us above the lower strata of our existence, and produces faith and devotion, just as the Law does.” This is more than an act of translation; Tillich is transforming the text into one that speaks about the worthiness of a particular philosophical approach. His choice to speak about idealism is not arbitrary, and neither does he elide the interpretive move he is making by too closely identifying idealism with ancient Jewish law. Instead Tillich employs the technique that he argues Christian theologians have always implied, correlating the questions of one’s own period with the answers in revelation.

In this sermon, he explicitly connects his theological method to Paul, in a move Augustine employs when developing his own interpretive techniques. Arguing that what is true for Paul in his ministry is true for theological existence generally, Tillich says, “The theologian, in his theology, must become all things to all men.” As the sermon unfolds, Tillich continues to interpret Paul’s words in terms of the intellectual situation of Tillich’s own period. He defends the theologian’s need to “...become a Platonist to the Platonists, a Stoic to the Stoics, an Hegelian to the Hegelians, a progressivist to the progressivists.”

With this claim Tillich moves from considering the existential state of the theologian, his focus of the first sermon, to how a theologian in that existential state must respond to the needs of the theologian’s community. Like Augustine, Tillich is grounding this claim in the writings of Paul, neatly grandfatherring in his own hermeneutical method as biblical in origin. Although neither uses this term explicitly, this technique functions as a sort of apostolic succession of theologians; at issue is not Peter’s role as bishop, but Paul’s as the first interpreter of the Christian situation.

A more Augustinian understanding of idolatry emerges in Tillich’s sermon, as he emphasizes that the theologian...

...utilizes [idealism] and states that it contains some truth which creates a continuous temptation for the theologian to become an idealist himself, and to deny the Cross which is the judgment over idealism. The theologian uses idealism, its concepts and methods. He becomes a Platonist to the Platonists, a Stoic to the Stoics, an Hegelian to the Hegelians, a progressivist to the progressivists. But he cannot confuse any of these forms of idealism with the Christian message.

The theologian, on Tillich’s reading of Paul, should freely use the cultural and intellectual tools available, but must avoid substituting them for or giving them the authority of the Christian message. The idea is not to become an idealist who worships an intellectual tradition, but to be a Christian theologian who is fluent in the languages of his or her culture. Although Tillich does not in this sermon raise the possibility of political or nationalistic idolatry, the danger of mistaking the finite for the absolute is all too clear in his experience.

Tillich is also deeply concerned with the intellectual integrity of the disciplines from which he says theologians can draw. He argues, “The theologian uses realism... But he does not say that realism is the Christian message. He does not fight for it in the name of Christianity. He knows the despair of mere realism, and he knows that there is a new Being which overcomes the self-destruction of reality.”

His approach is neither idolatrous—mistaking philosophy for gospel—nor totalizing—subsuming any and all intellectual disciplines into Christian thinking.

Tillich preaches his third sermon in this series on Acts 17:22-32, in which Paul preaches to the people of Athens on Mars Hill. He summarizes his first two sermons and then says, “This time let us think about the answering theologian who, in spite of his participation in the weakness and error of all men, is able to answer their questions through the power of his foundation, the New Being in Christ.”

First, Tillich elaborates on a theme from the first sermon, arguing that seeking after God, rather than certainty about God, is the mark of genuine religious experience. He says, “…[E]ven the atheists stand in God – namely, that power out of which they live, the
truth for which they grope, and the ultimate meaning of life in which they believe.”

Tillich argues that the citizens of Athens to whom Paul spoke were asking questions because they did not know the truth but did seek it. In other words, for Tillich as well as Augustine, they were positioned to be sought out by God through scripture. Paul formulated answers for them, because (as Tillich notes in the two prior sermons) he was grasped by the Divine Spirit and was willing to temporarily subsume himself in the worldview of his listeners in order to reach them. However, Tillich is explicit in his reminder that this task must be done carefully. He says, “Mankind is separated from its origin; it lives under a law of wrath and frustration, tragedy and self-destruction, because it produces one distorted image of God after another, and adores these images.” Paul is the model theologian for Tillich in part because he walks into Athens, speaks in the vernacular of those seeking the divine, and yet never ceases to preach Christ. Tillich continues, “The answering theologian must discover the false gods in the individual soul and in society. He must probe into their most secret hiding-places. He must challenge them through the power of the Divine Logos, which makes him a theologian…. No compromise or adaptation or theological self-surrender is permitted on this level.”

In describing the text this way, Tillich is again arguing for the biblical basis of his own theological method, and he is demonstrating the ways in which Paul’s preaching can function as a model for modern preachers who might seek to apply the method of correlation in their readings of the Bible and their sermons. Moreover, he is employing the distinction Augustine made, albeit somewhat differently than Augustine intended: there are things a theologian can use in the task of theology, but only God can be loved.

IV. Conclusion

Tillich’s method of correlation provides the organizational structure for each part of his theological enterprise: his systematic theology, his sermons, his theological anthropology, his soteriology, and his biblical exegesis. He sees the role of extra-theological disciplines, including philosophy, science, art, literature, and depth psychology, as offering human beings the means to ask the questions of their meaning and being. The task of the theologian is to answer these questions by interpreting the biblical texts so that they are meaningful for human beings; thus human questions are answered by divine revelation. Tillich spends his career systematizing this idea, which he emphasizes does not originate with him but with the Christian tradition.

What, then, does Tillich mean by his claim, cited at the beginning of this paper, that he is an Augustinian? Although Tillich suggests that he is Augustinian largely by means of his intellectual heritage, and Tillich does not specifically refer to Augustine as he is describing the method of correlation, Tillich’s enthusiastic use of non-religious disciplines in formulating human beings’ existential questions clearly has roots in Augustine’s own intellectual background. Like Augustine, he carefully and consistently prioritizes between ultimate concern and finite concerns, lest some other discipline or ideology assume an idolatrous role in his thought.

Finally, like Augustine, Tillich boldly turns to Paul as his theological forefather, arguing that for Christian theology, a rich intellectual heritage, always properly ordered, is in fact ordained in scripture. Although the two thinkers read Paul differently, and indeed the rest of the Bible as well, they each argue that Paul is demonstrating for Christians how Christian theology ought to be done. Augustine takes up Paul’s interpretation of Deuteronomy as a model for reading signs, while Tillich sees in Paul’s willingness to immerse himself in the worldview of his listeners a route into correlating existential questions with theological answers.

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**WEAKNESS OF BEING: A TACTICAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN PAUL TILlich’S DOCTRINE OF GOD AND MICHEL DE CERTEU**

CARL-ERIC GENTES

In *Systematic Theology,* Paul Tillich begins his discussion of the actuality of God by saying, “The being of God is being-itself. The being of God cannot be understood as the existence of a being alongside others or above others. If God is a being, he is subject to the categories of finitude.”1 These categories include space, substance, and causality. Yet, from this point in the text on, Tillich argues for a God who lives through creating, sustaining, and directing action, thereby positing divine agency without a divine agent. This paradox is a stumbling block for most forms of popular piety and even within the academy. And while most Tillichians may find Tillich’s doctrine of God philosophically accurate, not all would call it spiritually edifying. In light of this, I contend that help may be found in the budding discourse on practice, particularly within the work of Michel de Certeau and his notion of tactics. Engaging tactics will offer two substantial elements for Tillich scholarship: (1) it will reassert the pivotal role of the symbol of Jesus as the Christ within Tillich’s thought on divine agency, and (2) it will open a space for that agency to be considered under the symbol of the apocalyptic. More generally, I hope that this tactical encounter will present a more robust depiction of the divine life that resonates with Tillich’s call for catholic substance and popular piety’s desire for an active God.

**Tillich**

The movement from divine agency to human practices is admittedly more of a metaphysical leap than a natural step by any common theological logic. Therefore, there is need to defend the use of Certeau or any other theory of social interaction. However, I believe, such a defense is already given within Tillich’s discussion of the actuality of God as it is presented in volume one of *Systematic Theology.* Tillich’s argument follows a trajectory that begins with the being of God and ends with God’s activity of divine love. A simple outline of this argument follows.

God is being-itself or the ground of being. This is a non-symbolic statement. Anything else said about God is necessarily symbolic because it is based on the structural elements of being of which God is the structure. This includes the categories of relation, that is, substance and causality. Thus, the paradox of divine agency without a divine agent is more a distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic language than a metaphysical Rubik’s
cube. When speaking about God’s agency we are speaking symbolically and therefore attempting to speak concretely about the lived experience of God made know through revelation.

From this experience we appropriately say that God lives, in that God is the “eternal process in which separation is posited and is overcome by reunion.” As such, the assertion that God lives is also an assertion of the divine creativity. The divine creativity is understood in relation to the three modes of time affirming that God has created, is creating, and will creatively bring about God’s fulfillment. It is these three modes of time that provide us with God’s tripartite activity of original, sustaining, and directing creativity. God’s directing creativity is properly called providence, that is, one’s belief “that no situation whatsoever can frustrate the fulfillment of his ultimate destiny, that nothing can separate him from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus.”

This brings us to the last point of Tillich’s argument. He says, “The process of divine life has the character of love.” Love, as agape, is God’s creative activity by which God “accepts the other in spite of resistance. It suffers and forgives. It seeks the personal fulfillment of the other.” Love as the radical concern of completely finite beings points to the concreteness of a being-to-being relationship. However, when this creative act of love encounters the estranged creature that is universally caught up in the violation of love, the relationship is characterized by conflict symbolized by divine judgment or condemnation. As such, Tillich says, “condemnation is not the negation of love but the negation of the negation of love.” Thus, love is the answer to the question implied in finitude, and specifically the Christological answer offered in the symbol of Jesus as the Christ. And so it is that we find ourselves appropriately back at revelation and its criterion.

From this brief review, I conclude that any postulation of divine activity without an agent cannot begin with God in God’s asety but rather must begin with God as experienced in the existential situation of God’s creating, sustaining, and directing love. Therefore, I will use the epistemological key of Christ crucified and the existential situation of conflict between estranged humanity and God’s reconciling love as my point of departure. Since this encounter is understood by Tillich as a concrete being-to-being relationship, I find it appropriate, if not necessary, to entertain theories of social interaction. Michael de Certeau presents us with just such a theory, and it is to his work concerning human practices that I will now turn.

**Certeau**

Certeau’s book, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, is a collection of inquiries into the practices by which “everyday life invents itself by poaching in countless ways on the property of others.” As such, Certeau’s work does not focus on subjects that could be identified as the authors of these practices but rather looks at practices themselves as “ways of operating” that divulge an operational logic that is essentially relational. For my purposes here I will focus on Certeau’s distinction between strategic and tactical practices.

Certeau defines a strategy as that which “postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats can be managed.” Strategies claim power through the assertion of a place, e.g., a fortified position on a battlefield or from within an area of knowledge. On the other hand, a tactic is defined as “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus.”

Whereas strategies are the conquest of space, tactics are a “clever utilization of time.” They must take advantage of the moment due to their inability to claim a space of their own.

Certeau gives clarity to the interaction between strategies and tactics in the chapter, “Walking in the City.” Here, he describes strategies and tactics through the practices of city planning and city walking. The city planner devises a system of roads, sidewalks, traffic lights, parks, and shopping centers. This system seeks to organize and control how the city is to be used. The city planner is a strategic organizer of space. However, the plan for how the city should be used and how it is actually used by its inhabitants can be quite a different thing. Tacticians jaywalk, sleep on benches, and sit on steps. In the moment they use what is given for their own purposes. Closer to home we can see the battle between strategies and tactics on our campuses when sidewalks are constantly built where students have already worn paths in the grass.

This battle between strategies and tactics highlights a power relationship characterized by Certeau as a game between “the strong and the weak.” Strategies are an attempt to tame the untamed, to find language for the unspoken. A strategy’s claim to power comes through its ability through discourse to define and control. Tactics are then weak in that
they are always active within the strategic discourse that determines it. Therefore, a tactic’s weakness is defined by the “absence of power” in relation to the strategy’s “postulation of power.” Or, as Tillich might say, the strategist stands out of the chaos in order to impose a new economic order. By this claiming of power the strategist creates an economy by which its holdings are preserved and the tactic is left exposed—hence Certeau’s personification of the tactic as the homeless or the immigrant.

However, for Certeau, the strategy’s power is imperfect in that its discourse cannot account for the “immense remainder constituted by the part of human experience that has not been tamed and symbolized in language.” Thus, the cartographer’s sign to represent a living and breathing locale can only stand for its lack of descriptive power. The unspeakable cannot be spoken. It can only be denied. The unspeakable can only be labeled as less real. In this way tactics are apophatic practices inasmuch as they transcend or are beyond discourse. This apophatic quality makes any tactic a haunting presence for the strategist. It is, in not so many words, a brush with the holy, with the “quite other.” But, it is also at this limit between strategies and tactics that the munificent character of the apophtic gives way to the apocalyptic, a place and time when, as Tillich says, “the solid ground of ordinary reality is taken ‘out from under’ our feet.”

As I use it here, the apocalyptic does not stand for a literary genre but rather for the Pauline language of the “Apocalypse of Jesus Christ” (1 Cor. 1:7). In his book, The Scandalous God, Vitor Westhelle defines the apocalyptic as a search for the limits and margins of our claimed spaces. These escata are characterized by the intersection with an other. The apocalyptic, as used here, directs our vision to the intersection of strategies and tactics, that is, the battle line between the strong and the weak. For it is here that the line of definition becomes the “axis of inversion.” The tactician’s lack of a home becomes the freedom of the moment. At this limit the tactician poaches on the property of the other in order to subvert it, or even invert it, thus deriving strength from weakness.

**Tillich and Certeau**

Through the relationship between strategies and tactics, Certeau provides a framework for envisioning apophtic and apocalyptic practices that assert the agency of the weak, the agency of those without a place of power from which to act. The question in front of us is, can Certeau’s notion of tactics be applied to Tillich’s understanding of God? Can the God who is being-itself have a practice, that is, a particular way of operating? If we can say that God is a living God, then can we also say that God is a tactical God?

Answering these questions is, however, complicated. As I have already said, for Tillich, any account of divine agency can only be symbolic. Yet, Certeau’s concept of tactics is already symbolic inasmuch as it is a discourse that attempts to point to non-discursive practices for which it can never fully account for. Thus, there is a need to affirm and deny the reality of tactics at the same time. But this coincidence of symbolic language does not make that to which tactics point non-symbolic and therefore capable of standing alongside the category of being. I have flirted with suggesting the idea of tactic-itself but have decided that such a statement’s value lies solely in its ability to be provocative, rather than being able to communicate any discernable meaning. This said, tactic does not fit nicely into typical Tillichian symbolic speech the way other relational symbols do. While being relational and concerned with otherness, tactics disrupt these strategic categories as they are commonly understood and create something new out of them. In effect, when used alongside Tillich, tactics blur the line between the symbolic and non-symbolic. What follows is an account of what could happen in an encounter between Tillich’s doctrine of God and Certeau’s tactics. As such, it is both a description of that encounter and a performance of it.

**Tactically speaking, how is God related to God’s creation?**

A cursory reading could make us question any appropriation of tactics as the practice of a divine agent who is not a particular being. However, if we return to Certeau’s example of city planning, the blurred line between strategies and tactics will be much more apparent. To think of the city planner and the city as distinct from the city walker is misleading. The fact is that the city walker acts tactically in relation to his own bones, muscles, and ligaments just as much as the concrete of the sidewalk. It is also true that the city planner includes the city walker’s body in the planning just as much as she accounts for the proper dispersion of residential and commercial properties. Our spaces are designed with bodies in mind. Any time spent navigating our public spaces in a wheelchair attests to this truth.
The tactician has no place to call home, not even his own body. However, despite this homelessness, agency is not negated. For a Tillichian, to think of God tactically asserts that God does not have a space of God’s own demarcated from creation. God, like the peripatetic tactic, is always in the “space of the other” as the other’s creative ground and structure. As such, the structure of being is not that structure imposed upon being by an act of power, that is, a strategic action. Rather, as its ground, being-itself assumes a position of weakness, which allows creation to take a strategic position against it.

**Tactically speaking, how does creation relate to God?**

For Tillich, humans—defined as finite freedom—stand out of the ground. As existence is defined by the categories of finitude, creation is quite literally a strategic act by which the creature claims a “space” of its own over against the infinite ground. Like Tillich’s concurrence of creation and fall, strategic practice is also an act that ends in estrangement. Here again the relational quality of strategies and tactics needs to be addressed. The relationship between God and creature cannot be thought of as though in any one moment one was being capable of acting strategically or tactically, because existence itself is already a strategic stance against essence. It is the actualization of potential. It is a definition for the indefinable. It is this strategic position by which the creature attempts to escape from God through an act of freedom. Thus the universality of estrangement means the universality of a strategic stance against the divine. However, such a decisive statement must immediately be tempered with ambiguity. Just as life is the ambiguous mixture of essence and existence, so is it the ambiguous mixture of strategies and tactics precisely because tactics have no place of their own. Tactics are always active within and behind strategies. Any discursive practice is founded upon its need to account for the non-discursive and the non-discursive tactic is the creative force behind new strategic discourses.

From the side of the divine, this sustaining creative force that permits the strategic is nothing less than love. It is agape which, as was said before, “accepts the other in spite of resistance. It suffers and forgives. It seeks the personal fulfillment of the other.” Such love is necessary because creaturely existence universally rejects this love. Yet, this resistance cannot thwart God’s directing activity that as Tillich says, “creates through the freedom of man and through the spontaneity and structural wholeness of all creatures,” especially, “their resistance against the divine activity and through the destructive consequences of this resistance.” Speaking tactically, God, as the immigrant, uses the laws of the land. God poaches off of all that is provided by finite freedom; using freedom’s creations for God’s own purposes without destroying them. Tillich calls this activity revelation.

Revelation, when approached tactically, allows for the discussion of the apocalyptic within Tillich. Vitor Westhelle is again helpful as he describes the apocalyptic as “a margin that marks the critical turning point of transition and the axis of inversion from one state to the other.” Tillich identifies this point of transition in the symbol of the eschaton, as that which symbolizes the transition from the temporal to the eternal. However, the eschaton can also point to the axis by which the eternal becomes the temporal as symbolized by the doctrine of creation, essence becomes existence as symbolized by the doctrine of the fall, and existence becomes essence as symbolized by the doctrine of salvation. By focusing on these eschata, we can recognize that the apocalyptic end of the world does not point to a time of creation’s demise but rather the limits of this finite world, the border beyond which creation encounters its other. Likewise, the end of history does not determine a time for the cessation of time but rather a place where the strategic demarcation of chronological space is invaded by the other’s seizing of the moment, thus making the end of time also the time of coming. These eschata are then coincidentally kairos and cannot be diminished to a generic or even mystical affirmation of God’s presence through a “fullness of time” but must be acknowledged as a particular place and time of divine activity. These kairos, as Tillich reminds us in his simple definition, mark a time—and I believe place—in which something can be done.”

These little eschata and kairos mark the places where God’s providential activity happens. Yet they do so, not by the merit of their locale or timing, but through their participation in that which is their criterion: the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ. The cross of Christ is The Eschaton, the Great Kairos, or as Saint Paul would say, “the Apocalypse of Jesus Christ.” As the ultimate center of history, it is the place and time where God’s radical absence in the strategic conquest of existence over essence is simultaneously the place and time of God’s radical presence in the tactical inversion of death into life.
However, if we read Saint Paul’s apocalypse of Jesus Christ as shorthand for Tillich’s affirmation that there is no revelation without salvation and no salvation without revelation, then it becomes apparent that the final revelation of Jesus as the Christ is not only the criterion for final revelation, but also the criterion for the divine activity. The moment of God’s revelation is simultaneously the place of God’s saving action. The following lengthy quote from Certeau gives flesh to the criterion of revelation particularly well when read in a Tillichian register:

It takes advantage of “opportunities” and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. What it wins it cannot keep. This nowhere gives [it] mobility, to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected.23

The moments and places of God’s revealing and saving activity are fragmentary and constantly sacrifice their finitude, “being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plain raids. What it wins it cannot keep.” Outside the moment, these kairos become knowledge about kairos.24 Removed from the place, these eschaton become photo journals framing only a snapshot of the whole. Even the symbol of Christ Crucified is handed over to the powers of strategic conception that attempt to make the no-place of Golgotha into a place that can be controlled. Turned into form, these places of eschaton and moments of kairos can only be the site of God’s tactical art in the search for a new opportunity. We can only await a Second Coming(s). As the criterion for the little eschaton and kairos, the sites of God’s providential love, Jesus as the Christ may be characterized as the tactician par excellence. As a human face for the God’s creating, sustaining, and directing love, Jesus reveals the divine life, being-itself, as distinctly tactical.

In conclusion, I am compelled to let my propensity for provocation to have the last word. Is the language of tactic symbolic or not? Could tactic be used as another word for the “power of being”? Or, is tactic “stronger”? Even though Certeau derives his notion of tactics from his observation of the practices of everyday life, might these, as Tillich would call them, “segments of finite experience”25 actually be non-symbolic? Might tactic not point to the divine due to its participation in the power of the divine, but might tactics actually be that power—a power concretely observable in the ways everyday life invents itself?

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3 Ibid, 253.
5 Ibid, 279.
6 Ibid, 281.
7 Ibid, 283.
9 Ibid, 36.
10 Ibid, 33.
12 Ibid, 34.
13 Ibid, 38.
14 I am unable to fully develop this allusion to Tillich’s relationship of creation and fall in this proposal. Also see, Certeau, xiii.
15 Ibid, 61.
16 Tillich, ST 1, 116.
18 Certeau, 37.
19 Tillich, ST 1, 281.
20 Tillich, ST 1, 266.
21 Westhelle, 157.
23 Certeau is describing tactics not God, but the use of “it” allows for my own tactical appraisal. Certeau, 37.
24 Tillich, ST 1, 129.
25 Tillich, ST 1, 239.
The Experience of Grace Revealed to the Church: Tillich and Rahner on Method and Sacrament

Kyle K. Schiefelbein

The second half of the twentieth century saw an attempt to bring the Lutheran and Roman Catholic traditions into dialogue. The third in a long series of Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue dealt with the issue of the Eucharist (the second had dealt with baptism). Instead of discussing the concept of sacrament and how it relates to the actual sacraments and the church, the theologians chose the doctrine of the Eucharist as sacrifice as its starting point, giving the Catholic side an advantage over the Lutheran.

This essay is an attempt to choose a new starting point for future discussions by beginning with a theology of sacrament from whichologies of the individual sacraments and the church may be derived. To aid in this goal, this essay looks at a theological representative from both sides: Paul Tillich for the Lutherans and Karl Rahner for the Catholics. This essay discusses their theology of sacrament, beginning with an outline of their individual theologies, followed by a comparison. Although the goal of this essay is not to reach an agreement on the theology of sacrament, it is hoped that this approach can benefit future dialogue.

Sacrament: Tillich and Sacrament

A quick glance at the three volumes of Tillich’s Systematic Theology would not yield much on the concept of sacrament. His explicit treatment of the topic is in Part IV on the Spiritual Presence, where he writes that, “the Spiritual Presence is effective through the Word and the sacraments.” He goes on to speak of the sacraments as one of the modes of communication. Although this section of his Systematic Theology is rather short, Tillich’s understanding of sacrament is much greater. This is compounded by the fact that Tillich’s method relies heavily on a theology of symbol, about which much has been written. It will suffice in this essay to mention that a symbol participates in the reality to which it points, and an intrinsic relationship exists between the signifier and the thing signified, which is how traditional sacramental theology describes the relationship between the sacramentum and the res sacramentii.

Liturgical scholar Maxwell Johnson has proposed that “Tillich does not have a sacramental theology; his theology itself is sacramental, based on a particular vision of reality ontologically related to the mystery which is the ground and power of being itself.” Johnson does not employ the traditional definition of sacramental theology with its theology of specific sacraments; rather, Johnson’s understanding of Tillich’s sacramental theology revolves around three theological concepts: revelation, Christology, and ecclesiology. This three-part delineation of Tillich’s theology of sacrament is followed below.

Revelation

Tillich holds revelation to be a vital part of his theology: “Revelation is the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately. The mystery which is revealed is of ultimate concern to us because it is the ground of our being.” Tillich identifies different marks of revelation; one of these marks, mystery, is when something hidden is revealed in a special way. Even after the revelation, the mystery remains. Instead of being some abstract notion, revelation of the mystery comes to someone in a concrete situation as a two-sided event: a subjective side, where someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mystery; and an objective side, through which the mystery grasps someone. Another of these marks, miracle, speaks to the giving part of revelation. This giving happens through “sign-events,” which are received in faith.

Unlike Barth, Tillich believes that nature can be a medium of revelation. Since every person and thing participates in the ground and meaning of being, nothing can be excluded from being the bearer of the mystery of being. Here Tillich distinguishes his thought from natural revelation; nature itself does not have a revelatory character but can be used for revelation. This, of course, includes the sacramental elements. The basic medium for revelation is the “word” because revelation cannot be understood without the word of interpretation; it is a necessary element in all forms of revelation. Tillich connects this medium of revelation to the doctrine of the Incarnation by stating that “‘word’ can only be made the all-embracing symbol of the divine self-manifestation if the divine ‘Word’ can be seen and tasted as heard.”

Through revelation, the medium of revelation becomes a “sacramental object,” no matter its type. For this reason Tillich notes that media of revelation can become idols by being elevated above and taking the place of that which is mediated through them; thus, he states that the one criterion for evalu-
ating revelation is the event of Jesus as the Christ, which he calls the “final” revelation and the “Word of God.” This Word is not speech or language. Instead, it is the Logos that communicates in all revelation, either as the medium of creation, of history, or of final revelation, which is the incarnate Logos himself. The Word is therefore sacramental.

Tillich reinforces this argument by looking at the very nature of words themselves. Words as natural phenomenon can become bearers of transcendent power. The sound and meaning of words are bound together so that it is impossible to separate the natural power of words from being the bearer of its power of meaning. This natural power, becoming a potential bearer of transcendent power, can make the word a sacramental word.14

Christology

The criterion of Jesus as the Christ leads to Johnson’s second concept of Tillich’s theology of sacrament, Christology. “If a symbol, by [Tillich’s] definition, participates in that to which it points, opens up levels of reality which are otherwise closed, is transparent to those realities and denies its own ultimacy in the process of signifying, then Jesus as the Christ is the symbol par excellence.”15

Tillich identifies the paradox of all Christianity as the assertion that the New Being has appeared in Jesus as the Christ.16 One of the concepts of this paradox is the doctrine of the Incarnation, which traditionally states that God has become man. Tillich disagrees with this assertion, stating that it does not make sense. The transformative tone in the verb “become” makes it sound as if the Incarnation causes Jesus to lose his God-ness. Jesus cannot become something that is not God. Jesus as the Christ participates in the reality of God; thus, as symbol Jesus participates in the New Being to which he points.

Tillich prefers the Johannine interpretation of the Incarnation, where the “Logos became flesh,” meaning that the divine self-manifestation in God participates in human existence.17 As mentioned above, Jesus is the revelation of God’s self through the medium of the Word. The reality of God as the ground of being and being-itself is otherwise closed to humans, but as symbol Jesus opens up that ability as being the medium of revelation. Because of this, no sacrament can be understood apart from its relation to the New Being in Jesus Christ and apart from history.18

Christ fulfills all the necessary requirements for a symbol and is the medium of “final” revelation; thus, Christ is the Ursakrament, or primordial sacrament. This concept of primordial sacrament is a significant part of Vatican II Roman Catholic sacramental theology, but Tillich himself also uses that language and calls Christ the source of all the sacraments in the church.19 Langdon Gilkey, one of Tillich’s students, also describes this concept when referring to Christ as symbol.20

Ecclesiology

An integral part of Tillich’s Christology is his understanding of the church, which is Johnson’s third theological concept of sacrament. What ecclesiology would call “church,” Tillich refers to as “Spiritual Community,” which is a religious community “consciously based on the appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.”21 The Spiritual Community can be described with the traditional marks of the church, and these marks are based on the community’s foundation in the New Being. Each individual church, as a specific historical gathering, shares in these marks because of its nature of actualizing the Spiritual Community.22

The New Being in the Spiritual Community relates to Tillich’s understanding of symbol. Since the church is a manifestation or revelation of the Spiritual Community, it participates in and points to the reality of the Spiritual Community without being this reality itself. Since a symbol through a medium of revelation can be called a sacrament, the church is a sacrament of that community.23

The Spiritual Community experiences the presence of God through the sacraments:

The largest sense of the term [sacramental] denotes everything in which the Spiritual Presence has been experienced; in a narrow sense, it denotes particular objects and acts in which a Spiritual community experiences the Spiritual Presence; and in the narrowest sense, it merely refers to some “great” sacraments in the performance of which the Spiritual Community actualizes itself.24

The New Being in Jesus as the Christ is actualized through the Spiritual Community.

Tillich poses his understanding of the origin of the sacraments in this discussion. As was stated earlier, anything can become a sacrament. Sacramental symbolism is mostly connected with different stages in one’s life (rites of passage) or with sacred legend (the Eucharist), but above all this symbolism is asso-
ciated with the ritual activities of the group. The group is free to appropriate all symbols that are adequate to the needs of the group and possess symbolic power. The only criterion Tillich places on sacramental selection is that these acts “must refer to the historical and doctrinal symbols in which revelatory experiences leading to the central revelation have been expressed, for example, the crucifixion of the Christ or eternal life.”

Tillich’s theology of sacrament is dependent on his theology of symbol as expressed through the concepts of revelation, Christology, and ecclesiology. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ, who is the Ursakrament, is mediated and is made present in the Spiritual Community through the sacramental act, which is actualized in history by the church. The church itself is a sacrament of the Spiritual Community since it participates in and points to the Community.

**Rahner and Sacrament**

Compared to Tillich, Rahner has a more extensive collection of writings dealing with sacraments. As one of the theologians of the Second Vatican Council, Rahner’s influence on sacramental understanding in Roman Catholicism cannot be overstated. His theology of symbol has also greatly influenced twentieth century theology. As was the case with Tillich’s theology of symbol, this essay will not take on an explanation of Rahner on symbol; much has already been written about that. Suffice it to say, both theologians hold somewhat similar understandings of symbol, which will become clearer when these theologians are compared. Rahner and Tillich approach sacrament through different means; Tillich, as was demonstrated above, embeds sacrament into his theological concepts of revelation, Christology, and ecclesiology. Although Rahner’s theology of sacrament is more explicit, one can still divide it into different themes: Word and Christ, the Church, and the Nature of the Sacraments.

**Word and Christ**

In a short essay entitled “What is a Sacrament?”, Rahner attempts to approach the topic from a different perspective. In light of the Council and the ecumenical movement, he challenges (without dismissing) the traditional approach so that more fruitful discussions may occur between Catholics and Protestants. Influenced by Protestant, namely Lutheran, theologians, Rahner proposes a new starting point in discussing the Word and Christ.

Vatican II brought with it a change in the understanding of “word.” Previous generations of theologians thought of word as the bearer of objective truths, so that their task was to differentiate between word and sacrament as much as possible. This is the view that was taken by Augustine and was especially visible in the Reformation controversies. The new task of theology is to, according to Rahner, “work out the essential character of the word uttered in the Church and through the Church as event of grace—in other words as the word which is in principle exhibitive, and, moreover, exists in the Church as the eschatological presence of God’s salvation in the world.” This understanding allows the sacrament to be a specific word-event within a theology of the word. Rahner warns against interpreting the word as the primary part of the sacrament, although some sacraments, such as penance and matrimony, consist solely in the nature of the word. This theology of the word is how Rahner interprets the call of the Council to recognize that the proclamation of the Word is the genuine presence of the Lord as bringing about salvation through event. As Rahner writes, “The word pronounced in the Church in the name and at the behest of God and Christ has in principle an exhibitive character, that it effects what it signifies, to express it straightway in the formula which is classic to the theology of the sacraments.”

Words have essential distinctions, which Rahner demonstrates by comparing them to secular words. These two types of words have the same nature, but they vary on different levels of significance. Words that teach doctrine are not on the same level as words that proclaim absolution to the individual. The word that is preached in the context of the church achieves the fullness of its own nature when it has an exhibitive character—when that which it expresses is brought about through that word so that it is addressed to the hearer in ways that bring about the hearer’s salvation. Rahner makes the connection that the event character of the word could lead to an understanding of the Eucharist as being a sacramental word since the proclamation of the Lord’s death, which brings about salvation in the Eucharist, takes place within the community.

What truly distinguishes the word of God as revelation from a human word about God is grace, which by its very nature is exhibitive. Rahner refers to this as the “Copernican revolution,” which is a transition from the traditional understanding of grace being an isolated event that brings about a supplementary effect, to a new understanding where grace
is primordial. Grace is a radical opening of one’s total consciousness to God brought about by God’s self-communication. Grace-events are the concrete historical acceptance of God’s grace through human freedom.

In Jesus Christ, grace has become present in an historically perceptible way through time and space. In the language of traditional sacramental theology, Christ in historical existence is both sign and reality, sacramentum and res sacramenti, of God’s mercy given and established in the world. Therefore, Christ is the primordial sacrament of salvation (Ursakrament).

The Church

The Church is the continuing presence of God’s salvific will in Christ. It is the Church’s nature as determinative and constitute that constitutes it as a sacrament from which all the other sacraments originate, what Rahner calls Grundsakrament (basic sacrament). Between the Church and salvation, there exists a connection so that the Church is the historical sign of the will of God for salvation and unity. The Church fulfills two roles in one by both being the proclaiming bearer of God’s revealing word of salvation to the world and being subject to whom that world of salvation is addressed. Thus, the Church is both proclaimer and hearer of this word of revelation from God. In the language of symbols, the Church points to and renders present the word. In his earlier writings on the Church, Rahner would call the Church the Ursakrament since it is the Church that points to the word of grace.

The word is sustained in grace as the self-communication of God and by grace through the power of God. This word of God predetermines the world as a whole to salvation; thus, it is not directed to the Church but to the world. The Church, as the bearer of the word, creates salvation, even to those not joined to the Church through baptism. Because the Church is the symbol (or sacrament) of the word of grace that perpetuates Christ’s presence in the world, the Church is called the sacrament of salvation. Rahner warns that denying the ecclesiastical character of grace would be to deny that grace is linked to the Incarnation since the Church is the continuing earthly presence of Christ.

The sacraments, as exhibitive and as event, constitute the highest level in the word of grace in the Church. Because of this the sacraments are understood as opus operatum, which means that the “victorious power which belongs, from the standpoint of God, to the exhibitive word of faith...achieves the true fullness of its own nature precisely in the word of the sacrament.” The traditional explanation of opus operatum was that grace is conferred on the recipient through the positing of the sacramental sign itself; neither the merit of the priest nor that of the recipient is causally involved. The measure of grace was dependent on the recipient’s disposition. Because the power of the sacrament comes from the word of faith, Rahner states that, “in all truth a manifestation of God and [God’s] salvific will is taking place.”

The Protestant Reformers were opposed to opus operatum because they thought it neglected faith. Rahner notes that this is not true. By grace alone God gives faith and calls the recipient in the historically visible form of the sacraments; this grace does not ignore the faith of the recipient but rather is realized in the loving faith of the recipient.

The Nature of the Sacraments

Previous sacramental theologies began with flawed philosophical categories, ignoring the fact that sacraments are symbols. Those theologians were preoccupied with physical causality, but a symbol is not a physical thing. Rather, sacraments as symbols are precisely causes of grace because they are real symbols (Realsymbol). The reality of grace is made visible and present in the symbol. As such, the sacraments themselves are historical manifestations of the grace that is always and everywhere present, and participate on both Christ and the Church.

The sacraments are instituted by the Church because the Church derives from Christ. Since the Church is the Grundsakrament, one does not need a direct statement from Christ about a specific sacrament. Any fundamental act by the Church as the historical presence of grace can be considered a sacrament since Christ founded the Church with its sacramental nature. With current biblical scholarship it is historically improbable that Jesus spoke of the non-dominical sacraments. To justify the sacraments as enumerated in the Catholic Church, one must defer to the opus operatum of the Church as being the presence of grace on earth with the ability to confer grace. The Church decided historically on seven sacraments; thus, the Church cannot turn back to a former state prior to that decision.

A Theology of Sacrament

Both Tillich and Rahner have similar concepts of a theology of sacrament, even though they may
use different language. Both theologians were adamant that a better-defined theology of sacrament would aid in fostering relations between Protestants and Catholics. This section of the essay brings Tillich and Rahner into dialogue with the hope of future dialogue between these two traditions. To aid in this dialogue, two concepts are outlined based on the abovementioned theological concepts: word of revelation, and Ursakrament and Grundsakrament.

Word of Revelation

Tillich and Rahner both state that “word” is a primary part of any theology of sacrament. Word is a medium of revelation, and through the Incarnation, the Word that is the event of Jesus as the Christ is the final revelation. Although different means of revelation are possible, this word above all other words is sacramental. Words in their natural occurrence have the potential of being bearers of transcendent power. Because of this power, this word is an event of grace since it is God’s self-communication, which makes grace present and brings about salvation.

The two theologians do not agree as to the place of this sacramental word in relation to the sacramental element. Tillich understands the word to be the basic meaning of revelation that can only be understood through interpretation. Rahner sees the word as almost having a secondary role in relation to the sacraments, even though the sacrament is a specific word-event. This difference can lead to a difference in understanding the role of Christ and the church in the institution and perpetuation of the sacraments.

Ursakrament and Grundsakrament

Both Tillich and Rahner agree that Christ is the Ursakrament, the primordial sacrament, which they determine through the concept of symbol. Tillich specifically comes to this conclusion because Christ as word is the medium of final revelation. Rahner places Christ in the formula of traditional sacramental theology with Christ being both the reality and sign of God’s grace on earth.

One could assume that a Catholic theologian would have a higher regard for the institutional church than a Protestant theologian, and that assumption would be correct in this case. Tillich understands what would be traditionally called the church as Spiritual Community. Individual congregations are historical actualizations of that Community with its foundation as the New Being of Christ. Since the congregation participates in and points to the Spiritual Community, it is a symbol of that Community and of Christ; thus, the congregation is a sacrament of that community to the extent that it contains Christ’s grace-filled presence. The congregation can establish sacraments as long as they point to the symbols of Christ.

Rahner, on the other hand, considers the church in its historical, and thus institutional, form as Grundsakrament, basic sacrament. Because the church is the continuing presence of Christ on earth, the church itself is the sacrament of salvation. This fact also allows for the church to establish sacraments without needing direct institution recorded in Scripture; since the church is Christ’s presence on earth and Christ can establish sacraments, the church itself can establish sacraments.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to outline a theology of sacrament from Tillich and Rahner’s perspectives. As this essay has shown, both theologians were striving for a new starting place for this theology, which they both locate in a theology of the word. Their writings are filled with pleas to theologians of both sides to not let past disagreements about the nature of the sacraments and the church to prevent new dialogue about those subjects. As the introduction to this essay stated, one of the possible “failures” of the Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue that focused on the Eucharist is that instead of starting from the same place (with the word as Tillich and Rahner both suggest), theologians started with the Eucharist as sacrifice. No such dialogue has occurred on the official level since the 1960s, but hopefully this essay and others like it can spark a new round of discussions.

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3 Vatican II understood ecumenism as a mutual dialogue and not one of trying to convert one side to the doctrine of the other side (see “Decree on Ecumenism” [1964], paragraphs 5 and following, in Vatican II Council: The Basic Sixteen Documents, ed. Austin Flannery [Northport, NY: Costello Publishing, 1996], 507ff).


6 Johnson, “Place of Sacraments,” 18 (emphasis in original).

7 Although Johnson does not state this in his article, each of these three concepts is dealt with by a specific volume of Tillich’s Systematic Theology: revelation in volume one, Christ in volume two, and the church in volume three.

8 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:110.

9 Ibid., 1:111.

10 Ibid., 1:117.


12 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:123.

13 Ibid., 1:139.


15 Johnson, “Place of Sacraments,” 23 (emphasis in original).

16 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2:90.

17 Ibid., 2:95.


21 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:162.


23 Johnson, “Place of Sacraments,” 26. Gilkey agrees with this assessment; see his “A Protestant Response,” 304.

24 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:121.


26 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:123.


30 Rahner, “What is a Sacrament?” 139.


34 Rahner, Church and the Sacraments, 15.

35 Ibid., 18; idem, Meditations, xv.


37 Rahner, “What is a Sacrament?” 142-43.

38 Rahner, Church and the Sacraments, 23. See also Leijssen, “Rahner’s Contribution,” 204.

39 Rahner, “What is a Sacrament?” 144.

40 Rahner, Meditations, xv. See also idem, Foundations, 412.

41 Rahner, Church and the Sacraments, 22.

42 Rahner, “What is a Sacrament?” 145.

43 Rahner, Church and the Sacraments, 24.

44 Ibid., 32. See also idem, “Word and Eucharist,” 273.

45 Rahner, Church and the Sacraments, 34. See also idem, Foundations, 414.


47 Rahner, “What is a Sacrament?” 146.

48 Rahner, Church and the Sacraments, 41.

49 Classic Protestant sacramental theology considers Baptism and Eucharist the “dominical” sacraments because they have words of institution by Christ.

50 Rahner, “What is a Sacrament?” 148.

**Have you written something related to the thought of Paul Tillich or have you come across a publication on Tillich (all languages accepted)? Please send a full reference to the editor.**
Abstract
The present paper will examine the theme of hope in the thought of Paul Tillich, who described hope as “the tension of our life toward the future.” Although his contemporary Jürgen Moltmann, with his “Theology of Hope,” is certainly more known for this topic, there is nonetheless a complex understanding of hope that underlies Tillich’s thought. The paper will establish some of the foundations to the concept of hope, pointing also to Tillich’s background that is important in the understanding of hope in his thought. Secondly, the theme of hope will be traced in Tillich’s Systematic Theology as well as his broader work, examining, his concept of finitude and symbol and how these form the basis for his understanding of hope. Within this thought, Tillich’s approach to hope is interesting both in the ways he raises the topic of hope, and also in the ways of not raising the issue at all. Finally, these two parts will be put together, pointing out similarities and differences, drawing on broader sources of those who have engaged with the theme of hope in contemporary theology, doing so in an exemplary fashion by reading it next to Benedict XVI’s Encyclical Letter Spe Salvi. The paper will conclude by arguing that Tillich, if he indeed claims to be an apologetic theologian, can, and, in the end also has to be understood as a theologian of hope.

Introduction

Hope, n. Expectation of something desired; desire combined with expectation.

Hope. If one considers the state of the planet, being aware of the pain and brokenness around us, it seems feasible to desire something that goes beyond the status quo, something to look forward to, something to be encouraged by, something to believe in. The present paper sets out to develop a theology of hope based on the thought of Paul Tillich. It will argue that hope is an inherently complex, yet underlying motif of Tillich’s thought. This hope, as it will be seen, has to be understood against the difficulties of the present for Tillich as well as the post-war society as a whole. It is not a “cheap hope” that is merely eschatological, but it is a hope that is argued for in the midst of the presence of everything that is the very antidote to a hopeful understanding of the world and takes therefore courage to believe in and live. Tillichian hope, therefore, should not be taken as mere optimism, which, “tends to ignore the ambiguity of the world in which we live...a presumption that neglects the realities of pain and suffering and evil, especially the vulnerability of the human enterprise.”

Before embarking on the topic of hope itself, however, the raison d’être for the paper itself should be given. In other words, the question arises: why examine the topic of hope in Tillich? This will be done by looking at the context of Tillich’s life and his background that influenced his approach to theology, and, consequently also his understanding of hope.

The fact remains that Tillich had to leave Germany out of fear of the Nazi regime, and spent the majority of the second half of his life in the United States. “Yet he always considered himself a refugee, that is, one who had been forced to become an exile.” Consequently, the ambiguity of life—“life at every moment is ambiguous”—in all of its complexity, a major theme of the third volume of the system, is something that speaks to the very core of Tillich’s own being. It is not surprising, therefore, that, on the one hand, “the ideas that he expounded were often highly abstract and quite complex,” yet, simultaneously, “he gave the impression that he was speaking from his innermost self to the personal concerns of his hearers.” Tillich speaks, for example, in The Shaking of the Foundations to the theme of hope: “may we not turn our eyes away; may we not close our ears and our mouths! But may we rather see, through the crumbling of a world, the rock of eternity and the salvation which has no end.”

Furthermore, in the opening introduction to his system, Tillich gives another reason why he cannot give a systematic approach to his theology without—implicitly or explicitly—engaging with the topic of hope. Tillich argues strongly for an “apologetic” theology, i.e., an “answering theology” that engages with issues of concern. Tillich writes: “[A systematic theology] must answer the questions implied in the general human and the special historical situation. Apologetics, therefore, is an
omnipresent element and not a special selection of systematic theology.” Tillich consequently introduces the method of correlation, so to build an apologetic theology, that “correlates questions and answers, situations and message, human existence and divine manifestation.”

For the present purpose, the implications are therefore, two-fold: First, even though the issue of hope is not mentioned explicitly, the topic must be underlying the system as, after all, earlier, Tillich had argued that, “the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately.” The question of hope, engaging with, “ultimate concern, [which] is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or circumstance,” is, thus, a core part of theology. Secondly, another implicit element of theology is that of “practical theology,” “[without which the theological work] is not complete.” By definition, therefore, the practical implications of the issues discussed within the system have to be relevant and applicable for real-life situations and, keeping in mind the first point, the question of hope is inescapable and has to be answered, lest the system fails. Human beings, in the face of history, faced with the profound ambiguities of life search for the “goal toward which history runs,” search for the “moving power” of “symbols of hope,” and if these symbols, “have lost their moving power,” “history is negativity without hope.”

Along the same lines, Tillich also defines the multilayered nature of anxiety in its interwoven character, i.e., the interplay between the anxiety of fate and death, the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, and the anxiety of guilt and condemnation. Tillich, in the light of these forms of anxiety argues that, “they are fulfilled in the situation of despair to which all of them contribute. Despair is an ultimate or ‘boundary-line’ situation. One cannot go beyond it. Its nature is indicated in the etymology of the word despair: without hope. No way out into the future appears. Nonbeing is felt as absolutely victorious.” It is against this fatalistic negativity, the despair that Tillich coined later with the term, “the shock of possible nonbeing” that an argument of hope can and has to be made.

**Hope — Why it is not only about “eschatology”**

The previous quote from *The Courage to Be* points to the problems that hope has to address in the temporal sense. Not only does it have to find a way “out into the future,” it also has to speak to the present situation where “nonbeing is felt absolutely victorious.” In other words: “Hope has a job to do. In the continuous and far-reaching labor of the moral life, hope is the sense of possibility that generates and sustains moral agency. Hope’s object provides an impetus for action, a sense of direction, and a cause that renders process meaningful.” In the light of this extended definition of the concept of hope, it is necessary to argue against a too-simplistic understanding of the term hope. “Eschatology” can be defined as “…the study of the final end of things, the ultimate resolution of the entire creation.” Eschatology understood in this sense comprises hope; however, hope goes beyond this if it wants to speak to the present situation of the believer. Jürgen Moltmann, known for his *Theology of Hope*, speaks to this tension, arguing that: “Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the present.”

Tillich himself reframes the term eschatology by stating: “eschatology deals with the relation of the temporal to the eternal.” Hope, if it is supposed to be genuine, has to be actualized in the present: “where there is genuine hope, there that which for which we hope already has some presence... there are many things and events in which we can see a reason for genuine hope, namely the seed-like presence of that which is hoped for. In the seed of a tree, stem and leaves are already present, and this gives us the right to sow the seed in hope for the fruit.” In his section on eschatology in Volume III, Tillich comes to argue: “the eternal is not a future state of things. It is always present, not only in man (who is aware of it), but also in everything that has being within the whole of being.” This hope, in the tensions between the already and the not yet, in the temporal trajectory between past, present, and future, is the hope that Tillich writes about and is moved. And this hope is the topic of this paper.

**Tillich on Hope**

So far, the material that has been covered suggests that one can appreciate the complexity of the theme of hope. How does this theme articulate itself, then, in the case of Paul Tillich? This major section of the paper will argue from a variety of Tillich’s writings for a theology of hope that forms an essential part of his thought. From an organizational point of view, the first two sections below on finitude and symbols
lay, together with everything that has already been said, the foundation for the theology of hope.

Finitude

The terminology around the concept of finitude is rich and extensive. In the category of the concept fall the terms finitude, as well as alienation, estrangement, nonbeing, and ambiguity. Major parts of the system, especially the first and third volume, are dedicated to these terms.

It seems undoubtedly strange to start this examination with the negative; however, by doing so, Tillich successfully establishes the problem, and thus he speaks more effectively to the problem that he tries to solve. “Believing that when traditional values lose their appeal or are shattered, people may be overcome by a sense of emptiness which then causes them to fall victim to the anxiety of meaninglessness, he concentrated his attention upon the analysis of the human situation and the universal need for healing.” The assessment of life, therefore, sounds, in many ways, like a declaration of bankruptcy, as it has already been stated above: “life at every moment is ambiguous.” Put even more boldly, “today, man experiences his present situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all spheres of life.”

Or, again, “anxiety is the existential awareness of nonbeing. Anxiety is finitude, experienced as one’s own finitude. This is the natural anxiety of man as man, and in some ways of all living beings. It is the anxiety of nonbeing, the awareness of one’s finitude as finitude.” The human being is, therefore, aware of this profound angst, shaped by “experiences of anxiety [attributed] to our human condition, caught between finitude and infinity. We can see the stars and try to reach them, but our reach exceeds our grasp time and again… to be created is to be limited. Finitude is intrinsic to our creaturely condition. But that we know our limitations and can imagine other possibilities produces a disease and anxiety in us.”

What, therefore, can be done about this experience of finitude, anxiety, and the possibility of nonbeing? Tillich argues his point by stating that, “the question arising out of this experience…is the question of a reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creativity, meaning, and hope. We shall call such a reality the ‘New Being,’ a term…with the power of overcoming the demonic cleavages of the ‘old reality’ in soul, society, and universe.” The question of hope, therefore, points to the very core of any theology, as Tillich defines two formal criteria of theology at the very beginning of the system: (1) “the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us. (2) …our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not-being.” How this reality, a question of ultimate concern can indeed become “a reality,” will be shown in the following.

Symbols

The question that has just been raised, namely the question regarding ultimate concern, points to the need for symbols. As it has been argued already, God is the “ground of being” in Tillich’s thought, and while, “the statement that God is being-itself as a nonsymbolic statement,” “after this been said, nothing else can be said about God as God which is not symbolic.” Symbols are therefore needed to express ultimate concern, and to refer to God. Within the array of symbols of faith, “the fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern is God. It is always present in any act of faith, even if the act of faith includes the denial of God.” Within this, the importance of revelation has to be stressed, as in actual revelation, “the mystery appears as ground and not only as abyss. It appears as the power of being, conquering nonbeing. It appears as our ultimate concern. And it expresses itself in symbols and myths which point to the depth of reason and its mystery.” The symbol, through revelation, becomes therefore, amongst other things, a pointer to hope.

However, not all symbols function as symbols of ultimate concern. In The Dynamics of Faith, Tillich points to two criteria for religious symbols so that they can express ultimate concern: first, the symbol has to be “alive,” i.e., it has to be able to be, “expressing an ultimate concern in such a way that it creates reply, action, communication.” It has, therefore, be dynamic enough to point to an ultimate concern, while simultaneously being able to remain persistent and not become wearied by the changes and chances of life, as “one can never say a symbol is definitely dead if it is still accepted.” This tension is also applicable to hope itself, as, “one reason for hope’s endurance is its elasticity. That is, hope is a remarkably dynamic disposition because it
responds to possibilities that range from radical positive change to surviving disappointment.”36 The second criterion for a symbol of faith raises the question whether, “it expresses the ultimate which is really ultimate.”37 This might sound both limiting and broadening; however, keeping in mind that the ultimate concern is the New Being, the experience of unambiguous life, it points to the tension that, while everything can become the Word of God, “nothing is the Word of God if it contradicts the faith and love which are the work of the Spirit and which constitute the New Being as manifest in Jesus as the Christ.38

Hope in Relation to Faith and Love

While the topic of hope has been approached more and more closely, it also seems necessary to examine hope in relation to the other two concepts that are generally seen as “theological virtues” within church tradition, namely faith and love. Based on the thirteenth chapter of Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, the three of them are usually seen together, and Tillich discusses them in the context of the Spiritual Presence. Tillich argues that faith and love are “manifestations of the Divine Spirit in the human spirit.”39 He admits that, “a full discussion of faith and love… is not the present task,”40 and argues that he prefers, “to determine the place of the two concepts within the theological system and to show in this way their relation to other theological concepts and religious symbols.”41 For the present purpose, the question then becomes obvious: where does hope fit into this discussion?

Tillich answers this question by seeing hope in relation to them, yet denies the examination of hope systematically: “if hope were considered systematically (and not only homiletically, as in Paul’s formula), as a third creation of the Spirit, its standing in man would be on par with faith.”42 This statement does need further explanation, as it is crucial to interpret this, lest the proposition of the paper as a whole fails. The following argument is, thus, put forward: first, Tillich does not say that hope in itself is not important. He rejects an examination of hope within the system “for hope’s sake,” as an examination of hope within the system would make it—even degrade it, one might argue—to “an independent act of anticipatory expectation whose relation to faith would be ambiguous.”43 Hope, would, therefore, become a mere “attitude of believing that,” an attitude which is in sharp contrast with the meaning of faith.44 It is against this degradation of hope that Tillich wants to protect hope. He is, therefore, not interested in a lesser position of hope, but simply denies that the system in itself is an appropriate forum for this discussion.

Second, what is the precise understanding of hope as the third element of faith rather than as a self-standing entity? For an explanation of this, one has to look at faith. Faith is seen as having three elements: “being opened up by the Spiritual Presence…accepting it in spite of spite of the infinite gap between the divine Spirit and the human spirit…expecting final participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life.”45 This third element is the “hope” aspect of faith, it “characterizes faith as anticipatory, its quality as hope for the fulfilling creativity of the divine Spirit.”46 It has already been argued above that this is not to be interpreted necessarily as merely relating to the future. In a different context, Tillich defines faith as follows: “faith is the state of being ultimately concerned… it is not only the unconditional demand made by that which is one’s ultimate concern, it is also the promise of ultimate fulfillment which is accepted in the act of faith.”47 As faith depends, as it has been shown, on symbols, it is therefore, inherently linked to hope.

“For in hope we were saved” (Romans 8:24)

So, what then is hope in Tillich? We have seen a number of aspects that point towards the complexity of the theme of hope in Tillich’s writings. It seems obvious that, “nobody can live without hope, even if it were only for the smallest things which give some satisfaction even under the worst of conditions.”48 Is faith only related to the future? No, it cannot be. In the sermon that Tillich preached on “The Right to Hope,” he starts with a passage from Paul’s letters to the Romans: “In hope he believed against hope” (Romans 4:18), referring to Abraham. Accordingly, Tillich argues for a definition of hope as “the tension of life toward the future.”49 Yet he is very much aware of the fact that hope has immediate bearings upon the present. In this context, he distinguishes, thus, between foolish and genuine hope, and it is only the genuine hope that he considers worthwhile pursuing, as it has the following characteristic, “namely, the seed-like presence of that which is hoped for… We have no assurance that it will develop. But our hope is genuine. There is a presence, a beginning of what is hoped for… But it is hope, not certainty.”50 This hope, “lies in the here
and now, whenever the eternal appears in time and history. This hope is justified; for there is always a presence and a beginning of what is seriously hoped for.”

Is this hope equal to optimism? From all that has been argued, the answer seems obvious, but to underline it once more: this hope engages with the pain, brokenness, and difficulties surrounding life, “these hopes, in both Testaments, [just like in the present context] have to struggle with continuous attacks of hopelessness, attacks against the faith in a meaning of life and against the hope for life’s fulfillment.”52 The question of hope, therefore, becomes a question of ultimate concern, an issue of faith. It is a state of being grasped by God, and takes courage. This courage to be, taking a leap of faith, despite the weary circumstances, “is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt.”53 It means trusting and believing in the midst of anxiety and doubt, holding on to the promises of the past towards a future of new heaven and new earth, and trying to nurture the hope in the midst of the myriad of everything that speaks against it—and do so in patience and trust. This is the Tillichian hope.54

Contemporary Perspectives

Having established a theology of hope from the relevant passages of Tillich’s writings and the Scripture passages that are the sources of this understanding, it proves fruitful to put Tillich into the context of the 21st century and ask how his understanding holds up against more contemporary understandings. For this purpose, in an exemplary fashion, Tillich’s understanding of hope will be read against the writings of Pope Benedict XVI, especially based on the argument that he makes in his recent Encyclical Letter Spe Salvi. As will be seen in this short excursus, there are significant parallels as well as substantial differences between the two approaches.

The approach that both theologians pursue is strikingly similar. While Tillich points to the difference between foolish and genuine hope, as it has been seen above, Pope Benedict XVI also asks the question (under the subheading, “The true shape of Christian Hope”) “what may we hope? And what may we not hope?” (24)55 And, he continues, distinguishing between greater and lesser hopes, concluding that: “we need the greater and lesser hopes that keep us going day by day. But these are not enough without the great hope, which must surpass everything else. The great hope can only be God, who encompasses the whole of reality and who can bestow upon as what we, by ourselves, cannot attain” (31). Both Tillich and Benedict XVI consequently distinguish between degrees of hope, coming to the conclusion in both cases that the ultimate object and source of the believer’s hope can only be found in God.

Another similarity arises in the awareness to suffering and the challenges to hope. Tillich’s understanding of anxiety and finitude in the midst of the ambiguities of life has been described at length above. Similarly, Benedict XVI is aware of the challenges that are faced when trying to maintain hope, while giving it a slightly more positive note: “it is important to know that I can always continue to hope, even if in my own life, or the historical period in which I am living, seems to be nothing left to hope for. Only the great certitude of hope that my own life and history in general, despite all failures, are held firm by the indestructible power of Love… only this kind of hope can then give the courage to act and persevere” (35). Benedict XVI then continues. “it is when we attempt to avoid suffering by withdrawing from anything that involves hurt… that we drift into a life of emptiness, in which there may be almost no pain, but the dark sensation of meaninglessness and abandonment is all the greater” (37). The question is, thus, one of active engagement with suffering, not an attempt to avoid it, being insistent about the fact that the attempt to avoid pain and hurt might in fact lead to a life of meaninglessness where the awareness thereof is all the greater. Being attentive to the suffering and acknowledging it, thus, transforms the present moment: “suffering and torment is still terrible and well-nigh unbearable. Yet the star of hope has risen—the anchor of the heart reaches the very throne of God. Instead of evil being unleashed within man, the light shines victorious: suffering—without ceasing to be suffering—becomes, despite everything, a hymn of praise.” (37)

In what ways, however, do the two approaches differ from each other? There are two main points to be highlighted. First, Benedict XVI places hope, in relation to faith and love, into a very different position. His opening paragraphs do, in fact, argue that faith is hope. He writes: “the Christian message was [in the times of the early church] not only “informative” but “performative.” This means: the Gospel is not merely a communication of things that
can be known—it is one that makes things happen and is life-changing. The dark door of time, of the future, has been thrown open. The one who has hope lives differently; the one who hopes has been granted the gift of a new life.” Second, similarly, the passage in the paragraph above puts love into an immediate context of hope as well, as it is also illustrated by pointing to the witness of the faithful throughout the ages, those people, who “leave everything for love of Christ, so as to bring to men and women the faith and love of Christ, and to help those who are suffering in body and spirit. In their case, the new ‘substance’ has proved to be a genuine ‘substance’; from the hope of these people who have been touched by Christ, hope has arisen for others who were living in darkness and without hope. In their case, it has been demonstrated that this new life truly possesses and is ‘substance’ that calls forth life for others” (8). In Benedict’s case, therefore, the role that hope plays in relation to faith and love is one of a more central importance and gives it, arguably, a more important role.

Finally, the Pope is more aware of the role that the community of Christians plays in the pursuit of hope. While this might come from the different audiences that he and Tillich address—a point which is debatable—the significant contribution that Benedict XVI makes to the discussion is that he holds both the individual and society accountable for the pursuit of hope and its realization. He writes: “Society cannot accept its suffering members and support them in their trials unless individuals are capable of doing so themselves; moreover, the individual cannot accept another’s suffering unless he personally is able to find meaning in suffering, a path of purification and growth in maturity, a journey of hope” (38). He is aware of the question and asks poignantly: “Is Christian hope individualistic?” (13). His answer is multifold, arguing that the personal faith in Jesus is what redeems the individual. However, this is counterbalanced from exactly this perspective: “our relationship with God is established through communion with Jesus—we cannot achieve it alone or from our own resources alone… Being in communion with Jesus Christ draws us into his ‘being for all’” (28). It is the great achievement of Benedict XVI to take the understanding of hope to the level of being ministers of hope for others, as, “Christ died for all. To live for him means allowing oneself to be drawn into his being for others” (28).

These are, then, a few of the parallels and differences between Tillich’s approach to hope and a more contemporary understanding of hope as reflected by the Encyclical Letter Spe Salvi by Pope Benedict XVI.

Concluding Reflections

How, then, does Tillich’s understanding of hope apply to the practice of the Church, i.e., the individual Christian? As stated in the introductory comments, Tillich sees “practical theology” as a core element of his system, “[without which the theological work] is not complete.” So, how does Tillich’s understanding of hope hold up in practice?

Personally, I found the approach to hope throughout Tillich’s writings intriguing and helpful as it started with a profound acknowledgement of brokenness and despair, before being able to move on to the issue of hope. Certainly, the interpretation of the system as a whole can very easily be taken as a denial of hope; however, Tillich himself expresses his reluctance to examine hope systematically. Instead, he dwells on the ambiguity of life, the complexity and utter despair that results from the possibility of nonbeing; he can rightly be called a theologian “on the boundaries.” However, ultimately, Tillich stays neither on the “boundary line” between hope and despair, but instead comes to a full appreciation of hope, in the light of precisely these ambiguities and the experience of anxiety that he so extensively describes throughout the system. The hope that Tillich describes is, thus, not a cheap hope, in his own words, a “foolish” hope, which is easily attainable and does not require any work on behalf of the person who wants to be hopeful. Instead, Tillich works through the complexity of pain and brokenness, establishing why exactly hope is, indeed, needed.

However, does hope do its “job” in Tillich? I am endeavoring to answer this question positively. There are certainly limitations to the way Tillich approaches hope, and, arguably, the way that hope is understood in Tillich does not speak to the complexity entirely. I appreciated the thorough assessment of life in its ambiguity and the different ways that “foolish hopes” can distract from the genuine hope and the glimpses of unambiguous life that this hope can bring with itself. Additionally, Tillich has to be commended for the emphasis on the “courage to be” and the mere acknowledgement that it takes indeed, courage to believe.

Where does this leave me as a Christian, then? It leaves me with a sense of awareness to the utter
frailty of human life, balanced with the unsurpassable peace, hope, faith and love that can only be found in the Christ, ministered also through his people. The experience of life in its brokenness, therefore, resembles, in many ways that the way the Apostle Paul describes, and with whose words I want to close: “But we have this treasure in jars of clay to show that this all-surpassing power is from God and not from us. We are hard pressed on every side, but not crushed; perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not abandoned; struck down, but not destroyed. We always carry around in our body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be revealed in our body” (2 Corinthians 4: 7-10). May it be so.


4 Pauck (1979), 15.


7 Ibid.


9 Vol. I, 12.

10 Vol. I, 32.

11 Cf. Vol. I, 348. This point will be expanded much further in the main section below.


13 Vol. I, 163.

14 O Cit. note 10.


18 Vol. III, 298.


20 Vol. III, 400, my emphasis.

21 This is not to say that they are used synonymously. However, they all fall into the broader concept of characterizing the “problem” that is faced within the question of systematic theology in general, and also with hope more specifically. In fact, in *The Courage to be*, Tillich raises the issue of hope in the context of anxiety, arguing that, “all of them [i.e. types of anxiety] and their underlying unity are existential, i.e. they are implied in the existence of man as man, his finitude, ad his estrangement.” (54)

22 Pauck (1979), 19.

23 Vol. III., 32.


27 Vol. I, 49. Two additional comments are necessary at this point: firstly, Tillich reframes the question immediately after having said this, answering the question of where this “new being” is manifest by pointing to Jesus Christ. This question, however, would lead the paper into a different direction. Secondly, it is interesting to note that the notion of hope, together with the aspects that form part of the “new being” speak to “soul, society and universe.” Tillich, therefore, pursues a holistic approach to hope, speaking again, not only to the future, but also to the “present situation.”

28 Vol. I, 12, 14, emphasis in original.

29 Vol. I. 238.

30 Ibid., 239.


32 Vol. I., 110.

33 *Dynamics of Faith*, 96.

34 This phrase is borrowed from part of the traditional Compline service.

35 *Dynamics of Faith*, 97.


37 *Dynamics of Faith*, 97.

38 Vol. III, 125.

39 Vol. III, 129.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 129-130.
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